in the motion, the intuition of cause comes in to declare that there must have been active power at work. This is one of those cases which will come before us more and more frequently as we advance, in which cognitions, beliefs, and judgments mingle together; and yet the act can scarcely be described as complex, except in this sense, that on other occasions some of the parts can exist separately or in other combinations. The circumstance that these other elements conjoin in our conviction as to motion, will bring the subject before us in other parts of the Treatise.

Müller's Physiology, trans. by Baly, p. 1083. Aristotle places motion, like number, among the common sensibles; Descartes among the properties perceived in every perception of body (see places in last note); and Locke among the primary qualities of bodies, which are always in them (11. viii. 22). The young man operated upon by Dr. Franz for cataract, three days after the operation, saw an extensive field of light, in which everything appeared dull, confused, and in motion." In a case reported by Dr. Wardrop, the woman returning home after the operation saw a hackney coach pass, and asked, "What is that large thing that passed us?" (See Abbott, Sight and Touch, p. 153.)

CHAPTER XIII.

POWER.

I HAVE been laboring to show, in the last chapter and in this, that power is involved in our knowledge of substance. We can never know either self, or bodies beyond self, except as exercising influence or potency. Not that we are to suppose that we have thus by intuition an abstract or a general idea of power; all that we have is a knowledge of a given substance acting. This seems the only doctrine in accordance with the revelations of consciousness. It is involved in the common statement that we cannot know substance except by its properties; for what are properties but powers acting when the needful conditions are supplied? I reckon it as an oversight in a great body of metaphysicians that they have been afraid to ascribe our apprehension of power to intuition. In consequence of this neglect, some never get the idea of power, but merely of succession, within the bare limits of experience, which can never entitle us to argue that the world must have proceeded from Divine Power; others have been obliged to find cause, not in any perception of the mind as it looks on things, but in some form imposed by the mind. on subjects; while a considerable number hesitate and vacillate in their account, representing it now as an original conviction, and now as an acquisition of experience.

Wherever there is power in act, there is an effect. But the discovery of the relation between cause and

effect cannot be discovered except by an exercise of judgment. The discussion of the nature of our conviction of Power will be resumed under the head of Primitive Judgments.

It is by overlooking the varied attributes perceived by intuition, as specified in these last chapters, that J. S. Mill reaches his deplorably defective definitions of matter and mind. He

says: "Matter may be defined a permanent possibility of sensations" (Examination of Hamilton, p. 198). No doubt there are accompanying sensations, but matter is perceived by us as a thing without us, extended and with potency in multiplied forms. Mind "is a series of feelings aware of itself." But we know it as vastly more it is a series not only of feelings, but of perceptions of things, memories, imaginations, judgments, moral decisions, volitions. And then there is an itself, of which, it is acknowledged, we are aware, and this makes the whole a substance.

BOOK II.

PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.

CHAPTER I.

THEIR GENERAL NATURE.

I.

OUR primary cognitions and beliefs are very intimately connected, and they run almost insensibly into each other. Yet they may be distinguished. The phrase "primitive cognition," when we find it needful to separate it from faith, might be confined in strictness to those mental energies in which the mind looks on an object now present, say on body perceived by the senses, or on self in a particular state, or on a representation in the mind; and then "faith" would be applied to all those exercises in which we are convinced of the existence of an object not now before us, or under immediate inspection.

Philosophers have drawn the distinction between Presentative and Representative Knowledge. In the former the object is present at the time; we perceive it, we feel it, we are conscious of it as now and here and under our inspection. In Representative Knowledge there is an object now present, representing an absent object. Thus I may have an image or conception of Venice, with its decaying beauty, and this is now present and under the eye of consciousness; but it represents something absent and distant, of the existence of which I am at the same time convinced. When I was actually in Venice, and

gazed on its churches and palaces rising out of the waters, there would have been no propriety in saying that I believe in the existence of the city, — the correct phrase would have been that I know it to exist. I know, too, that I have at this moment an idea of Venice; but as Venice itself is not before me, the proper expression of my conviction is, that I believe in its existence. I maintain that whenever we have passed beyond Presentative Knowledge, and are assured of the reality of an absent object, there faith-it may be in a very simple form, but still real faith — has entered as an element. So far as I am conscious of an imaging of the past, or a judg ing of it, or a reasoning about it, my mental state is cognition; but so far as I am convinced of the existence of the absent object, my state of mind is belief. In such examples the faith is of a low order, and need not be distinguished from knowledge, except for the purposes of rigid science; but still faith is there, and there in its essential character; and he who would know what faith is, must view it in these lower forms, " which exist more simple in their elements," as well as in the higher, just as he who would know the nature of the plant or animal must study it in the lichen or zoophyte. These are the incipient movements of a mental power which is capable of rising to the greatest heights of earth, and looking up to the heaven above, which can call before it all time, and go forth even into the eternity beyond.

According to this account we are said to know ourselves, and the objects presented to the senses and the representations (always, however, as presentations) in the mind; but to believe in objects which we have seen in time past, but which are not now present, and in objects which we have never seen, and very specially in objects which we can never fully know, such as an Infi