« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
(115 U. S. 29)
(May 4, 1885.)
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.
J. S. Beach, J. K. Beach, and E. J. Phelps, for plaintiff in error. C. R. Ingersoll and John W. Alling, for defendant in error.
MILLER, J. The case was submitted to the court without a jury, and the* question to be decided here is whether on the finding of facts the judgment for plaintiff below is right. The action was brought by the railroad company on the following agreement:
"NEW HAVEN, January 31, 1880. “James Murchie, Esq., V. Prest. N. Brunswick & Canada R. R.-DEAR SIR: We have this day bought of you, as representative of the New Brunswick & Canada R. R. Co., one thousand tons old rails, for delivery in New York or New Haven, (at our option,) at $30, without duty, and delivery to be before August 1st; and also two (2) to six hundred tons, for delivery in New York or New Haven, between August 1st and October 1st, at $28, without duty. Terms in each case cash ag'st B. L., and insurance policy in satisfactory company, Very resp’y,
E. S. WHEELER & Co."
"NEW HAVEN, January 31, '80. "8. Wheeler & Co., New Haven: We hereby accept your order of this date, and will deliver rails at place, and on terms named. Resp.,
"NEW BRUNSWICK & CANADA R. R. Co.,
“JAMES MURCHIE, V. Prest.”
There was a tender of the rails by the railroad company, and a refusal to receive or pay for them by Wheeler & Co. The court finds as a matter of fact that the contract was a valid contract, and that Murchie had authority to make it on behalf of the company. The controversy in the case grows out of the following correspondence subsequent to the making of the contract by the execution and delivery of the foregoing papers:
"ST. STEPHEN, February 17, 1880. “Mess. E. 8. Wheeler & Co., New Haven-DEAR SIRS: I herewith inclose a copy of resolution passed at our meeting of directors yesterday. This confirmed the sale 'made by me to you' by the company, which was done on my arrival home. The car-wheels and chains that we had on hand were sold before I came home. We will have a large quantity by the time we ship our rails. “Please acknowledge the above.
"JAMES MURCHIE.” "NEW BRUNSWICK & CANADA RAILROAD COMPANY. "Minute of a resolution passed at a directors' meeting, February 16, 1880.
"Resolved, that the following sale of old rails, made by Mr. James Murchie to Messrs. E. S. Wheeler & Co., New Haven, Connecticut, be confirmed: Sold Messrs. E. S. Wheeler & Co. one thousand tons of old rails, for delivery in New York or New Haven, at their option, before August the 1st next, at thirty dollars ($30) per ton of 2,000 lbs., the duty to be paid by Wheeler & Co., and also two hundred to six hundred tons, for delivery in New York or New Haven between August 1st and October 1st, at twenty-eight ($28) per
18. C. 12 Fed. Rep. 377.
ton of 2,000 lbs., the duty to be paid by Wheeler & Co. In each case cash against invoice bill of lading. Insurance policy in satisfactory company.
F. H. TODD, Pres."
"NEW HAVEN, February 28, 1880. “James Murchie, Esq., Vice-Prest. New Brunswick & Canada R. R. Co., St. Stephens, Canada–DEAR SIR: We received duly your favor of the seventeenth inst., inclosing what purports to be a certified copy of a resolution adopted by the directors of the N. B. & C. R. R. Co., in reference to the sale of old rails made by you on behalf of that company to us on the thirty-first ulto. We assume that this resolution was passed merely as a matter of form, and a copy has been sent to us for our information solely, as no mention was made at the time of the negotiations that you acted subject to any approval by your company. We understood then, and understand now, that the sale made at that time on behalf of your company was an absolute and final unconditional sale. We do not understand, further, that this resolution was forwarded to us with the view of in any way modifying that sale in any of its terms. Furthermore, we understood at the time, and now understand, that the number of pounds in each ton of this contract, there being no contrary specification when the contract was made, was not 2,000 but 2,240. Old rails, like other scrap and like pig-iron, are bought and sold by the gross ton, not only in this market but in every foreign market. The custom of the trade fixing 2,240 as the standard number of pounds in a ton of old rails is universal, and can be excluded from operating on contracts only by distinct conditions fixing some other quantity: No such conditions were mentioned in the contract of your company with us, and we look, therefore, for the delivery of the rails within the dates named in the contract of your company, and in ' .net'tons. We make no doubt but that your understanding of that contract is in accord with ours, and that in so far as this resolution fixes a different number of pounds for each ton, that it so fixes them by an oversight on the part of the directors. We hope to hear froin you at your early convenience.
“Very truly yours,
“E. S. WHEELER.”
No answer was made to this letter, nor was any further correspondence had until June 14th, when the railroad company notified Wheeler & Co. by letter, that they had the 1,000 tons of old rails ready for delivery, and added:
"In your letter to James Murchie, as vice-president of our company,of February 28th last, you construe the contract as meaning that the ton of rails specified in that contract is 2,240 lbs., or the gross ton; now, without waiving any of our rights under that contract, but to avoid dispute, we tender you the delivery of the thousand tons at gross weight of 2,240 lbs. to the ton, and ask your determination whether the delivery shall be made at New Haven or New York.
NEW BRUNSWICK & CANADA RAILROAD Co.
"By F. A. PIKE, Special Agent."
* To which reply was made by the plaintiffs in error as follows
"NEW HAVEN, June 15, 1880. “New Brunswick & Canada Railroad Co.-GENTLEMEN: Your letter of yesterday advising us that you are ready to deliver to us 1,000 tons of old rails, and asking us to designate a port of delivery, is received. As we do not recognize the existence of any such contract of sale as your letter contemplates, we have no instructions to offer upon the subject. It is true that we tried last winter to buy of you 1,000 gross tons of old rails at a price which would have netted us a large profit; but this we had to lose, as your company insisted that they were selling net tons, and no contract resulted upon which we could base our sales. Very truly yours,
E. S. WHEELER & Co.”
A similar correspondence took place between the parties in August, in ref. erence to the 600 tons tendered by the railroad company under the clause of the contract for two to six hundred tons to be delivered in that month. The court finds as a fact that each of the parties, at the time the contract was made, understood that the word “tons” meant tons of 2,240 pounds, and there was no misunderstanding between said persons (Wheeler and Murchie) as to the true intent and meaning of the contract. The court also finds that Murchie was duly authorized to make the contract on behalf of his company, and it rendered judgment for the plaintiff. (1) It is assigned for error that no legal contract between the parties to the action was established. (2) That if any contract existed at any time, the defendant in error was estopped from setting it up as against the plaintiffs in error by the pleadings and by the facts proved. (3) If such contract existed, it was repudiated and terminated by the defendant in error in such manner as to discharge the plaintiffs in error from further obligation. (4) Damages were more than plaintiff was entitled to recover.
As regards the first of these propositions, it is sufficient to say that the circuit court finds as a fact that there was a contract made. It also finds other facts which establish that proposition beyond controversy, namely, that Murchie and Wheeler, who signed and delivered the papers which constituted the written agreement, had authority to do so and to bind the parties to their action. The agreement, on its face, makes a contract. The court finds that there was no mistake or misunderstanding between Wheeler and Murchie as to the number of pounds which the ton should contain. It is, therefore, to be taken, as the foundation of the whole case, that when these papers were signed and delivered at New Haven, January 31st, a valid and completed contract, the one on which this suit was brought, existed between the parties to the suit,
The second and third grounds of error may be considered together. What was done by the railroad company which repudiated and terminated the contract and discharged Wheeler & Co. from its obligation, or estopped the railroad company from setting it up against them? It is to be observed that to annul or set aside this contract, fairly made, requires the consent of both parties to it, as it did to make it. There must have been the same meeting of minds, the same agreement to modify or abandon it, that was necessary to make it. All that was said or done, on which reliance is placed, for that purpose, is in the two letters, one written 17 days after the contract was completed and the other 28 days afterwards. The first of these, that of Mirchie to Wheeler & Co., inclosing the resolutions of the directors of the railroad company, so far from repudiating the contract or denying its force and validity, by this resolution, in express terms, atfirms it. Though the contract needed no ratification to make it binding, the company here ratifies what its vice-president had done. In doing this, it thought proper to place its own construction on the word “ton,” as used in the contract; but neither in the resolution of the directors nor in the letter of Mr. Murchie is there the slightest intimation that a difference of opinion on this matter would be relied on as impairing the obno ligation of*the contract. If they believed that their construction was the right one, it was the simplest piece of justice and precaution to suggest it, leaving the question, as by law it must be left, to a court to construe, if the difference was insisted on by either party. Finding that Wheeler & Co. did not concur in this construction, the railroad company waived their view of it, and tendered performance in accordance with the view of the other party.
Looking now to what was said by Wheeler & Co. in reply to this, it is still clearer that they did not entertain for a moment the idea of an abandonment
or rescission of the contract; but, on the contrary, that they insisted on its continued existence, and on performance of it according to their understanding of its meaning. After stating that they did not understand that the contract needed the ratification of the company to make it valid, they say: “We understood then, and understand now, that the sale made at that time on hehalf of your company was an absolute, and final, unconditional sale. We do not understand, further, that this resolution was forwarded to us with the view of in any way modifying that sale in any of its terms." Certainly this was a fair construction of the resolution. Then, after commenting on the commercial meaning of the word “tons," which could only be varied by express conditions in the contract, they say: “No such conditions were mentioned in the contract of your company with us, and we look, therefore, for the delivery of the rails within the dates named in the contract of your company, and in 'gross' not .net'tong." They then add their belief that Murchie, to whom the letter was addressed, understood the contract as Wheeler did as to the number of pounds to the ton. The correspondence ceased here until the time for delivery of the rails arrived. Nothing more was said or done by either party during this time. The last word from each to the other was a clear assertion of the existence of a valid contract, and the very last words of the correspondence was the assertion of Wheeler & Co. that “we look for the delivery of the rails within the dates named in the contract." When, therefore, on the fourteenth of June, the railroad company notified Wheeler & Co. that they were ready to comply with the contract by delivering tons of 2,240 pounds, and requested to know whether it should be made at New York or New Haven, they must have been surprised by the letter of Wheeler & Co. denying the existence of the contract, and treating the matter as a negotiation from which no contract resulted. The contrast between this and their last letter of February 28th is indeed remarkable.
By this letter of June 14th Wheeler & Co. do not place their refusal to receive on the ground now set up by counsel, namely, that though a contract was made, it had been waived or abandoned by the parties, or by the railroad company, or that the company was estopped from enforcing it; but on the broad ground that the negotiations for the sale and purchase of the iron had failed, and had never become a contract because of the disagreement as to the difference between net and gross tons. As there was a contract, as neither party had abandoned it, or expressed any purpose to do so, Wheeler & Co. were bound to accept and pay for the rails when tendered, unless they have some other good reason for not doing so. It is said such reason is to be found in the silence of the railroad company after the receipt of the letter of Wheeler & Co. to Murchie of the twenty-eighth of February, by which the railroad company is estopped from enforcing the contract. It would be difficult to make out such an estoppel from mere silence, since nothing remained to be done by either party until the time for performance came. If the letter of Wheeler & Co. had expressed any doubt of the binding force of the contract, or had made any proposal for its modification, or had suggested a willingness to reconsider the question of weight of the tons, there might be some reason why the railroad company should have responded, and why a failure to respond might be some small evidence of want of good faith. But these letters show a determination on both sides to insist on their rights under the contract, and Wheeler & Co.'s letter left no answer to be maule unless the other party should yield its construction of the contract. It was not bound to do this. It had a right to insist on the contract, and to refer its performance of it to the courts in case it became necessary. The railroad company could, when the time for delivery of the rails came, deliver the 1,000 tons by either standard. If the other party accepted there was an end of the matter. If it did not, it could accept pro tanto, and sue for the balance, or it could refuse to accept at all. But in all this the contract would remain, and would be the measure of the rights of the parties in court or out of it. There was, therefore, no necessity for the railroad company to reply to the letter of Wheeler & Co. It was not bound to say any more than it had said as to the true meaning of the contract. There was no demand in the letter of Wheeler & Co. that the railroad company should accept its construction. There was no intimation that if this was not done the contract was at an end, or would be abandoned. Let us suppose that the price of iron had risen instead of declining during this three or four months, and the railroad company had failed to deliver, would Wheeler & Co. have lost their right of action by anything in their letters, or by the cessation of the correspondence? Clearly not. And yet, if that correspondence released one party, it must have released both. There remained no obligation, unless it was mutual. The right to deliver and require payment, and the right to require delivery, were correlative rights, one of which could not exist without the other. The judgment of the court that plaintiff was entitled to recover is right.
The objection to the amount of the recovery rests upon the contention of defendants that they were only bound by the contract for the October delivery to accept 200 tons, while the court held them bound for the difference in price for 600 tons. We concur with the circuit court in holding that when Wheeler & Co. say we have bought of you (the railroad company) “froin two (2) to six hundred tons for delivery in New York or New Haven between August 1st and October 1st” that they agreed to accept any amount of old rails between those limits. The company was selling old rails. It knew that by August it would have a thousand tons. It did not know how much more they would have by October 1st. It intended to secure the sale of what it might have, between 200 and 600 tons. Besides, as it was bound to do the first act in performance of the contract by delivering the iron, the option, if there was one, was with the railroad company. The defendants were never in condition to exercise this option, if one existed. Townsend v. Wells, 3 Day, 327; Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292; M Nitt v. Clark, 7 Johns. 465.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
(114 U. S. 698)
(May 4, 1885.) CABSAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY-STATUTES MD. 1834, CA. 241; 1835, Ch. 395;
1838, Ch. 396; AND 1844, Ch. 281--LEVY BY CREDITOR-RIGHTS OF STATE OF MARYLAND.
Under the statutes of Maryland of 1834, c. 241; 1835, C. 395; 1838, c. 396; and 1844, c. 281, and the instruments executed pursuant to those statutes,-the tolls and revenues of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Company are mortgaged to the state of Maryland, to secure the repayment of money lent by the state to the company, and the payment of dividends and interest on the stock subscribed for by the state; subject, in the first place, to the appropriation of so much of the tolls and revenues as is necessary to keep the canal in repair, to provide the necessary supply of water, and to pay the salaries of officers and annual expenses; and, in the second place, to mortgage to trustees to secure the payment of certain bonds of the company. And, at the suit in equity of the state and of such trustees, even before the state has taken possession under its mortgages, a general creditor of the company, who, at the time of contracting his debt, had notice of the provisions of the statutes and of the mortgages, will be restrained from levying on money deposited by the com
pany in a bank, and needed to meet such necessary expenses. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.
This was an appeal from a decree in equity of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland, restraining a judgment creditor of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Company from levying upon money deposited by