« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
lowed a road or footpath to the right of way | tion hand working along the track where he of respondent company. He entered on the was killed, and hence had knowledge of the right of way either through, or by climbing frequent use of the tracks. As material to over, a gate which had been left for the con- | the history of the case, although not a fact venience of the owner of the land; the place essential to our holding, there was a public having been formerly maintained as a pri- highway leading into Bucoda at about the vate crossing. The crossing had been aban- same distance from the place where the dedoned about three years before when the com- ceased was working as was the railroad track. pany double-tracked its road. The gates had At the close of plaintiffs' testimony, the trial not been removed. Imler had apparently judge took the case from the jury and entergone but a short distance in the directioned a judgment of nonsuit. of Bucoda when he was struck and killed. Much of the briefs are taken up with the
The testimony shows, notwithstanding the discussion of the inquiry as to whether defact that respondent maintained a double-ceased was a trespasser or licensee. We shall track railroad, a part of its transcontinental not inquire whether deceased was a trespasssystem over which some 40 trains passed each er. We shall assume that he was a licensee, way every day, and with the track properly although it may well be doubted whether any guarded, that the people in the neighborhood person can claim a license to use a railway had for a long time been accustomed to use
track, more especially the double track of a the right of way and the tracks as a footpath
transcontinental system over which trains in going to and from their homes situated
run with great frequency, as a footpath near the tracks. At times some had ridden
where, as in this case, the track is laid in bicycles along and between the tracks. One
the open and between stations and is fenced witness testifies that he bad ridden a motor
and guarded. Under such circumstances, it cycle, and another that he had seen a man
has been held that a use, however long conriding along the tracks on horseback,
tinued, will not imply a license. Burg V, It is contended by the appellants that the
Chicago, R. I. & P. Co., 90 Iowa, 106, 57 N. W. use of the tracks and the right of way by
680, 48 Am. St. Rep. 419; Ward v. Southern the public in the manner indicated had con
Pac. Co., 25 Or. 433, 36 Pac. 166, 23 L. R. A. tinued for so long a time that a license to use
715. And such would seem to be the logical the tracks as a footpath is implied, and re
result of the opinion of this court in the case spondent did not use that degree of care
of Hamlin v. Columbia & Puget Sound R. which it owed to deceased as a 'licensee and
Co., 37 Wash. 448, 79 Pac. 991, and Dotta v. is liable to answer in damages. Negligence
Northern Pac. R. Co., 36 Wash. 506, 79 Pac.
32. The duty of a railroad company to a liis charged, in that respondents' train was
censee is defined in the case of McConkey v. running against traffic, that is, running north
Oregon R. & Nav, Co., 35 Wash. 55, 76 Pac. on the south-bound tracks; that the headlight
1526, as follows: was not burning or was so defective as to
"In the case of the licensee, the company when give no warning; that the train was running
| moving trains is charged with the additional duat an excessive rate of speed (the testimony ty of being in a state of expectancy as to the does not sustain a finding that it was run- probable presence of persons upon the track at ning more than 35 miles an hour); that at
| places where travel thereon is known to be cus
tomary and frequent. The care required in the the time of the happening of the accident a case of the licensee, therefore, calls for both reanorth-bound passenger train equipped with a sonable lookout in advance, and a reasonable efpowerful electric headlight, and with cars
fort to avoid injury after presence is discov
ered." and coaches brilliantly lighted, was going
The determinative question is, therefore, north on the north-bound track; that the
whether the engineer and fireman, or either lights from the passenger train sufficiently
of them, discovered the presence of the delighted the track and that portion of the
ceased and his peril in time to avoid the acright of way upon which the deceased was
cident. walking to enable the engineer and fireman to
There is no testimony that would warrant see and observe him in time to give him warn
us in holding that respondents' agents were ing of his peril; and further that the noise
remiss in the performance of their duty to and light caused by the passing of the pas
the deceased; that is, to keep a lookout and senger train held the attention of the de
avoid any wanton or willful injury. The enceased, and he relied upon the fact that the
gineer testifies that he was keeping a lookout, west track was habitually used by south
and that he did not see the deceased until bound trains, and was induced to believe that
just the moment he was struck. This is not the south-bound track was, and would be, disputed by the testimony of any one, nor free and clear of obstructions from behind, do we find the physical or admitted facts to and the light and noise and confusion of the be contrary to his declaration. passenger train made it impossible for him
In Spicer v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 34 W. to hear and discover the approach of the Va. 516, 12 S. E. 553, 11 L. R. A. 385, a recovwork train.
ery was denied under the following state of It is shown that deceased was about 45 facts: years of age, in the possession of all of his “He is not at a street crossing, but purely for faculties and had, at one time, been a sec- his own convenience is walking on the track
from Sixteenth to Twentieth street; and, seeing and sends a train forward against traffic. a train moving towards him on the track on which We might as well hold that a train, running he is walking, he steps upon the next track; and lahen being blinded by the headlight of the engine ap
ahead of time or behind time, would have to proaching, and, his hearing dulled by it, or more flag its way to protect those who were aclikely because he did not look for a train on the customed to use its track as a footpath in track to which be stepped, he is scarcely on country districts; for, if appellants' theory that track before he is struck by a train which is being backed from the depot to the shops, re
be good, a licensee might as well rest under ceiving injury, from which he dies in about an the assumption that if a train did not pass hour. No one questions that the company was the point of his use at a given time, or upon simply exercising, on ground belonging to it, its lawful business, and that the deceased was not
schedule time, it would have no rights which in the public highway, but using the track for he was bound to respect or to take notice of. his own convenience, when he could have used a In all cases then, we come to the one walk or path but a few yards distant, outsidel question whether the company kept a lookout, the tracks, or an alley but a short distance further away. What duty did the company owe and whether the presence of the licensee him, under these circumstances, except that it was discovered in time to prevent the acshould not. willfully or wantonly hurt him? | cident. As we have said, the testimony in Where could the deceased have found a more
this case not only does not sustain such a deadly, dangerous walk? And he was fully aware of this, for he was an employé of the com
finding, but is contrary to it. pany, was well acquainted with the yard and The fact is apparent and conclusive that works of the company there, but not in service
vice the deceased acted upon the assumption that in the yard nor on duty then or there. Indeed, his daily contact and familiarity with the raila | but one train was approaching from the road operations lulled him into a feeling of se- south and that the west track was clear. curity and negligence which cost him his life, such assumptions find no favor in the law. when but 21 or 22 years of age. He was in possession of all the natural senses and faculties
A similar contention was made in Boulden which tell of danger and aid us in self-preserva- v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 112 S. W. tion amid perils surrounding us.”
936. The court there held that the company  Although there is no testimony to sus- | had a right to run its trains on either of the tain it, we think the assumption of appel- | two tracks. lants, as set forth in that part of their ... "The court properly instructed the jury that
I the defendant had the right to use either trac complaint describing the presence of the pas
as otherwise they might have thought it nege senger train, is a fair theory of the immedi-ligent for the defendant to run the train in quesate circumstances and conditions. The de tion on the east track. Persons who walk along ceased was evidently on the west side of
e a railroad track are under obligations to keep
out of the way of trains, and they cannot comthe west track when struck, for the bruises plain that the train is run on one track and not on his body indicate that he was struck just on another. There was nothing in the plaintiff's above the hip by the pilot beam. At the
conduct to apprise the operatives of the train time the two trains were running nearly par
that he was ignorant of its approach, or to im
pose upon them the duty of taking extra precauallel, and the deceased must have assumed tions for his safety, until he, without looking that the passenger train was the only train back to see if the train was coming, suddenly approaching, and, there being an utter ab
placed himself in peril when the train was right sence of testimony that he had been walking
upon him." for any distance on either track, he must
| See, also, Morgan v. Northern Pac. R. Co.,
196 Fed. 449, 116 C. C, A. 223. have stepped upon the ties immediately in
In Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Jones, 144 Fed. front of the work train without looking, resting upon the assumption that a train on
47, 75 C. C. A, 205, instead of running against
traffic, a train was running off its schedule. the west track, if any, would come from the
The court, in holding that the company was north and not from the south. It follows
not negligent in so operating its trains, said: that the only contention that can be advanced
"In Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. McClish, 115 with any show of reason is that respondent Fed. 268, 53 C. C. A, 60, it was said: 'Eren was bound to operate its trains "with traffic" in the case of a licensee, there is, under such cir in all instances, and that licensees may rest cumstances, the highest duty to exercise the ut. secure in the belief, and act upon it with
it with most degree of vigilance in looking out for ap
| proaching engines or cars. * * The track out looking, that all trains will move in the is the property of the railroad company, which ueromary manner. Whatever the rights OLC uus te legatu
it has the legal right to use at any and all times.'
Y. a licensee may be. railroad tracks are laid | The rule is well established that it is the duty
of a traveler to stop and look and listen before for the convenience of those who operate
crossing or walking along a railroad track. He them, and the public which employs them, has no right to assume at any time of the day or and those who ride upon their cars. A licensee night that trains will not be run over the track.
TRailroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697, 24 L. cannot, Irom the nature of things, having in | Ed. 542. Schofield v. Chicago & St. P. Ry Co. mind the public duty of the carrier, assume 114 U. Š. 615, 5 Sup. Ct, 1125, 29 L. Ed. 224; that a railroad company will not, or may not, Northern Pacific Railroad v. Freeman, 174 t. use its property as will best serve, or as may
S. 379, 19 Sup. Ct. 763, 43 L. Ed. 1014. Said
the court in Elliott v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Rr. be necessary at times to serve, its primary pur- | Co., 150 U. S. 248. 14 Sup. Ct. 86. 37 L. Ed. poses. It cannot be held guilty of negligence if, 1068: "The track itself, as it seems necessary to
It is in the performance of its functions as a pub- | iterate and reiterate, is itself a warning.
a place of danger. It can never be assumed that lic carrier, it suspends its own rules for the
cars are not approaching on a track, or that "The defendant in error was a miner of the track using it as a footpath, especially where age of 34 years, and was in the full possession of the track is in the country and fenced, canhis senses. According to his own testimony, he walked upon the railroad track a distance of more
not claim the protection given to those who than half a mile without once looking back or
do things of necessity, for, from the very stopping to listen for an approaching train. In nature of things, he is using the track for so doing, it must be held that he was guilty of
bis personal comfort and convenience. Men gross negligence, which, irrespective of negligence in the failure of the engineer to discover
must, and therefore may, move from one him on the track, is sufficient to bar his right of side of a track to another at places establishrecovery. It was no excuse for his failure to ed by the company, or so long used by the take such precautions that the wind was blowing
public as to imply a license, resting under the in his face, or that the noise of a waterfall may have deadened the sound of an approaching assumption of legal right. But the one who train. Those circumstances only rendered the does not cross, but loiters, or crosses the use of his senses the more imperative. It was barriers that have been erected to warn him his duty continually to exercise vigilance."
and save him from the consequences of his We attach no importance to the contention
folly, can claim no more than that he shall that the headlight on the train was not burn
not be wantonly or willfully injured if his ing, or was so dim as to afford no protection
peril is discovered in time to prevent his to the deceased. There is no testimony even
injury. The cases all rest in the same sound tending to show that the lack of a headlight, i principle which controls every exploration inor its detective character, was the proximate to the law of negligence; that is, that the cause of the injury. Appellants' 'testimony degree
testimony degree of care in every case shall be measshows that the electric headlight of the pas- | ured, not by any abstract rule, but by refersenger train illuminated the track and the lence to the facts and circumstances attending right of way. Another headlight would have
the particular case. added no security to the deceased.
 There is no merit in the contention that  Appellants rely principally on the cas the respon
the respondents' engineer had an unobstructes of Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525,
ed view of the track for more than a mile, 43 Pac. 641, 44 Pac. 253, 31 L. R. A. 855; / and should have discovered the peril of the Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Baxter, 187 Fed. 789, deceased. There is no evidence that deceas109 C. C. A. 635; and Great Northern R. Co.
Coed was on the track, and we cannot hold, v. Thompson, 199 Fed. 395, 118 C. C. A. 79,
as a matter of law, that the engineer was 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 506. These cases, like
bound to anticipate that a man walking along many that might be cited, are either cross
the right of way would step in front of a ing cases, or cases from cities and towns railway train without exercising any care where population is congested and the public
for his own safety. have been accustomed to cross the tracks
Affirmed. or to use them as a thoroughfare. Recoveries are allowed in such cases because a higher
MORRIS, C. J., and FULLERTON, duty rests upon a railroad company under MOUNT, and ELLIS, JJ., concur. such circumstances. In moving trains over and across the streets of cities, or through depot grounds, or in switchyards, the rail
(89 Wash. 674) road company, from the nature of things,
SALLY v. WHITNEY CO. (No. 13126.) must have its trains under control and be constantly alert to the possibility of injuring (Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 17, 1916.) persons or property. This is a condition ADJOINING LANDOWNERS 7 - BANKING which is generally compelled or regulated by
DÉBRIS AGAINST BRICK WALL - DAMAGE
anal FROM WATER-LIABILITY. statute or ordinance. But we do not find
Defendant, in building a structure on land it to be so held in any of the cases where, as adjoining plaintiff's building, allowed mortar in this case, a fenced and guarded track was and other debris to fill up a long narrow space used, not as a crossing, but as a footpath, in between the wall of the new building and plainthe country and between stations.
tiff's brick wall. In the following rainy season
the ordinary rainfall saturated the débris, and  The crossing cases may be further dis-held it in suspension, whence it was absorbed by tinguished. They rest in implied license up- plaintiff's wall, so as to damage the wainscoton legal grounds, as differentiated from the ing on the inside of plaintiff's building. Held, acts or conduct of the parties as they may he having set in motion a chain of events which
that defendant was liable for such damage, since, arise in a particular case. In consequence, naturally resulted in such damage, his wrongful a duty is put upon the court in all such cases act in depositing the débris against plaintiff's to measure the relative rights as well as
wall was the proximate cause of the injury. the relative obligations of the parties to the l_ [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Adjoining
Landowners, Cent. Dig. 88 53-59; Dec. Dig. action. The company is held to a rule of
Om7.) strict accountability, because it is necessary for men and traffic to cross railway tracks in Department 2. Appeal from Superior the pursuit of their legitimate undertakings Court, King County; R. B. Albertson, Judge. and conveniences. The law charges a com- Action by Charles Sally against the Whitpany with a knowledge that they will do so. ney Company. Judgment for defendant, and Whereas one who walks along a railroad / plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Vanderveer & Cummings, of Seattle, for, where under different facts a third person's appellant. George R. Biddle, of Seattle, for negligence contributed to the ultimate misrespondent
| Here the result came of a succession of BAUSMAN, J. Plaintiff sues in damages physical causes naturally convening. Sooner the builder of a structure adjoining his own, or later this choking must hare some effect who allowed mortar and other débris to on the wall; if not in one season, then in choke a long and very narrow space lying two or three or more. This is not, let it be between the two and belonging to the land on | remembered, a case of unprecedented rains; which plaintiff's building rested. In the fol. for the lower court expressly found the rain. lowing season the ordinary rainfall satur- fall to have been normal. Now, the builder ated this débris until the absorbed or col- is presumed to have known that this débris lected water oozed through plaintiff's com- would absorb and obstruct rain, that in this mon brick wall, 12 inches in thickness, and climate rain in considerable quantities must injured the wainscoting inside.
fall, and that rain stopped and collected Liability in tort, exceeding that of con- against a wall must tend to soak into or tract, cannot safely be defined. Each case through it. That it would probably soak must be decided upon its own facts. On the through a three-inch wall the builder would one hold, the law does not wish to punish too have to admit, and the most he can say is severely the careless man; on the other, it that he did not believe that it would ever is he that is at fault in some degree when the penetrate a twelve-inch wall. In short, de.. damaged party may not be at fault at all. fendant but debates degree. He has set in The former must not, accordingly, expect conjunction two natural forces, and merely easy limitations. And the law holds him lia-argues that he did not think they would go ble in two classes of consequences from his so far. He must respond to the consequence. fault, one, where purely physical or natural | It was he who was in fault, not the plaintiff; causes set in motion go beyond what ordina- and he must make at his own peril estimates rily follows, and, second, where an interven- as to the effect of natural forces set in moing cause appears in an unexpected meddlertion. He is in a far poorer position to comwho makes things worse.
plain than if he were held liable for the In Eskildsen v. Seattle, 29 Wash. 583, 589, capricious or unexpected act of a third per70 Pac. 64, we quoted with approval the Lord son. Chief Justice's statement of the law in Byrne Allowing to the findings of the lower court v. Wilson, 15 Irish C. L. 332, that the tort- all proper presumptions of fact, we are nevfeasor's liability is "not only for the immedi- ertheless of opinion that it was in error. ate consequences of his negligence, but also The judgment is reversed, with instrucfor the resulting consequences of his acts, tions to enter one in favor of plaintiff for whether those acts are acts of violence, or of his ascertained damages, $1,011.85. negligence in breach of a duty." This he held applicable where a defendant stagedriver's MORRIS, C. J., and HOLCOMB, MAIN, negligence tipped the coach into a canal lock, and PARKER, JJ., concur. and yet no injury would have come to plaintiff save for the blunder of a lockkeeper who
(89 Wash. 537) turned in the water. In Akin v. Bradley O'DONNELL y. McCOOL et al. (No. 11346.) Company, 48 Wash. 97, 92 Pac. 903, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 586, we applied the same doctrine (Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 9, 1916.) with more rigor to him who left dynamite in
1. APPEAL AND ERROR
-a field where a child chanced to come upon and STRACTS-STATUTORY PROVISIONS. blast it. There we expressed the view that. The statute requiring the service of abthe child's exploding a piece of this dynamite stracts upon respondents does not apply to apby means of a dry battery which she obtained peals taken and pending before it went into ef
fect. was not too remote a consequence to be an
| [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and swered for under the rule, though we then Error. Cent. Dig. 88 3-7, 1882, 2421; Dec. Dig. put the rule in these words:
2.] "Where'a negligent act or omission sets in 2. PLEADING 369 — REQUIRING ELECTION operation a train of occurrences resulting natu
BETWEEN THEORIES OF COMPLAINT. rally in the injury complained of, such negli
Where, in an action to quiet plaintiffs, tigent act or omission is deemed to have been the
| tle to land and to enjoin its sale under the fore proximate cause, or to have contributed thereto."
closure of a mortgage executed by one of the In the Eskildsen Case, Seattle was held defendants to the other, the complaint based liable for injuries to a boy who, when his plaintiff's claim of title on adverse possession
and on a trust resulting from the payment of the foot was caught in a defective street, was
purchase price of the land by her, a motion to run over by a negligently operated locomo require her to elect on which theory she would tive of a railway company, and this decision proceed was properly denied, as both states of
facts could be true, and to prove one she w3s was approved as upholding proximate cause
not compelled to contradict the other, and there in another case (Thoresen v. St. Paul Co., 73 is no inconsistency in urging different souris Wash. 99, 107, 131 Pac. 645, 132 Pac. 860), ) of title, all of which lead to ultimate title ia
plaintiff and result in one and the same judg-17. TRUSTS Ow79—"RESULTING TRUST"--PAYment.
IMENT OF CONSIDERATION FOR LAND. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Pleading, Defendant in 1891 purchased the possessory Cent. Dig. $$ 1199-1209; Dec. Dig. 369.] Tor squatter rights of a settler on railroad land
for $800, paying a part in cash and giving his 3. ELECTION OF REMEDIES ml - REMEDIES note for the remainder. In the same year plainSUBJECT TO ELECTION
tiff and her husband, under an arrangement of The doctrine of election of remedies ap- some kind with defendant, took possession of plies only to cases where plaintiff has a choice the land and remained in possession for about of remedies arising out of the same state of 20 years, and placed valuable improvements on facts.
the land valued at from $2,500 to $3,500. The [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Election of husband, who had a bank deposit, gave defendRemedies, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. wwl.) ant the privilege of drawing against it to the
extent of $900, and he did draw thereon to the 4. ADVERSE POSSESSION Om58_NECESSITY OF extent of $680, and possibly $200 more. In HOSTILE PosseSSION.
1896, defendant contracted with the railroad Possession of real property to ripen into company to purchase the land for $640, which title must not only be open and notorious, but he subsequently paid in installments; the final under color of title or claim of right and ad | payment not being made until 1909. Held, that verse to all other claimants.
there could be no resulting trust to the whole of [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Adverse Pos- the property in plaintiff's favor, as it appeared session, Cent. Dig. $8 279-281; Dec. Dig. Om | that neither she nor her husband, nor both to58.
gether, paid the entire purchase price, but a For other definitions, see Words and Phrases,
trust did result in her favor for an undivided First and Second Series, Adverse Possession.]
half interest, as it was not reasonable to suppose
that the payments by her and her husband and 5. ADVERSE POSSESSION 60% NECESSITY OF | the making of the improvements were with the HOSTILE POSSESSION.
intention that they were to be mere tenants at In 1891, defendant purchased the posses sufferance of defendant, and as the exact prosory or squatter rights of a settler on railroad portions of the purchase price paid by each parland, and in the same year plaintiff and her hus- ty could not be known with absolute certainty band took possession under an arrangement of after the lapse of years, it would not be unjust some kind with defendant. They made valuable to either party to conclude that they intended improvements on the property and remained in to invest therein in equal moieties. . possession until the husband's death, after which [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. plaintiff continued in possession and was still | Dig. $$ 111, 112; Dec. Dig. Om79.) in possession in 1911. During all of this time
8. TRUSTS Om79 - "RESULTING TRUST" defendant paid the taxes and pastured cattle or
PAYMENT OF CONSIDERATION FOR LAND. horses on the land, and they were cared for by
There may be a "resulting trust" in land to plaintiff and her husband. In 1896, defendant
part less than the whole, and when one party contracted with the railroad company for the
makes an oral contract with another that the purchase of the land, and thereafter made par
latter shall buy a specific tract of land on their tial payments; the final payment not being
common account, furnishing him with an aliquot made until 1909. In 1902, plaintiff's son wrote
part of the money required for the purpose, and defendant asking his price for the land, and stating that if defendant did not want too much
he purchases the property, but, in violation of he would try to buy it. In 1909, plaintiff wrote
the agreement, takes the title in his own name
or in the name of a third person, a trust redefendant concerning the contemplated construc
sults in favor of the first person for such aliquot tion of a high school building near the premises,
part. and asking him to give her the privilege of giving enough water from a spring on the premises
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. for the schoolhouse, stating that, “We will ney
Dig. $$ 111, 112; Dec. Dig. Om 79.) er miss the water," and that, "It is money in
Department 2. Appeal from Superior our pockets:" Plaintiff's son-in-law, at the request of the school districts interested, also / Court, Stevens County ; E. H. Sul wrote defendant asking for the right to pipe wa-Judge. ter from the spring. Held, that the facts show
| Action by Elizabeth O'Donnell against ed that plaintiff recognized some interest in the land in defendant, and that it was not made
Hugh McCool and others. Judgment for clear to defendant that plaintiff's possession plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed was adverse to him, and hence plaintiff did not and remanded, with instructions. have title by adverse possession. (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Adverse Pog
Pedigo & Smith, of Walla Walla, for apsession, Cent. Dig. SS 282–312, 323, 328; Dec. pellants. Peacock & Ludden, of Spokane, . Dig. Om60.]
and Samuel Douglas, of Colville, for me 6. TRUSTS em 6334 - "RESULTING TRUST" - spondent. How CREATED.
A “resulting trust” is a trust implied by FULLERTON, J. This is an action insti. law from the transactions of the parties, and never arises out of a contract or agreement that
tuted by Elizabeth O'Donnell against Hugb is legally enforceable, but arises by implication McCool, Mary McCool, his wife, and the first of law from the acts and conduct of the par- | National Bank of Walla Walla, to restrain ties apart from any contract; the law implying the sale under a decree of foreclosure of cera trust where the acts of the party to be charged as trustee have been such as are, in honesty
tain real property situated in Stevens counand fair dealing, consistent only with a purpose ty, and to quiet the plaintiff's claim of title to hold the property in trust, though he may to the property. From a judgment in favor never have agreed to the trust and may have lof the plaintiff the defendants appe,
of the plaintiff, the defendants appeal to really intended to resist it. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent.
this court. Dig. $$ 91, 92, 98-100; Dec. Dig. Cu 6334. The facts, as we gather them from the
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases. / record, are in substance these: The lands First and Second Series, Resulting Trust.] Tin question lie within the belt and form a
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes