to the Senate after a citizenship of nine years. They become citizens upon naturalization; but they cannot become naturalized until after a previous residence of five years. Thus fourteen years must expire before a foreigner can be elected to the Senate. It will be recollected that he is eligible to the House of Representatives after a citizenship of seven years. The fact that the Senate concur with the executive in making treaties with foreign nations, suggests the reason why a too hasty admission of adopted citizens into that branch of the government might be attended with serious inconvenience, by creating a channel for foreign influence; and also the reason why the qualification, in point of citizenship, is raised higher for the Senate than for the House of Representatives.

72. The only other qualification prescribed for a Senator is, that he must when elected be an inhabitant of the state for which he is chosen. If this qualification be important, as is thought, in order that a Senator, by being an inhabitant of the state for which he is chosen, may have a more intimate knowledge of its wants, and a more sensitive regard to its rights, character, and dignity, it is singular that the Constitution should not have gone further, and required that he should continue an inhabitant of the state during his senatorial term. As it now stands, a Senator may be an inhabitant of the state

for which he is chosen on the day of his election, and cease to be an inhabitant the day after, and yet continue its representative.

73. We have now considered the qualifications. attached to the office of a Senator of the United' States. These qualifications, it will be observed, are confined to three particulars, and have regard only to age, citizenship, and inhabitancy. First, he must be thirty years of age; secondly, he must have been nine years a citizen of the United States; and, thirdly, he must, when elected, be an inhabitant of the state for which he is chosen.

President of the Senate.

74. The President of the Senate is the Vice-President of the United States; but he has no vote unless the Senators be equally divided. The House of Representatives choose their Speaker from among their own members; but the Vice-President is not a member of the Senate, and is not chosen as their presiding officer by themselves.

75. The reason for this difference is not very obvious but the necessity of providing for the case of a vacancy in the office of President gave rise to the creation of the office of Vice-President, and if he were not to be President of the Senate he would be without employment.

Officers and President pro tempore.

76. With the exception of the Vice-President, the Senate choose all their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the VicePresident, or when he exercises the office of President of the United States, as he may in the cases to be mentioned hereafter. It is customary for the Vice-President, before the close of each session, to vacate the chair, in order that the Senate may choose a President pro tempore, who becomes their presiding officer, in case the Vice-President should, in the recess, succeed to the Presidency, in consequence of the death of the President or his resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office.

Impeachment.

77. We have already seen that the House of Representatives possess the sole power of impeachment, and we must now add that the Senate have the sole power of trying the party accused. It would be obviously unjust to permit the accusers to try the accusation which they make; and hence it is, that the Constitution intrusts the House with the one duty and the Senate with the other.

78. This process of impeachment is borrowed from

England, where the Commons impeach, that is, make the accusation, and the Lords try; and is designed to reach public functionaries, the President, VicePresident, heads of departments, foreign ministers. judges, and all civil officers of the United States, who, in the course of their employment, are guilty of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde

meanors.

79. When sitting as a court of impeachment the Senate are required to be on oath or affirmation. When acting in a similar capacity the House of Lords only make a declaration upon their honor. Ast the members of that house cannot testify as witnesses, except on oath, there would seem to be no good reason for permitting them to act as judges without a similar obligation resting upon them. Another difference is, that two-thirds of the Senators present must concur in order to convict, whereas a majority of the Lords is sufficient for that purpose. It is necessary, however, to the validity of a judgment of impeachment that at least twelve of the Lords concur in it a verdict by less than twelve would not be good.

80. In a trial by jury, the verdict must be unanimous, but if that principle were to be adopted in the trial of political offenders, there would be reason to fear that from political sympathy few convictions

would ever take place. And if a simple majority were sufficient there would be danger, in times of high party excitement, that the person impeached might be unjustly convicted.

81. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides; because the Vice-President, from a possible desire to succeed to his office, might be. tempted to employ his position as President of the Senate to procure his conviction. And the Chief Justice thus presiding is a constituent member of the court, and has a right to vote as such.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment.

82. Judgment in cases of impeachment does not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. The party convicted is, nevertheless, liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

83. By confining the judgment of the Senate to removal from, and disqualification to hold office under the United States, the Constitution has wisely prevented those excessive punishments, which political resentment, warping the sense of justice, might inflict. Politically, the offender is punished by the