The Schooner Ruby. "4. That the defendant shall be entitled to take out any commission to meet such testimony after inspection, so that the cause may be heard at the next term." Shepley, District Attorney, now moved the Court to enlarge the rule, so as to allow new evidence, which had come to the knowledge of the District Attorney since the former order of the Court had been complied with, to be taken under the commission, and admitted in the cause. Emery, for the claimants, objected, upon the ground that the application was not justified by the former order of the Court, which, having been made with the assent of the District Attorney, was conclusive. STORY J. We are of opinion that the former order of the Court ought not to govern us under the circumstances of the present application. It would be conclusive as to any testimony known to the District Attorney, and which might have been taken by him under the authority of the former order. But this is the case of new evidence discovered since that order was made, and not in the contemplation of the parties when the former commission was executed. It is therefore the common case of an application by the party, to avail himself of new evidence material to the merits, where there has been no prior knowledge, and of course no laches on his part to affect his rights. Even after a trial, Courts of law are in the habit of granting new trials under circumstances of this sort. And if so, there can be no just reason why the application should not be entertained in a suit in Admiralty, addressing itself to the sound discretion of the Court. The former must be necessarily restrained in its operation to evidence antecedently existing and known to the District Attorney, so that it might be taken under the former commission. Motion granted. CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Spring Circuít. MASSACHUSETTS, MAY TERM 1830, at BOSTON. BEFORE (Hon. JOSEPH STORY, Associate Judge of the Supreme Court. UNITED STATES vs. SHADRick Keen. It is no defence to an indictment for forcibly obstructing or impeding an officer of the Customs in the discharge of his duties, that the object of the party was personal chastisement, and not to obstruct or impede the officer in the discharge of his duties, if he knew the officer to be so engaged. INDICTMENT against the defendant, for forcibly obstructing and impeding one James Gooch, an officer of the Customs, and an Inspector, in the discharge of the duties of his office, against the act of 1799, ch. 128, § 71; act of 3d of March 1815, ch. 246, 3; and act of 3d of March 1823, ch. 186, § 3. Plea, not guilty. At the trial it was admitted that Gooch was an Inspector of the Customs, and known as such by the defendant. Evidence was also before the jury for the purpose of showing, that Gooch, while in the actual discharge of his duty as inspector, in superintending the unlading some goods on board of a vessel in the port of Boston, was, upon some sudden quarrel between the parties, assaulted and struck several times by the defendant. United States vs. Keen. Welsh, for the defendant, contended, that it was not sufficient that there was an actual obstruction of the inspector in the discharge of his duties, but the assault must be, not for the purpose of personal chastisement, but with intent to obstruct him in his duties. Dunlap, è contra. STORY J., in summoning up to the jury, said,- The Court are clearly of opinion that the argument of the defendant's counsel upon the point of law, cannot be maintained. To constitute an obstruction or impediment within the meaning of the act, it is not necessary that the party should intend to obstruct or impede the officer in the discharge of his duties. If the officer is in fact obstructed or impeded in the discharge of his duties by a person, knowing him to be an officer, then engaged in his duties, the case is within the act. It is wholly immaterial that the party has another object in view, to avenge a supposed wrong or affront, or to inflict a personal chastisement. The law intends to protect public officers, while in the discharge of their duties, from all violence and forcible impediments. That is not the time or place to avenge private quarrels. The security of the revenue, as well as the convenience of merchants, requires that such a protection should exist. The fact of forcible impediment, and not the private intent of the party, if the fact is unjustifiable, constitutes the offence in contemplation of law. Verdict, guilty. United States vs. Amory. UNITED STATES vs. JONATHAN AMORY. Where there is a general assignment of a debtor's property, for the benefit of creditors, and the priority of the United States attaches, they having various debts due by bonds, with different sureties, all payments made by the assignees are to be applied pro rata to all the debts of the United States; and the latter are not at liberty to apply the payments in any other manner, without the consent of all the parties in interest. T 'HIS was a bill in equity. The facts arising in the cause are fully stated in the opinion of the Court. It was spoken to at several times by Dunlap, District Attorney, for the United States; by F. G. Loring, for Dexter and Holbrook & Dexter; by Merrill & Samuel Hubbard, for Daniel Appleton; and by William Sullivan, for Jonathan Amory. STORY J. The present bill in equity is an amicable suit brought against Jonathan Amory Jr., surviving assignee of the firm of Jonathan Amory & Jonathan Amory Jr., as assignees of Messrs. Adams & Amory, for an account, and to compel satisfaction of certain debts due to the United States, for which the United States have a right of priority of payment, out of the funds in the hands of the assignees. Messrs. Adams & Amory became insolvent in May, 1826, and on the 25th of that month made an assignment of their property and effects to certain persons, for the payment of their creditors, and these persons having declined, the Messrs. Amory, the defendants in the bill, succeeded to the trust. There is no difficulty on the part of the assignees, in rendering an account of the monies received by them; and they have already paid into Court the sum of $20,433.60, which is all that at present they can properly account for, there being still some outstanding claims in litigation. The real question is, in what manner the sum so paid in, shall be appropriated by the Court towards satisfaction of the debts due to the United States, the same having arisen from various custom-house bonds, United States vs. Amory. on which there are various sureties, who have an interest in the appropriation. The assignees alone are regularly before the Court, as parties; but all the sureties having consented to be bound by such decree as the Court may make, and having desired a final settlement of the question, and the District Attorney having agreed to that course, I have thought it my duty to proceed to make such a decree, especially as the point is raised in the answer of the assignees. The assignment of Messrs. Adams & Amory, after reciting that it is made to secure certain creditors, indorsers, sureties, and guarantors, for their debts and liabilities, conveys all their estate and effects &c. to the assignees for sale, and after deducting charges and expenses, to apply the proceeds, first, to the payment of certain preferred debts and liabilities, mentioned in a schedule annexed to it, pari passu; and afterwards to all other creditors, &c. pari passu; and the surplus, if any, to hold in trust for the assignors. And the further usual powers are given to the assignees. It is observable that no notice whatsoever is taken in this instrument of debts due to the United States; but it being the intention of the parties that all custom-house bonds should be paid before any debts due to private creditors, a supplemental instrument to that effect was drawn up and executed on the 2d of June following, and was signed by all the parties who had previously signed the original assignment, except one, who is not understood to dissent from it. On the 6th of the same month, the defendants were in due form substituted as assignees. At the time of their failure, Messrs. Adams & Amory were indebted to the United States upon custom-house bonds, upwards of 92,500 dollars, and upon these bonds there were various sureties. All of these bonds became due after the assignment; and upon the principal part of them, judgments have been obtained by the United States against the principals and sureties, as stated in the bill. Upon some of these bonds, Messrs. Holbrook & Dexter, and others, were sureties; upon others, Daniel Appleton was |