πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τήν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον· καὶ τοῦθ ̓ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὢν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἵσταται δέ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ ̓ ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη είναι (Anal. Post. i. 3); see also i. 22, where he says there must be principles of demonstration: τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀρχὰς εἶναι. He speaks of science and demonstration carrying us to intuition, vous (Ib. i. 23); see also ii. 19, where voûs is said to give principles: voûs ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν. He blames those who seek for a reason of those things of which there is no reason: λόγον γὰρ ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος (Metaph. iii. 6). 6. He appeals to catholic consent, adding that those who reject this faith will find nothing more trustworthy: ὅ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τουτ ̓ εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ ̓ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα épeî (Eth. Nic. x. 2). 7. He draws the distinction between two classes of truths. We believe all things, either through syllogism or from induction: ἅπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς (Anal. Prior. ii. 23). Το nature, the syllogism is the prior and the more known; but to us, that which is through induction is the more palpable: Φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλο γισμός, ἡμῖν δ ̓ ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς (1.; compare Eth. Nic. vi. 3). In explaining this, he says that he calls “ things prior and more knowable to us " those which are nearer to sense, and "things prior and more knowable simply " those which are more remote; but those things which are universal belong to the most remote, and those which are singular, to the nearest: Λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἁπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωρισ μώτερα τὰ ποῤῥώτερον· ἔστι δὲ ποῤῥωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ ̓ ἕκαστα (Anal. Post. i. 2). But the question is started, How does the human mind, which must begin with the singulars, as better known to it, reach the universal ? He seems to say, in the following passage, we reach universal truth through induction: Μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει· ἔστι δ ̓ ἢ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ ̓ ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι ̓ ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι υπάρχει ἑκάστη γένει ἔνια, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ᾖ τοιονδ ̓ ἕκαστον ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον· τῶν γὰρ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεὶν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δί ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως (Ib. i. 18; cf. Eth. Nic. vi. 3). All these are important principles. But how does he reconcile them? How in particular does he reconcile his doctrine that universals are gained by induction with his statement as to the mind having a voûs which looks at principles? There are passages in his Metaphysics which show that such questions had been before his

mind. The question is put whether first principles are universal, or as singulars of things; and the further and most important question, whether they subsist in capacity or in energy, that is, whether they exist virtually or in act: Ποτερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθόλου εἰσίν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθ ̓ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καί δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ (Metaph. ii. 1 ; ed. Bonitz). I have already quoted (on page 35) his declaration that the soul is the place of forms, not in readiness for action, but in capacity: OĎTE ἐντελέχεια ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη. In another passage he seems to answer, that those things which are predicated of individuals are first principles rather than the genera, but adds that it would not be easy to express how one should conceive these first principles: 'Ek μèv obv τούτων μᾶλλον φαίνεται τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορούμενα ἀρχαὶ εἶναι τῶν γενῶν· πάλιν δὲ πῶς αὖ δεῖ ταύτας ἀρχὰς ὑπολαβεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴπειν. For this statement he gives reasons which lead him to the conclusion that the universals which are predicated of individuals are principles in the ratio of their universality, and that the very highest generalizations must be emphatically principles: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν δεῖ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ὢν ἀρχή, καὶ δύνασθαι εἶναι χωριζομένην αὐτῶν· μοιοῦτον δέ τι παρὰ τὸ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον εἶναι διὰ τί ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι, πλὴν ὅτι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται καὶ κατὰ πάντων; ἀλλὰ μήν, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο, τὰ μᾶλλον καθόλου μᾶλλον θετέον ἀρχάς· ὥστε ἀρχαὶ τὰ πρῶτ ̓ ἂν εἴησαν γένη (Ib. ii. 3). There are points of connection not brought out in this stateBut we are not rashly to charge Aristotle with an inconsistency. I believe that his statement as to first truths and syllogism and his statement as to the universality of induction are both true. But he has not drawn the distinction between first principles as forms in the mind, and as individual convictions, and as laws got by induction; nor has he seen how the self-evidence and necessity, being in the singulars, goes up into the universals when (but only when) the induction is properly formed.

ment.

IV. THE STOICS were the first, so far as is known, to lay down the principle that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses (see Origen, contra Celsum, Book VII.). But those who quote this statement often forget that the Stoics placed in the mind a ruling principle (yeμoviêòv), and maintained that we have innate èvvolaι and poλhes. According to Cicero, Topica, they held by a notion," insitam et ante perceptam cujusque formæ cognitionem enodatione indigentem." Diogenes Laertius represents them as maintaining ἔστι δ ̓ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννινα φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. These two doctrines of the Stoics are not inconsistent. The supposition that they must be so led to Brucker's criticism in Historia Critica de

Zenone, of Lipsius' account in Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam. It is quite conceivable that there may be a ruling principle and an anticipative notion in the mind, and yet that all our notions may arise from sense; only it is not true, as Locke has shown, that all our ideas come from sense, for many of them are derived from the inward sense or reflection. The Stoics represented the notions as "obscuras et inchoatas, adumbratas, complicatas, involutas" (Cicero, De Legibus; see Lipsius, Manud. ii. 11). In Epictetus, vii. 22, we have examples of the Stoic preconception as that good is advantageous, eligible, and to be pursued, and that justice is fair and becoming.

V. THE EPICUREANS are usually represented as denying everything innate. But it is quite certain that they held by a πрóληyıs, as implied in all intelligence, investigation, and discussion: "Id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quaeri, nec disputari potest." This prolepsis gives a prenotion of the gods which is innate, and has in its behalf universal consent: "Cum enim non instituto aliquo, aut more, aut lege, sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio; intelligi necesse est, esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas, cognitiones habemus. De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est" (Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i. 17).

VI. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY is an original but by no means a clear thinker; he is certainly not a graceful writer. In his treatise De Veritate, he maintains that truth is discoverable in consequence of there being an analogy of things to our minds. He finds in the soul four faculties: 1. Natural Instinct, "sive sensus qui ex facultatibus communes notitias confirmantibus oritur." 2. The Internal Sense. 3. The External Sense; and 4. The Discursive Power. Whatever is not revealed through these faculties cannot be known by man, but he insists that what is known is in the things, and that man can know realities. Under Natural Instinct he treats of Common Notions, Koval évvolal, and specifies six marks: 1. Their priority, the natural instinct being the first to act, and the discursive faculty the last. 2. Their independence, that is, of every other. 3. Their universality, giving universal consent. 4. Their certainty, which allows not of doubt. 5. Their necessity, which he explains as their tendency towards the preservation of men (a very unsatisfactory account of this characteristic). 6. The immediacy of their operation. His exposition of the Internal Sense is not very clear; but under it he treats of the conscience which he describes as

sensus communis sensuum internorum," and as discovering what is good and evil, and what ought to be done. Passing over his account of the External Senses and the Discursive Power, we may mention his Common Notions about religion. They are, that there is a Supreme Deity; that he ought to be worshipped; that virtue with piety should be main part of the worship; that there is in the mind a horror of crime which should lead to repentance; and that there are rewards and punishments in another life. Under this system I would remark: a, that Herbert does not see that Natural Instinct runs through all the faculties; b, he does not accurately distinguish between Natural Instinct and the Common Notions, nor see that in the formation of the latter there is an exercise of the Discursive Power; c, while he has caught a vague view of the more important characteristics of our intuitions, he has not apprehended them closely, and he fails in the application of his own tests.

VII. THE ENGLISH DIVINES OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, both High Church and Puritan, often discuss the question as between Aristotle and Plato (not as between Locke and Descartes), as to the nature of ideas, and throw out views in which there is much truth, but also much confusion. They held that there is something in the mind, and born with it, which is deeper than sense and experience. Thus Dr. Jackson, in A Treatise concerning the Original of Unbelief, Misbelief, or Mispersuasion concerning the Veritie, Unitie, and Attributes of the Deity (1625), inquires what truth there is in the Platonic theory of ideas and reminiscence, and cannot just agree with those who maintain that there are notions in the soul like letters written with the juice of onions, and ready to come forth on certain applications being made to them. His doctrine is, "The soul of man being created after the image of God (in whom are all things), though of an indivisible and immortal nature, hath notwithstanding such a virtual similitude of all things as the eye hath of colors, the ear of sounds, or the common sense of these and other sensibles, woven by the finger of God in its essential constitution or intimate indissoluble temper.' The Cambridge Platonists all maintained that there was something in the soul prior to sense, but requiring sense to call it forth, and were fond of describing this as 99 connate or "connatural." H. More states the question, "Whether the soul of man be a rasa tabula, or whether she have innate notions and ideas in herself?" He answers, "For so it is that she having first occasion of thinking from external objects, it has so imposed on some men's judgments, that they have conceited that the

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soul has no knowledge nor notion, but what is in a passive way impressed or delineated upon her from the objects of sense; they not warily enough distinguishing between extrinsical occasions and the adequate or principal causes of things." "Nor will that prove anything to the purpose when it shall be alleged that this notion is not so connatural and essential to the soul because she framed it from some occasions from without." In modification he allows, "I do not mean that there is a certain number of ideas as glaring and shining to the animadversive faculty, like so many torches or stars in the firmament to our outward sight, or that there are any figures that take their distinct places, and are legibly writ there like the red letters or astronomical characters in an almanac " (Antidote against Atheism). Culverwel says, "You must not, nor cannot, think that nature's law is confined and contracted within the compass of two or three common notions, but reason, as with one foot it fixes a centre, so with the other it measures and spreads out a circumference; it draws several conclusions, which do all meet and crowd into these first and central principles. As in those noble mathematical sciences there are not only some first airhuara which are granted as soon as they are asked, if not before, but there are also whole heaps of firm and immovable demonstrations that are built upon them." He talks of a "" connate notion of a Deity, but then he shows that there is a process of the understanding in it, "so that no other innate light but only the power of knowing and reasoning is the 'candle of the Lord'" (Light of Nature, pp. 82, 127, 128. Edition by Brown and Cairns). Cudworth stands up for an immutable morality discovered by reason, and distinguishes, like More, between occasion and cause (see infra, Part III. Book 1. Chap. ii. sect. vi.). The Puritans generally appealed to first principles, intellectual and moral. Thus Baxter says (Reasons of the Christian Religion, p. 1), "And if I could not answer a sceptic who denied the certainty of my judgment by sensation and reflexive intuition [how near to Locke], yet nature would not suffer me to doubt." "By my actions I know that I am; and that I am a sentient, intelligent, thinking, willing, and operative being." "It is true that there is in the nature of man's soul a certain aptitude to understand certain truths as soon as they are revealed, that is, as soon as the very natura rerum is observed. And it is true that this disposition is brought to actual knowledge as soon as the mind comes to the actual consideration of things. But it is not true that there is any actual knowledge of any principle born in man." It is wrong to "make it consist in certain axioms (as some