liability against the administrator personally for such tax by such assessment until all the requirements of section 35 are complied with, and that his liability is the same then as on any other probated claim and sufficient funds are in the estate to pay the same. This section treats the claim for taxes as an original claim against the decedent and allows it to be probated as a first-class claim against the estate. This shows clearly that it is not a claim againsť the administrator as owner of the property, as taxes assessed against the property of the decedent for the years after his appointment and before distribution are regarded. For such latter taxes he is treated as an owner in every sense of the word. He is required to list the property for such years, and in case he fails to do so and the assessor assesses him for the property as administrator, even without notifying him, he is personally liable for the taxes although he may have distributed all the funds. People v. Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 245 Ill. 522. Another reason for our conclusion is, that the omitted assessments and taxes are referred to in these sections as "the arrearages of tax which might have been assessed," and it is provided by the statute that a penalty of ten per cent interest thereon shall be collected "from the time the same ought to have been paid." Arrears or arrearages, as defined by our best lexicographers, are some things overdue and unpaid, outstanding debts or liabilities,—and that is a common definition of these terms when found in the law. (Hollingsworth v. Willis, 64 Miss. 152.) Interest is the legal damages or penalties for the unjust detention of money, as used in this statute. (County of Madison v. Bartlett, 1 Scam. 67.) There were no arrearages against the administrator as owner and no reason for assessing a penalty against him as owner. He was in no fault whatever. There was nothing due appellants from the decedent or his estate for arrearages, and hence there was no reason to penalize the estate or the administrator by allowing to appellants interest as a penalty. There was every reason for allowing interest or a penalty against decedent's estate to school district No. 38. In conclusion we may add that it is not possible for the county clerk to "find the person owing such uncollected tax assessed" for the subsequent years aforesaid, as provided in section 276, because such owner is dead, and the administrator is not the one owing the tax, within the meaning of that section. It would not be proper, therefore, for the county clerk to add these taxes for arrearages to the taxes of the administrator which he owes as administrator or owner to appellants. Neither the administrator nor the deceased ever owed such arrears to appellants. The deceased in his lifetime did justly owe these arrearages to school district No. 38. His estate now owes them to that district, and section 35 contemplates that that debt "shall be a claim of the first class" in favor of that district and not in favor of appellants. The general rule of law is that, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, property should be assessed and taxed in the name of the owner at the place where he resides and in favor of the taxing district in which he resides, for all years that the same is taxed. (Cooley on Taxation,-3d ed.-665; 37 Cyc. 947.) No one of the sections provides in terms where those arrears should be assessed and taxed, but from all the provisions of those sections the implication is strong that school district No. 38 is to have the benefit of those assessments, and we must so interpret the statute. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. (No. 12918.-Reversed and remanded.) THE VILLAGE OF BAYLIS, Appellee, vs. JOSEPH F. ORR, Appellant. Opinion filed December 17, 1919–Rehearing denied Feb. 4, 1920. 1. EMINENT DOMAIN-time fixed for paying compensation can not be changed after its expiration. Under section 10 of the Eminent Domain act, as amended in 1897, where the time fixed by the judgment for paying compensation has expired without any payment being made, the court has no power to extend the time, and the proviso to said section as to costs and attorney's fees must be applied although the petitioner's failure to pay was not due to an intention to abandon the proceeding but to delay in collecting the tax for the improvement. 2. SAME-proceedings for condemnation for a cemetery must come under Eminent Domain act. The provisions for condemnation in the Local Improvement act do not apply to proceedings to condemn land for a cemetery, but the power of condemnation given by paragraph 5 of the Cemeteries act must be exercised by proceedings under the Eminent Domain act. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Pike county; the Hon. HARRY HIGBEE, Judge, presiding. L. T. GRAHAM, and LEE CAPPS, for appellant. W. E. WILLIAMS, and A. CLAY WILLIAMS, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: The village of Baylis, in Pike county, Illinois, filed its petition in the circuit court in vacation in 1917 to condemn one and two-fifths acres of the land of Joseph F. Orr for cemetery purposes. The petition alleged the village owned a cemetery in the corporate limits, of about two acres, which was laid off in lots and used for the burial of the dead; that it was necessary to enlarge the cemetery and acquire additional ground therefor; that an ordinance of the village had been duly passed authorizing it to acquire, by condemnation or purchase, the land described in the petition; that the village was unable to agree with the owner for its purchase, and the petition prayed that the compensation to be paid for the land be determined and fixed by the court according to the statute in such case made and provided. A hearing was had in April, 1918, and the compensation to be paid for land taken and damaged was fixed at $800 and ordered paid on or before March 1, 1919. On the 21st of March, 1919, and during the November, 1918, term of the Pike county circuit court, Orr, the owner of the land condemned, filed his petition alleging the compensation had not been paid, that the village had abandoned its petition and the proceedings had thereunder had abated, and prayed to have his attorney's fees, costs and expenses incurred in the proceeding fixed and ordered paid, and that the court declare the petition for condemnation, and the proceedings had thereunder, had abated. When the hearing came up on the petition, April 21, 1919, the village of Baylis entered a crossmotion for leave to pay the judgment of compensation into the county treasury for the use of Orr eo instanti, and that upon payment the village be authorized to enter upon and appropriate the property for cemetery purposes. From testimony heard on the petition and motion it appeared that when the condemnation proceeding was heard and compensation fixed, the village had no, funds available out of which it could pay the judgment but would have to raise the money by a tax levy made that year but which could not be collected until the next year, 1919. For that reason March 1, 1919, was fixed as the time for payment of the compensation. Accordingly, appropriation and levy ordinances were passed providing for the levy of a tax to pay said judgment. The tax was levied and collected and was available for payment of the judgment at the time the hearing was had, but it had not been collected March 1 because of the fact that by reason of an amendment to the Revenue law in 1917 the time of settlement with the county treasurer for taxes. was changed from March 1 to April 1. When the village authorities learned of Orr's intended action, and before they had settled with and received the tax money from the county treasurer, they procured on their individual credit the sum of $800 and on April 9 tendered it to Orr in payment of the judgment, but he refused to accept it. The court entered an order directing that the village pay on the 21st day of April, 1919, to the county treasurer of Pike county for the use of Orr, $800 and interest thereon from March 1, 1919, and that upon making said payment it enter upon and take possession of the land. From that order Orr has prosecuted this appeal. Appellant contends that by the failure to pay the damages awarded within the time specified in the judgment appellee abandoned the proceeding, the same by operation of law abated, and he became entitled to file a petition for payment of his expenses and attorney's fees incurred in the condemnation proceedings. The appellant relies upon section 10 of the Eminent Domain act as amended in 1897. Prior to the amendment of section 10, in 1897, the statute did not require the court to fix the time for the payment of the compensation as part of the judgment, but the only requirement was that payment be made within a reasonable time or the proceeding would be regarded as abandoned. As it exists at present, section 10 provides that the court order the petitioner to enter upon the property upon payment, within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court, of the compensation, "Provided, that in case the petitioner shall dismiss said petition before the entry of such order or shall fail to make payment of full compensation within the time named in such order, that then such court or judge shall, upon application of the defendants to said petition or either of them, make such order in such cause for the payment by the petitioner of all costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees of such defendant or defendants paid or incurred by such defendant or defendants in defense of said petition, as upon the hearing of such application shall be right and just, |
