ever, although a motion can be made immediately after the Minister has answered the interpellation, the debate and vote, instead of taking place at once, while the Chamber is in a state of excitement, is postponed to a future day. Nevertheless, interpellations are more numerous and occupy even more time in Italy than in France, although, as we have said, the Italian Chamber of Deputies has more work to do, and does it, than devolves on the House of Representatives. With regard to the popular branch of the German federal parliament, we may observe that the rules of the Reichstag provide for interpellations. Ostensibly, these are addressed to the Bundesrath, but in fact they are communicated to the Chancellor, who either answers them himself, or allows one of his subordinates to do so. A debate may ensue, if demanded by fifty members, but it is not followed by an order of the day, expressing the opinion of the House. Indeed, in Germany, interpellations have no such importance as they possess in France and Italy, because the system of ministerial accountability to the legislature does not exist. They give, however, the individual member great power of initiative.

We have thus far confined ourselves mainly to the first question left unanswered by Mr. Reed, why, namely, the gag and handcuff are at present more needed in the House of Representatives than in other parliamentary assemblies which comprise a greater number of members and have an incalculably larger amount of work to accomplish? The second question is this: if the sole justification for stifling debate in the House of Representatives, and for reducing the bulk of the members to sheer nullities, the mere simulacra and shadows of legislators, be the alleged necessity of getting through the business of the House, how does it happen that the House under such a system does, as a matter of fact, accomplish considerably less work than does the Senate, where no gag law prevails? About the fact there is no doubt whatever. Some of the statistics bearing on this point were, by an interesting coincidence, set forth by a correspondent of the REVIEW in the June number. In the Fifty-fourth Congress, upon which Speaker Reed dwells at some length, the Senate passed 1,682 bills and joint resolutions; the House of Representatives but 1,200. In the Fifty-third Congress the figures were 1,086 and 951 respectively; in the Fifty-second there were 1,350 bills and joint resolutions to the credit of the Senate, as

against 990 for the House. We are told that a similar result could be shown in almost any Congress since the members of the House of Representatives have allowed themselves to be manacled and muzzled. We say "have allowed themselves," for of course the Speaker is in no wise responsible for the existing system. It is submitted that by the figures just cited the single plea put forward by Mr. Reed to excuse the obliteration of individuals in the House is rendered inadmissible.

There is a third question upon which we wish that a man so superlatively qualified to illuminate the subject, as is the Speaker, had thrown some light. How does he account for the deplorable loss of prestige on the part of the chamber wherein he presides, as compared with the contemporaneous Senate? How does he explain the scant attention paid by the public press to the proceedings of the House of Representatives, when at the same time the debates in the Senate are reported with care? How does he decipher what to many modern eyes seems the inscrutable, historical phenomenon that Henry Clay in 1811, although he had been twice returned to the Federal Senate, and could have remained there all his life, was glad to throw up his seat in that body in order to enter the House of Representatives? Does the Speaker believe that there now exists a Senator who could be tempted to follow Clay's example? If not, why not? How has it happened that the House of Representatives has declined from the place of eminence which it occupied when James Madison, Henry Clay, John Randolph, John Quincy Adams, and Thaddeus Stevens possessed and exercised freedom of utterance, and the right of truly representing their constituents upon its floors? M. W. HAZELTINE.

BY

THE MENACE OF LEGISLATION.

THE HOΝ. JAMES H. ECKELS, COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY.

A NUMBER of years since one of the foremost of American writers upon the political and economic history of the country called attention to the growing sentiment of fear with which business men regarded the convening of Congress in legislative session. This was equally apparent whether the legislative machinery was to be in Republican or Democratic hands, or whether the question dealt with was one of tariff revision or currency reform. In the time which has intervened since this fact was first noted, it cannot be said that the business world has become any more reconciled to the recurring sessions of legislative bodies or that it has felt a greater degree of assurance in observing the trend of public legislation. If the exact statistics could be obtained, and the truth stated, the results would undoubtedly show a greater intensity of feeling on the subject now than at the earlier date. It is safe to say that the feeling has not been lessened by the development of a character of law-making in almost every State of the Union, far more disturbing and harmful in its effects than the accomplished or attempted efforts at the national capital. This sentiment of fear and distrust finds expression in the columns of the press and in the private speech of the people and is of sufficient seriousness to warrant a public discussion of the reason for it. There must be something radically wrong, when, admittedly, any considerable body of the conservative people of the country entertain such views and withhold respect from legislatures and from enacted legislation. The final result must be a greatly weakened government and a thoroughly disorganized state of social order.

The origin of this condition of affairs is not difficult of ascer

tainment, nor is it of sudden growth. It is to be found in the manifest tendency, each year made more perceptible, of the lawmaking forces, national, State, and municipal, to subject all the undertakings of the private citizen to legislative inquiry and their management to statutory control. Even if such a course was inevitable during the extraordinary exigencies of the war period it is without excuse to-day. The aid of the law is invoked on every hand. The legislature of the nation reaches the affairs of the whole country, that of the State confines itself to State lines. Both proceed upon the theory that every business principle and business enterprise must be regulated by legislative act. The outcome of this wide and extreme exercise of power is a complete thralldom of business and a paralysis of enterprise and stoppage of investment. Nothing could seem more self-contradictory than the statement that the business prosperity of the whole country is delayed and the people impoverished through law, and yet there is absolute truth in the assertion. It cannot be expected that capital will be invested when the suggestion is continually put forth that the basis upon which it is to be expended is liable to change before return is made upon it. The business world knows how essential to business success is stability, and if this is wanting nothing but loss can follow. It awaits some token that the conditions are stable, and that it shall be free from repeated unnecessary legislative interference, before it again calls into activity the means at hand to revive lagging industries and quicken the arteries of trade and commerce.

How completely all this is a reversal of the principles of gov-* ernment invoked at the adoption of the Federal Constitution and the founding of the States is shown by the most casual inquiry. It was then believed that a Republican government should be one of few laws and limited powers. Neither in the enforcement of the one nor in the exercise of the other should there be any attempt to encroach unnecessarily upon the rights of person and of property guaranteed to the citizens. The rights of property were regarded as sacredly as the rights of person, and held to be equally free from invasion. The citizen was, under all circumstances, expected to maintain his individuality. His individual efforts were to work out, without either legislative check on the one hand, or legislative aid on the other, his social and political YOL. CLXV.-NO. 489.

16

status, and his energy and economy to gain for him whatever degree of material prosperty was possible. The right of governmental interference, even to the extent of sumptuary legislation, was as stoutly denied as would have been a legislative attempt to dictate the citizen's religious belief and form of worship. In the view of the strongest advocate of a paternal government, at that time and for seventy years thereafter, the operations of enacted law were to be confined entirely to matters of public moment, in no wise giving unequal advantage to any one class of citizens over another. Equality under the law had not then become, through the uncalled-for exercise of legislative powers, a mere legal fiction, but was a substantial fact. The government took no man's property unjustly through an abuse of legislation, nor had it favored citizens upon whom it bestowed the privileges which it denied to itself. When legislation had secured the protection of the individual in those things which were absolutely essential to his happiness and which were beyond his own gaining, its work was fully accomplished. The making of the government by statute a partner in the citizen's private business successes and failures was a thing unknown. There was no attempt to create either law-made wealth or law-made money. If tax enactments were to find a place upon the statute book, it was that the treasury might have the means wherewith to meet the expenses of a government economically administered. The measure of the rate of taxation to be enacted from the citizen was the measure of the government's legitimate needs and not of the selfish requirements of private interests. If monetary legislation was demanded the object of the law to be enacted was simply to ratify the decrees of the commercial world and not to defy or nullify them. The improvements undertaken at governmental expense were undeniably for the general good and not in aid of mere local interests. The employer and employee, the capitalist and laborer, all worked out their own difficulties, and it cannot be successfully denied that the relations created between these classes by their own acts were as harmonious and profitable as at present, when on every statute book are to be found innumerable labor acts.

Nothing was more evident during the period when such political ideas obtained than the soundness of the views of every public man upon public questions, saving always upon that of