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tempted from the position that men are by nature religious and will in any event have a religion; that there has been ineradicably implanted in them a sensus deitatis (as Calvin has taught us to call it) which inevitably becomes a semen religionis. Fresenius himself is compelled to allow the presence in man of "a religious disposition, or an inborn religious capacity" which provides the psychological possibility of religion (p. 60); and he freely admits that this "capacity for religion" has enabled multitudes to become actually religious under influences wholly unknown to us (p. 16). His contention only is that it must be called into action by influences coming from without and of a personalethical kind: it never, according to him, functions independently so as to produce religion. The Mystic, on the contrary, insists that it normally effloresces into actual religion whenever opportunity is given it to function. The difference here is fundamental and rests on divergent ontologies. If it be reduced to the single question of whether God approaches man only from without, through the medium of other personalíties acting upon him by the way of a so-called "ethical" appeal; or rather Himself forms a part of man's spiritual environment in contact with Whom man exists and of Whom he has immediate experience, we must pronounce the Mystic certainly in the right. And this we may surely do without prejujdice to complete rejection of the entire Pantheizing coloring of the common (or shall we say constant?) Mystical presentation. The mischief of Mysticism lies not in its claim to find God through the ineradicable natural instincts of the soul but in its persistent effort, being natural religion, to substitute itself for supernatural religion, that is to say, for Christianity. The relation of Christianity to natural religion seems to be very frequently, we might even say commonly, misconceived. They are not two religions, lying side by side of one another, of which one must be taken and the other left: whether with the Ritschlian we take Christianity (or rather, what they mistake for Christianity) and leave natural religion, or with the Mystics take natural religion and leave Christianity. As what is called special revelation is superinduced upon and presupposes what is called general revelation, and these two form one whole, so Christianity is superinduced upon and presupposes natural religion and forms with it the one whole which is the only sufficing religion for sinful man. Although Mysticism is not Christianity, therefore, Christianity is mysticism. There are multitudes of Mystics who are not Christians, but there is no Christian who is not a mystic,-who does not hold communion with God in his soul, and that not merely as the God of grace by virtue of whose recreative operations he is a Christian, but as the God of nature by virtue of whose creative, upholding and governing operations he is a creature. We may or may not be able to make out a historical claim to the name of Mysticism to express this Christian mysticism the name may be preëmpted by something essentially different and any attempt to rescue it to this nobler usage may be productive only of confusion. We may think it futile to distinguish as has often been attempted (von Hügel quotes the distinction from Rauwenhoff, as

Charles Hodge quoted it from Nitzsch) between Mystik and Mysticismus, as designations respectively of the "white" and the "black" Mysticism. But the name apart, the thing lies at the very foundation of the Christian religion: there is no Christian religion where there is no inward communion with God.

As Christianity is mysticism without being Mysticism, so also is it a historical religion without being "Historical Religion" in the sense of Fresenius and his school. In calling religion "historical" Fresenius and his school mean nothing more than that its origin in every individual case is to be sought and found not in some innate disposition of the man but "in his own history," that is, as he explains (p. 21), “in the experiences of his life, in the effects of living personalities, in occurrences which can maintain their right before his clear ethical judgment." Their minds are not at all on the great historical occurrences by which the God of Grace, has intervened in the sinful development of the race by redemptive acts,-the incarnation, the atonement, the outpouring of the Holy Ghost-but merely on the life experience of the individual man, in the course of which, they affirm, religion is brought to him as one item in the temporal series of his experiences. Of the great redemptive acts of God by which Christianity is constituted and by virtue of which, lying at its heart, it is a "historical religion" they will know as little as the Mystic himself. To them, too, all religion, inclusive of Christianity, as a, or the, religion, is independent of all occurrences of the past and is purely a present experience of man. They differ with the Mystic here only in making it an experience, not of man's native life of feeling, but of his presently acting ethical will. When remarking on this matter Fresenius carefully explains that "the deepest difference" between von Hügel the Mystic and Herrmann, the advocate of "historical religion," "lies here in this: that Hügel seeks to assign its place in the soul-life of man to religion as a given entity (psychological method), while Herrmann exhibits its origin in the spiritual ethical life of man and establishes it as a power which works from person to person and is therefore historical (historical, systematic method)" (p. 21). So eager is he not to be misunderstood, by the use of the term "historical" here to imply some recognition of the historical elements of Christianity as that term is ordinarily understood, that he attaches a note to the word to explain that he, like Wobbermin (ZThK. 1911), distinguishes between the two German terms geschichtlich and historisch and applies only the former, but never the latter, to his Christianity. To him Christianity has ceased to be a "historical" (historische) religion and the "faith" which he calls by that name is absolutely independent of all "historical" (historische) facts. This includes even the fact of Jesus. We must not be misled here by the place which "the Person of Jesus" holds in the "Christianity" of Herrmann and of course also in that of his pupil Fresenius. Fresenius has been at pains to explain to us that it is the geschich tliche Jesus, not the historische Jesus, that is here in question. It is a matter of indifference to him and all those of his way of thinking

whether there ever existed any historische Jesus: all that is important is that we shall have a genuine "experience" of Jesus, that He should come to us geschichtlich, that is, in a real encounter with our soul. This constitutes Him to us the point of inspiration needed to awaken us to religious life and it is indifferent to us whether He really ever lived on earth (ZThK. 1912, pp. 244-268.) Not merely have the incarnation, the atonement, the outpouring of the Spirit-all the redemptive acts of God-gone; the "historical Jesus" may go too. On no fact of the past whatever can Christianity rest: it is purely for each man an experience of his own.

Certainly no Mystic could cut himself more completely loose from the historical elements of Christianity than is done here. And, by virtue of the fact that all that makes Chirstianity that specific religion which we call Christianity lies precisely in these historical elements, the neglect or rejection of them is the rejection of Christianity. The whole life work of Herrmann may have been to show how a man of our day may still be a Christian; but unfortunately he has done this by adapting what he calls Christianity to the point of view of the "man of our day," and the outcome is that he solves the problem by dissolving Christianity. The "historical religion" which Fresenius offers us is therefore no more Christianity than the Mysticism of the most extreme of the Mystics, and brings us not a single step closer than it to a real Christianity. Of course if the whole difference between Mysticism and "historical religion" were reduced to the single question of whether Christianity is the product of the native religious sentiment or comes to man from without and is embraced by an act of his own ethical will, we should have unhesitatingly to give the right to "historical religion." We have not had to wait for the Ritschlian school to learn that faith comes by hearing; or that as believing implies hearing so hearing implies a preacher. By virtue of the very circumstance that Christianity is a historical religion and is rooted in facts which have occurred in the world and through which the redemption which has come into the world has been wrought out, it must be communicated. And nothing is more sure than that there can be no Christianity apart from the working upon the heart of these historical facts as proclaimed, appreciated and embraced in confident faith. The action of the ethical will in laying hold upon the Saving Christ is of the essence of Christianity and there is no Christianity without it.

What Fresenius brings into contrast in his discussion is, then, merely two extremely one-sided conceptions of religion: the religion of the mere feelings and the religion of the bare ethical will. Neither has any claim to the name of Christianity. For Christianity is a historical religion and neither of these conceptions of religion has any essential connection with history. The religion of the mere ethical will is just as purely a merely natural religion as is the religion of the mere feelings. The Christian may therefore stand by and watch the conflict of these standpoints with interest indeed but without concern. Each tendency-"Mysticism," "Historical Religion,"-is engaged in validat

ing elements of the religious life, which enter into and find their due place in Christianity. But not only is each fatally one-sided in its exclusive insistance upon its own element of religious experience, but both in combination fall far short of even a complete account of natural religion; and neither has any place whatever in its system of thought for that supernatural religion which alone can avail for the needs of sinful men. The problem which presses on us is not whether, in the religious conflicts of our time, we should turn for rest and peace to "Mysticism" or to "Historical Religion"-to the religion of the feelings or to the religion of the ethical will: but whether there is not some more comprehensive religion which will take up into itself and engage the whole man, intellect, sensibility and will alike, and meeting him in his actual condition of weakness and corruption and guilt, rescue him from his lost state and renew him in all the elements of his being, to present him to God a new man. After all said Christianity remains the only religion which meets the case. Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Church of To-morrow. By JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 272. $1.00 net.

Here is a serious endeavor to set forth what the Church must be in order to fulfill its supremely important task. The author is in no personal danger of incurring the stigma of being a Calvinist, a Trinitarian, or possibly a Christian. His suggestions relative to Christianity are in fact the vital defect of the book. He has much to say in reference to the dignity of man, but makes no intimation of the deity of Christ. For example, when declaring of the church that "Its great task is to reveal man to himself as the Son of God and open within him the deep and everlasting source of Eternal life," he never intimates that the church is "the pillar and ground of the truth" relative to the incarnate, crucified, risen, divine Christ in Whom is Life Eternal. Nevertheless he has much to say that is not only interesting, but of practical value, and some things which to-day need strong emphasis. In the first chapter, dealing with the method of the church, it is maintained that there is far greater need of unity in spirit than of unity in organization, or uniformity in ritual or unanimity in creed. The church of to-morrow must adopt principles of coöperation and comity. The task of the church is shown to be spiritual; it is "to feed the roots of life." In opposition to certain socialistic and other false views, it is shown that the true function of the church does not consist in bettering social economic and physical conditions, but in creating right hearts and producing moral character. It is next suggested that in carying out this task there must be stimulated a sufficient and efficient thought of God, "the tap-root of religion."

This can best be done by maintaining public worship, and nurturing the spirit of prayer. The next chapter emphasizes the possible power of the pulpit and the need of preserving its prophetic character. The last chapter sounds out a call to the pew to support the pulpit and to strengthen the church by active participation in various forms of strictly religious service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Pulpit and the Pew. By the REVEREND CHARLES H. PARKHURST, D.D., LL.D. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Cloth, 12m0; pp. 195. $1.50 net, postage 10 cents extra.

This volume contains the "Lyman Beecher Lectures delivered 1913, before the Divinity School of Yale University." In commendation it may be sufficient to say that they merit a place in the valuable course of which they form a part. They possess a marked individuality, and are characterized by the pungent epigrams, human interest, and vivid illustrations, which have made popular the public utterances of the author. The whole field of homiletics has been so frequently traversed by previous lectures on this same foundation that the present series suggests a conscious limitation and an intentional avoidance of some of the more usual topics relative to the art of preaching. The long experience of the distinguished metropolitan pastor would have assured a welcome from his hearers and readers had he chosen to discuss such obvious matters as the intellectual, social and spiritual life of the minister, the sources and structure of the sermon, or the relation of preaching to pastoral duties. It may also be felt that the treatment of the themes selected is at times too limited, and lacking in concrete and comprehensive instruction. However, there is so much of originality and value in the discussions as to suggest some of the reasons why the author has maintained, for more than thirty years, in a conspicuous New York pulpit, a place of such influence and power. The subjects of the lectures are as follows: "The Preacher and his Qualifications"; "Pulpit Aims"; "The Pulpit's Estimate of the Pew"; "Love Considered as a Dynamic"; "Ministerial Responsibility for Civic Conditions"; "Responsibility of the Church to the Life of the Town"; "Dealing With Fundamentals"; "The Sanctuary and Sanctuary Service." Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Spiritual Health in the Light of the Principles of Physical Health. By HOWARD FOSTER WRIGHT, D.B., M.D., D.O. New York: The Shakespeare Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 142. $1.00.

In accordance with the suggestion made by Professor Drummond in his "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," an endeavor is here made to show how therapeutic principles can be applied in spiritual healing. The writer who is a reverent Christian, and a practitioner of Osteopathy, seems to fall into the common error of identifying laws which are merely similar. He presents certain interesting illustrations, but seems tempted to treat analogies as established facts. It is, however,

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