Baraboo v. Dwyer, 166 Wis. 372. ties. Ayres v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, 87 N. E. 1073; Buffalo v. Lewis, 192 N. Y. 193, 84 N. E. 809; Ex parte Shaw (Okla.) 157 Pac. 900. In Buffalo v. Lewis, supra, the court said: "Automobiles have but recently come into common use. Within the last few years their use has not only greatly increased, but tours therewith have been extended through many municipalities. Good judgment has not always been exercised in their use, and the rights of others have sometimes been overlooked by their owners or drivers, and, principally in consequence thereof, more or less opposition has arisen to their unrestricted use upon the public streets and highways. The opposition to such use has frequently found expression in local restrictive rules and ordinances. Such local rules and ordinances existing prior to the enactment of the motor vehicle law were not only dissimilar and conflicting, but sometimes difficult to understand. The necessity for a uniform law throughout the state was apparent, and the motor vehicle law was clearly designated as a new, complete, and general enactment to take the place of all previous statutes, ordinances, or rules relating to the use of motor vehicles upon the streets and highways of this state. The purpose of the legislature in enacting such law is shown in the clear and unmistakable language used by it." The decisions above cited are pertinent when viewed in the light of our statutes upon the subject. Sec. 1636-55, Stats., provides: "The provisions of sections 1636-17 to 1636-57, inclusive, shall be uniform in operation throughout the state, and no city, village, county, town, park board or other local authorities shall have power to enact, pass, enforce or maintain any ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation, requiring local registration or other requirements or in any manner excluding or prohibiting any automobile, motorcycle or other similar motor vehicle, whose owner has complied with the provisions of sections 1636-47 to 1636-57, inclusive, from the free and unobstructed use of all public highways, driveways and parkways within the state; but the provisions . . . shall not prohibit any city, village, county, town, park board Baraboo v. Dwyer, 166 Wis. 372. or other local authorities from passing any ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation in strict conformity with the provisions of section 1636-47 to 1636-57, inclusive, imposing the same penalty for a violation of any of the provisions of said sections, where such violation occurs within such city, county, town or village. . . .' It is obvious from the foregoing as well as other provisions before referred to that it was the intention of the legislature to exclude local legislation inconsistent with state legislation upon the subject. True, under the statute local authority shall not be prohibited from enacting ordinances in strict conformity with the state law "imposing the same penalty for a violation of any of the provisions of said sections" where the violation occurs within the jurisdiction of such local authority. Ogden v. Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 87 N. W. 568. The ordinance in question is not in conformity with our statute regulating speed of automobiles. It attempts to fix a limit of ten miles per hour over all bridges in the city of Baraboo regardless of particular conditions. The ordinance provides a speed regulation and fixes a speed different from the statute, hence is not in conformity therewith. Counsel for appellant relies on that part of sec. 1636-49, heretofore quoted, which provides, in effect, that no person shall operate any automobile recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway, and that in turning corners, going around curves, and at sharp declines the speed shall be reduced to such a rate as will tend to avoid danger of accidents. It will be seen, however, that this provision does not authorize the fixing of a speed limit generally. To give it the construction contended for by appellant would be in direct conflict with the statutes on the subject, because it would authorize the municipality to fix a speed different from that provided by the statute in different parts of the city regardless of conditions, and would authorize the fixing of a Baraboo v. Dwyer, 166 Wis. 372. rate of speed over all bridges within the limits of the municipality different from that provided by the state law. The portion of the statute just referred to has reference to unusual conditions and situations which are not fixed by the legislature and for which no definite limit can be fixed by the legislature or the local authorities. The reasonableness of the speed in such case must depend upon the particular facts in each case. Oshkosh v. Campbell, 151 Wis. 567, 139 N. W. 316, and Eichman v. Buchheit, 128 Wis. 385, 107 N. W. 325, are relied upon by counsel for appellant. Neither of these cases is controlling, because they do not conflict with the state statutes. In Oshkosh v. Campbell this court upheld the ordinance because it did not conflict with the state law on the subject, and said: "It is too well settled that a city may make reasonable police regulations respecting the use of its streets, not contravening the letter or spirit of any statute on the subject, to warrant discussing the subject in this case." We are convinced that the ordinance in question is in conflict with the letter and spirit of the statutes regulating the speed of automobiles and therefore void. Appellant refers to sec. 925-52, Stats., as giving authority to regulate bridges. This section is not applicable to the instant case. Sec. 925-2, Stats., provides that "No city now incorporated shall be affected by the provisions of this chapter unless such city has adopted or shall adopt the same or some part thereof for its government in the manner hereinafter provided." The city of Baraboo was incorporated prior to the enactment of the general city charter law and still operates under a special charter. But, independent of this, we think the state law regarding automobile regulations includes bridges, and, while the law provides with reference to "public highways," a bridge is a public highway within the meaning of the statute (sub. (5), sec. 4971, Stats.). Prentiss v. Danaher, 20 Wis. 311; Nuthals v. Green Bay, Kuetbach v. Industrial Comm. 166 Wis. 378. 162 Wis. 434, 156 N. W. 472; Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 N. W. 652. Counsel for appellant also refers to sec. 1323, Stats., as supporting his contention. This section, however, is limited in explicit terms to animals or vehicles drawn by animals, hence is not in conflict with the state legislation affecting speed of automobiles. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. KUETBACH, by guardian ad litem, Appellant, vs. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN and others, Respondents. KUETBACH, Respondent, vs. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN and others, imp., Appellants. November 16-December 4, 1917. Workmen's compensation: Who are dependents: When rights become fixed: Statutes construed: Wife married after accident: Posthumous child not legitimate at date of accident: "Lineal descendant." 1. Under sub. 5, sec. 2394-10, Stats., all questions as to who are dependents and the extent of their dependency upon a deceased employee are to be determined as of the date of the accident to such employee, and their right to any death benefit becomes fixed as of such date irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions. 2. Sub. 4 of said sec. 2394—10 limits the dependents to the classes of persons therein described; and every claimant must show that at the date of the accident he was within one of such classes. 3. Sub. 3 of said sec. 2394-10 does not create separate classes of dependents or provide for exceptions to the provisions of sub. 5; it merely prescribes the method of determining the degree of dependency of persons who, under sub. 4 and 5, are shown to be dependents. 4. Construing the statute as above stated, the wife of an employee "with whom she is living at the time of his death" is not declared by sub. 3 (a), sec. 2394-10, Stats., to be a dependent, and under sub. 5 is not a dependent unless she was such wife "at the date of the accident." Kuetbach v. Industrial Comm. 166 Wis. 378. 5. So, also, where a woman who was not at the date of the accident the wife of the employee was pregnant by him before that date, was married to him after that date, and lived with him until his death, and thereafter the child was born, such child is not declared by sub. 3 (c), sec. 2394-10, Stats., to be a dependent and, his status as a legitimate child of the employee not having been fixed "at the date of the accident," he is not a dependent, under the express provisions of sub. 5, “irrespective of" the "subsequent change in conditions." [What the result would be in case an employee were lawfully married, his wife pregnant and living with him when he was injured, thereafter the child should be born and the wife should die, and later the husband should die, is not determined.] APPEALS from judgments of the circuit court for Dane county: E. RAY STEVENS, Circuit Judge. One judgment affirmed; the other reversed. Both of the above entitled actions arise out of the same accident and they will therefore be treated together. Claim for compensation for accidental death. The deceased, Ferdinand Kuetbach, Jr., on and prior to December 19, 1915, the date of the accident, was in the employ of the defendant Washington Cutlery Company, and living with his father, Ferdinand Kuetbach, Sr., who was dependent upon him for support. Prior to this time, as a result of illicit intimate relations between the deceased and the respondent Etta Kuetbach, she was pregnant by the deceased. On May 18, 1916, the deceased and Etta Kuelbach were married. On June 5, 1916, as a result of accidental injuries, the death of Ferdinand Kuetbach, Jr., occurred, and on June 21, 1916, Ferdinand Edward Kuelbach, the minor, was born. The widow, Etta Kuetbach, was living with her husband, Ferdinand Kuetbach, Jr., at the time of his death. The matter was presented to the Industrial Commission and issue joined, and upon the hearing the Commission made an award giving compensation to the father, Ferdinand Kuetbach, Sr. Etta Kuetbach, the widow, brought an action in the circuit court for Dane county to review the award of the Commission, and |