"no principle of law is more evident, than that where a limited jurisdiction has a course prescribed by statute, that must be pursued ; and so appear on the face of the proceedings." 7. Low v. RICE, 8 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 409. ap If he holds his court in bidden by the statule Where the statute said, that no justice shall try any cause in a place for a house where a tavern was kept, held, that the plaintiff's pearing and going to trial, will not give jurisdiction; and judgment was reversed; because the court was thus holden 8. the judgment SCHROEPEL V. TAYLOR, May T. 1833, 10 Wend. N. Y. Rep. 196; GUERNSEY V. LOVELL, 9 ib. 319. will be re versed. The R. S. have not al risdiction of Justices in England have always been county officers; and tered the ju they were such in this state, until 1818; which limited the num-justices; but ber in each town to four. That act affected only the tenure of the altera tion only af the office not the jurisdiction. And a justice of the peace may is- fects the ten sue process and make it returnable, in any part of the county. 9. HUNTER V. BURTIS, ET AL. 10 Wend. N. Y. Rep. 358. ure of their office. Non resi to sue and By the justice's act in this state, a non-resident plaintiff dents, how may bring his action before any justice of the county; but a be sued in suit against a non-resident defendant, must be brought in the N. Y. in a town, in which the defendant may happen to be at the time. 10. EMERY V. NELSON, 9 Sergt. & Rawl. Penn. Rep. 12. If a justice has jurisdiction of the case, it is binding upon the parties, untill set aside or reversed on appeal, or by certiorari. 11. THE COMMONWEALTH V. CHENY, 6 Mass. Rep. 347; M'KENSY V. RAMSEY, 1 Bailey's S. Ca. Rep. 457. justice's courts. There can imprison or A justice of the peace has no jurisdiction of an offence, be no au which by law may be prosecuted by indictment, or an informa- thority to tion qui tam. Parsons, C. J. observed: No man is liable to im- bail for an prisonment, or to find bail to answer to the commonwealth, un- which can less, when he shall appear to answer, the latter shall have an not be pros indefeasible right to prosecute him. If it were not so, a man accused might suffer imprisonment for months, and eventually could not be holden to answer. Therefore, a recognizance for ecuted. The small tion to his appearance at court, for selling mixed liquors without license, was held to be void on demurrer to the declaration. 12. PEARCE V. ATWOOD, 13 Mass. Rep. 341; sed see 11 Johns. N. In the language of Lord Mansfield, "there is no principle in est interest the law more settled than this, that any degree, even the smallest in a magis trate is a de degree of interest in the question, depending, is a decisive objec cisive objection to a witness, and much more so to a juror, or to the officer, entertain by whom the juror is returned; and that the minuteness of the ing jurisdic tion. interest, will not relax the objection; for the degree of influence cannot be measured; no line can be drawn, but that of a total exclusion of all degrees whatever." The principle applies with equal strength to a judge or magistrate; especially to a magistrate, exercising the authority both of judge and jury; and who have cognizance of suits, criminal and civil, by our statutes. But cases the legisla 13. HILL V. WELLS, 6 Pick. Mass. Rep. 104; COMMONWEALTH V. But where the statute in respect to the maintenance of a bassometimes tard child, gives jurisdiction to a particular court, the minute inexist when terest of the justices as inhabitants of the city or town,interested ture may in the question, will not prevent the court from entertaining judisregard a risdiction. very minute interest; And in the prosecution against Ryan where the exception to and give ju risdiction. the indictment was the interest which one of the grand jurors had as an inhabitant of the town, on account of the fine for that offence going to the use of the town; Parsons, C. J. said, considering the question abstractly there, certainly was an interest in the jury, as inhabitants of the town, to recover this penalty from the defendant. This interest at common law, is a sufficient objection; unless by the necessary construction of our statutes, this objection is removed. To allow the objection, would be to repeal the statute; for the offence cannot be prosecuted by other jurors. It cannot, therefore, be allowed. A remote and small 14. THE COMMONWELTH V. RYAN, 5 Mass. Rep. 92, 93; CORWIN It is not only a maxim of law, but a principle of natural jus terest isn ot clare. tice to have judges and jurors free from interest. It is not al- corporate in ways possible perfectly to adhere to it. Where penalties accrue sufficient objection if to towns, the interest of the inhabitants may be a little affected; but in practice it cannot have much effect. It is for the legislature so de ture to decide when this theoretic interest shall be an objection. There can be no good reason why the legislature may not constitutionally provide, that a remote and small corporate interest, shall not be an objection to a jurors trying a cause; where the defendant may be sentenced to pay a fine to the use of the commonwealth. 15. THE MAYOR, &c. OF JONESBORO' v. M'KEE, 2 Yerger's Tenn. ject. A justice, who is a member of a corporation, (city,) it was Same sub held, might nevertheless issue his warrant in a case where the corporation is a party. The case is different, if it be a common aggregate corporation; in which the justice has a private interest. 16. OWING V. GIBSON, 2 Marshall's Ky. Rep. 517; HUMPHREYS The fact that a judge has been engaged as counsel in the Same in case for one of the parties, does not disqualify him from sitting and Louis Kentucky in the cause; it is discretionary with him to take his seat or not, ania. And in the case in Louisania, Martin, J. observed, that a court. was not ousted of it jurisdiction, by the circumstance of the sole judge of it, having an interest in the suit, as being personally incapacitated. 17. tion may THE MINISTERS, &C. OF THE DUTCH CHURCH, V. ADAMS, 5 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 346; HотснKISS V. HOMER, 7 ib. 356. Although a corporation cannot be sued in a justice's court A corpora for the reason mainly, that the justice cannot compel a corpora sue, but tion to appear: Yet, a corporation can sue, because it can con- cannot be stitute an attorney to appear and prosecute; see tit. "Corpora- justice's tion." sued in a court. III. POWER AND DUTY.* * Whenever power is given to justices, their decision is final unless an appeal is expressly given; Parson v. Blondy, Wighw, 22. He may commit for a breach of the peace in his view; Brookshaw v. Hopkins, Lofft. 240. If the plain tiff does not appear on the coming in of a ver dict, the jus tice should enter a dis continu ance. But a jus tice cannot case from 1. RELYEA V. RAMSAY, 2 Wend. Rep. 602; BUNN V. CROUL, 10 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 239; HENLOW V. LEONARD, 7 ib. 200. Judgment rendered in the absence of a plaintiff is only voidable; but its validity cannot be enquired into collaterally. If the plaintiff does not appear on the coming in of a verdict, it is the duty of the judge or justice to direct a discontinuance to be en tered. And in Bunn v. Croul, it was irregular for the justice to make an explanation to the jury in respect to the evidence, in the absence of the parties, and after the jury had retired; and the judgment for this cause was reversed. But in the prior case of Henlow v. Leonard, where a witness was permitted to go before the jury to answer further questions; but in the presence of the justice, and after notice to the parties, one of whom would not attend; it was held not to be sufficient to set aside the judgment. 2. LOCKE V. SMITH, 10 Johns. Rep. 250; BURLINGHAM V. DEYER, 2 ib. 189. Where the defendant on the trial, offered to prove certain determine a facts material to his defence; but was prevented by the justice, facts within who stated, that knowing the facts, alleged on the part of the his own plaintiff, from being personally acquainted with the circumstanknowledge; and with ces, and the several contracts alleged, at the time of the same, out proof. he overuled the evidence of the facts as illegal. The court on certiorari said: "The justice could not act upon his own knowledge of the verity of the facts; and this was the ground on whice he excluded the evidence. Judgment reversed. 3. PEARCE V. ATWOOD, 13 Mass. Rep. 353; COMMONWEALTH V. A justice a breach of the sabbath a trespasser. on that day. And where a justice after the examination of the case, ordered the defendant to recognize to the common pleas, to answer for the offence, and afterwards permitted him to retract his plea, and plead guilty; whereupon he was sentenced to pay a fine and costs of prosecution. The court held, that the justice having by the statute jurisdiction of the offence,and a discretionary power to recognise the party, or to hear and determine the cause, might lawfully reconsider his determination, to recognise, while the proceeding remained open, and proceed to hear the cause, in his discretion this course was thought by him to be proper. 4. COMMONWEALTH V. OTIS, 16 Mass. Rep. 198. conviction The defendant was convicted in this court for forgery; and The court having avoided after the verdict and before the sentence, but was in which a brought back, and the justice took his recognizance, with sure is had alone ties for his appearance in this court. On his default, a scire fa- diction of have juris cias was sued out; and after oyer of the recognizance and gen- the perton." eral demurrer to the declaration, the court held, the declaration to be bad, on the ground that the court in which the conviction was had, alone had jurisdiction over the person. If, as in the case before us, the party has fled into another state, and is brought back on application of the executive, he is to be lodged in prison, and there remain until sentence, unless bailed on habeas corpus. 5. COMMONWEALTH V. MESSENGER, 4 Mass. Rep. 462. (See post proceedings before No. 6.) forms is not In a summary proceeding before a justice-such as a com- A rigid ad plaint for a breach of the Sabbath law, the court will see that herence to the fact charged is strictly within the statute, and that the pro- required in ceedings are conformable to it. But a rigid adherence to forms before a jus proceedings will not be required. Therefore, the conclusion of a complaint tice. "against the statutes enacted for the observance of the Lord's day," though not technically formal, is sufficiently certain. So, where a complaint does not show on whose behalf it is exhibited, nor what defendant has forfeited by the offence, nor how the forfeiture is appropriated. The inference is purely legal, and the court is competent to decide what the forfeiture is, and also what is its appropriation. 6. COMMONWEALTH V. ALDERMAN, 4 Mass. Rep. 477. A conviction before a magistrate for a breach of the peace, on A convic the confession or information of the offender himself, is no bar to an indictment for the same offence. 7. COMMONWEALTH V. WARD, 4 Mass. Rep. 497; Same v. Mo REY, 8 ib. 78. tion before a justice on confession, is no bar to an indict ment. The war A mittimus or warrant of commitment should always recite rant of com |