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sued for the purchase price of goods, may show that the goods were not what he contracted for.

In Smith v. Pickands, 148 Mich. 558, 112 N. W. 122, the court held that the burden of proof was on the vendee to show that the goods delivered were not as specified in the contract after an acceptance by the purchaser.

In Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2 Wash. 600, 27 Pac. 454, 26 Am. St. Rep. 890, this court said:

"It is undoubtedly true that, if the brick were defective, and appellant was silent, and did not give notice or offer to return them within a reasonable time after discovering defects, the right to rescind the sale was thereby waived. But the right to recover damages on account of defective quality was in no wise affected."

In Home Ice Factory v. Howells Mining Again, in Dickinson Fire, etc., Co. v. Crowe Co., 157 Ala. 603, 48 South. 117, there was & Co., 63 Wash. 550, 115 Pac. 1087, we said: a contract by the terms of which the vendor of warranty, the rule is that a failure to give contracted to ship the vendee the best qual-notice or to offer to return the property within

"If we should concede that there was a breach

a reasonable time after discovering the defects operates as a waiver of the right to rescind, and leaves the purchaser only the right to recover or offset damages to the extent of the diminished value of the article."

ity of coal, and the vendee sought to es-
cape liability on the purchase price on the
ground that the coal received was of an in-
ferior grade, and the court there held that
the quality of the coal was an issue in the
case, and evidence was taken on that ques-court held that:
tion.

In Neck v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 158 Wis. 298, 148 N. W. 869, a quantity of cement was sold under a written contract which provided that the cement should conform to standard specifications for Portland cement adopted by the American Society for testing materials with methods of testing recommended by the American Society of Engineers. Evidence was admitted showing that the cement was inferior by the use of another test, and, in answer to the vendor's contention that the only way the cement could be shown inferior in quality was by the test provided for in the contract, the court said: "In the absence of a provision * making the test the sole evidence of the inferiority of the cement, the fact might be established by other evidence."

Mette & Kanne Distilling Co. v. Lowrey, 39 Mont. 124, 101 Pac. 966, holds that, in an action by a vendor to recover the purchase price of chattels sold under a contract, the

burden of proof is on the vendor to show a delivery of the goods described in the contract, thus recognizing the rule that the vendee can show that the goods delivered were not the goods described in the contract.

[3] Respondent next contends that, because Peterson accepted and used the brick without notifying it, until this action was instituted, that they were of a quality inferior to that contracted for, he cannot now be heard to say that the bricks were inferior to those described in the contract. In discuss ing the rules applicable to this contention, it will be well to keep in mind that respondent is attempting to recover the purchase price of highway paving brick as provided for in the contract of purchase; there thus being an express warranty that the brick to be delivered would be highway paving brick. Peterson is not seeking to rescind the contract nor to avoid liability for the value of the brick, but is attempting to set off the difference in price between the brick described in the contract and the brick he claimed to have received.

In Dayton v. Hooglund, 39 Ohio St. 671, the

"In a suit for the price of a lot of iron manufactured by the plaintiff for the defendant, the defendant, in case there is a breach of warranty such damages as he has sustained, although he as to the quality of the iron, may recoup for has used the iron without offering to return it."

Other cases adhering to this rule are Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. Mayhew, 160 Mo. App. 60, 141 S. W. 433; Grisinger v. Hubbard, 21 Idaho, 469, 122 Pac. 853, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 87; J. Rosenbaum Grain Co. v. Pond Creek Mill & Elevator Co., 22 Okl. 555, 98 Pac. 331; Graff v. Osborne, 56 Kan. 162, 42 Pac. 704.

The case of Williams & Co. v. Miller & Co., 1 Wash. T. 88, cited by respondent, does seem to support its contention that the acceptance and use of goods estops the vendee from showing that they were not what he conit does not appear whether or not there was tracted for. But from the facts in that case any warranty of the goods sold, or whether there was any provision in the contract for

inspection, either of which conditions would change the rule; and, if that case could be construed as supporting respondent's conten

tion, it has been impliedly overruled by the

Tacoma Coal Co. and Dickinson Cases, supra, in so far as it attempts to hold that a vendee is liable for the contract price of goods when he has accepted goods inferior to those described in the contract.

Wash. 128, 68 Pac. 373, holds that, where a The case of Childs Lumber Co. v. Page, 28 party does not object to materials furnished them to be used in the building, he cannot for the construction of a building, but allows thereafter refuse to pay for them on the tract in that case provided for an inspection ground that they were inferior. But the conon the part of the vendee.

the rule where an inspection or test is pro[4] There is a well-defined distinction in vided for in the contract, which was noticed by us in Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, 79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381, L. R. A. 1915B, 1131. In that case we said in part:

clearly distinguishable from the case here. In "The authorities cited by the respondent are Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2 Wash. 600, 27

Pac. 454, 26 Am. St. Rep. 890, there was involved the sale of bricks by the manufacturer for the construction of coke ovens. The sale was not expressly subject to inspection or test, and the order for the bricks negatived any implication to that effect. * While recognizing the rule, as sustained by the New York and Wisconsin authorities, that, in the absence of a warranty and a breach, the vendee's right to recover damages does not survive the acceptance of the property after an opportunity to discover defects, unless notice has been given to the vendor or the vendee returns or offers to return the property, the court points out the fact, which we have also noted, that this rule does not apply in cases of express warranty of quality."

Schopp v. Taft, 106 Iowa, 612, 76 N. W. 843, cited by respondent, sustains this doctrine, and holds that, in the absence of a warranty, when goods are tendered by the seller in performance of an executory contract of sale, and accepted by the buyer after an opportunity of inspection, without objection, the purchaser is liable for the price agreed upon.

In Yeiser v. Russell & Co. (Ky.) 83 S. W. 574, relied upon by respondent, the court said:

"There is no better settled principle of law than that, if a vendee accepts goods delivered under a warranty of quality, or retains them after the discovery that they are not the articles purchased, and fails to give notice within a reasonable time that he declines to receive them, because not in conformity with the contract, or exercises ownership over them, he cannot thereafter refuse to pay for them."

While this case holds that the vendee will have to pay for the goods, it does not hold that he has to pay the contract price, or that he cannot recoup damages for the difference between the contract price and the price of the goods actually delivered. In fact, in this very case the vendee did file a counterclaim for damages accruing from the failure of the vendor to deliver the goods he contracted to deliver, and a judgment for $40 was entered in favor of the vendee, and the vendor took nothing. The right of a vendee when sued for the purchase price of goods to show that the goods received were not as contracted for is well established. Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, supra, and Dickinson Fire, etc., Co. v. Crowe & Co., supra.

with the judgment of the trial court in denying motions for directed verdict, etc.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3938-3943, 4023, 4024; Dec. Dig. 997, 1003.]

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; H. L. Kennan, Judge.

Action by E. M. Skoug against John M. Downs and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

D. R. Glasgow, of Spokane, for appellants. Zent, Powell & Redfield, of Spokane, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. No question of law is involved in this case. It was tried by a jury. There is testimony to sustain the verdict. In such cases this court will not inquire into the preponderance of the evidence, interfere with the verdict, or with the judgment of the trial court in denying motions for directed verdict, judgment non obstante veredicto, and for a new trial. We interfere in jury cases only when it can be said that there are no facts which will support the legal conclusion that a judgment should be rendered.

A part of a real estate commission which respondent claims and which is the foundation of his suit was taken in the form of a promissory note which was discounted by appellants. It is contended that in any event respondent's judgment must be diminished to the extent of the discount. Whether respondent was bound to lose the discount or any part of it was for the jury. The judgment is affirmed.

(89 Wash. 55)

SUMNER v. GRAYS HARBOR RY. & LIGHT CO. (No. 12913.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 4, 1916.) 1. CARRIERS 318-SETTING DOWN PASSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE.

Evidence, in a passenger's action for personal injury while alighting from defendant's street car, apart from any negligence of the conductor in failing to warn her that the car was still in motion, held not to show any negligence on the part of the defendant.

We conclude, therefore, that it was error Cent. Dig. §§ 1270, 1307-1314; Dec. Dig. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, to exclude evidence of the kind of brick actu-318.] ally delivered by the respondent, and for this | 2. CARRIERS 303-SETTING DOWN PASSENreason the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GERS-ANNOUNCEMENT OF STREET.

A street car conductor's announcement of

a stopping place, is not of itself an invitation to a passenger to alight before the car comes to a full stop and does not show that the conduc

FULLERTON, MAIN, and ELLIS, JJ., tor intended or had any reason to believe that

concur.

(89 Wash. 92)

SKOUG v. DOWNS et al. (No. 12806.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 6, 1916.) APPEAL AND ERROR 997, 1003-REVIEWVERDICT-DIRECTION OF VERDICT.

the passenger would alight before the car stopped.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1216, 1218, 1224, 1226-1232, 1234-1240, 1243; Dec. Dig. 303.] 3. CARRIERS 303-SETTING DOWN PASSEN

GERS WARNING OF CAR'S MOTION.

Where a passenger, after the announcement Where there is testimony to sustain the of her stopping place, went to the platform, verdict, the appellate court will not inquire into stood in the doorway, and, after directing the the preponderance of the evidence or interfere conductor's attention to her suit case, which he

picked up, stepped from the car while it was in suit case. Q. Where was the suit case? A. motion, slowly coming to a stop, there was no Setting in the vestibule. Q. Where with refernegligence on the part of the conductor in fail-ence to his position? A. Sitting right at the ing to warn her that the car was in motion. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1216, 1218, 1224, 1226-1232, 1234-1240, 1243; Dec. Dig. 303.]

from

Department 2. Appeal Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; Mason Irwin, Judge.

Action by Ethyl Sumner against Grays Harbor Railway & Light Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and case dismissed.

Bridges & Bruener, of Aberdeen, for appellant. F. W. Loomis, of Aberdeen, for respondent.

PARKER, J. The plaintiff seeks recovery of damages which she claims as the result of personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant while she was alighting from one of its street cars. Trial before

back up as close to the rear of the car as could be. Q. Sitting behind him or beside him or in front of him? A. I think it would be at the side of him. Q. And then what did you do? A. The last I can remember I went and took hold of the handle on the door to step out, and that anything to you about the car not having stopis the last I can remember then. Q. Did he say ped? A. I didn't hear him. Q. Why did you get off the car when you did? A. Well, I thought the car had stopped, and I was supposed see that it had not stopped? to get off when the car stopped. Q. Could you A. No; it had stopped apparently to me. The fog was so thick-I didn't feel any motion of the car. Q. Was the fog any thicker than usual on that night? A. Yes, sir; very thick. * * * Q. You could see just as well as if you had been outdoors all the while? * A. Well, I wasn't outside of the car when I last remember. That is, I wasn't out onto the pavement. The last I can remember is taking hold-just as I reached for the handle of the car and stepped down onto the first step. Q. Did you see anything that night? Could you see the objects on the street, or anything, that night? A. Not for any length of time, for a moment? A. I plain. Q. Did you wait at the vestibule hesitated there. I thought he would get the suit case picked up. Q. The car was still in motion at that time? A. It must have been. Q. You knew it was still going? A. Yes, while I was standing in the door. Q. You say that you stepped out and took hold of the handle of the door, was it, or of the steps? A. Just right there as you step out. Q. When did you ask the conductor for your suit case? A. Just as I stood in the vestibule door. As I went out At about 9 o'clock on the evening of No- I looked where it was left, and it was gone. vember 11, 1914, the respondent was a passen- Just then I said to him: "That is my suit case.' ger on one of appellant's street cars in AberQ. As the conductor turned around in a southerly direction over towards the brewery deen. She was on her way home, expecting to get your grip, you, thinking the car had stopto leave the car at Washington street, at ped, stepped off the car? A. I don't know which point she usually left the car when re- whether I stepped off or fell off. The last I turning to her home from the business por- can remember is when I took hold of the handle. Q. And the conductor at that time was tion of the city. It will be conducive to ac- just turning around getting the suit case in the curacy to tell the story of the incidents im- back of the vestibule? A. Yes, sir. * * mediately preceding the accident in respond-Q. You say you don't remember after you stepent's own language. She was asked and answered in her testimony as follows:

the court, and a jury resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $208.36, from which the defendant has appealed. The principal contention of counsel for appellant is that the trial court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict in appellant's favor, made at the close of the evidence for the plaintiff and also at the close of all the evidence.

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"Q. When you got on the Heron street car did you tell the conductor where you wanted to go? A. Not when I got on. Q. Did you later? A. I think when he called Washington street I just nodded my head at him. * * Q. Always got off at Washington street? A. While I was living in that part of town I always got off at Washington street. * Q. How did you know it was your destination? A. He called Washington street. * Q. Where was he when he called the street? A. If I remember right, I think he was about in the middle of the Q. When did you get up? A. When I thought the car was about where I would get off; slacking up about enough. * * Q. Did the conductor go out ahead of you or behind you? A. He went out, and then I got up and went out after him. Q. Where was the conductor when you went out? A. He was in the vestibule. * Q. What direction was he facing? Toward you or facing some other A. He had turned around to pick up my suit case, and he would really be facing I can't tell the directions in Aberdeen; facing towards the brewery out that door of the car. Q. Was he picking up your suit case as you came out of the car? A. As I stood in the door. Q. As you came up to the door, what direction was he facing? A. Facing me. Q. Did you say anything to him? A. I told him that was my

* * *

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night. You say it was still in motion?
ped off, fell off, or whatever happened that
A. It'
must have been, but I thought it was not. I
didn't remember anything until I got in my
house."

[1] Other evidence shows that respondent

stepped or fell to the ground while the car was moving slowly, and that it thereafter moved some 10 or 12 feet before coming to a full stop. It also appears that the car was possibly a few feet beyond the usual stopping place when it came to rest. It does not appear, however, that there was any difference in the surface of the street at any point alongside of the track at or between the usual stopping place of the car and the place where it actually did stop, assuming that it really passed the usual stopping place. So, so far as the surface of the street is concerned one place was as safe to alight as another within these limits. There were no gates or doors at the sides of the vestibules of the car for the conductor to open or close, as in some cars. There was no jerk or sudden acceleration of speed of the car which might throw

one off their balance or furnish the least cause for their falling. The car was gently

coming to a stop. There is nothing in the evidence indicating that respondent was not in full possession of all her faculties, both mental and physical. She was of mature years. This version of the facts we think is as favorable to respondent as the evidence will admit of.

[2, 3] It seems clear to us that there is no possible ground of negligence on the part of appellant upon which the respondent can recover, except it might be said that the conductor was negligent in failing to warn her of the fact that the car had not stopped when she stepped off. Manifestly, there was no affirmative act of negligence whatever committed by appellant, or any of its servants, contributing to respondent's injuries. Counsel for respondent call our attention to a number of decisions holding that it is not contributory negligence, as a matter of law, on the part of a passenger, when a station or stopping place is announced, for him to get up and proceed to the platform with a view of alighting. These decisions are of no aid here. Other decisions render it plain that such an announcement is not of itself an invitation to a passenger to alight before the train or car comes to a full stop. So the fact that the conductor announced Washington street as the stopping place, then being approached, and that respondent in response thereto got up and proceeded to the platform, argues little or nothing here. Such facts do not show an invitation to respondent to alight before the car came to rest, nor do they show that the conductor had any such intent, nor do they argue that the conductor had any reason to believe that the respondent would attempt to alight before the car came to rest. According to the respondent's own testimony, she was standing in the doorway, and directed the conductor's attention away from her to her suit case, and saw him partly turn to pick it up immediately preceding her stepping off the car. The real question is, conceding all these facts in the light most favorable to respondent's contention, Was the conductor negligent in failing to warn respondent that the car was in motion? We think it must be decided as a matter of law that he was not negligent in that respect.

. Of the decisions of this court relied upon by counsel for respondent, our attention is called to Brown v. Seattle City Ry. Co., 16 Wash. 465, 47 Pac. 890, and Ranous v. Seattle Electric Co., 47 Wash. 544, 92 Pac. 382. In the Brown Case the car was standing still when the plaintiff arose to go out, and suddenly, when she was stepping to the ground, the car started, throwing her to the ground and injuring her. In the Ranous Case while the plaintiff was getting ready to step off the car, it apparently being about to come to a stop, its speed was suddenly accelerated, and the lurch caused by such acceleration threw plaintiff onto the street. In these cases, therefore, there was manifestly a positive af

firmative negligent act on the part of the company contributing to the injuries for which damages were claimed. We have no such condition here.

In Morris v. I. C. R. R. Co., 127 La. 445, 53 South. 698, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 629, there were involved conditions similar to those before us. In answering contentions of substantially the same nature as here made, Chief Justice Breaux, speaking for the court, observed:

The

"The train was still in motion. Plaintiff testified that it was in motion, but that he was not Did it not devolve upon him to satisfy himself aware of it at the time. The question arises: before alighting that the train was standing ready to permit passengers to alight? If a passenger, who has every reasonable opportunity to assure himself that the train is at full stop, fails to make inquiry, he cannot hold others liable for damages in case he alights while it is in motion and is hurt. There were lights at the jects, although it was in the night, whereby it depot. Near the depot there were visible obwas possible to satisfy himself that the train was still moving. Besides, the motion of the car is of itself a warning that the train is still moving and has not come to a full stop. Plaintiff's position is that there was negligence on the part of the flagman, who should have warned him of the danger and should have notified that would have been a very proper act on the him not to attempt to alight. Unquestionably part of the flagman. The question is whether the company is liable for the failure of its flagman to thus notify and warn the plaintiff. That is not the trend of the decisions. flagman had seen plaintiff pass him. He was standing behind him on the steps. He, the testimony states, had no reason to infer that plaintiff would seek to alight at that particular time. It happens (it is within common knowledge) that passengers frequently step down to that step, while on their way to alight, without attempting to step off before the car has stopped. the flagman had invited the passenger to step We are not led to infer from the testimony that off. It is true, as before stated, that at about the time the whistle sounded for Kentwood, he There is not in this announcement an invitation announced that the next stop was that place. to alight before the train has stopped. The following is from the text of Thompson on Negligence, vol. 3 (2d Ed.) § 2845: Ordinarily a railway carrier of passengers is under no duty to assist adult passengers who are in apparent good health and possession of their faculties to get on and off its vehicles or to find seats for them; but its duty is limited to giving them a reasonable time and opportunity to do so without assistance, and this is especially true where there are no special sources of danger.'

In Armstrong v. Portland Ry. Co., 52 Or. 437, 97 Pac. 715, à situation quite similar to this was involved. The plaintiff, arising from her seat and going to the platform upon an announcement of the street she expected to alight at, stepped off the car before it came to rest, there being no invitation for her to do so. Holding that there was no negligence upon the part of the conductor, Chief Justice Bean, speaking for the court, observed:

"It clearly and undisputably shows that there was no negligence on the part of defendant, and that plaintiff was injured because she attempted to alight from a moving car, without any necessity, or seeming necessity, for so doing, and that she was not advised or requested to do so

by defendant's servants. This was negligence of such an obvious character that the court was justified in directing a verdict against her. 3 Thompson on Negligence, § 3013.

"It is argued, however, that defendant is liable because the conductor did not notify plaintiff that the car was still in motion and warn her against the danger of her contemplated act; but the evidence does not show that the conductor knew, or had any reason to believe, that she was intending to get off the car until it had stopped. Plaintiff was of mature years and in possession of all her faculties, and we are not advised of any rule of law making it negligence for the conductor of a street car, under such circumstances, not to warn such a person of the danger to be apprehended in alighting from a moving car. The facts do not bring the case within the rule announced in Smitson v. S. P. Ry. Co., 37 Or. 74, 60 Pac. 907. There the injured party was a passenger on a steam railway. As the train approached her destination it stopped, and she was invited by one of the company's servants to alight but, as she was in the act of doing so, the train suddenly started, injuring her. The facts, therefore, are entirely different from those shown in the present case. Here there was no invitation or request to plaintiff, from any employé or agent of defendant, to alight from the car, and they had no reason for supposing or believing that she would attempt to do so while the car was in motion. There is therefore no ground upon which the defendant can be charged with negligence by reason of the failure of the conductor to notify plaintiff that the car was still in motion, or that she was liable to be injured if she attempted to alight before it stopped."

These views find support in Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Massey, 97 Miss. 794, 53 South. 385, and Burton v. Wichita R. & Light Co., 89 Kan. 611, 132 Pac. 183.

The decision principally relied upon by counsel for respondent, and which probably lends as much support thereto as any in the books, is that of Blue Grass Traction Co. v. Skillman (Ky.) 102 S. W. 809. That case is possibly distinguishable from the one before us, in that the conductor could plainly see that the plaintiff was going to get off while the car was in motion. If not so distinguishable, we are inclined to view that decision as not being in harmony with the weight of authority. However, the Kentucky court in the later case of Louisville Ry. Co. v. Furnas, 155 Ky. 470, 159 S. W. 994, ex

pressed views apparently quite in harmony

with the decisions we have above noticed.

In Elwood v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 77 Conn. 145, 58 Atl. 751, 1 Ann. Cas. 779, we have a decision which it may be said is not in harmony with our conclusion here reached. That decision, however, seems to proceed upon the theory that the facts showed an invitation on the part of the conductor to the plaintiff to alight while the car was in motion.

on the part of the railway company's servant to the plaintiff to step off.

In Long v. Red River T. & S. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 S. W. 10418, there were also involved facts which might well be construed as an invitation to the plaintiff to get off the moving train.

We are of the opinion that it must be held as a matter of law that appellant's conductor was not guilty of negligence in failing to notify respondent that the car was still in motion when she stepped off.

The judgment is reversed, and the case dismissed.

HOLCOMB, MOUNT, and MAIN, JJ., con

cur.

(89 Wash. 172)

In re BUCHANAN'S ESTATE. (No. 12925.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 10, 1916.)

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COMMUNITY

HUSBAND AND WIFE 257 PROPERTY-CORPORATE STOCK. Deceased, in contemplation of their marriage, and her husband contributed in the proportion of five-ninths and four-ninths, respectively, to the amount required for the purchase of stock in a lumber company in the name of the husband. Thereafter for several years, and until the death of deceased, the husband gave his time to developing the business of the corporation, drawing a salary therefor, and mainly as the result of his efforts the value of the stock increased manyfold. At the time of the death of deceased one-half of the corporate stock of the corporation stood in the name of the husband, and the dividends paid on the stock had been so intermingled that no part thereof could be said to be the separate property of either the husband or the wife. It appeared that the growth of the business and increase in value of the original investment resulted, not as a natural increase apart from the efforts of the husband while a member of the community, but resulted from his personal efforts during his married life in the performance of which he was the servant of the community. Held, that the gains and profits produced by the personal efforts of the husband, though added to in a measure by the original investment, became community property, and that, though the funds used in purchasing the stock were separate property, yet, since they had lost their identity and become intermingled with community property, the entire interest in the corporation which stood in the name of the husband was commu

nity property, and should be administered as

such.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife. Cent. Dig. §§ 904-908, 910; Dec. Dig. 257.]

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; C. M. Easterday, Judge.

Proceeding in the administration of the estate of Sarah A. Buchanan, deceased, wherein Earl McCoy seeks to have brought into the estate and administered as part thereof property claimed by James Buchanan as his separate property. From judgment for Earl McCoy, James Buchanan, personally and as administrator, appeals.

Affirmed.

In Cooper v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. Co., 61 S. C. 345, 39 S. E. 543, we have a condition where there was an acceleration of the speed of the train, instead of its coming to a stop, as it was apparently doing at the time the F. D. Oakley, of Tacoma, for appellant. plaintiff stepped off. The facts of that case Burkey, O'Brien & Burkey, of Tacoma, for may also be well construed as an invitation respondent.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 154 P.-9

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