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Essay I.



29. It was the boast of Sparta that her form of government under. went no material alteration from its original foundation by Lycurgus till after the close of the Peloponnesian struggle. And this boast was so far just, that she certainly continued during the period indicated remarkably free from those sudden and complete revolutions which afflicted almost every other Greek state. It was not possible, however, that she should escape altogether the silent and gradual alterations which the hand of time imperceptibly works; and accordingly we observe in her history that little by little the original constitution was modified, and that finally a state of things was introduced almost as different from that which Lycurgus designed, as if the government had at some time or other been changed by violence. Lycurgus preserved not only the forms but the essential spirit of the ancient monarchy. His Sparta was to be governed by her kings.4 Before the commencement of the Persian war, the kings had sunk into mere cyphers—they “reigned but did not govern.” Honour and dignity were theirs; but power was lodged in a different quarter. The principal kingly functions are found to have been transferred to the Ephors, who were the true rulers of the Spartan state during the time of which Herodotus and Thucydides treat. The Ephors in Herodotus receive embassies, direct the march and give the command of armies,6 issue their orders to the kings, act as their judges and condemn or absolve them, accompany them abroad as a check,' interfere in their domestic concerns, 10—in all respects have the real management of affairs; while the king is a nonentity, possessing little more political power than a senator, 11 and obliged to have recourse to the Ephors before he can force a foreigner to quit the town.12 In Thucydides the Ephors recall the kings from abroad 13_imprison them, and even put them to death 14—act as presidents of the assembly, though the king is present 15_conduct the foreign affairs of the country 16—and control

3 Thucyd, i. 18.

12 Herod. iii. 148. Compare, how. 4 Tyrtæns, Fr. 2, ll. 5, 6.

ever, the case of Aristagoras (v. 50), 5 Herod. ix. 7. 6 Ibid. ch. 10. 1 whom the same king sends away with7 Ibid. v. 39, 40. 8 Ibid. vi. 82. out consulting the Ephors. 9 Ibid. ix. 76. 10 Ibid. v. 39.41. 13 Thucyd. i. 131.

I The only real superiority which 14 Ibid. and i. 134. the king possessed over a Senator in 15 Ibid. i. 87. &TreyÝ Olcev aŭtós (o Sparta, seems to have been the double develaidas), dopos óv. vote (Herod. vi. 57, ad fin.), which 16 Ibid. v. 36, vi. 88, viii. 6 and 12. itself was probably nothing more than Remark also that while the Ephors' a casting vote (see note ad loc.). | names are essential to a treaty those



APP. Book V.

the monarch on foreign expeditions by means of a body of council. lors. It is clear that by a slow and silent process of continual usurpation the Ephors had, by the time of Thucydides, completely superseded the kings as the directors of affairs at Sparta; while the kings' military pre-eminence—which was the last of their prerogatives that remained to them—had begun to be viewed with jealous eyes, and was already in danger of passing from them.2

If it be asked how this gradual change was brought about what inherent strength there was in the Ephoralty enabling it to make and maintain these usurpations—the answer is to be found, first of all in the fact that the Ephors were annually elected by the whole mass of Spartan citizens, and thus felt themselves the representatives of the nation; and, secondly, in the misconduct of the kings on various occasions, which caused them to be regarded with con. tinually increasing distrust. The Ephors, it is probable, first assumed royal functions during the Messenian wars, when in the absence of both kings from the city it would naturally fall to them to convoke the assembly and the senate, to receive embassies and reply to them, to send out troops, and in fact to take the chief conduct of public affairs. They were able to establish themselves above the kings by means of their general right of supervision and correction of offenders, which entitled them to summon the kings

of the kings are not (v. 19 and 24). | with the king when he proceeded on The kings, however, still have a supe. | foreign service (Xen. Hell. II. iv. $ rior dignity, and when they sign, sign 36). before the Ephors.

3 The kings of both houses misconi Thucyd. v. 63.

ducted themselves about the time of 9 It appears that, as early as B.C. | the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. 479, Ephors accompanied the king (or Cleomenes was discovered to have rather the regent) on a military expe. bribed the oracle, and, having fallen dition (Herod. ix. 76). They do not, into disgrace, plotted an Arcadian however, appear then to have exer rising (Herod. vi. 74). Pausanias was cised any actual control. The next willing to have betrayed Greece to instance is in B.C. 415, when Clean Persia (Thucyd. i. 128-131). Plisto. dridas, the father of Gylippns, accom anax, his son, was tempted by a bribe panied Plistoapax, as councillor, in his to forego the opportunity of conquering invasion of Attica (Plut. Vit. Pericl. Athens (Thucyd. i. 114, and v. 16). c. 22). The fact that Pericles regarded He also bribed the oracle to obtain his him as the special person to bribe, recall. Of the other house, Leotychiwould indicate that he possessed a das took a bribe from the Thessalians large share of the chief authority. The (Herod. vi. 72), and Agis was strongly appointment of ten councillors to con. | suspected of having had similar deal. trol Agis (B.C. 418) is the next step. | ings with the Argives (Thucyd. v. Finally, before B.C. 403, it became the | 63). regular custom to send out two Ephors

Essay I.



themselves before their tribunal, to censure and to fine them; and especially by their power of intermeddling with the king's domestic concerns, under pretence of watching over the purity of the race of Hercules, with which the existence of Sparta was supposed to be bound up. The humiliating subjection in which the kings were thus kept, led naturally to their entertaining from time to time treasonable projects; and the discovery of these projects favoured the further advance of the Ephors, who in transferring to themselves the royal prerogatives seemed to be adding to the security of the commonwealth.

30. Another gradual change in the Spartan state—and one which ultimately destroyed the Lycurgean constitution—was effected by the working of regulations which Lycurgus had himself instituted. The perpetual diminution in the number of citizens, which is to be traced throughout Spartan history,6 arose in part from the infanticide which he enjoined, in part perhaps from the restraints which he placed upon the free intercourse of young married persons, but chiefly from the disqualification under which he laid all those whose means did not allow them to furnish from their estates the necessary quotas for the syssitia, which acted as a discouragement to marriage, and gradually reduced, not only the number of the 360

4 It was arged in later times that | as is generally supposed, td dúo mépni the constitutional power of the Ephors (comp. Thucyd. ii. 10), they would was not above that of the kings because | have amounted really at that time to the latter were not bound to attend to 1 7500. After this they rapidly dimin. the first or second summons of the ished. Not more than 700 Spartans former (Plut. Vit. Cleomen. c. 10); were engaged at Leuctra (Xen. Hell. but the fact that they were bound to vi.iv. § 15). Isocrates probably gives obey the third summons is the really the number in his own time, when important point. Their power of fining (Panath. p. 286, C.) he estimates the the king appears in Thucyd. v. 63, and original conquerors at 2000 (see Clin. is, of course, included in the general ton, F. H. i. p. 498, note P). This statement of Xenophon-ikavol uèv elow would be abont B.c. 350. Aristotle (oi é dopol) (nuloûv ov av Boúwytal (Rep. (about B.C. 330) declares that they did Lac. viii. 4).

not amount to 1000 (oùdè xixiou to 5 Herod. v. 39.41.

años toav, Pol. ii. 6). Eighty years 6 The original number of the full | later, in B.C. 244, the whole number Spartan citizens was, according to one was 700 (Plut. Vit. Agid. c. 5). account, 10,000 (Ar. Pol. ij. 6). In the 17 Polybius notes that in his time three division of the territory, ascribed by or four Spartan brothers had often the some to Lycurgus, by others to Poly same wife (Collect. Vet. Script. vol. ii. dorus (Plut. Vit. Lycurg. c. 8), they are p. 384), the truth being, probably, that estimated at 9000. Demaratus (B.C. only the eldest brother could afford to 480), describing their numbers to marry (see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. Xerxes, and probably exaggerating a p. 205, E. T., and Grote's Greece, little, laid them at 8000 (Herod. vii. | vol. ii. p. 536, note ?). 234). If the 5000 sent to Platæa were,



full citizens, but that of the whole Dorian body, to a mere handful in the population of the city. An exclusive possession of political rights, which (according to Greek ideas) was fairly enough enjoyed by a Demus of some 10,000 men controlling an adult male population of 50,000 or 60,000,9 became intolerable, when its holders had dwindled to a few hundreds, and were scarcely a visible element among the inhabitants, or an appreciable item in the strength of the country. The general disaffection which arose from this disproportion, first showed itself at the time of the conspiracy of Cinadon, B.c. 397, which was with difficulty suppressed. It afterwards caused Periæci as well as Helots to join with the Thebans in their invasion of Sparta. Finally it robbed the community of all real national spirit, producing a state of internal struggle and disunion which took away from Sparta all her influence in Greece, and tempted the young and enthusiastic Agis to his great experimentfatal at once to himself and to what remained of the Lycurgean system.

8 It is the whole Spartiate body | Agesilaus into Asia (Xen. Hellen. III. which is in the reign of Agis 700. Of iv. $$ 2, 3). The same number went these not more than 100 were full with Agesi polis to the Olynthiac war citizens (Plut. Vit. Agid. 1. s. c.). (ibid. v. ii. $ 8). The 700 who fought

9 See Clinton on the Population of at Leuctra are an unusually large con. Ancient Greece, F. H. vol. ii. Appen tingent for the time. dix, ch. 22, pp. 491-505.

3 Xen. Hellen. 111. iii. SS 8.11. 1 Xen. Hellen. 111. iü. $ 5.

4 Ibid. vi. v. $ 25; Ages. ii. 24. 2 Thirty Spartans only accompanied | 6 Plut. Vit. Agid. c. 5, et seqq.

Essay II.





1. Obscurity of early Athenian history. 2. Primitive inhabitants of Attica

unwarlike. · 3. Causes of her weakness-no central authority-Pelasgio blood. 4. First appearance of the Athenians in history-stories of Melan. thns and Codrus. 5. Blank in the external history. 6. Ionian migration conducted by sons of Codrus. 7. Internal history. 8. Early tribesTeleontes, Hopletes, Ægicoreis, and Argadeis. 9. Clans and phratries-im. portance of this division. 10. Trittyes and Naucraries. 11. Political distribution of the people-Eupatrida, Geomori, and Demiurgi. 12. First period of the aristocracy-from Codrus to Alcmæon, B.c. 1050-752. 13. Second period—from Alemæon to Eryxias, B.C. 752-684-rapid advance. 14. Mode in which the usurpations were made-substitution of the Eupatrid assembly for the old Agora. 15. Power of the old Senate. 16. Full establishment of oligarchy, B.c. 684. 17. First appearance of the demo. cratical spirit—legislation of Draco. 18. Revolt of Cylon, crushed. 19. Sacrilege committed-widespread discontent. 20. Solon chosen as mediator-his proceedings. 21. Date of his archonship. 22. His recovery of Salamis. 23. His connection with the Sacred War. 24. His legislationthe Seisachtheia and debasement of the currency. 25. Prospective measures. 26. Constitutional changes-introduction of the four classes, Pentacosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugite, and Thetes. 27. Arrangement of burthens-income tax-military service. 28. Pro-Boulentic council. 29. Im. portance of these changes-Dicasteries. 30. Solon the true founder of the democracy. 31. Solon confined citizenship to the tribes. 32. Laws of Solon-(i.) Penalties for crimes—(ii.) Stimulus to population-(ii.) Law against political neutrality. 33. Results of his legislation-time of repose

-revival of discontent-Solon leaves Athens. 34. Re-appearance of the old parties--Pedieis, &c.-return of Solon-his courage. 35. Tyranny of Pisistratus.

1. The early history of Athens is involved in even greater obscurity than that of Sparta, owing to the comparative isolation and seclusion, which were the consequence of its geographical position, and of the character of its soil. Lying, as Attica did, completely out of the path of the armies which proceeded from Northern Greece to the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus or the Straits of Rhium, and possessing little to tempt the cupidity of conquerors, it scarcely came into contact with the other nations of Greece till just

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