C.), 47 Fed. 495. The case of Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 437, 29 L. Ed. 684, and United States v. McKee, 4 Dill. 128, Fed. Cas. No. 15688, are plainly distinguishable from the present.

"That conviction was had in the criminal cause is a pertinent allegation to the government's right to condemn the automobile. For the want of such allegation, the libel or information must be held to be insufficient. The information, however, is amendable. The exceptions will therefore be sustained, with leave to the government to amend within ten days." United States v. One Stephens Automobile, 272 Fed. 188, 189, et seq.

9. Burden on owner to show innocence.

Section 26 provides for the forfeiture of an automobile unless good cause to the contrary is shown, and this puts upon the owner the burden of proof to show good cause in law why the vehicle shall not be thus condemned. What is good cause is not defined in the Act but imposes on the owner the duty of proving clearly that his automobile was used, not only without his knowledge and consent, but in excess of any authority, express or implied, which may have been conferred by him upon the person using it. The owner must further remove any imputation that he negligently intrusted his automobile to an employee or other person under circumstances from which a careful and prudent person ought to have foreseen that it was likely to be thus illegally used.

"A heavy burden, however, remains upon the owner, not only of proving that his vehicle was thus used without his knowledge, authority, or consent, but of repelling any inference of negligence or collusion. It is in the light of the evils at which the law is directed that the facts in each case must be weighed and scrutinized, in order to determine whether good cause is shown." United States v. One W. W. Shaw Automobile Taxi, etc., 272 Fed. 491.

Under section 26 "good cause" "is a term which cannot be reduced to legal certainty and vests discretion in the court when it has statutory authority to do a thing on good cause shown. What is good cause, to relieve the owner from forfeiture of the vehicle, depends upon the circumstances, including the owner's conduct before, during and in respect to the case. If the circumstances do not reasonably inspire belief that justice will be better served by refusal to impose or enforce the statutory order of forfeiture and sale, prima facie due or made, good cause has not been shown. Each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances, and no more definite rule can be declared in advance. The statute is definite in respect to what shall be proven by a lienor; indefinite in respect to an owner. This difference in statutory phraseology, and the greater accountability of an owner, indicates that the "good cause" that must be proven by an owner is something other and more than the lack of notice at a particular time that must be proven by a lienor. An owner may assert that he is free from complicity in the illegal use, and had no notice such use was contemplated, and yet by reason of neglect, indifference, consent, or acquiesence manifested in advance, or condonation or ratification afterward, or other fault or inequitable conduct, he may fail to show good cause against forfeiture and sale." United States v. Kane, 273 Fed. 275.

Where an automobile is forfeited for transporting liquor and the owners appear and show that they loaned the car to the defendant without knowledge of the purpose for which the vehicle was to be employed, the court may modify its previous order during the same term and order the return of the car to the owners. "It might be otherwise if, from the reputation of the person intrusted with the vehicle or other circumstances attending his occupation or employment, the inference would arise that the owners had reason to suspect that their property might be used for the purposes for which it was employed." United States v. Brockley, 266 Fed. 1001.

In a recent case evidence was considered that the claimant of an automobile seized was driving it, having in the tonneau milk cans containing whisky, and the court on all the evidence finds that the claimant has not sustained the burden of showing good cause why the automobile should not be forfeited, as he has not proved to the court that he was free from guilt and the knowledge of the transportation, especially as he had once pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful transportation. United States v. Polowy, 286 Fed. 297.

10. Evidence of knowledge.

Where a taxi driver answered a call at a building formerly a saloon and was employed to take a passenger a distance of 150 miles for which the charge would be $150, when the passenger could have travelled by train at the usual rate and found that several sacks had been placed in his car while it was standing back of a saloon he is chargeable with knowledge that the taxi was being used for the transportation of liquor. So where the officers of the company knew that the taxi was being used on an unusual trip and no precautions were taken to ascertain for what purpose, the company cannot claim the car although it had ordered its drivers not to transport liquor. The court does not hold that an automobile livery is liable in all cases if a driver, contrary to instructions, carries liquor in one of its cars but here as it was a matter of public notoriety that liquor was being transported to the point of destination of this trip the company did not use due precautions. United States v. One W. W. Shaw Automobile Taxi, 272 Fed. 491.

Where the intervening lienor sold the car to a stranger association one of whom was in the soft drink business which business is notoriously often a cloak for illicit liquor traffic, made no inquiries into the vendee's purpose or repute and does not disclose whether they were bad or known to it and was indifferent as it was insured against loss, and

when the car is seized it does not attempt to retake possession and invokes no default and does not make known its ownership until more than eight months after seizure and after defendant by misrepresentations that he owned the car had escaped with a small fine, all these circumstances combined suffice to the conclusion that good cause against sale of the car has not been shown by the intervener. United States v. Kane, 273 Fed. 275.

11. Proceedings for return of property taken.

Where the petitioner's chauffeur, without her knowledge, used her automobile for the transportation of liquor and no proceedings have been instituted for the forfeiture of the automobile, the District Court has no power on a summary proceeding to order the return of the automobile. Such power exists only over officers of the court, which the prohibition enforcement officers are not. Moreover, if the chauffeur shall be convicted, the automobile may be subject to forfeiture even though the owner of it did not participate or know of its illegal use. Lewis v. McCarthy, 274 Fed. 496, citing Grant v. U. S., 254 U. S. 505. As to return of seized property, see, further, ante, p. 343.

12. Property already seized by state officers.

Where liquors were illegally unladen from a vessel within four leagues of the coast and there transferred to a motor boat to be brought ashore, and the state police seized the liquors in the motor boat and forfeiture proceedings were had before the state court, which rendered judgment that the liquors seized were forfeited to the commonwealth, the federal court holds in a forfeiture proceeding (following Taylor v. Carryl, 20 Howard 583) that where there are several authorities equally competent to bind the acts of a party, the goods shall be considered as bound effectually by the authority which first actually adjudges upon them.

Furthermore, this proceeding is in rem, and possession of the res by the United States is essential to jurisdiction, and to give jurisdiction there must have been a valid seizure and actual control by the marshal of the court. The seizure made by the state police was not on account of the United States and was inconsistent with possession by the United States, and it cannot be adopted by the United States as having been made on its account, and therefore the information should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. United States v. Twenty-six Cases of Intoxicating Liquors, 287 Fed. 540.

13. Authority of prohibition agent. Bribery.

Section 39 of the Criminal Code provides that whoever shall promise, offer or give any money to any officer of the United States or to any person acting for or on behalf of the United States in any official function with intent to influence his decision or action on any question or proceeding which may at any time be pending or which may by law be brought before him in his official capacity, shall be fined and imprisoned. In this case it appeared that one Counts was prohibition agent in charge of the Cleveland territory, and hearing that certain liquor was being transported through that territory on permits which he thought were illegal, he seized the liquor and the owner thereupon gave him a large sum of money to approve these permits and "get the thing cleared up" and he was convicted of bribery.

It was claimed by the defendant that the matter of the validity of the permits was not pending before Counts so that the bribery could not exist, and the court remarks that there seems to be an entire lack of satisfactory definition by statute or by regulation of the duties of the various prohibition enforcement officers, but the court thinks it clear enough that Counts was an assistant to the commissioner within the meaning of sections 26 and 38, and that in seizing this liquor Counts was acting in behalf of the United