Carriage of goods: Liability for freight charges: Consignor and con- signee: Carrier's lien.
1. The consignor of freight with whom the contract of shipment is made is liable to the carrier for the transportation charges un- less there is an express agreement between them exempting him from such liability; and the carrier may also look to the con- signee to whom the goods are actually delivered for the pay- ment of the freight charges. Great Northern R. Co. v. Hocking Valley F. C. Co. 465
2. A condition, printed on and made a part of the bill of lading, that "the owner or consignee shall pay the freight and all other law- ful charges accruing on said property, and, if required, shall pay the same before delivery," does not affect the liability of the consignor for such charges. Ibid. 3. Where goods had been rejected by the consignee upon their ar- rival at destination, and had been held at that point for several days, an agreement between the consignor, the consignee, and a corporation from which the consignee had ordered the goods, that they should be delivered to the consignee upon his promise to pay the freight and demurrage charges, did not discharge the consignor from liability for the freight charges. Ibid. 4. Nor did the delivery of the goods, in such case, by the carrier without collecting the freight charges from the consignee, dis- charge the consignor; it merely released the carrier's lien on the goods. Ibid.
5. A finding by the trial court in such case that notes given by the corporation from which the goods had been ordered, to the carrier, for the amount of the freight and demurrage charges, did not constitute payment of such charges, is held to be sus- tained by the evidence. Ibid.
Carriage of passengers: Jitneys: Indemnity bond.
6. The indemnity bond provided for in sec. 1797-63, Stats. 1915, covers injuries to pedestrians as well as injuries to passengers. Ehlers v. Automobile Liability Co. 185
7. In an action for an injury caused by negligent operation of the motor vehicle described in an indemnity bond issued pursuant to said sec. 1797-63, it was proper to make the surety company a party defendant and, under sec. 2647 as amended by ch. 219, Laws 1915, to join the cause of action against it with the cause of action against the operator of the motor vehicle. Ibid. CAUSE OF ACTION: When arises or accrues. CERTIFICATE of death. See WITNESSES, 12.
CHECKS. See GUARDIAN AND WARD, 1, 2.
CHILD LABOR. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 5, 6.
CLAIMS against decedent. See EXECUTORS, 1-5. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 3, 7, 8. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. WITNESSES, 1-4.
COLLATERAL ATTACK. See COURTS, 2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DIS-
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
COMMISSION. See BROKERS.
COMPENSATION for injuries. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
CONDEMNATION of school building. See SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DIS- TRICTS, 1, 2.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS. See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 4-6. PRINCI- PAL AND AGENT.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 3. TAXATION, 10, 11. CONSIDERATION. See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 4, 5. BILLS AND NOTES. CONTRACTS, 6.
See CONTRACTS, 3-5. JUDGMENT, 2-4.
1. A complaint charging that defendants and plaintiff's divorced husband conspired together to produce a breach of his ante- nuptial contract with plaintiff by fraudulently disposing of all his property, and that they consummated such conspiracy so that prior to his death all his property had been acquired by defendants fraudulently and without consideration, and at his death nothing was left with which to pay the amount which then became due to plaintiff on said contract, is held to state a cause of action for damages. Field v. Siegel, 99 Wis. 605, dis- tinguished. Schwenn v. Schwenn, 420 2. A demurrer to such complaint on the ground of a defect of parties plaintiff, in that plaintiff was not the executor or administrator of the estate, was properly overruled. Ibid. 3. In an action for breach of a contract for the sale of land the com- plaint is held not to charge that the defendant P., who was merely an agent of the other defendants, concerted with them in the breaking of the contract which they had made through him with the plaintiff, and hence not to show any liability of P. for such breach. Laney v. Pemberton, 462
Police power. See TRADING STAMPS, 1. Validity of statutes: Difficulty in administering. See JUDGMENT, 6. Personal civil rights: Compulsory attendance at school. See SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 10.
Vested property rights. See NAVIGABLe Waters, 7, 8.
Due process of law. See STATE SUPERINTENDENT. TRADING STAMPS, 4. Equal protection of the laws. See TAXATION, 5. TRADING STAMPS,
Impairing obligation of contracts. See STREET RAILWAYS, 3. TRAD- ING STAMPS, 3.
Taking property without compensation. See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 8. TAXATION, 5.
Uniformity in taxation. See TAXATION, 15.
CONTINUATION SCHOOLS. See SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 9-13. VOL. 166-41
Place of making. See SALES, 1.
Validity. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1.
CORPORATIONS, 3. HOMESTEAD.
INSANE PERSONS. INSURANCE, 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 5. WORKMEN'S COMPENSA- TION, 4.
Same: Unconscionable agreement.
1. A contract by which real-estate dealers who were exchanging lands with plaintiff agreed to sell for him a tract of land, which he was receiving in the exchange, for a price much greater than its actual value as found by the jury, cannot upon the evidence in this case be held unconscionable and for that reason unen- forceable. Trumpf v. Shoudy, 353
Same: Public policy: Fraudulent purpose.
2. The term "public policy" is one of vague and uncertain meaning; and the power to declare a contract void as being against public policy should be exercised only in cases free from doubt. Trumpf v. Shoudy,
3. Upon the evidence in this case (showing no intent on plaintiff's part to defraud third persons), a contract fair on its face can- not be held void as against public policy on the ground that by its terms the parties were joined in a fraudulent scheme to sell to third persons at a price of $150 or more per acre land which was worth but $16 per acre. Ibid. 4. It not appearing upon the face of the contract that any wrongful or illegal act was contemplated, the mere fact that plaintiff, be- ing doubtful as to the marketability of the lands and not satis- fied as to their value, protected himself against loss by means of the contract, does not establish the fact that he was a party to a scheme or conspiracy to defraud third persons. Ibid.
5. The question as to the validity of such contract must be deter- mined as of the date it was made; its legality cannot be affected by reason of facts subsequently appearing and not previously known, or by what the parties or either of them did in attempt- ing to carry out and perform the contract. Ibid.
Consideration: Conclusiveness of recitals.
6. In an action to recover $800, the rental specified in a lease of plaintiff's farm to defendant for fifteen months, the question be- ing whether such rental was included in the sum of $2,100 which was named in a bill of sale as the consideration for which plaint- iff sold to defendant the personal property on the farm, the re- citals in said instruments as to consideration were not conclu- sive, and it was not necessary for defendant, in order to avail himself of the defense that the rental was included in said $2,100, to have the writings reformed, nor was it necessary for him to prove a mutual mistake by evidence so clear and satis- factory as to warrant a reformation. Chapman v. Schroeder, 330
Construction. See SALES, 2-4. STREET RAILWAYS, 3-6. TELEPHONES, 1-4, 6.
Same: Building contracts. See DAMAGES, 1-3.
7. In a contract whereby plaintiff agreed to furnish and deliver the marble with which parts of the walls of a building were to be faced by specified dates as to specified units of the structure,
and all "so that the entire work must be completed not later than the first day of December, 1911, if the progress of the work at the building demands it," the words "progress of the work at the building" are held to refer to the particular work which was the subject of the contract, i. e. the marble work; so that it was plaintiff's duty to deliver the marble at the building by the dates specified or as fast as the masons were ready to set it, regardless of whether delay in such delivery necessarily caused delay in the mason work as a whole. Grant M. Co. v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 547 8. So, also, in a provision in said contract by which "the contractor agrees to pay the owner $10 per day for each and every day the work remains unfinished after the day set for its completion," the word "work" refers to the marble work. Ibid. 9. The provision above quoted, as to payment of $10 per day, is wholly distinct from a further provision in the same contract, as follows: "The mason contractor being under penalty of $50 per day to complete his contract by a certain date, this con- tractor agrees to assume the responsibility for this penalty in case he delays the mason in completing his work according to the terms of his contract."
Impairing obligation. See STREET RAILWAYS, 3. TRADING STAMPS, 3. Modification. See SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 6-8.
Reformation. See CONTRACTS, 6. HOMESTEAD, 2. Rescission. See CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
Abandonment. See EXECUTORS, 5.
See EXECUTORS, 6. GUARDIAN AND WARD, 4. TRUSTS, 1. In an action for conversion of money deposited by plaintiff with the defendant bank and paid by the bank directly to one K., the evi- dence is held to sustain a verdict to the effect that plaintiff ex- pressly instructed the bank to use the money in paying a note given by plaintiff to K., which was then held by another bank. Ziegenhagen v. Suring State Bank, 22
Assessments on stock. See TELEPHONES, 2.
Officers. See ARREST, 1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1. WITNESSES, 5, 6. Liability for torts of agents: Benevolent association: Fraternal in surance society.
1. A corporation is liable for the torts of its agents within the scope of their employment and in furtherance of the corporate busi- ness, and this includes libel. Morse v. Modern Woodmen, 194 2. The Modern Woodmen of America, a fraternal insurance corpora- tion conducted on the assessment plan and having, besides a
benefit fund out of which death claims are to be paid, a general fund which may be used for other purposes, is not a purely be- nevolent association and its funds are not all trust funds in such a sense that it should be exempt from the ordinary liability of a corporation for the torts of its employees or agents. Ibid. Corporate powers: Ultra vires acts. See TAXATION, 3. Same: Contracts with stockholders. Taxation of. See TAXATION, 12, 14-19. Foreign corporations: Interstate commerce: Enforceable contracts. 3. A contract whereby a foreign corporation not licensed to do busi- ness in Wisconsin agreed to sell certain trees and shrubs, then in another state, to a resident of this state, and to plant them upon his premises here, is not enforceable by the corporation in our courts on the ground that such transaction constituted in- terstate commerce. The planting was not a mere incident of, nor was it essential to, the sale and delivery of the trees and shrubs, and the agreement in that respect was one relating to business of strictly local character. Phoenix Nursery Co. v. Trostel, 215
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In action to recover unpaid taxes.
1. In view of sec. 1107a, Stats., providing that an action to recover unpaid taxes shall be "an action of debt," it seems plain that it was the legislative intention that any remedy in such an ac- tion should be a recovery as upon contract, and the costs therein are governed by sec. 2921, which provides that in actions at law upon contract the costs, exclusive of disbursements, shall not exceed $25. Superior v. Allouez Bay Dock Co. 76
In mandamus actions. See MANDAMUS, 1. Motion costs: Inclusion in judgment.
2. Absolute motion costs allowed to plaintiffs under sec. 2924, Stats., on striking out an answer as frivolous could not properly be in- cluded in a judgment rendered for plaintiffs upon defendants' failure to amend the answer. Payment of such costs should be enforced under sec. 3479. Holmes v. Webb, 280 3. The improper inclusion of absolute motion costs in the final judg- ment in this case was not a prejudicial error, the defendants' obligation to pay such costs to plaintiffs not having been varied thereby.
Use of patrol wagon. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 17. COUNTERCLAIM. See SALES, 5. TRIAL, 7. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT. See SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 4.
Jurisdiction: Denial by party: Request for relief.
1. A defendant cannot be allowed to assert that the court is without proper jurisdiction over him and at the same time ask the same court for other relief which could only be granted by a court having proper jurisdiction. Simon v. de Gersdorff,
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