verse, even in this age of advanced science. It should be added, in order to save the remark from appearing to some incredibly extravagant, that while we thus know spontaneously so much about the workings of the mind, the majority of men think far more about their objective than their subjective knowledge.

(a) "This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable; but it is so because it is superior to definition. It can be analyzed into no simpler elements, for it is itself the simplest of all; it can be made no clearer by description or comparison, for it is revealed to us in all the clearness of an original intuition, of which description and comparison can furnish only faint and partial resemblances" (Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 129; see, also, Metaphysics). It was the greatest of all the oversights of Kant that he did not give personality a place among the intuitions of the mind, to which it is entitled quite as much as space and time. Held in by no primary belief in personality, those who came after, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, wandered out into a wide waste of Pantheism. Taking with them no belief in the personality of self, they never could reach personality in God.

It has been keenly disputed how we are to understand the "Cogito, ergo sum of Descartes. Are we to regard it as a process of reasoning? If it be so, it is either a petitio principii, or its conclusiveness may be doubted. If the cogito be understood as embracing ego, that is, be understood as ego cogito, then the ego is evidently involved in it, is in fact assumed. If it means anything short of this, then it might be difficult to establish the accuracy of the inference; thus, if the cogito does not embrace the ego, it is not clear that the conclusion follows. Or are we to regard the statement as a sort of primitive judgment, not implying mediate reasoning or a middle term? Taken in this sense, I would reckon that the connection between thought and existence is involved in our knowledge of self as existing, rather than that the knowledge of self issues from the perception of the connection between thought and personal existence. Or are we to look on the expression as simply a mode of stating an assumption? In this case, the word ergo, the usual symbol of inference, comes in awkwardly; and besides, the truth to be assumed is not the complex judgment, cogito, ergo sum, but the fact revealed at once to consciousness of ego

cogians. This primitive cognition may be the ground of a number of judgments, but it is to reverse the order of things entirely to make any one of these judgments the ground of the cognitions. Kant has a powerful criticism of the "Cogito, ergo sum,' sidered as an argument, in his Paralogismen in the Kritik. See the subject discussed by M. Cousin, Prem Ser: tome 1.

con

In answering the objections of Gassendi, Descartes says : "Cum advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima quædam notio est quæ et nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque etiam quis dicit Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo,' existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, sed tanquam rem per se notam simplici mentis intuitu agnoscit."

Buffier gives the correct account with his usual clearness: "C'est par une même perception de notre âme que nous éprouvons le sentiment intime et de notre pensée et de notre existence " (Buffier, Prem. Vér. p. i. c. i.).

The Scottish School generally maintains that we do not know mind and body, but only the qualities of them. Reid indeed says, "Every man is conscious of a thinking principle, or mind, in himself" (Collected Writings, p. 217). Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, speaks of consciousness being concerned with "the existence of mind itself, and its actual feelings," etc. (Book 1. Chap. V. But this language is not free from ambiguity. Reid says that "sensation suggests to us both a faculty and a mind, and not only suggests the notion of them, but creates a belief of their existence;" and he defends the use of the word "suggest," which I reckon a very unfortunate one in such an application (Collected Writings, pp. 110, 111). This view is carried out and elaborated by D. Stewart: "It is not matter or body which I perceive by my senses, but only extension, figure, color, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition, operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills" (Elem. Vol. I. p. 46; see also Vol. II. p. 41, and Phil. Essays, p. 58).

Kant holds that the inner sense gives no intuition of the soul as an object. "Der innere Sinn, vermittelst dessen das Gemüth sich selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand anschaut, giebt zwar keine Anschauung von der Seele selbst, als einem Object ” (Kr. d. r. V.

p. 34). He speaks of the subject envisaging itself, not as it is but as it appears: "Da es denn sich selbst anschaut, nicht wie es sich unmittelbar selbstthätig vorstellen würde, sondern nach der Art wie es von innen afficirt wird, folglich wie es sich erscheint, nicht wie es ist (Zw. Aufg. p. 718). He says that by the inner sense we know the subject self as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself: "Was die innere Anschauung betrifft, unser eigenes Subject nur als Erscheinung, nicht aber nach dem, was es an sich selbst ist, erkennen " (Ibid. p. 850). Dr. Mansel has done great service to philosophy by maintaining so clearly and resolutely, in his Prolegomena Logica and Metaphysics, that we intuitively know self. "I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and thinking” (Prol. Log. p. 129). Hamilton speaks of our being conscious every moment of our existence, and of the ego as a "self-subsistent entity" (Metaph. Lect. 19).

(b) It can be shown that Locke consistently or inconsistently states that we know power as being in body, but especially in mind. "Bodies by our senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operations of our own mind." In deriving our idea of Power from Sensation and Reflection he supposes the mind to be actively and intelligently exercised. "Whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere to make that change" (Essay, 11. xxi. 4). But Locke has omitted to inquire what it is in the mind which insists that it must collect a cause wherever there is a change.

Hamilton admits all I am pleading for. "I know myself as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter-force in energy" (Note D, p. 666, of Ap. to Reid). And again we have a perceptive power of the secundo primary quality of resistance in an extra-organic force as an immediate cognition " (p. 883). Is this statement an essential part of his doctrine, or an incidental admission? If part of his system, it should modify the view he has given elsewhere of our conviction of power as being a mere impotency (see Appendix to Discuss.). If it be inadvertent, it is a proof that truth will come out of honest men in spite of the errors of their system.

CHAPTER VII.

SUBSTANCE.

I.

SIR W. HAMILTON remarks that the word "substance" may be viewed as derived from subsistendo, and as meaning ens per se subsistens (ovora in Greek): or it may be viewed as the basis of attributes, in which sense it may be regarded as derived from substando, and id quod substat accidentibus; like the Greek róσtaois, ÚTOKEίμEVOV. In either case it will, however, signify the same thing viewed in a different aspect." With this latter statement I cannot concur. In the first of these senses there is such a thing as substance, and its characteristics can be specified. But I can see no evidence whatever for the existence of any such thing as a substance in the other sense, that is, as a substratum lying in and beyond, or standing under, all that comes under our immediate knowledge. There is no topic on which there has been a greater amount of unsatisfactory language employed than on this. We know, it is said, only qualities, but we are constrained by reason, or by common sense, to believe in a something in which they inhere. Or qualities, it is said, fall under sense, while substance is known by vous, or reason. Others, proceeding on these admissions, maintain that, qualities alone being known, we may doubt whether there is such a thing as substance, and may certainly affirm that we can never know it. Now in opposition to all this style of thinking and writing, which has prevailed to so great an

extent since the days of Locke, I maintain that we never know qualities without also knowing substance. Qualities as qualities distinct from substance are as much unknown to us as substance distinct from qualities. We know both in one concrete act.

All that the metaphysician can do in regard to substance is to show that our cognition of it is original and fundamental, and to evolve what is contained in the cognition. He should not attempt to prove how it is so and so (the dɩór of Aristotle), but he may show that it is so and so (the or of Aristotle). He could not give the dimmest idea of it to one who had not already the knowledge, but he may separate it by analysis from the other cognitions with which it is combined, and make it stand out distinctly to the view. He may so weigh and measure it as to show its extent and boundary, and deliver it from those crudities in which speculators have in crusted it. The following is the best analysis I am able to furnish.

II.

In all knowledge of substance there is involved BEING or EXISTENCE, not of being in the abstract, but of something in being. This we have seen is an essential element in our cognition, both of mind and body. The mind starts with knowledge, and with the knowledge of things as existing. This is the foundation, the necessary foundation, of all other exercises. If the mind did not begin with knowledge, it could not end with knowledge. In particular, if it had not knowledge in the concrete, it never could reach knowledge in the abstract. If there were not a knowledge of things in the premises with which we set out, there never could be knowledge in the conclusion. But having knowledge, obtained by intuition, to set out with, we find that when we proceed