amended, charges, in substance, that the defendants have received and collected certain moneys belonging to the complainants and have wrongfully appropriated them to their own use. A demurrer was filed and overruled. Answers and replications were then filed, the cause was again referred to a master to take the proofs and report findings, and upon the coming in of his report the court entered a decree against the defendants, and in favor of Todd, for the sum of $1445. The Martins again appealed to the Appellate Court, where the decree was affirmed on October 26, 1903, and they prosecute a further appeal to this court. The appeal was not considered on its merits in the Appellate Court when the cause reached there the second time, as appears from the opinion of that court, which is in the words and figures following:

"The transcript of record in this cause is incomplete, and by reason thereof we cannot consider the merits of this appeal. The certificate of the clerk of the superior court is that the transcript of the record is true, perfect and complete, except in master's report, certain exhibits, two certain certificates of evidence and certain testimony, all of which are described in the clerk's certificate as being filed in his office on certain days, specifying them. The testimony, report and exhibits mentioned are also stated to have been contained in one of the certificates of evidence referred to. The transcript of the record contains a stipulation of counsel for the respective parties that the clerk of the superior court might incorporate in a transcript of the record, on appeal to this court, 'the original certificate of evidence' filed in this cause, instead of a copy. To which of the two certificates of evidence referred to in the clerk's certificate this stipulation refers we cannot determine, unless it refers to the first mentioned certificate. If it refers to the first certificate, then there is no authority to the clerk, from anything appearing in the record, to send up to this court the original of the last named certificate of evidence.

This being the state of the record, the point being made by the appellee's counsel on oral argument and urged, we are precluded from considering the merits of the case, which we would be required to do in order to determine the several questions discussed by counsel in their briefs.

"In Beth Hammidrash, etc. Congregation v. Oakwoods Cemetery Ass. 200 Ill. 480, in which the parties attempted, by stipulation, to make a part of the transcript of the record the original master's report containing the evidence taken before the master and original exhibits offered in evidence, it was held that the statute did not authorize such a practice and 'that it could not be tolerated,' citing several previous cases of this and the Supreme Court. What was done in that case is sought to be done in the case at bar. What was said in that case is true here, viz., that the 'finding of facts in the decree is ample to sustain the decree,' and a portion of the evidence not being before us, the decree must be and is affirmed because of the incomplete record."

S. A. & W. G. FRENCH, and HENRY D. BEAM, for appellants.

JAMES J. BARBOUR, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court: The testimony in this case was taken before the master. The findings of fact contained in the decree warrant the relief awarded. In the transcript of the record there is no transcript of the master's report nor of the evidence taken before him. Instead, the original master's report, including the evidence taken before him, was embodied in a certificate of evidence, the original master's report with the evidence attached, and not a copy thereof, being inserted bodily in that certificate. A stipulation was then made that the original, instead of a copy, of the certificate of evidence be incorporated in the transcript of the record, the result of which is, that

the original master's report, together with the original evidence attached, which was taken before him, is now before us and embodied in the transcript of the record.

It is urged that this case is distinguishable from Beth Hammidrash, etc. Congregation v. Oakwoods Cemetery Ass. 200 Ill. 480, for the reason that in that case the original master's report was inserted in the transcript of the record by stipulation, without any action of the court below, there being in that case no certificate of evidence, while in the case at bar there is a certificate of evidence and the master's report is included therein, and it becomes a part of that document by the action of the court and not by the act of the parties. This can make no difference. Where, as here, the evidence is all taken before the master and included in his report, a certificate of evidence is unnecessary and has no proper place in the record. Under such circumstances the master's report, including the evidence therewith submitted, is a part of the record. Inserting it in the certificate of evidence does not change its status, as the only office of such a certificate is to make that a matter of record which without the certificate in not a part of the record.

Original papers filed in the court below should remain there for the benefit and security of all parties in interest, (Trustees of Schools v. Welchley, 19 Ill. 64; Beth Hammidrash, etc. Congregation v. Oakwoods Cemetery Ass. supra;) except where a different course is pointed out by the statute, or by the rules of the court exercising appellate jurisdiction, to which the case is taken for review.

With the exceptions just noted, a court of review acts upon the transcript of the record, and not upon the record itself, and as was said in the case last cited: "The original report of the master of the evidence taken by him is a part of the record in the court below, but not of the transcript which the statute requires to be filed in this court."

As a consideration of matters which should be shown by a transcript of the master's report and the evidence

attached was necessary for the determination of errors assigned which go to the merits of the cause, and as no such transcript was presented in the Appellate Court, the judgment of that court will be affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed, upon request of appellants, to detach the two original master's reports from the transcript in this cause and return them to the clerk of the superior court of Cook county.

Judgment affirmed.

HENRY H. GAGE

V.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO.

Opinion filed June 23, 1904-Rehearing denied October 13, 1904.

1. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-when it is proper to enter default against objector. Default is properly entered at the hearing of objections in a special assessment proceeding where the objector fails to appear after notice and makes no attempt to sustain objections.

2. SAME-when motion to set aside default is properly denied. A motion to set aside a default is properly denied where the evidence in support of the motion fails to show that the defendant was not negligent in suffering default or that he had a meritorious defense.

3. APPEALS AND ERRORS—court will not search transcript for error. The Supreme Court will not search the transcript of the record to find grounds for reversal which have not been made to appear in the abstract of record.

4. SAME-points made in reply brief for first time are not considered. Under rule 15 of the Supreme Court (204 Ill. 14) a point not made in appellant's original brief will not be considered, though urged in the reply brief.

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. L. C. RUTH, Judge, presiding.

F. W. BECKER, for appellant.

WILLIAM M. PINDELL, (EDGAR BRONSON TOLMAN, Corporation Counsel, and ROBERT REDFIELD, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the county court of Cook county on November 18, 1903, confirming a special assessment for the purpose of providing for the cost of a sidewalk on Ridgeway avenue, in the city of Chicago. The petition for the confirmation was filed on January 11, 1901. Appellant filed certain objections thereto, among others one to the effect that the engineer's estimate of the cost of the proposed improvement was not made a part of the record of the first resolution of the board of local improvements. The county court overruled all objections, and a judgment was entered on July 10, 1901, confirming the assessment. Gage, the present appellant, then appealed to this court, where the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded on April 16, 1902, (Gage v. City of Chicago, 196 Ill. 512,) for the reason that the cost of making and collecting the assessment was included in the judgment of confirmation. On July 25, 1902, an order was entered in the county court re-docketing the cause, reciting that the mandate of the Supreme Court had been filed in the county court on July 14, 1902, and that due notice had been given that a motion would be made on July 25, 1902, by the city of Chicago to re-docket said cause and for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court; and the record further shows, Gage not appearing, he was defaulted. The assessment roll was then reduced as to each piece and parcel of real estate by the amount which had been included in that roll as the cost of making and collecting the assessment, and it was then ordered that the objections theretofore filed by Gage should stand to the assessment so reduced, and it was further ordered that said objections be and they were overruled. Thereafter, on November 18, 1903, Gage appeared in the county court and moved to set aside the order of July 25, 1902, because the court was without jurisdiction to enter