The filing of the schedule with the Commission and the furnishing by the railroad company of copies to its freight offices in controvertibly evidenced that the tariff of rates contained in the schedule had been established and put in force as mentioned in the first sentence of the section, and the railroad company could not have been heard to assert to the contrary. The requirement that schedules should be "posted in two public and conspicuous places in every depot," Argued October 11, 1906. Decided February etc., was not made a condition precedent to the establishment and putting in force of | same state does not make the shipment between such two points, when performed by a connecting carrier to which the car was delivered by the original terminal carrier in obedience to the instructions of the owner, the regulations of the state railroad commisan interstate one, and, as such, exempt from sion. [No. 2.] 25, 1907. N to the Supreme Court of the which affirmed a judgment of the Court of common carrier for extortion. Affirmed. the tariff of rates, but was a provision based ERROR to do to review a judgment upon the existence of an established rate, and plainly had for its object the affording of special facilities to the public for ascertaining the rates actually in force. To hold that the clause had the far-reaching effect claimed would be to say that it was the intention of Congress that the negligent posting by an employee of but one instead of two copies of the schedule, or the neglect to post either, would operate to cancel the previously established schedule, a concluIn the district court of Tarrant county, sion impossible of acceptance. While 86 Texas, on July 28, 1902, the state of Texas forbade an increase or reduction of rates, recovered a judgment against the Gulf, Coloetc., "which have been established and pub-rado, & Santa Fé Railway Company for lished as aforesaid," otherwise than as provided in the section, we think the publication referred to was that which caused the rates to become operative; and this deduction is fortified by the terms of § 10 of the act, making it a criminal offense for a com mon carrier or its agent or a shipper or his employee improperly "to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: $100 as a penalty for extortion in a charge for the transportation of a car load of corn from Texarkana, Texas, to Goldthwaite, Texas. both the court of civil appeals (32 Tex. Civ. This judgment was sustained by App. 1, 73 S. W. 429) and the supreme court of the state. 97 Tex. 274, 78 S. W. 495. Thereupon the railway company brought the case here on a writ of error. The case was tried in the district court rates then established and in force on the line of transportation of such common car-without a jury. Findings of fact were made, rier." which were sustained by the uary 13, 1902, the Texas & Pacific Railway GULF, COLORADO, & SANTA FE RAIL-it arrived on the 17th day of January, 1902. WAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., V. STATE OF TEXAS. Interstate commerce-continuous shipment When it reached Goldthwaite, Saylor & Burnett, who were acting for the Samuel Hardin Grain Company, tendered the charges prescribed by the state railroad commission, which the agent declined to accept, and demanded and collected a larger sum. following findings state the important facts upon which the controversy turns: The "8. On December 23d, 1901, the Samuel "11. The Hardin Grain Company's officers kept themselves informed of interstate commission freight rates and of the state commission rates, and the reason why they contracted for the corn to be delivered to them at Texarkana was because they could fill their contract with Saylor & Burnett at Goldthwaite at about 12 cents per bushel cheaper than they could if they bought the corn for delivery to them at Kansas City and had it shipped from Kansas City to Goldthwaite. Hardin Grain Company, at Kansas City, Mis- | pounds, which would have been apportioned souri, offered to sell Saylor & Burnett, at as follows: 18 cents from Hudson to KanGoldthwaite, Texas, No. 2 mixed corn at sas City, and 28 cents from Kansas City to 862 cents per bushel for delivery on rail- Goldthwaite, Texas. The G. C. & S. F. Ry. way track at Goldthwaite, and this offer Co., the T. & P. Ry. Co. and the Kansas was accepted for two car loads of corn. This | City Southern Ry. Co. together with othoffer and acceptance was by telegraphic com- er connecting lines from Kansas City, munication between the parties at their re- Missouri, to Goldthwaite, Texas, had esspective places of business. The Hardin Grain tablished a joint tariff of 35 cents per Company did not at that time have the corn, 100 pounds on shipments from Kansas City but on December 24th, 1901, to fill the order, to Goldthwaite via Texarkana and originatit contracted with the Harroun Commission ing in Kansas City, had agreed on a division Company of Kansas City for the purchase,- of that rate between them, and had filed two 66,000-pound cars of No. 2 mixed corn tariffs establishing such rate with the Inat 752 cents per bushel, to be delivered at terstate Commerce Commission, and by such Texarkana, Texas, to the Hardin Grain Com- steps had brought itself within the provipany. Previously to this the Harroun Com- sions of the interstate commerce laws. mission Company had contracted for the purchase of two cars of corn to be delivered to it at Texarkana, Texas, and with these two cars it it expected to and did fill the order of the Hardin Grain Company. These cars had originated in Hudson, South Dakota. The receiving carrier at Hudson was the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway company, who issued bills of lading limiting its liability to losses occurring on its road, with a like limitation of liability of all other carriers who should handle said corn in transit to its destination. By the terms of said bills of lading the corn was consigned to 'Forrester Bros., Texarkana, Texas,' and shipment made in cars of C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., care of Kansas City Southern Ry. at Kansas City, Missouri, with the privilege to stop the corn at Kansas City for inspection and transfer. The corn reached Kansas City on December 17th, 1901, was there unloaded, sacked, and transferred to the Kansas City Southern Railway Co. who, on December 31st, 1901, issued bills of lading reciting that the corn was loaded in cars No. 3845 P. G. and No. 4189 P. G., that same was received of Forrester Bros. and consigned as follows: 'Shipper's order, notify Harroun Commission Company, Texarkana, Texas,' and reciting further that freight 14 cents per hundred pounds was prepaid, and one of these cars, to wit, car No. 3845 P. G.' is the car in controversy in this suit. "9. The Harroun Commission Company paid no freight on the corn from Hudson, South Dakota, to Texarkana, Texas, as it had purchased it to be delivered at Texar "12. At the time of the purchase contract between the Hardin Grain Company and the Harroun Commission Company, Hardin, the manager of the former company, intended that the corn to be thereby acquired should go to Saylor & Burnett and should be shipped to Goldthwaite, from Texarkana, as soon as practicable, and, on December 26th, 1901, two days after this contract for purchase had been made, Hardin was informed that the corn with which Harroun Commission Company expected to fill his order would be sacked in Kansas City and be shipped out of Kansas City to Texarkana, but at the time of making the contract he did not know from whence the corn would come. "13. On December 31st, 1901, the date of shipment from Kansas City to Texarkana. Harroun Commisssion Company informed the Hardin Grain Company that the corn to fill the latter's order had been loaded to start to Texarkana, and requested instruction as to how the corn should be shipped from Texarkana for the guidance of F. L. Atkins, their agent at that place, who would attend to such reshipping for the Hardin "10. The freight on the corn from Hudson Grain Company, as per former understandto Texarkana was as follows: 18 cents per ing. Thereupon and in compliance with such 100 pounds from Hudson to Kansas City and request blank bills of lading were made out 14 cents from Kansas City to Texarkana, all by the Hardin Grain Company in Kansas of which was paid by the vendors of Har- City and furnished to the Harroun Commisroun Commission Company. The minimun sion company, to be forwarded to F. L. Atinterstate rate from Hudson, South Dakota, kins. These bills of lading were to be exto Goldthwaite, Texas, was 46 cents per 100 lecuted by the Texas & Pacific Railway Com kana. do not control, and the court erred in enforcing the penalty. If, however, it was a purely local shipment, the judgment below was right and should be sustained. The facts are settled by the special find pany, and F. L. Atkins, as agent for ulations of the state railroad commission the Hardin Grain Company, and were for shipment of the corn to Goldthwaite, Texas, consigned to 'Shipper's order, notify, etc.' giving the numbers and initials of cars, which information had been furnished by the Harroun Commission Com-ings, those findings being conclusive upon pany, and on January 14, 1902, the reshipment having been made as per instructions, the bills of lading duly executed by the Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. were by Harroun delivered to Hardin Grain Company, who thereupon paid the Harroun Commission Company $1,779.64, the purchase price previous-ly agreed upon for the corn, and the receipt of said blank bills of lading by the Harroun Commission Company was the first information had by that company of the intended final destination and disposition of the corn. this court. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658, 38 L. ed. 305, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188, 41 L. ed. 680, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; Thayer v. Spratt, 189 U. S. 346, 47 L. ed. 845, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; Adams v. Church, 193 U. S. 510, 48 L. ed. 769, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512; Clipper Min. Co. v. Eli Min. & Land Co. 194 U. S. 220, 48 L. ed. 944, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632. that such transportation was interstate commerce, and that its interstate character was not affected by the various changes of title or issues of bills of lading intermediate its departure from Hudson and its arrival at Goldthwaite. The corn was carried from Texarkana, Texas, to Goldthwaite, Texas, upon a bill of lading which, upon its face, showed only a local transportation. It is, however, con"14. Neither Hardin Grain Company nor tended by the railway company, that this Harroun Commission Company had any local transportation was a continuation of store or warehouse at Texarkana, but, under a shipment from Hudson, South Dakota, to the agreement between the two companies Texarkana, Texas; that the place from (Hardin and Harroun), one F. L. Atkins, who which the corn started was Hudson, South was the agent of the Harroun Commission | Dakota, and the place at which the transCompany, and stationed at Texarkana, re-portation ended was Goldthwaite, Texas; shipped the corn at Texarkana for the Hardin Grain Company. That shipment was to Goldthwaite, Texas, over the Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. and the G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co., by bill of lading reciting its receipt from Hardin Grain Company, and consigned to 'Shipper's order, notify Saylor & Burnett, Goldthwaite, Texas,' and was transferred under original seals and without breaking packages, to the Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., after having remained in Texarkana five days; the only thing done by F. L. Atkins was to surrender the Kansas City Southern bill of lading, have the cars set over on the T. & P. Ry., and take a bill of lading from the latter company. The corn reached Texarkana January 7th, 1902, and was shipped out from Texarkana January 13th, 1902; the defendant was not a party to the bill of lading executed at Texarkana. "15. On December 31st, 1901, Hardin Grain Co. mailed to Saylor & Burnett an invoice of the corn in the form of an account, stating the car numbers and initial, the amount of corn, and price to be paid by Saylor & Burnett." Messrs. Gardner Lathrop, A. B. Browne, and J. W. Terry for plaintiff in error. Mr. Robert Vance Davidson for defendant in error. It is undoubtedly true that the character of a shipment, whether local or interstate, is not changed by a transfer of title during the transportation. But whether it be one or the other may depend on the contract of shipment. The rights and obligations of carriers and shippers are reciprocal. The first contract of shipment in this case was from Hudson to Texarkana. During that transportation a contract was made at Kansas City for the sale of the corn, but that did not affect the character of the shipment from Hudson to Texarkana. It was an interstate shipment after the contract of sale as well as before. In other words, the transportation which was contracted for, and which was not changed by any act of the parties, was transportation of the corn from Hudson to Texarkana,—that is, an interstate shipment. The control over goods in process of transportation, which may be repeatedly changed by sales, is one thing; the transportation is another thing, and follows the contract of shipment, until that is changed by the agreement of owner and carrier. Neither the Harroun nor the Hardin Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion company changed or offered to change the of the court: contract of shipment or the place of delivThe single question in the case is whether, ery. The Hardin company accepted the as between Texarkana and Goldthwaite, this contract of shipment theretofore made, and was an interstate shipment. If so, the reg-purchased the corn to be delivered at Tex Again, it appeared that this corn remained five days in Texarkana. The Hardin company was under no obligation to ship it further. The further. It could, in any other way it saw fit, have provided corn for delivery to Saylor & Burnett, and unloaded and used that car of corn in Texarkana. It must be remembered that the corn was not paid for by the Hardin company until its receipt in Texarkana. It was paid for on receipt and delivery to the Harain company. Then, and not till then, did the Hardin company have full title to and control of the corn, and that was after the first contract of transportation had been completed. arkana,—that is, on the completion of the It must further be remembered that no bill of lading was issued from Texarkana to Goldthwaite until after the arrival of the corn at Texarkana, the completion of the first contract for transportation, the acceptcom-ance and payment by the Hardin company. In many cases it would work the grossest injustice to a carrier if it could not rely on the contract of shipment it has made, know whether it was bound to obey the state or Federal law, or, obeying the former, find itself mulcted in penalties for not obeying the law of the other jurisdiction, simply because the shipper intended a transportation beyond that specified in the contract. It must be remembered that there is no pre In this respect there is no difference between an interstate passenger and an interstate transportation. If Hardin, for instance, had purchased at Hudson a ticket for interstate carriage to Texarkana, intending all the while after he reached Texarkana to go on to Goldthwaite, he would not be entitled, on his arrival at Texarkana, to a new ticket from Texarkana to Goldthwaite at the proportionate fraction of the rate pre-sumption that a transportation when comscribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for carriage from Hudson to Goldthwaite. The one contract of the railroad companies having been finished, he must make a new contract for his carriage to Goldthwaite, and that would be subject to the law of the state within which that carriage was to be made. The question may be looked at from another point of view. Supposing a car load of goods was shipped from Goldthwaite to Texarkana under a bill of lading calling for only that transportation, and supposing that the laws of Texas required, subject to penalty, that such goods should be carried in a particular kind of car,-can there be any doubt that the carrier would be subject to the penalty, although it should appear that the shipper intended, after the goods had reached Texarkana, to forward them to some other place outside the state? To state the question in other words, if the only contract of shipment was for local transportation, would the state law in respect to the mode of transportation be set une side by a Federal law in respect to interstate transportation, on the ground that the shipper intended, after the one contract of shipment had been completed, to forward the goods to some place outside the state? Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517-527, 29 L. ed. 715-718, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475. menced is to be continued beyond the state limits, and the carrier ought to be able to depend upon the contract which it has made, and must conform to the liability imposed by that contract. We see no error in the proceedings, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas is affirmed. Indians-new remedy by review in citizenship cases-vested rights. 1. Congress could constitutionally empower the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court, created by the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 641, chap. 1362), to rements of the United States courts of the view and annul, for irregularities, the judgIndian territory in Indian citizenship cases, although, by the terms of the act of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 339, 340, chap. 398), those judgments had become final. Judgments-test case-effect as to persons not parties. 2. A decree of the Choctaw and Chicka There is but a single matter to be determined. As counsel for plaintiffs in error saw citizenship court in the test case against | case is to be found in the opinion of the ten persons who had been admitted to citi- United States circuit court of appeals. An zenship or enrolment by the United States entire restatement of these matters is, therecourts in the Indian territory, vacating, for fore, unnecessary. certain irregularities, the judgments of those courts, is binding on a person similarly situated who was not made a party, but who did not avail himself of his privilege, under the act of July 1, 1902, to transfer his individual case from the territorial court to the citizenship court, but chose to abide the outcome of the case against the ten represent atives of his class. [No. 260.] say: "The assignment of errors presents but one question. If the decree of the ChoctawChickasaw citizenship court, in the test case known as the Riddle Case, vacated the decree that defendant, Hill, had, theretofore, procured in the United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, Argued December 21, 1906. Decided Febru- wherein he was adjudged to be a member of ary 25, 1907. N ERROR to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, which had, in turn, affirmed a judgment of the United States Court for the Southern District of that territory, in favor of plaintiffs in an action to recover the possession of real property. Affirmed. See same case below. 143 Fed. 716. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. A. C. Cruce, Jackson H. Ralston, Frederick L. Siddons, William E. Richardson, W. I. Cruce, and W. R. Bleakmore for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. George A. Mansfield, J. F. McMurray, and Melven Cornish (by special leave) for Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. the Choctaw tribe of Indians, this case should be affirmed. If it did not, it should be reversed." To properly appreciate and rightly answer this single question some things in the history of the legislation and litigation and also some of the facts in this case must be noticed. In order to divide the lands of these Indian nations an enumeration of the individuals entitled thereto became necessary. By the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 645, chap. 209, § 16), the commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, generally known as the Dawes Commission, was empowered to negotiate and extinguish the tribal title to the lands and to make an allotment thereof to the members of the tribe in severalty. By that of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. at L. 339, 340, chap. 398), the commission was authorized to hear the application and determine the right of each applicant for Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion citizenship in either of these tribes. of the court: This was an action commenced in September, 1904, by Mrs. Ella Adams, for herself and her minor children, defendants in error, in the United States court for the southern district of the Indian territory, to recover possession of a tract of land in that territory. Defendants answered, and, upon trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. This judgment was sustained by the United States court of appeals of the Indian territory, and, on further appeal, reaffirmed by the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. 143 Fed. 716. The case arises out of the legislation of Congress designed to secure the disintegration of the tribal organization of the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian territory, and the distribution of the property of those tribes among the individual Indians. A full résumé of this legislation and the general litigation following it is to be found in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 43 L. ed. 1041, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722, and a full statement of the facts in this The act also granted an appeal to the proper United States district court in the Indian territory to any party aggrieved by the ruling of the commission, and declared that the judgment of that court should be final. It required the commission to make a complete roll of the citizens of each of the tribes, to be "hereafter held and considered to be the true and correct rolls of persons entitled to the rights of citizenship in said several tribes." Hill, who is the principal defendant, applied to be enrolled as a citizen of the Choctaw Nation, and his application was finally sustained by the court, and he was, on March 8, 1898, adjudged to be a member of the Choctaw tribe by blood and entitled to be enrolled as such. The land in controversy was selected and taken possession of by him in reliance upon this adjudication of citizenship. On July 1, 1898, Congress passed an act (30 Stat. at L. 591, chap. 545) granting to the tribes an appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgments of the United States courts of the Indian territory in citizenship cases. Under the authority of |
