Wakefield vs. Ross. in the conveyance from Greene to the defendant, Ross, would not include all the land to the Ridge hill, of which the defendant, Ross, is in possession. He has been obliged, therefore, to resort to a construction of the deed to Ross, which would limit the conveyance to him to thirty acres only by admeasurement, rejecting all the accompanying parts of the description of the premises. In this construction also he has failed. And in the last place the objection of a disseizin of Bradley Greene at the time of the conveyance in 1825 is decisive against any right of recovery under that conveyance, even if every other objection were removed. Verdict for the defendant on both pleas, and judgment accordingly. CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. BEFORE Spring Circuit. MASSACHUSETTS, MAY TERM 1828, AT BOSTON. Hon. JOSEPH STORY, Associate Judge of the Supreme Court. UNITED STATES US. ALEXANDER Drew. Where a person is insane at the time he commits a murder, he is not punishable as a murderer, although such insanity be remotely occasioned by undue indulgence in spirituous liquors. But it is otherwise, if he be at the time intoxicated, and his insanity be directly caused by the immediate influence of such liquors. INDICTMENT for the murder of Charles L. Clark on the high seas on board of the American ship John Jay, of which Drew was master, and Clark was second mate. Plea, general issue. At the trial the principal facts were not contested. But the defence set up was the insanity of the prisoner at the time of committing the homicide. It appeared, that for a considerable time before the fatal act, Drew had been in the habit of indulging himself in very gross and almost continual drunkenness ; that about five days before it took place, he ordered all the liquor on board to be thrown overboard, which was accordingly done. He soon afterwards began to betray great restlessness, uneasiness, fretfulness and irritability; expressed his fear that the crew intended to murder him; and complained of persons, who were unseen, talking to him, and urging him to kill Clark; and his dread of United States vs. Drew. so doing. He could not sleep, but was in almost constant motion during the day and night. The night before the act, he was more restless than usual, seemed to be in great fear, and said, that whenever he laid down there were persons threatening to kill him, if he did not kill the mate, &c. &c. In short, he exhibited all the marked symptoms of the disease brought on by intemperance, called delirium tremens. case. Upon the closing of the evidence, the Court asked Blake, the District Attorney, if he expected to change the posture of the He admitted, that unless upon the facts, the Court were of opinion, that this insanity, brought on by the antecedent drunkenness, constituted no defence for the act, he could not expect success in the prosecution.1 After some consultation the opinion of the Court was delivered as follows. STORY J. We are of opinion, that the indictment upon these admitted facts cannot be maintained. The prisoner was unquestionably insane at the time of committing the offence. And the question made at the bar is, whether insanity, whose remote cause is habitual drunkenness, is, or is not, an excuse in a court of law for a homicide committed by the party, while so insane, but not at the time intoxicated or under the influence of liquor. We are clearly of opinion, that insanity is a competent excuse in such a case. In general, insanity is an excuse for the commission of every crime, because the party has not the possession of that reason, which includes responsibility. An exception is, when the crime is committed by a party while in a fit of intoxication, the law not permitting a man to avail himself of the excuse of his own gross vice and misconduct, to shelter himself from the legal consequences of such crime. But the crime must take place and be the immediate re 1 See 1 Hale P. C. 29, 36.—1 Russell P. C. 11.-19 State Trials, 946. -3 Paris and Troutt. 140.-Haslam on Insanity, 50.-Coates, 34.Armstrong, 372.-Cooper Med. Jurisp. 10.—Arnold on Insanity, 67. United States vs. Drew. sult of the fit of intoxication, and while it lasts; and not, as in this case, a remote consequence, superinduced by the antecedent exhaustion of the party, arising from gross and habitual drunkenness. However criminal in a moral point of view such an indulgence is, and however justly a party may be responsible for his acts arising from it to Almighty God, human tribunals are generally restricted from punishing them, since they are not the acts of a reasonable being. Had the crime been committed while Drew was in a fit of intoxication, he would have been liable to be convicted of murder. As he was not then intoxicated, but merely insane from an abstinence from liquor, he cannot be pronounced guilty of the offence. The law looks to the immediate, and not to the remote cause; to the actual state of the party, and not to the causes, which remotely produced it. Many species of insanity arise remotely from what in a moral view is a criminal neglect or fault of the party, as from religious melancholy, undue exposure, extravagant pride, ambition, &c. Yet such insanity has always been deemed a sufficient excuse for any crime done under its influence. D. Davis and Basset for the prisoner. Verdict, not guilty. UNITED STATES vs. EDWARD CLARKE AND OTHERS. Under the Tariff act of 22d of May 1824, ch. 136, bombazines, being goods of which wool is a component material, are liable to pay a duty of 30 per cent. THIS was a writ of error from the District Court. The original action was debt on a bond for duties on goods imported in the Mercury, Birt master, from London, in the common form. The bond was dated on the 5th of September 1826. Plea of a tender of $151.18 on the day of payment of the duties, in United States vs. Clarke et al. full of the duties, specifying the goods, and the duties payable on each kind, and among them bombazines of the value, with the charges, of £67. Os. 10d., on which the duties amounted to $65.49; that is to say, 20 per cent ad valorem increased by the addition of ten per centum of said amount in value. Replication, that the bombazines were a manufacture of which wool was and is a component part, and are by law subject to a duty of 33 per cent, with the addition of ten per cent, &c. Demurrer and joinder. Judgment for the defendants, on which the writ of error was brought. The cause was argued by G. Blake, District Attorney, for the United States, and by F. Dexter for the defendants. STORY J. This is a writ of error from a judgment of the District Court of Massachusetts District, in a suit on the common bond given to secure the duties on certain foreign goods imported in the Mercury from London. It is unnecessary to consider the pleadings, because the parties have agreed, that the cause shall be decided upon its merits; and in this view alone has it been argued at the bar. The whole controversy turns upon the question, what duty is payable on bombazines of foreign manufacture imported into the United States under the act, commonly called the Tariff act of 22d May 1824, ch. 136. That act imposes "on all manufactures of wool, or of which wool shall be a component part, except worsted stuff goods and blankets, which shall pay 25 per cent ad valorem, a duty of 30 per cent, ad valorem,”. &c. In a subsequent clause of the same section, it imposes "on all manufactures of silk, or of which silk shall be a component material, coming from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, a duty of 25 per cent ad valorem; on all other manufactures of silk, or of which silk shall be à component material, 20 per cent ad valorem." Non-enumerated articles pay a duty of 15 per cent ad valorem. |