where the binding is into a different county or jurisdiction of the peace, a further *allowance by two justices also of the county or district within which the place shall be situated wherein such child shall be intended

to serve.

[*71

Then follows the proviso upon which the present question arises, and which is printed as part of the second section; but whether it be printed as part of the second section, or had been separated from it by the printer, and made into a third section, can make no difference in the construction of the statute; for in the construction of a statute, the question whether a proviso in the whole or in part relates to, and qualifies, restrains, or operates upon the immediately preceding provisions only of the statute, or whether it must be taken to extend in the whole or in part to all the preceding matters contained in the statute, must depend, I think, upon its words and import, and not upon the divisions into sections that may be made, for convenience of reference in the printed copies of the statute. The same construction must prevail, I apprehend in this case, as if the proviso, which has been printed as if incorporated in the second section, had been, as I think it might with as much or more propriety have been, separated therefrom and made into a different section.

[*72

The proviso in question is as follows: "Provided always, that no indenture shall be allowed by any justice of the peace for the county into which such child shall be bound, who shall be engaged in the same business, employment, or manufacture, in which the person to whom such child shall be bound is engaged." This part of the proviso, I think, is confined to an allowance by a magistrate of the second county, and to cases where there is a binding from one county into another, and the expression appears to me to be the most correct and apt to mark it to be the intent of the legislature that the construction should here be so confined; the expression, the county into which such child shall be bound," appearing to me to imply another county out of which he is bound. The same proviso then immediately further proceeds thus: "and notice shall be given to the overseers of the poor of the parish or place in which such child shall be intended to serve an appren ticeship, before any justice of the peace for the county or district within which such parish or place shall be, shall allow such indenture, and such notice shall be proved before such justice shall sign such indenture, unless one of such overseers shall attend such justice and admit such notice." Here the expression "justice of the peace for the county into which such child shall be bound," which immediately before, as I conceive, confined the first part of the proviso to a binding into a different county, is changed into expressions, both as to overseers and justices, which let in both descriptions of bindings, in requiring notice to be given, not to the overseers of "the parish or place in the county into which such child shall be bound," but "to the overseers of the poor of the parish or place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship, before any justice of the peace for the county or district within which such parish or place" (that is, the parish or place in which he is intended to serve, whether it be in the same or a different county,)"shall be, shall allow such indenture." The legislature, as it intends, as I think, to restrain the first part of the proviso to cases of bindings into a different county, adopts the correct expression *for that very purpose; [*73 and again, where it has not, as I think, such intent of restraint, it abandons that restraining expression which it had just adopted, and uses the more enlarged expression, which here will embrace the whole object and subject matter of the legislature's care and regulations, namely, parish apprentices and parish bindings in general, and not merely parish apprentices bound into a different county. These circumstances show that the legislature in this very part of the statute, where it plainly, as I think, intends restraint, uses a corresponding restraining expression, when such restraining expression is

either necessary or useful for that purpose, and it recurs again to the more enlarged one, when the expression can, according to the legislature's intent, be more extensively applied. This proviso in sect. 2, is immediately followed by the proviso, printed as sect. 3. "Provided always, and it is hereby declared, that the allowance of two justices of the peace for the county within which the place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship shall be situated, shall be valid and effectual, although such place may be situated in a town or liberty within which any other justices of the peace may in other respects have an exclusive jurisdiction." This section, it is not only admitted, (but which, in order to gain a settlement in Newark-uponTrent, must be contended and established,) does extend to and embrace parish apprentices in general and parish bindings, whether into a different county or not, and yet the expression in this section is the same as those in question which are contained in the proviso in the second section. For unless this third section extends to parish apprentices bound to serve in a parish in the *74] same county, the want of an allowance of the indenture by two justices of the exclusive town or liberty of Newark-upon-Trent would be fatal to the claim of the apprentice's settlement being established there. And if this section does so extend, then, I ask, upon what principle of construction is it that a different interpretation is to be given to the same expression in the proviso in the second section from that which is to be given to it in the third section? And, if the same interpretation be to be given to both, then no settlement is gained in Newark whether that interpretation be according to the restrained or according to the extended construction. In either case the indenture is ineffectual for that purpose; in the former case for want of an allowance of the indenture by two magistrates of Newark, and in the latter case for want of notice to the overseers of the parish of Newark. The expression," such child," in the proviso in the second section, includes, I think, parish apprentices in general, and is not confined to "parish apprentices bound into a different county." And the relative expressions, such parish or place," and "such indenture," and "such justice" in that section, and "such place" in the third section, must, I think, be taken to mean (according to their grammatical construction with reference to the context) the parish or place in which the child is intended to serve, and the indenture by which he is so bound, whether it be into a parish in the same or a different county. This, I think, will more distinctly appear by having, in the construction of the first expression such child," regard to the first section as well as to the second *75] section, and by considering that a different and more restrained *construction cannot be given to the expressions in the second section, without getting into this dilemma, either of giving a different interpretation to the like expressions in the proviso in the third section, or else, by narrowing their construction, of invalidating the apprentice's settlement in the parish of Newark, by reason that a binding into a parish in the same county would not in that case come within the third section.

66

In the present case, the overseers of the poor of the parish of Newark are the overseers of the poor of the parish within which the child was intended to serve the apprenticeship; and therefore, within the description of the persons entitled to notice, or proof, or admission thereof, within the words of this proviso, though their parish is within the same county with the binding parish. No such notice, or proof, or admission thereof, has been given or made. As they are within the words of the proviso, they must, I think, be construed to be within its operation, more especially as such notice might be of importance to the protection both of the apprentice and of themselves, unless a different intent can clearly be collected from the context, or from the scope and objects of the statute. No such different intent can, as it appears to me, be so collected; but in my opinion, an inference to the contrary of such a different intent is to be drawn, the intent being, as far as I

can collect it, that notice should be given to the overseers of the parish in which it is intended the child should serve, in all cases, whether the binding be into the same or into a different county.

I have considered this case in a great measure without regard to the circumstance of the binding being into a different exclusive jurisdiction, [*76 treating, it only as a binding into the same county, and as if the third section had the effect of rendering that circumstance of another local exclusive jurisdiction immaterial, though it may be questioned whether the third section by its making a binding by the county magistrates valid, so as to dispense with the allowance of the local magistrates, would have the effect also of dispensing with notice to the overseers in such a case if such notice would otherwise be requisite. But in the view I have taken of the case, it has become unnecessary for me to consider that point.

For the above reasons, I think that a settlement in this case has not been gained in the parish of Newark-upon-Trent.

BAYLEY, J. I agree in opinion with my two learned Brothers. It is unnecessary for me to discuss the question at any length after the judgments delivered by them. The first section of the statute applies generally to all cases, and directs the duties the justices are in all cases to perform. It imposes no qualification as to the justices, and contains no restrictions except as to the distance of the master's residence or business. The second section introduces two provisions, one to exclude justices who may be interested, the other to require a notice to the overseers of the parish in which the service is to be, but whether these provisions, or either of them, are general, applicable to all cases, or confined to particular cases contemplated by the earlier part of the section, admits of doubt. The nature of the provisions has a tendency to show that they are general, their position in the act the contrary. But whether they are general or not, if this case is within the earlier part [*77 of the second section, and not taken out of it by the third section, they apply to this case. The earlier part of the second section contemplates two cases, first, where the master's residence or business is in a different county or jurisdiction from that of the binding parish; and, secondly, other cases where the justices for the district or place in which the binding parish is, shall not have jurisdiction; and in either of those cases it provides, that the indenture shall be allowed as well by two justices for the county or district in which the binding parish is, as by two justices of the county or district within which such child shall be intended to serve. The binding parish here is in the county of Nottingham; the parish in which the service is to be in the town of Newark, where the county magistrates have no jurisdiction. The master's business, therefore, is in a different jurisdiction from that of the binding parish, so as to bring this case in words within the first class of cases mentioned in the second section, and the justices of the place in which the binding parish is, have not jurisdiction, so as to bring it also in words within the second class of cases in the second section. And there is nothing, as far as I can judge, in principle or in the other provisions of this act to exclude it. The provisions to exclude interested magistrates, and to obtain the information which the overseers may be enabled to give, are calculated to promote the object of the act to secure proper, disinterested, and unexceptionable bindings, and to place magistrates in the place of the parent, and to put them in possession of whatever knowledge may be desirable to influence their discretion; and the greater the number of cases to which these provi[*78 sions are extended, the more the object of the act will be advanced. Is there any thing then, upon principle, which should exclude this case from the protection of the second section, or are there any words in that clause which show with such certainty as to furnish a ground for judicial decisions, it was not intended to include it? As the object of the whole act is to give protection to the helpless, and to introduce guards to prevent abuse, such a

construction should, upon principle, be given to the act as will extend that protection to every object to which the words would extend it, and to introduce those guards as extensively as the words will allow, and the exclusion of interested judges; and the chance of obtaining useful information should be applied to every case to which the words of the provision will warrant its application. Are there any words, then, in this clause which will justify us in saying, it was not intended to include this case? The only ground upon which, as it seems to me, any question can be raised upon this point, is this: the variation of phrase with regard to the justices: section 1, speaking of justices of peace for the "county, riding, division, or place;" and section 2, in one instance, of justices of the "district or place," in others, of the justices of the county or district," and in one, of justices of the "county" only; but whether this variation is intentional or accidental I cannot discover, and the language appears to me to be too loose to be a foundation upon which a court of justice can act. I therefore, conclude, that this case will fall within the second section, unless it is taken out of it by the third section. That section provides, that an allowance of two justices for the “ county," *79] dropping the words "district or place," in which the place of service is situate, shall be valid, though that place is within a town or liberty of exclusive jurisdiction. It does not state that such a town or liberty shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed part of the county in which such town or liberty is situate, but that the allowance of two justices of the binding county shall be valid. It does not supersede in words the excluding restriction, that the justices shall not be of the same business, nor does it in terms dispense with the notice to the overseers, and it seems to me, the true construction of section 3, is, that in cases like the present, to which sections 2, and 3, both apply, the allowance by the original magistrates, according to section 1, shall not alone be sufficient unless they are exempt from the exclusion of section 2, as being magistrates of the same business with the intended master, and unless notice has been given to the overseers of the poor of the place in which the service is to be. If the service is to be in the county from which the binding is to be, the justices of that county may, from the business which comes before them as magistrates, be supposed to be sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances of every part of their own county to make information by overseers unnecessary; but this may not be the case in places of exclusive jurisdiction, though within their own county, because, in their character of magistrates, they can have no knowledge of the local circumstances of such places. I am therefore of opinion, that in this case there ought to have been a notice to the overseers of the parish in which the service was to be, and that for want thereof, no settlement was gained under these indentures.

80*] *ABBOTT, C. J. I have the misfortune to differ from my learned Brothers on the present occasion; and notwithstanding my great and unfeigned reverence for their opinions, I still think that a settlement was gained in Newark under the circumstances of this case. It is not necessary to repeat the facts. The case arises upon the statute 56 G. 3, c. 139. It is enacted by the fifth section of that statute, that no settlement shall be gained by the apprentice unless such order shall be made and such allowances of the indenture signed as are directed by the statute. As to some of the directions, the statute is introductive of a new law: and as a non-compliance with its directions will prevent the gaining of a settlement, I apprehend that, according to general principles, the construction of the statute must not be carried beyond the plain and obvious meaning of the language of the directions, upon any supposition that a case, not within such meaning, may be within the mischief intended to be remedied, or within the reason upon which the direction may be supposed to have been enacted. Those directions may, in my opinion, properly be considered as divided into two classes; those of the first class

applying to every case of the binding of a parish apprentice; and those of the second class confined to certain particular bindings, with reference to the local authority of the justices of the peace. I consider all the directions of the first class to be placed together in order, and printed as the first section of the statute; and those of the second class to be in like manner placed together in order, and printed as the second section of the statute. And 1 consider the third section as explanatory only of the jurisdiction of the justices.

The directions of the first class are three-fold; first, the duty of [*81 the justices to inquire into the particulars of distance and other matters wherein the interest of the apprentice is concerned; secondly, if the justices upon inquiry approve of the binding proposed by the parish officers, to make an order authorising the officers to bind the apprentice as proposed: this order is, by the statute, made the warrant to the officers for the binding, and it must be referred to in the indenture by its date and the names of the justices; thirdly, the signature of the allowance of the indenture by the justices after the order made, and before the execution of the indenture by any of the other parties thereto. These directions apply to every case of every binding, without regard to the jurisdiction within which the master's parish may be situate; and they are followed by a proviso applicable to them, not containing any general regulation as to the binding of an apprentice to be employed in another county; but prohibiting a binding for employment in another county at a greater distance than forty miles from the parish to which the apprentice belongs, unless such parish be more than forty miles from London; in which latter case the justices, on a binding to a distance exceeding forty miles, are to make a special order specifying the grounds on which they think fit to allow a binding to the greater distance. Thus far, all the enactments regard only the justices of the county to which the apprentice belongs; and whether we attend to the comprising of the whole in one numbered section, or disregard that circumstance and attend only to the order and disposition of the sentences, which is the more correct mode of reading an act of Parliament, the effect will be the same.

*I come now to the second class, which, as before observed, I con[*82 sider to be placed together and printed as the second section of the act. By this section it is further enacted, "that in all cases where the residence or establishment of business of the person to whom any child shall be bound, shall be within a different county or jurisdiction of the peace from that within which the place by the officers whereof such child shall be bound, shall be situate; and in all other cases, where the justices of the peace for the district or place within which the place, by the oflicers whereof such child shall be bound, shall be situate, and who shall sign the allowance of the indenture by which such child shall be bound, shall not have jurisdiction, every indenture by which such child shall be bound, at any time after the said first day of October, shall be allowed as well by two justices of the peace for the county or district within which the place, by the officers of which such child shall be bound, shall be situate, as by two justices of the peace for the county or district within which the place shall be situate wherein such child shall be intended to serve." This is an enactment, the sentence that immediately follows begins with the word "provided," a word properly applicable to qualify some antecedent matter. I think the enactment plainly requires a two-fold allowance, and by two distinct authorities. The words, "who shall sign the allowance of the indenture by which such child shall be bound," considering the place in which they are here introduced, convince my mind that the things required by this enactment are to be done after the allowance required, in the first instance, for the binding, and by different persons. The enactment applies to the binding into a "different county or jurisdiction of the peace;" it seems to have been thought, that if those words had stood [*83