robs his position of any advantage it might have by interposing faith as the medium through which the revelation. must come to validity. Revelation becomes then that from which faith may take what it pleases under the guidance of the practical ideas of the Christian religion, which are arbitrarily determined to be Atonement and the Kingdom of God. Finally Wobbermin recognizes that the content of our religious-ethical consciousness implies an objective authority which is to be found in the person of Christ who stood in unbroken fellowship with the Father and whose experience was never disturbed by sin. But this Jesus is known out of the sources from which a historical-psychological method is to derive the norms of a religious ethical life. Authority is thus placed in the validity of the method or if transferred to the content which the method discovers it is no more than ethical.

The worth-judgments of Ritschlianism therefore seem to be just as troublesome and just as indispensable as the Ding an Sich of Kantianism; retain it and it is the one thing that cannot be explained; exclude it and the system ceases to exist. Professor Troeltsch carries the development to its logical conclusions. 34 Religion is to be looked on as a universal expressed in the historical religions and to be investigated by the religious-historical method. The elaboration of this method is Troeltsch's special contribution to the advance of theological thought. Its application may be seen by the following considerations. Christianity is not to be separated from the other religions35 but is to be classed with them. Nevertheless it is Troeltsch's wish to demonstrate that Christianity must come first and so the task is to find a norm by which to rank the various religions. This norm arises by assuming hypothetically the standards of Christianity and applying them sympathetically to the

Cf. Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, II. Zur religiösen Lage Religionsphilosophie und Ethik. Tubingen, 1913. Also Süskind in Theolog. Rund. Jan. and Feb., 1914, "Zur Theologie Troeltschs".

"Es kann im Christentum kein anderes Wunder enthalten sein als im sonstigen Geschehen."

other religions. At once worths and ideals are recognized which involuntarily arrange themselves in series from highest to lowest. The only assumption in this we are told is that of the ability of our reason to recognize value when it is seen. The result of the investigation is that Christianity is found to be the highest religion hitherto developed and as such the basis for future developments. It cannot however be shown to be the absolutely unsurpassable religion. Now since in this there is no authority such as religion requires, it is not surprising that Troeltsch turns next to the problem of the religious a priori. The aim is to discover a specifically religious a priori different from the logical, the ethical, the aesthetic a priori, or in other words that the religious consciousness possesses its own specific law. Troeltsch's formula is "Das Apriori ist die aus dem Wesen der Vernunft heraus zu bewirkende absolute Substanzbeziehung, vermöge deren alles Wirkliche und alle Werte auf eine absolute Substanz als Ausgangspunkt und Massstab bezogen werden." This is clear enough as it stands but nevertheless discussion has arisen not so much perhaps as to what Troeltsch has in mind but as to what his words imply. Some, so Süskind informs us, think that it is analogous to what Kant called the "Metaphysical tendency of the spirit." He himself however does not agree with this interpretation but allies Troeltsch's meaning with the concept of "purity" in Schleiermacher already mentioned in the preceding which consists in the relating of all that is and takes place to the activity of the universe or to the divine in its omnipresent efficiency. Is it then logical or psychological? If the latter we have not advanced beyond the preceding concept of authority, if the former it is not easy to see why the development has not returned to rationalism.

We have now traced the concept of authority as presented in the three historically important views of its ground and nature. Let us now reflect on the problem of whether a choice may be made between them. Let us put before our

36

selves, for now we are in position to do so, what authority really means. "La définition", says Professor Doumergue, "contient tout le système". True! But we should end with it, not begin with it. Various definitions of authority are presented for our consideration by those who have written on the subject. Stanton defines authority as "that principle which is exhibited in all reasons for receiving, or assenting to, a truth, if such there be, which are external to the man himself, to his own observation, reasoning, or intuition, or which, if revealed internally, lie beyond the reach of his own verification." Sterrett3 flippantly enough makes authority equivalent to the "must" which Patrick told the priest he had left behind when he came to the new country. Monod38 borrows a definition from M. Edmond Scherer, "Tout ce qui détermine une action ou une opinion par des considérations étrangères á la valeur intrinsèque de l'ordre intimé ou de la proposition énoncée." Sabatier39 defines authority as "the right of the species over the individual". Leckie40 says "Authority is a power not self produced, which rules belief or conduct." Iverach11 calls authority "a power to enforce obedience". Forsyth12 apparently gives no formal definition but evidently considers it as that which has the right to rule the individual.

The remark has been made43 that the term authority "is used with the greatest indiscrimination, so as to include all the grounds, valid or invalid, for the acceptance of any content as true. In view of this the great need is a critique that will enable us to determine the place and value of authority in a scheme of knowledge and belief." If we understand Professor Ormond correctly his contention is The Place of Authority in Religious Belief, 1891, p. 12. "Reason and Authority in Religion, 1891.

38 Le Problème de l'autorité, 1892.

30

1904.

40

Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit, Eng. Trans.,

"Authority in Religion, 1909.

"Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, "Authority".

43

Professor Ormond, Foundations of Knowledge, 1900, p. 355.

that authority is not what he calls an "end-category"; its claim must be legitimated by grounds. Therefore our consideration of the term will be incomplete unless we notice. the field of authority and the grounds on which it bases its claim in each field. Authority is to be seen in the methods and the results of science. In this field a body of positive knowledge has been built up the power of which to command assent is well nigh irresistible. The ground of this authority is truth, an assertion which is not invalidated by the difficulty of reaching a satisfactory definition of truth. For men do not waste time in defining that which has absolutely no relation to the subject in hand. A second field of authority is government, the expression of the collective will, which with its laws and offices we all regard as the highest authority in a certain great sphere of action. At first we may think that this authority is based on might but to reflection this reveals itself as not a final explanation; the might must be directed by the good. Here again there has been endless discussion of the meaning of the good but without causing most men to believe that the good exists both in the abstract and the concrete, and without invalidating the authority of government guided by the good. We also recognize authority in ethics and here it is the authority of the "ought". Once more men differ with respect to that which confers upon the "ought" its power to command, but once more the discussion is not a proof that the ought has no authority; rather that the domain of the human spirit is so vast that no one formula can exhaust it. Is it that the ought represents the voice of the reasonable, the universal, self? Or is it that which will bring happiness to all concerned? Is it the will of the compact majority, liable to change but authoritative as long as it lasts? Or is it the side of the expanding self, the one constant thing which it is our duty to follow through each changing moment of our life? Not every grounding of the authority of the ought has equal claim to recognition but each in its way is not intended to weaken the authority of duty but rather to strengthen it.

These considerations enable us to think clearly concerning authority in religion. Here again there must be authority** and here again we may ask what is the ground of this authority. The unanimous answer is that it must be a divine authority. This calls for explanation however, if we are to grasp exactly the meaning of our assertions. We shall present one view of their meaning. Religion is a relation between God and man. God however is not an object to be investigated by man at man's good pleasure; God must take the initiative and enter into relation with man. God must make Himself known and this activity of God is His Revelation. Thus religion implies revelation. Now Christians believe that in virtue of the work of Creation and Providence, the entire world and all that takes place in it form a standing revelation of God. Notice that both Creation and Providence are standing activities, the former of which is the explanation of miracle, miracles being a creative way of God's making Himself known. For the Christian then all experience is capable of religious interpretation for it may lead him to God. It may also lead him away from God, because, since the world, as we have said, has been given a separate, if not independent, existence, there is the possibility of seeing the creature and ignoring the Creator. This is what has happened and so Christians know that they are sinners in need of salvation. They also believe that God has come near to them in order to save them, a revelation not different in source from the other mentioned above: no more supernatural, no more miraculous, no less providential, but with a special aim: to bring about the salvation of God's people.

The authority in religion therefore must be the authority

“ Cf. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, III, 73, " es hat in der Welt keinen starken religiösen Glauben gegeben, der nicht an irgend einen entscheidenden Punkt sich auf eine äussere Autorität berufen hatte. Nur in den blassen Ausführungen der Religionsphilosophen ode rin den polemischen Entwürfen protestantischen Theologen wird ein Glaube construirt, der seine Gewissheit lediglich den eigenen inneren Momenten entnimmt."