"The expressed purpose is that, in districts co-extensive with a city having a population of 250,000, or more, the board of education shall consist of seven members elected at large by the electors of the whole district qualified to vote for school inspectors."

Now it is urged that at the time the question of whether or not said Act No. 251, Public Acts of 1913, should become effective in said school district of Detroit was submitted on November 7, 1916, the said city of Detroit did not comprise a single school district and (in the language of Burton v. Koch, supra) said school district of Detroit was not co-extensive with the said city of Detroit. This is based upon the fact that as the city in its rapid growth from time to time enlarged its territorial limits, it took in limited territories which did not immediately go into the school district, and also, as the school district was enlarged, very limited territory was also taken into the district which was not within the territorial limits of the city of Detroit.

The first section of the act in question reads as follows:

"The board of education of any city having a population of two hundred fifty thousand or over which comprises a single school district shall consist of seven school inspectors who shall be elected at large by the electors of the whole city qualified to vote for school inspectors in such municipality."

* * *

The contention here urged by the plaintiff is that it was the purpose of the legislature in passing the act in question to make it apply only to cities having a population of 250,000 or over, wherein the board of education exercises jurisdiction in territory that was co-extensive and coterminous with the principal municipality. While such a construction of the legislation is possible, it is not in my opinion the natural construction which the words necessarily require. I agree with the contention of counsel for the defend

ants that the word "single," as used in the act, should be held to signify "principal" or "dominating" and not "one." Plaintiff further contends that the word "comprises" means mutually inclusive and exclusive. I do not think it should be held to so mean, as in the ordinary meaning of the word it is held to be a synonym of the word "embrace." De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 Fed. 341. The city of Detroit has always had one dominating school district and at no time have there ever been two complete school districts within its borders. There have been only parts of other school districts in the outlying sections. It has comprised at all times a single school district. These outlying portions of districts have come in as the territorial limits have been expanded, and have been gradually brought into the school district as the conditions with reference to the territorial limits of the municipality and the school district were gradually adjusted in accordance with the provisions of law. The construction which the plaintiff asks for would create a hardship and injustice, which, under the rules of construction, should not be given to a statute if it can be avoided. In 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), § 490, it is said:

"Statutes will be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit to prevent absurdity, hardship or injustice; to favor public convenience, and to oppose all prejudice to public interests."

All the other questions, in my opinion, as to the validity of the legislation are finally determined by our decision in Burton v. Koch, supra.

For these reasons I think that the order denying the writ should be affirmed.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, and STONE, JJ., concurred.

LIVESAY v. EAST SIDE CREAMERY CO.

1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-STATEMENTS OF AGENT-ADMISSIONS— WITNESSES.

While it is not competent to show statements and admissions of an agent to establish his agency, he may testify to the fact of his agency; he being as competent upon that question as the principal would be.

2. SAME-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.

Evidence, although conflicting, held, sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial court that agency was established.

3. SAME-NEW TRIAL-GREAT WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

Held, that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

Error to Lenawee; Hart, J. Submitted January 30, 1918. (Docket No. 70.) Decided October 7, 1918.

Assumpsit by Frank M. Livesay against the East Side Creamery Company for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Edward D. Devine, for appellant.

Herbert R. Clark and Henry I. Bourns, for appellee.

BIRD, J. From a finding of facts by the trial court it appears that for several months prior to September 15, 1915, defendant purchased milk from one Guy R. Skidmore, of Jasper, who in turn purchased it from the farmers in that vicinity. Some disagreement arose between Skidmore and the farmers in September, 1915, and it looked as though they, or some of them, would refuse to make further deliveries to him. This coming to the attention of defendant, Mr. Paul Roggebamb, general manager of defendant, went to the Jasper creamery, where Skidmore had been re

ceiving the milk, and arranged with George Delano and Frank Skinner, who were in charge of the creamery, to say to the farmers that if they would continue to deliver the milk to the Jasper creamery the defendant would pay them direct for all milk delivered after September 15th, at the rate of $1.30 per hundred. In pursuance of this arrangement Delano and Skinner conveyed the information to the farmers and as a result thereof they continued to deliver their milk at the Jasper creamery and Delano and Skinner in turn shipped the same to defendant. After milk had been delivered under this arrangement amounting to nearly $1,000 demand was made for payment. Defendant refused to pay, claiming that it had purchased the milk from Skidmore and paid him for it. Plaintiff thereupon, on behalf of himself and as assignee of other farmers who delivered milk, brought this suit to recover the amount due. A trial was had before the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $943.53. Exceptions to the conclusions of law and fact were duly filed by defendant.

1. Counsel contends that the trial court was in error in finding that a contract was made between defendant and plaintiff. The testimony of Delano and Skinner is direct and positive that such an agreement was made with the farmers through them. That after the 15th of September they received the milk from the farmers and forwarded it to defendant. The fact of delivery was corroborated by Mr. William Bradish, the station agent of the Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railway Company at Madison. It is true that Mr. Roggebamb denied that he made the arrangement but does not deny that defendant received the milk. It is also claimed that Skidmore was paid for the milk under its contract with him. This appears to be denied

203-Mich.-22.

by Skidmore. The testimony on this phase of the case was in conflict and we think fully sustains the finding of the trial court.

2. But counsel says there was no competent proof that Roggebamb had authority to bind defendant to such an agreement, and the contention is made that Roggebamb's testimony to the effect that he had authority as general manager to purchase milk for defendant was incompetent. No rule of evidence was violated by permitting him to testify that he was the general manager of defendant, and as such officer had the authority to, and did, purchase milk for defendant. The case of Logan v. Agricultural Society, 156 Mich. 537, and other similar cases are cited to the effect that agency cannot be proved by the declaration of the agent. This is a well recognized rule, but it does not apply to this situation. It was not competent to show statements and admissions of Roggebamb to establish his agency, but because that is true it does not follow that Roggebamb himself may not testify to the fact of his agency. He is as competent a witness upon that question as his principal would have been. 31 Cyc. p. 1651; 1 Mechem on Agency (2d Ed.), § 292; Cleveland Co-operative Stove Co. v. Mallery, 111 Mich. 43; Spears v. Black, 190 Mich. 693.

3. It is also contended that the agency of Delano and Skinner is not made to appear by competent evidence. It appears that Roggebamb had the authority to make the arrangement with them, and it appears from their testimony that he did make the arrangement. This would justify the conclusion reached by the trial court that Delano and Skinner were the agents of defendant.

4. Witnesses Melner, Cross and Alcock, farmers with whom Delano and Skinner made the arrangements to continue bringing their milk in pursuance of the instructions of Roggebamb, were permitted to tes