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The contention that only village lots and blocks platted and subdivided for village purposes can be organized into a village is without force. Paragraph 182 of chapter 24 (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 289,) is as follows: "Whenever any area of contiguous territory, not exceeding two square miles, shall have resident thereon a population of at least three hundred inhabitants, and which territory is not included within the limits of any incorporated town, village or city, the same may become incorporated as a village, under this act, in the manner following: Any thirty legal voters resident within the limits of such proposed village may petition the county judge of the county in which they reside, to cause the question to be submitted to the legal voters of such proposed village, whether they will organize as a village under this act. And if the territory described in said petition shall be situated in more than one county, then the petition shall be addressed to the judge of the county court of the county where a greater part of such territory is situated. Such petition shall be addressed to the county judge, contain a definite description of the lands intended to be embraced in such village, the number of inhabitants resident therein, and the name of such proposed village.” Said section designates the territory which may become incorporated as a village as “lands," makes no mention of “lots" or "blocks,” and we find nothing therein which indicates that the legislature intended that no lands other than such as are platted into lots and blocks shall be included within the corporate limits of a village when formed from unorganized territory. To hold that farm lands cannot be included within the corporate limits of a village when organized under this section of the statute would be to inject into the statute a provision which is not found therein, which we have no right to do.
We find nothing in section 1 of the act in relation to the disconnection of territory from cities and villages
(Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 294,) inconsistent with this view. Neither do we find anything in the statute which requires a village incorporated thereunder to contain two square miles of contiguous territory. The language of the stat. ute is "contiguous territory, not exceeding two square miles," which means that the area of said village shall not exceed in extent two square miles, the territory of which shall be contiguous.
We are of the opinion that said replications set up no valid objection to the organization of said village, and that the court properly sustained a demurrer thereto. The judgment of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed.
382 f1932401 192 382 p194 1601
THE ILLINOIS TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK.
Opinion filed October 24, 1901.
1. CORPORATIONS-liability of assignor of stock for unpaid balance to pay debts of corporation. The mere assignment by a stockholder of part of his shares of stock before the institution of a suit by the receiver of the corporation to collect the unpaid balance on the stock to pay corporate debts, does not relieve the assignor from liability for the unpaid balance upon the shares so assigned.
2. INTEREST-party withholding payment of decree is liable for legal interest. Withholding payment of the amount fixed by a decree after the time specified therein for payment renders the parties primarily liable under the decree liable also for legal interest.
Florsheim v. Illinois Trust and Sar. Bunk, 93 Ill. App. 297, afirmed.
APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. C. H. DONNELLY, Judge, presiding.
HORNSTEIN & COITH, for appellant.
WALKER & PAYNE, for appellee.
Per CURIAM: In deciding this case the Branch Appellate Court delivered the following opinion:
“The original bill of complaint in this cause was filed in the circuit court January 19, 1891, by Charles F. Morse, on his own behalf and on behalf of all other creditors of the Pacific Railway Company, making the corporation and all of its stockholders parties defendant. Appellant, Simon Florsheim, was made party defendant as the owner and holder of eighty-eight shares of the capital stock of the Pacific Railway Company. The proceedings were instituted and prosecuted to final decree under section 25 of an act entitled 'An act concerning corporations,' approved April 18, 1872. Such proceedings were bad in the case as to cause it to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in Sprague v. National Bank of America, 172 Ill. 149. In obedience to the mandate of the Supreme Court in that case it was subsequently ascertained and decreed by the circuit court that as to the appellant, Florsheim, he was liable for the unpaid balance of $68 per share on eighty. eight shares of the Pacific Railway Company stock received by him in exchange for a like number of shares in the Los Angeles Cable Railway Company, with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum, from August 1, 1898, and that appellee, as receiver, have exe. cution therefor. It is from such decree that this appeal has come.
"No contention is made against the amount of $68 per share found to be due from appellant, it being conceded that the Supreme Court decision in the case referred to settled that question. It is insisted, however, that appellant is not liable for such amount on more than twentyfive of such shares. This contention is based upon the fact that appellant had sold sixty-three of said eightyeight shares to one Nash before the bill was filed. The bill was filed January 19, 1891, and appellant assigned
his certificate for said sixty-three shares to Nash on the ninth day of June, 1890, and it is argued that appellant is liable, under said section 25, only upon the shares owned by him at the time the suit was brought. We had substantially the same question before us in Rogan v. Ilinois Trust and Savings Bank, 93 Ill. App. 39, and there held adversely to the same contention by some of the there appellants. It was admitted by the appellant in his answer, and also as a witness, that he received the whole eighty-eight shares in exchange for a like number of shares of the cable company stock. Nash, to whom appellant assigned his certificate for the sixty-three shares, was not a party to the suit and was not a witness on the hearing, nor did appellant, in his testimony, explain in any manner the circumstances of the assignment to Nash. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is shown in the record any reason which would exempt appellant from liability.
"The only other error that is claimed by appellant is in the allowance of interest on the amount found due from appellant. No matter how much appellant may claim that the amount was in dispute prior to the decree fixing the amount due from him, his liability was fixed by that decree, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court. That decree was entered July 1, 1898, and interest was not to begin to run thereon until August 1, 1898,-thirty days afterward. By the decree the amount due became liquidated. It was then as final as any judgment, so far as we can see, and a withholding of payment thereafter comes clearly within the provision of the statute concerning interest."
We concur in the foregoing views of the Appellate Court and in the conclusion reached by that court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
THE UNION NATIONAL BANK et al.
ALFRED POST, for use, etc.
Opinion filed October 24, 1901.
1. BAILMENTS-liability of pledgee who accepts payment of a pledged note. One holding a note as collateral security who accepts payment thereof is liable to the pledgor for the face value of the note less the original indebtedness, whether the pledged note was legally collectible or not; and in the absence of any authority from the pledgor to accept anything but the full value of the note in money in payment, such liability exists whether the payment accepted by the pledgee was in money or in another note.
2. EVIDENCE-method of book-keeping is not conclusive as to who is liable on indebtedness. The manner in which a corporation keeps its books is not conclusive evidence as to whether the debt for which the individual note of its president was given was the obligation of the corporation or of its president.
Union Nat. Bank v. Post, 93 Ill. App. 339, affirmed.
WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. KAVANAGH, Judge, presiding.
This is a writ of error to the Appellate Court to reverse a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of the superior court, recovered by defendant in error against plaintiffs in error. The following, taken, in part, from the statement of the Appellate Court in its last opinion, with the references to the several decisions rendered in course of the litigation, will be sufficient for a full understanding of the case as it is finally presented to this court:
“The facts out of which the cause of action of appellee (defendant in error here) arises have been reviewed, in one phase or another, three times by this court and once by the Supreme Court, and the various decisions rendered upon such reviews may be found in Kelley v. Post, 37 Ill. App. 396, Union Nat. Bank v. Post, 55 id. 369, (and upon petition for rebearing 373,) Post v. Union Nat.