V. RIGHT OF WAY AND OTHER IN-
TERESTS IN LAND.

73 (Wash.) Plaintiff, who granted defend-
ant a right of way by an instrument restoring
an old contract for a right of way, held not en-
titled to enjoin defendant from running addi-
tional trains, the branch of which the right of
way was a part having been extended.-Tacoma
Mill Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 154 P. 173.
82 (Wash.) Under a right of way deed
for an electric railroad, held, that forfeiture
could not be declared because the construction
was not completed and the road had not been
electrified at the expiration of two years from
the date of the deed.-Oechsli v. Washington
Electric Ry. Co., 154 P. 1079.

Though right of way deed for electric road
provided for forfeiture in case of abandonment,
unreasonable delay in electrifying the road held
not to operate as a forfeiture.-Id.

A railroad company which enters under fran-
chise to construct an electric railroad does not
lose its right of way by unreasonable delay in
electrifying the road, and its operation cannot
be enjoined, nor can it be ejected.-Id.

(F) Accidents at Crossings.

307 (Colo.) Where the automatic bell, which
a railroad required by ordinance at a crossing
failed to ring on approach of a train, traveling
at an excessive rate of speed, the road was
guilty of negligence sufficient to sustain a ver-
dict for death of one killed at the crossing.-
Headley v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 154 P. 731.

327 (Colo.) Decedent, killed at a railroad
crossing when he attempted to cross the tracks
on his bicycle immediately after the passage of
one train, was under duty to look and listen
for any other approaching train before attempt-
ing to cross the tracks, two switch and two
main line.-Headley v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.,

154 P. 731.

Where one attempting to cross railroad tracks,
two switch and two main line, reached the
middle space between the main line tracks, be-
fore going on the second of them he was under
duty to look and listen for an approaching train.
-Id.

328 (Colo.) Decedent, attempting to cross
railroad tracks with knowledge that a train, his
view of which was temporarily cut off by an-
other, and would be until he reached a middle
space between the tracks, was approaching, was
under duty to look for the approaching train
as soon as he could see to ascertain if he could
cross before it.-Headley v. Denver & R. G. R.
Co., 154 P. 731.

able only when the company has created a con-
dition of apparent safety.-İd.

330 (Kan.) An attempt of an automobile
driver to cross a track at a grade crossing with-
out looking or listening for an approaching
train, held contributory negligence barring re-
covery, though an electric bell maintained at
the crossing was not ringing.-Jacobs v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1023.

335 (Colo.) The contributory negligence of
one killed at a crossing in going upon the track
without looking and listening barred recovery
for his death, though the automatic bell required
by ordinance to be maintained there failed to
ring, and the train was traveling at a speed
& R. G. R. Co., 154 P. 731.
excessive under ordinance.-Headley v. Denver

339 (Kan.) Failure to ring the bell or sound
the whistle for a grade crossing in a small city,
held not wantonness avoiding contributory neg-
ligence, though the train was going at 45 miles
per hour, where the trainmen cut off the steam
and applied the air, and supposed that an elec-
Jacobs v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P.
tric warning bell at the crossing was ringing.—

1023.

350 (Colo.) The question whether decedent,
killed at a railroad crossing, was guilty of con-
tributory negligence, is for the jury, where the
facts are such that different conclusions may
fairly be drawn therefrom.-Headley v. Denver
& R. G. R. Co., 154 P. 731.

(G) Injuries to Persons on or near
Tracks.

357 (Wash.) The degree of care to be ex-
ercised by a locomotive fireman in watching the
track is the most reasonable care under exist-
ing circumstances, taking into consideration his
other duties.-Anest v. Columbia & P. S. R.
Co., 154 P. 1100.

358 (Wash.) A railroad owes no duty to li-
censees, using double-tracked right of way for
path, to refrain from operating trains on a par-
ticular track in a direction contrary to its usual
custom.-Imler v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 154
P. 1086.

Railroad owes duty of strict accountability to
persons crossing tracks at points fixed therefor,
whether established by railroad or implied by
license.-Id.

365 (Wash.) Duty of railroads to persons
using right of way in cities for footpath is high-
er than in country districts.-Imler v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1086.

decedent licensee walking on right of way held
369 (Wash.) Defendant railroad's duty to
to require reasonable lookout to discover pres-
ence and reasonable care to avoid injury after
discovering presence.-Imler v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 154 P. 1086.

377 (Wash.) In action for death of licensee
walking on defendant railroad's right of way,
engineer held not bound to anticipate that de-
cedent would step in front of train.-Imler v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1086.

401 (Utah) Instruction as to right of train
operators to assume that person near tract
would not go on or dangerously near it held not
erroneous; it not authorizing such assumption
regardless of circumstances.-Thomas v. Oregon
Short Line R. Co., 154 P. 777.

(H) Injuries to Animals on or near Tracks.

Though one approaching a railroad crossing
can assume that the road will give the required
signals, and that the crossing may be made safe-
ly when he can neither see nor hear signs of a
train, he is not relieved from the duty to use his
senses vigilantly to avoid danger, being excus-

8730, as railroad company was not required tö
fence depot and side track, held, that absence
of cattle guards was not proximate cause of in-
jury to live stock.-Benn v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1082.

441 (Wash.) Railroad company failing to
comply with statute as to fences and cattle
guards held merely required to meet a prima
facie case, or presumption of negligence respect-
ing killing of stock.-Benn v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1082.

443 (Wash.) In action for value of colts
struck by train, evidence held insufficient to
support trial judge's finding that the trainmen
expected the horses to run off the track.-Benn
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1082.
446 (Wash.) Court held to have erred in
holding as matter of law that freight train of
16 cars fairly light, running 28 or 30 miles an
hour could have been stopped within 600 or 650
feet.-Benn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
154 P. 1082.

See Appeal and Error, 544, 874, 920; Chat-
tel Mortgages, 281; Evidence, 82.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

7 (Wash.) Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2601,
defining and providing the penalty for "lar-
ceny," where subdivision 5 thereof makes one re-
ceiving goods "so appropriated" guilty of lar-
ceny, an information is not defective for fail-
ing, in charging an offense under subdivision 5
to charge the original taking under subdivision
4.-State v. Ketterman, 154 P. 182.

In charging the offense of receiving stolen
goods, it is not necessary to allege the facts of
the original unlawful taking.-Id.

RECLAMATION DISTRICTS.

See Drains, ~2, 6, 17.

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF.
45 (Wash.) Where a party before signing a
contract read a portion and objected to the rate
of interest, though he alleged and the other de-
nied that he was told it was only a form, and
the other party testified that the whole contract
was read, he could not have reformation on the
ground of fraud in omitting warranties in the
absence of clear and substantial evidence of
fraud.-Northwest Motor Co. v. Braund, 154
P. 1098.

REHEARING.

See Appeal and Error, 832, 835; New Trial.
REINSTATEMENT.

See Appeal and Error, 807; Dismissal and
Nonsuit, 43.

RELEASE.

See Accord and Satisfaction; Banks and Bank-
ing, 39; Compositions with Creditors;
Compromise and Settlement; Mortgages,
309, 312; Payment.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.

17 (Colo.) A grossly inadequate considera-
tion for the release of valuable rights may of
itself be an evidence of fraud.-Weber v. Head
Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction, Woodmen of the
World, 154 P. 728.

*

*

21 (Kan.) A letter stating that the injured
passenger "would like some kind of position
with your company, as I settled fairly
and without any trouble," when voluntarily
written after recovery, and with full knowledge
of all circumstances, was a "ratification" of a
settlement made under influence of anesthetics.
-Frazier v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1022.
III. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

58 (Kan.) Evidence that plaintiff, at sug-
gestion of defendant's agent, wrote a letter
made by plaintiff under the influence of anæs-
claimed to be a ratification of a settlement
thetics, held not to authorize submitting to the
jury the question of fraud in procuring the let-
ter to be written.-Frazier v. Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co., 154 P. 1022.

RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

17 (Or.) For deed to create perpetual trust
for purpose of a parsonage, church, etc., it must
specify exclusive purpose, and by appropriate
language express or import perpetual use of
land therefor, as by use of words "only," "for-
ever," or "for no other purpose."-Stansbery v.
First Methodist Episcopal Church, 154 P. 887.
Deed reciting that land was conveyed for the
purpose of a parsonage, church, etc., held mere-
ly to express motive of grantor or intention of
grantee, and not to create trust for such pur-
poses.-Id.

18 (Or.) Where a deed recited that land
was conveyed for use as a church and such use
was partial consideration, 60 years' user held
to discharge such obligation.-Stansbery v. First
Methodist Episcopal Church, 154 P. 887.

REMAINDERS.

See Life Estates.

14 (Cal.) Remainder in trust, whether vest-
ed or contingent, held alienable.-Gray v. Union
Trust Co. of San Francisco, 154 P. 306.

REMOVAL.

See Municipal Corporations, 155; Officers,
7, 74.

RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE.
See Deeds, 128.

SAFETY APPLIANCES.

See Master and Servant, 111.

SALES.

See Chattel Mortgages, 6; Corporations,
116-121; Crops; Evidence, 400, 442;
Estoppel, 94; Execution, 291-297;
Executors and Administrators, 162, 168,
329; Frauds, Statutes of, 89; Husband
and Wife, 86; Intoxicating Liquors;
Judicial Sales; Limitation of Actions,
100; Logs and Logging, 3; Municipal
Corporations, 562-582; Principal and
Agent, 103; Public Lands, 54; Re-
mainders; Trusts, 198; Vendor and Pur-
chaser; Weapons, 18.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT.

23 (Wash.) Where the seller repudiated a
tentative contract and submitted another which
the buyer rejected, held, that the seller could
not sue on the original tentative contract as
an express contract for automobiles shipped
to the buyer, but not accepted by him.-Cook
v. Story, 154 P. 147.

Where the buyer ordered automobiles on faith
of a tentative contract made by him with the
seller's agent and repudiated by the seller, he
was under no obligation to accept the automo-
biles ordered.-Id.

II. CONSTRUCTION

OF CONTRACT.

64 (Okl.) A contract providing that "the
seller agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to buy
upon the terms as stated herein," held not op
tional, but binding on both parties.-Chenault v.
Mauer Mercantile Co., 154 P. 507.

IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT.

(C) Delivery and Acceptance of Goods.
161 (Okl.) Where goods are delivered to
the carrier for delivery to the buyer, the car-
rier is presumably the buyer's agent, and de-
livery to it is delivery to the buyer.-Rose v.
Woldert Grocery Co., 154 P. 531.

179 (Wash.) Upon the sale of goods by con-
tract giving buyer right to an inspection, but
containing no warranty, the buyer's right to
recover damages for defects did not survive his
acceptance after opportunity to discover de-
fects, unless he notified the seller or returned
or offered to return the goods.-Peterson v.
Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co., 154 P. 123.

181 (Wash.) In an action for price of high-
way brick delivered under shipping order con-
stituting on its face a complete contract be-
tween the parties, the buyer might show that
the bricks actually delivered were bricks of
another quality selling at a lower price.-Peter-
son v. Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co., 154 P.

123.

VI. WARRANTIES.

261 (Cal.App.) In a contract of sale of per-
sonalty, it is not necessary, to create an express
warranty, that the word "warrant" or any for-
mal words be used, but any affirmation as to the
quality or condition of the goods, if so intended,
and so relied upon, is a warranty.-Coats v.
Hord, 154 P. 491.

ance and use, without notice that they were of
an inferior quality, could set off the difference
in price between the brick which was to be
delivered and that which he received.-Peterson
v. Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co., 154 P. 123.
VII. REMEDIES OF SELLER.
(D) Resale.

334 (Cal.App.) While a seller of goods need
not resell immediately after repudiation of the
contract of sale by the buyer and his refusal to
accept, nevertheless he must exercise reasonable
diligence in locating the nearest market and as-
certaining the prevailing market price for the
rejected goods to sell thereat.-Lund v. 'Lach-
man, 154 P. 295.

339 (Okl.) Evidence that the contract price
to the defendant buyer's refusal to accept same,
of the car of melons was $120, and that, owing
they sold for $55, held sufficient evidence of the
measure of damages to go to the jury.-Rose v.
Woldert Grocery Co., 154 P. 531.

(E) Actions for Price or Value.

359 (Okl.) Evidence in an action for the
price of books to be paid for in monthly install-
ments held to sustain a verdict for plaintiff if
modified by correcting a clerical mistake in the
calculation of interest.-Walker v. West Pub.
Co., 154 P. 1189.

(F) Actions for Damages.

369 (Cal.App.) Where the buyer of wine
bottles refused to accept them, and title there-
to had not passed from the sellers, who there-
upon resold the bottles at private sale, their
only remedy was to sue for damages for breach
of the contract of sale.-Lund v. Lachman, 154
P. 295.

383 (Cal.App.) In an action by the sellers
of wine bottles for damages for the buyer's re-
fusal to accept, evidence held sufficient to justi-
fy a finding that the market price for bottles
prevailing on and after their arrival and rejec-
tion was at an advance over the contract price,
which, if the sellers had sold in the market,
would have more than covered drayage, storage,
and insurance expense.-Lund v. Lachman, 154
P. 295.

384 (Cal.App.) In suit for damages by the
sellers of wine bottles against the buyer, who
refused to accept, the measure of damages was
regulated by Civ. Code, § 3353, providing that
in estimating damages the value of property to
a seller is the price in the nearest market at
such time after the buyer's refusal to accept as
would have sufficed for the seller to resell.-
Lund v. Lachman, 154 P. 295.

Under Civ. Code, § 3353, where, upon the
bottles resold through their agent, an iron sales-
buyer's refusal to accept, the sellers of wine
of his unfamiliarity with the market, the sellers.
man, at less than the market price, on account
could not recover of the buyer the difference be-
tween the selling and the contract price.-Id.
buyer's refusal to accept, failed to sell in the
Where the sellers of wine bottles, after the
market at prevailing prices so greatly over the
contract price as to have made them whole, such
sellers could not claim damages on account of
interest on damages from the breach or compen-
sation for making a resale at less than market
price.-Id.

Where sellers of wine bottles, upon the buyer's
refusal thereof, failed to resell at a prevailing
market price that would have more than made
them whole, they were entitled only to nominal
damages.-Id.