actually, to a great extent, the case of our Bible), in which the subject-matter of the revelation is merely above our previous knowledge, by revealing new facts, or doctrines, of which we were not previously cognisant. Now, in such a case as this, miracles, we affirm, would be sufficient to prove the truth of the revelation, and to show that it really comes from God. For it cannot be believed that the all-perfect God would permit His power of working miracles to be employed by any being to deceive His creatures in a case where they have no means of judging as to the source whence the revelation proceeds. While no miracles could render it our duty to believe an obvious absurdity, or to practise a flagrant immorality, yet, in this third case, it would clearly be our duty to bow implicitly to the authority of the miracles alone, apart from all reasonings or imaginings of our own.

Nor, in arguing thus, can we be justly charged with reasoning in a circle;" that is, with first making the doctrine prove the miracle, and then making the miracle prove the doctrine; as the advocates of the Papacy do, in arguing that the truth of the Bible rests on the authority of the Church, and that the authority of the Church is derived from the Bible. Such reasoning in a circle can prove nothing, except its own fallaciousness. But the case with regard to miracles, as proving the truth of doctrines, is totally different. What we affirm is, that if the doctrines of a professed

revelation are self-contradictory, or its precepts immoral, then such a revelation cannot be proved by any miracles to be Divine. And further, we affirm that, in showing that the doctrines of the Bible are not self-contradictory, and that its precepts are not immoral, we do not necessarily prove them to be divinely true, but we merely render them capable of being proved to be so by suitable and sufficient evidence. We do not build a direct argument in favour of the Divine authority of the Bible upon the absence of contradictions or immoral teachings from its pages, but we merely clear the ground in order to lay the foundation for such an argument. And when we have got this length, when we have shown, as can easily be, and as has been shown to demonstration, that there is no real contradiction or immorality in the Bible, then the proof furnished by miracles is conclusive in favour of its Divine authority. Beyond all question, the Bible, in its every page, breathes a pure and lofty morality which, if universally practised, would change this sin-burdened world into a paradise of holiness and peace-a morality which, instead of thwarting or counteracting the force of the miracles, only superadds one miracle to another. And still more, the Bible, though composed in different ages, and by various writers, under the direction of One Spirit, is so selfconsistent and harmonious in all its teachings, as to show incontrovertibly that these teachings have all

come from one source, and that this source is Divine. Is it not, then, evidently true, that in so far as the case of the Bible is concerned, there is no practical difficulty whatever in applying the argument from miracles; but, on the contrary, as has been eloquently said, that "the miracles and the morality of the Bible stand side by side, and conspire together in showing that it comes from Him who unites the highest power with the highest holiness?"

CHAPTER V.

INFIDEL OBJECTIONS.

ET us now consider some of the leading objections of modern infidels to the reality of the Bible miracles. Here we are called to notice chiefly the well-known argument of David Hume, in his celebrated "Essay on Miracles"—an argument which has been employed by many other opponents of the Bible, and which has been substantially adopted by the late Professor Powell, in his essay "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity;" although with this difference, that the Oxford professor went much beyond the avowed infidel in his opposition to miracles. The substance of Hume's

argument is stated in the following words: "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined" (Essays, vol. ii., sect. 10). To the same effect Strauss says, "We summarily reject all miracles, prophecies, narratives of angels or demons, and the like, as simply impossible, and irreconIcilable with the known and universal laws which

govern the course of events." The argument of Hume seems to amount to this: Our experience of the uniformity of nature's laws has never deceived us, but the testimony of our fellow-creatures has often deceived us; and therefore he concludes that their testimony, except in certain cases, can never prove that there has been a "violation" of the laws of nature, He admits, indeed, with strange inconsistency, that human testimony might in some cases prove a miracle; but he maintains that if the miracle be intended to support religion, then no proof can establish its reality. That is to say, suppose that God should resolve to reveal His will directly to the human race, in order to remove their miseries and sins, and should think fit to convince them by miracles that He has really done so, then Hume would at once deny the reality of these miracles, and discredit the strongest testimony in their favour. Though the

miracles might, in certain circumstances, be received as facts, yet they must be rejected as fictions, provided that they are designed to support a religion. In his estimation, a religious motive vitiates and evacuates the evidence furnished by miracles.

Such is Hume's argument; but if we closely examine it, it will not be difficult to show that it contains a double fallacy; first, in regard to experience, and second, in regard to testimony.

For

First, as to our experience of the uniformity of nature's laws. No doubt this experience may inform us as to past events, but it can give us no certain or infallible information as to future events. instance, experience tells us that the sun has risen and set daily during the last six thousand years; but experience cannot make us perfectly sure that the sun will continue to rise and set for ever. Nay, if the observations of astronomers and the calculations of mathematicians are to be relied upon, it can be demonstrated that the solar system, as at present constituted, cannot last for ever, but that it contains within itself the elements of its own destruction. Again, suppose that the extinct animals which have been found imbedded in the rocks, and which belong to an era far anterior to the creation of man, had been capable of reasoning, they might have said, like Hume, "Our experience for many centuries shows that the laws of nature have never been violated;