ARTICLE XI. The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against. one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. ARTICLE XII. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for president and vice-president, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as president, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as vice-president: and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as president, and of all persons voted for as vice-presi dent, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate; the president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted: the person having the greatest number of votes for president, shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such a majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as president, the house of representatives shall choose immediately by ballot, the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote;' a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the house of representatives shall not choose a president whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the vice-president shall act as president, as in the case of the death or other' constitutional disability of the president. The person having the greatest number of votes as vice-president, shall be the vice-president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate shall choose the vice-president; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of senators and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of president shall be eligible to that of vice-president of the United States. [NOTE. The eleventh article of the amendments to the constitution was proposed at the second session of the third congress; the twelfth article, at the first session of the eighth congress.] INDEX. No. I. INTRODUCTION, Necessity of a new constitution, Obstacles to be encountered, Inducements to moderation in controversy, General propositions to be discussed, II, III, IV, V. CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND IN- FLUENCE, Inquiry into the importance of union, 10 Characteristics of our country and people, 11 12 Union will secure the election of capable men to office, Union will lead to a readier settlement of differences with other Union will strengthen the nation so as not to invite hostility, 18 Results of union illustrated by the history of Great Britain, VI, VII. CONCERNING DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE STATES, 23 24 24 24, 25 The idea that the genius of republics and the influence of com- Danger of collisions arising from the apportionment of the public 31 Conflicts of laws, 32 Alliances between states, and with foreign nations, 39 VIII. — THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR IN PRODUCING STANDING ARMIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO LIBERTY, 17 19 IX, X. — THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION, Distractions which agitated the republics of Greece and Italy, 38 Perfect equality of states not essential in a confederacy, Dangers of factions in popular governments, The remedies or preventives discussed, 39, 40 41 42 43 Impracticability of removing the causes of faction, A pure democracy admits of no cure for faction, 44 45 46 47 XI. - THE UTILITY OF THE UNION WITH RESPECT TO COMMERCE AND A 48 Jealousy in Europe of our commercial tendencies, 48 Union will increase our power to obtain commercial privileges 49 Union will increase the aggregate commerce of the states, Union will give us the ascendant in the affairs of this continent, 52 53 XII. THE UTILITY OF THE UNION WITH RESPECT TO REVENUE, XIII. - THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH A VIEW TO ECONOMY, Probable confederations in case of disruption of the union, XIV. - AN OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE EXTENT OF COUNTRY ANSWERED, 60 Distinction between a republic and a democracy in this respect, Facilities of intercourse will increase, 57 58 58 59 60 XV, XVI.-CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION, IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN Insufficiency of the confederation to preserve the union, National legislation must act on individuals instead of states, In a league of states, the only remedy for disobedience is force, 72 72 A military despotism would result, 73 Impracticability of sustaining the union by such means, 73 74 Or repress commotions, 75 XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX. THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLES, TO SHOW THE TENDENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, RATH- Danger of encroachment on state rights and powers, considered, 76 76 76 77 78 Illustration from the history of the Grecian republics, 79 81 Illustration from the history of the Germanic body, 84 Illustration from the history of Poland, Illustration from the history of the Swiss cantons, XXI, XXII. - FURTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, Want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments, The want of a power to regulate commerce, The right of equal suffrage among the states, an evil, Requiring a vote of two-thirds of the states is not a remedy, This principle gives scope to foreign corruption, 98 98 99 100 Instances from history of officers of republics corrupted by for- The want of a judiciary power a crowning defect, 101 102 102 Present organization of congress unsuitable for an executive head, 103 103 XXIII. THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT, AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC The powers must be co-extensive with the objects of govern- 107 XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII. — THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH 108 The constitution vests the power of raising armies in the legisla- 108 Standing armies not prohibited by the state constitutions, Dangers of invasion from foreign countries or savage neighbors, 110 111 112 Armies of separate states more dangerous to liberty than those 113 Objections to restrictions on the power of the government as to 113 Militia cannot be relied upon alone for national defence, 114 115 Danger of making the government too feeble by restrictions, 116 117 Effect of the limitation of appropriations to two years in the new 118 Liberty cannot be subverted, nor large armies raised, without time, 119 121 The national government will be as well administered as state 121 It will be strengthened by extending into internal affairs, 122 123 The force occasionally necessary to execute the laws, an argu- 124 The same necessity for force might exist in case of several con- 125 Union the best safeguard against the representatives of the peo- 125 |