tion, but interferes with the legitimate enterprise of other railroads. These scrambles are lawless, vicious, riotous. They injure the parties to them and disturb every other industry. A merchant in Chicago purchases goods in New York, and they are shipped at the prevailing rates. A large portion of his capital may be invested. In a day or two war begins between some of the trunk lines. Rates are cut down by one road and then another retaliates by cutting them down still more, and the unseemly wrangle continues until the rates are little more than nominal. The merchant finds himself unable to compete with other merchants who have shipped at these nominal rates during the war. He is greatly damaged ; perhaps ruined. Then the war ceases and the usual freight tariff is imposed. It is needless to say that business enterprise is paralyzed by the uncertainty thus created. Sometimes millions are spent in these hurtful contests by the roads. The injury to the public cannot be estimated. No man or body of men have any right thus to use their property. Is a government which looks quietly on and permits it, altogether respectable? Neither our railroads nor the government can control the magnitude of the wheat crop in Russia, nor the rate of transportation from Odessa to Liverpool, nor the volume of business in our own borders; but is it not a confession of wickedness on the part of the railroads, and of weakness on the part of government, to say that there is no help for a railroad war? Will it be said that these wars are undertaken for the general good? Some charitable economists say, "Let the roads alone; these matters will regulate themselves." Yes, all conflicts will regulate themselves in time, and order will reign as it reigned in Warsaw.

A third evil, near akin to those already mentioned, and, in some degree growing out of them, is sudden changes in rates. A variety of economic and other causes often dictate a change in rates. Some harm must inevitably come of these changes; but this should be reduced to a minimum, and all arbitrary action, in that regard, forbidden.

A fourth and very great evil is the engaging by railroads,

and their directors and officers, in enterprises and speculations other than the business of transportation, the success of which depends on the rates of transportation fixed by themselves. This leads to discrimination in their own favor, and a consequent monopoly of some branches of industry. The anthracite coal combination is a good illustration. By this several roads secured the ownership of seventy-five per cent of the anthracite coal fields of the country, and, consequently, the control both of the production and the transportation of this commodity. (Report on Internal Commerce, 1879.) Speculation in grain is another instance. Perhaps these might be unobjectionable if all discriminations were forbidden. But, at present, the roads, with their vast capital and influence, may defy competition, and ruin small dealers and crush the beginnings of enterprise.

And the last evil I shall notice is what are known as apportionment schemes or combinations among the companies. The professed object of these is to prevent railroad wars; and it is claimed that they are an improvement on the system of transportation. The great and leading objection to them is that they usurp the proper and exclusive functions of government, and establish a dangerous power which threatens to place itself beyond control and above the reach of the law. I am aware that a very eminent authority in these matters (Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Jr.) makes light of this danger and calls it a "spectre." spectre." He would not only encourage them but give them a legal existence and sanction. But I cannot think this the course of true wisdom. If, as he says, the only alternative is a survival of the fittest, then the plan might be adopted as a choice of evils and as the lesser of two great dangers. Combinations will be made, it is said, if not openly and lawfully, then secretly and unlawfully. If this be true, sovereignty no longer abides with the government or with the people. Here is a power to which it must be conceded. Mr. Adams' position is, in plain terms, this: The railroads must and will have their way; not that he would give so much to them, but that it is inevitable in the development of modern

industry and society. If this be true all legislation is utterly useless; the Government is powerless to protect its citizens. We might as well let public opinion fight out its losing battle with the railroads, at once, and then all will be quiet. Mr. Adams says, justly perhaps, that the great underlying cause of existing evils of transportation is excessive and unregulated competition. I do not see how it is possible under our institutions, if we wish to preserve them, to adopt the remedy he proposes. To escape present ills he would have a federation of corporations wielding truly imperial powers. A federation commanding the activity, energy and brains of two hundred and fifty thousand men, and five billions of capital, and controlling eighty thousand miles of railroad, and upon which the internal and foreign commerce of the country is largely dependent, cannot be contemplated without great concern. And Mr. Adams himself says the character of these quarter of a million officials is hardly better than that of a race of horse jockeys on a large scale. The Southern Confederacy, in its best days, never wielded a greater power. True, it is proposed to make this federation subject to the law and the government. But how? Does any sober-minded man doubt that this vast interest will have a voice in the enactment and enforcement of laws affecting its action? It is idle to suppose that the vote of its officers and employes will represent its strength, even were those votes impartially cast. We cannot escape the belief, that with the rapid increase of railroad development, and its tendency to concentration of power in the hands of one, or at least a few men, the government would be overshadowed and become a mere puppet in the grasp of this federation. If it is held in check by any it will only be with its own consent. Already the railroads, single-handed, exercise a dangerous political power. A prominent railroad man testified before the investigating committee in New York, "in a republican district, I was republican; in a democratic district, I was a democrat; in a doubtful district, I was doubtful; but I was always Erie." The money paid by the public for transportation, instead of being paid for interest on bonded indebtedness and dividends on stock, is

law,

used by the corporations to influence legislation, and much of the corruption of men in public life may be traced directly to this source. The committee appointed by the legislature of the State of New York, in 1872, to investigate the affairs of the Erie railroad, say: "It is further in evidence, that it has been the custom of the managers of the Erie Railway, from year to year, in the past, to spend large sums to control elections and to influence legislation." Mr. Gould, when examined in relation to vouchers, admitted the payment, during the three years prior to 1872, of large sums to Barber, Tweed and others, and to influence legislation or elections; and said that he had been in the habit of sending money into the numerous districts all over the State, either to control nominations or elections of senators and members of the Assembly. And these operations extended into four different States. (Report on Internal Commerce, 1879, Appendix, p. 13.) Pooling schemes and combinations, with or without legal sanction, increase the facilities for such corrupt operations. The tendency of legislation should be towards the dispersion instead of the concentration of such dangerous power. The possession of power is attended with irresistible temptations to use it. This is so where there is a system of checks and balances, as between the executive and legislative branches of the government. One has a continual tendency to encroach upon the other. But no power of modern times is so active and aggressive as concentrated corporate power. Prompted by self and corporate interest, without check or restraint, beyond the reach of compassion or ethical principles, entirely forgetful of all rights save its own, subtle and insinuating in its methods, it moves on with resistless force. Much has been said of public opinion. Corporate power seldom feels the force of criticism as individuals may be made to do, and besides it can organize public opinion. It can have its journals and spokesmen, able and wary, and if it does not always crush adverse comment, it strongly and subtly presents the "other side," and breaks the darts that may be hurled. The greater power afforded by combinations, legal or otherwise, will be used to add impetus to its operations; and I

cannot doubt that the end must be the subserviency of the government. It seems inexpedient for the government to permit a struggle for the mastery among the railroads, as it certainly is inexpedient to place the railroads in a position where they will inevitably enter into a struggle for a mastery of the government itself. I say inevitably, because two rival powers cannot occupy the same ground, however well intentioned they may be, without a conflict sooner or later. There are some lesser evils arising out of apportionment schemes which might be tolerated, in view of the greater evils of discrimination and war, if the government were really impotent. But as no patriotic citizen can admit that his government is impotent, corrective legislation seems to be demanded. And important among these evils is instability. The great desideratum is uniform, steady and reasonable rates. Absolute perfection in this regard is impossible, from constantly recurring economical changes; but disagreements, the construction of new roads, the consolidation of other lines, to say nothing of "cutting of rates" and other breaches of faith, render the "pools" uncertain in duration and effects, and lead or tend to frequent disruptions. Then shippers are deprived of a choice of lines. The superintendent of the pool determines the route the shipment shall take. It may be thus sent by an unreliable line, whose time is longer than others, which refuses to settle promptly for losses, and which is managed by a set of disobliging and insolent officials. Shippers may prefer to pay more freight and have, in return, promptness, faithfulness, civility and moral and pecuniary responsibility. Here is a great evil of combinations. That skill, industry, honesty, economic management, prompt delivery, polite consideration for the rights and comfort of the public, which is directly, perhaps absolutely, dependent on competition, is entirely lost by combinations. It is no unimportant matter that to increased injury insult may be added, if the law sanctions these railroad federations.

But I must take leave of the enumeration of ills. A volume would be necessary to relate them all, with their effects,