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the jury could find that to have been the fact. While this is true, there is not a scintilla of testimony to show that Gordon
and Ridley were ever theretofore in a con- Officers—disbursing agent—right to compendition of peonage. That they were in debt, and that they had left Georgia and gone to Florida without paying that debt, does not show that they had been held in a condition of peonage, or were ever at work, willingly or unwillingly, for their creditor. We have
examined the testimony with great care to see if there was anything which would justify a finding of the fact, and can find nothing. No matter how severe may be the condemnation which is due to the conduct of a party charged with a criminal offense, it is the imperative duty of a court to see that all the elements of his crime are proved, or at least that testimony is offered which justifies a jury in finding those elements. Only in the exact administration of the law will justice in the long run be done, and the confidence of the public in such administration be maintained.
We are constrained, therefore, to order a reversal of the judgment, and remand the case for a new trial.
1. The right of a disbursing clerk of the Treasury Department to compensation for services performed by him under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, as disbursing agent of the funds appropriated for a postoffice at Washington, depends solely upon the congressional legislation on that subject.
2. The existence of a collector of customs, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2550 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1745), for the Georgetown district, which is defined in § 2550 as comprising "all the waters and shores of the Potomac river within the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia, from Pomonkey creek to the head of the navigable waters of that river," precludes the Secretary of the Treasury from appointing, with a right to compensation, a disbursing agent for the funds appropriated for a postoffice at Washington, under § 3658 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2430), which authorizes such appointments only where there is no collector at the place of location of a public work.
Mr. Justice McKenna concurs in the Submitted February 27, 1905. Decided judgment.
Mr. Justice Harlan: I concur with my brethren in holding that the statutes in question relating to peonage are valid under the Constitution of the United States. I agree, also, that the record sufficiently shows that it contains all the evidence introduced at the trial.
But I cannot agree in holding that the trial court erred in not taking the case from the jury. Without going into the details of the evidence, I care only to say that, in my opinion, there was evidence tending to make a case within the statute. The opinion of the court concedes that there was abundant testimony to show that the accused, with another, went from Georgia to Florida to arrest the two negroes, Gordon and Ridley, and take them, against their will, back to Georgia to work out a debt. And they were taken to Georgia by force. It is conceded that peonage is based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The accused admitted to one of the witnesses that the negroes owed him. In any view, there was no motion or request to direct a verdict for the defendant. The accused made no objection to the submission of the case to the jury, and it is going very far to hold in a case like this, disclosing barbarities of the worst kind against these negroes, that the trial court erred in sending the case to the jury.
25 S. C.-28.
March 18, 1905.
PPEAL from the Court of Claims to re
view a judgment rejecting a claim of a disbursing clerk of the Treasury Department to compensation for services performed by him under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury as disbursing agent of the funds appropriated for a postoffice at Washington. Affirmed.
See same case below, 39 Ct. Cl. 338. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. J. M. Vale for appellant. Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. Frederick DeC. Faust for appellee. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of claims rejecting the claim of the appellant. 39 Ct. Cl. 338. The claimant, while a disbursing clerk of the Treasury Department, received a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, as follows: "George A. Bartlett, disbursing clerk, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C. Sir: You are hereby appointed disbursing agent for such funds as may be advanced to you from time to time on account of the appropriation for postoffice, Washington, D. C. You will be entitled to such compensation for the services named as is provided by law, and the same rate of compensation will be allowed on all amounts. disbursed by you since October 15, 1891, on account of the appropriation named." Directions followed.
The claimant gave no new bond and took | the shores, as that word is used in § 2550; no additional oath of office. He proceeded and if Georgetown is within it, Washingto disburse nearly two and a half millions of dollars, and claims % of 1 per cent upon the sum disbursed.
ton is in it also, on the same ground. The same form of expression and the same assumption constantly recur in other sections. The claimant puts his right to compensa- To show still further that collection districts tion on two grounds: the general powers run inland, and are not limited to the matheof the Secretary of the Treasury, apart from matical line which bounds the water, it may statute, and Rev. Stat. § 3658 (U. S. Comp. be observed that, while "waters and shores" Stat. 1901, p. 2430). As to the former, it is the most common expression, a district is enough to say that whatever power the frequently is declared to include towns; e. Secretary might have in the absence of leg- g. § 2517, Seventh, Thirteenth; § 2522; § islation, Congress has dealt with the sub- 2531, First, Second; § 2533, First. It may ject so fully that it is plain that we must include lands (§ 2519), or embrace a counlook to the statutes alone. Rev. Stat. §§ ty (§ 2517, First, Sixth), or even a state (§ 1760-1765, 3657, 3658, 255 (U. S. Comp. 2522). If Washington is within the collecStat. 1901, pp. 1204-1207, 2430, 141); act | tion-district, then there was a collector at of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 306, chap. the place of location of the Washington 433; U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.. 2428). postoffice (see § 3657), and the authority Locking to the statutes, the claimant relies of the Secretary to appoint a disbursing on Rev. Stat. § 3658: "Where there is no agent under § 3658 was excluded by its very collector at the place of location of any pub- words. lic work specified in the preceding section [which section specifies postoffices], the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint a disbursing agent for the payment of all moneys appropriated for the construction of any such public work, with such compensation as he may deem equitable and just." It is urged that there is no collector at Washington, the place of location of the public work concerned.
The claimant does not contend that his case gets any appreciable help from the act of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat. at L. 306, chap. 433, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2428). That gives the compensation allowed by law to collectors of customs to disbursing agents appointed to disburse any appropriation for any United States postoffice or other buildings, "not located within the city of Washington." No other statute is relied upon. The statutes as to the collector for Wash- No doubt the Secretary was under the imington are as follows: Rev. Stat. § 2550 (U. pression, when the letter was written, that S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1745): "There he was making an appointment which would shall be, in the District of Columbia, one entitle the claimant to distinct compensacollection-district, as follows: The district tion for new work and responsibility. He of Georgetown; to comprise all the waters did not regard the claimant as designated to and shores of the Potomac river within the be disbursing agent within the claimant's state of Maryland and the District of Co- district under Rev. Stat. § 255, and therelumbia, from Pomonkey creek to the head fore as not entitled to any additional of the navigable waters of that river; in pay. Rev. Stat. §§ 1764, 1765 (U. S. which Georgetown shall be the port of en- Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1206, 1207). But try." § 2551 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. we do not see how the case can be put any 1745): "There shall be in the district of higher. It is agreed that the claimant was Georgetown a collector." It appears from not appointed to a new office by the Secre§ 2550 that the collection district of George-tary's letter. Therefore, no help is to be got town is more extensive than the city of from United States v. Saunders, 120 U. S. Georgetown. And this is not changed by 126, 129, 30 L. ed. 594, 595, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. the later statute making Georgetown a part 467. The case is a hard one, but we are of of Washington. Act of February 11, 1895 opinion that the decision of the court of (28 Stat. at L. 650, chap. 79). We do not claims was right. perceive on what ground it is denied that the Washington postoffice is within this district. The words, "shores of the Potomac river," seem to us broad enough to include the whole of a city on those shores and within the other limits named. "Waters and shores" is the usual phrase in Rev. Stat. Title 34, chap. 1, §§ 2517-2607 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1711-1800). The words "in which" assume that Georgetown is embraced within the district. If within
(197 U. S. 223)
UNITED STATES, Appt.,
STEPHEN C. MILLS.
Army-increased pay for service in the Philippines-"pay proper" includes lon gevity pay.
the district, it is so simply because it is on The "pay proper" on which the percentage of
increased pay to an Army officer serving in | inspector general February 2, 1901, and still the Philippine Islands is to be computed, un- holds the last-named rank and office. der acts of May 26, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. "The claimant was, by proper military 211, chap. 586), and March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 903, chap. 803, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, orders, on duty with the Army of the p. 896), includes the longevity pay to which United States in the Philippine Islands from he is entitled, under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1262 a date prior to May 26, 1900, continuously (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896), as well as until April 15, 1902, when, in accordance the minimum pay prescribed by § 1261 (U. S. with orders, he arrived at San Francisco, Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 893) for his grade. California, on his return from said Philippine Islands. During all of that period he was serving in the Philippine Islands, and beyond the limits of the states comprising the Union, and the territories of the United
Submitted February 20, 1905. Decided March 13, 1905.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims to
review a judgment sustaining the claim of an Army officer that the percentage of increased pay due him for his service in the Philippine Islands should be computed on the minimum pay of his grade, enlarged by the longevity pay to which he was entitled. Affirmed.
Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of claims in favor of the appellee. The question relates to the amount of compensation payable to him under the acts of May 26, 1900, and March 2, 1901, making appropriations for the Army. The particular provisions of these acts are set forth in the margin.†
The court gave judgment in favor of appellee upon the authority of its opinion in Irwin v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 87.
The facts found by the court are as fol
"The claimant, Stephen C. Mills, entered the military service of the United States as a cadet at the Military Academy, July 1, 1873, was commissioned second lieutenant June 15, 1877, and by successive promotions became major and inspector general July 25, 1888, and lieutenant colonel and
*Act of May 26, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 211, chap. 586).
"That hereafter the pay proper of all officers and enlisted men serving in Porto Rico, Cuba, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, and in the territory of Alaska shall be increased ten per centum for officers, and twenty per centum for enlisted men, over and above the rates of pay proper as fixed by law in time of peace." Act of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 903, chap. 803, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896). "That hereafter the pay proper of all officers and enlisted men serving beyond the limits of the states comprising the Union, and the territories of the United States contiguous thereto, shall be increased ten per centum for officers, and twenty per centum for enlisted men, over and above the rates of pay proper as fixed by law for time of peace, and the time of such service shall be counted from the date of departure from said states to the date of return thereto."
States contiguous thereto.
"During the entire period from May 26, 1900, to April 15, 1902, named in the next preceding finding, the claimant, while holding the rank of major, was paid at the rate of $2,500 a year, the minimum pay of the grade of major, established by § 1261 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 893); $1,000 longevity increase; established by § 1262 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896), and $250 a year as the increase of 10 per cent upon his pay proper, provided by the act of May 26, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 211, chap. 586), but calculated only upon the minimum or grade pay fixed by said § 1261.
"While holding the rank of lieutenant colonel during said period the claimant was paid at the rate of $3,000 a year, the minimum pay of that grade, as provided by § 1261 of the Revised Statutes, $1,000 longevity increase, provided by § 1262, and $300 a year as 10 per cent increase on his pay proper, as provided by the acts of May 26, 1900, and March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 211, chap. 586, 31 Stat. at L. 903, chap. 803, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896), but computed only on the minimum pay of the grade.
"If said 10 per cent increase should be calculated upon the total pay of $3,500 received by the claimant while in the rank of major, his increase would be at the rate of $350 a year instead of $250, and, if so cal culated while he was in the rank of lieutenant colonel, the increase would be at the rate of $400 a year instead of $300, making a difference of $100 a year for the period covered by the claim, and aggregating for the entire period $188.87."
Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. John Q. Thompson for appellant. Messrs. George A. King and William B. King for appellee.
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
The question is, upon what principal sum the 10 per cent increase of compensation,
increased pay derived from additional periods of five years' service was added to the minimum pay of the grade, and 10 per centum of that total was held to be the proper compensation.
The government, however, contends that the term "current yearly pay," mentioned in § 1262, has a different meaning from the term "pay proper," contained in the acts under discussion, and it insists that the latter term is not as comprehensive as the former. We do not think that there is any such material difference between the two expressions as in this case to demand their different construction. "Current yearly pay" and "pay proper," as used in the sections, mean the regular, ordinary pay which an officer may be entitled to under the facts in his case; and if, by virtue of length of service, he is entitled to receive the com
to which the government concedes the appel- | periods of five years of service. Thus, the lee is entitled, is to be computed. The appellee, as major, was entitled, by § 1261 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 893) to the pay of $2,500 a year. Subsequently, as lieutenant colonel, he was entitled, by the same section, to the pay of $3,000 per year. By the following section (1262, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896) it is provided that there shall be paid to the officers below the rank of brigadier general "10 per centum of their current yearly pay for each term of five years of service," and by § 1263 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 897), the total amount of such increase for length of service cannot exceed, in any case, "40 per centum on the yearly pay of the grade as provided by law." Under § 1262 the appellee had become entitled to pay to the amount of $1,000 a year in addition to the pay provided for in § 1261; thus, as major, he was entitled to $2,500 per year, and un-pensation provided for in § 1262, that comder § 1262, $1,000 more, or $3,500 under these two sections; as lieutenant colonel he was paid $3,000 per year under § 1261 and $1,000 more under § 1262, or $4,000 under these two sections. He contended that the additional 10 per cent under the acts of 1900 and 1901 should be computed on the respective sums of $3,500 and $4,000, the total compensation granted by the two sections, while the government insists that the percentage must be computed upon the sums of $2,500 and $3,000, respectively, the minimum pay granted to the grades of major and lieutenant colonel.
The court of claims directed the computation to be made on the total of the sums given by the two sections, and, in our opinion, that court was right in so doing. The term "pay proper" used in the acts of May 26, 1900, and March 2, 1901, includes, in our opinion, the longevity pay under § 2162 as Iwell as the sum named as pay under § 1261, the latter being the minimum sum for the grade. Every five years of service, under § 1262, up to a certain percentage of the yearly pay of the grade, as provided by law (§ 1263) entitles the officer to be paid 10 per centum of his yearly pay. The term "current yearly pay" (§ 1262) was the subject of examination as to its meaning in United States v. Tyler, 105 U. S. 244, 26 L. ed. 985. That case related to the claim of a retired officer, and the question was whether he was entitled to the benefit of the section (1262) after his retirement; and also, if he were so entitled, how was the computation to be made. The court held that he was entitled to the benefit of the section, and that the percentage was to be computed on the total amount of the pay of the officer, increased as it might be by the
pensation is his "pay" or his "pay proper," as distinguished from possible other compensation by any allowances or commutation or otherwise. The method of computation adopted herein by the court of claims is the same as that adopted in United States v. Tyler, 105 U. S. 244, 26 L. ed. 985; that method has therefore received the approval of this court, or, at least, it has been held that the 10 per centum of the current yearly pay is to be calculated upon the aggregate pay provided for in the two sections (1261 and 1202), and not merely upon the minimum pay granted by § 1261.
In regard to retired officers, Congress subsequently provided otherwise. 22 Stat. at L. 118, chap. 254.
The words, "pay proper," we see no reason to think are to be construed differently from the word "pay." The term means compensation, which may properly be described or designated as "pay," as distinguished from allowances, commutations for rations, or other methods of compensation, not specifically described as pay.
The government refers to the act of Congress approved March 15, 1898 (Army appropriation act, 30 Stat. at L. 318, chap. 69), as giving some ground for the contention it makes in this case, because, as is stated, Congress itself therein distinguishes between "pay proper," and "additional pay for length of service," and it is urged that pay proper does not include longevity pay in the opinion of Congress, as expressed in the act. The provision of the act is as follows:
"For pay proper of enlisted men of all grades, four million two hundred and ninety thousand dollars.
"Additional pay for length of service, including hospital corps, six hundred and
seventy-one thousand, one hundred and sev-| has not been called to any decision of this enty-two dollars." court looking to the contrary principle. The judgment of the Court of Claims is right and must be affirmed.
The act cited by the government, it will be seen, refers to enlisted men, and not to officers at all. In that same act of 1898 a provision for the payment of officers is in the following language (30 Stat. at L. 318, GREER COUNTY, Oklahoma Territory, chap. 69):
"For pay of officers of the line, two million eight hundred sixty-five thousand dollars.
"For pay of officers for length of service, to be paid with their current monthly pay, seven hundred and ninety thousand dollars."
And in the appropriation act of March 3, 1899, the appropriation for enlisted men was changed so that it reads as follows (30 Stat. at L. 1065, chap. 423):
"Pay of enlisted men of all grades, including recruits, thirteen million, five hundred thousand dollars.
"For additional pay for length of service, seven hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars."
Piff. in Err.,
(197 U. S. 235)
STATE OF TEXAS.
Public lands-Texas school grant-succes-
The legal title to the Texas lands patented to
Under the language of the act of March 15, 1898, the Comptroller of the United States had held that the language used in that act showed that the compensation of enlisted men, upon which the per centum Submitted March 6, 1905. Decided March provided for was to be computed, was the minimum pay, not enlarged by any longevity
pay to which the person was entitled. At TN ERROR to the Court of Civil Appeals the very next session of Congress the form of the appropriation was changed, as we have seen. That change has been continued since. See acts of May 26, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 206, chap. 586), March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 896, chap. 803, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 919), June 30, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 508, chap. 1328), March 2, 1903 (32 Stat. at L. 929, chap. 975), and April 23, 1904 (33 Stat. at L. 260).
The ground for arguing that the term "pay proper" does not include the "additional pay for length of service" was thus taken away by a change in the form of the appropriation in all the acts subsequent to that of 1898. As we have already stated, however, that particular form in regard to
enlisted men in the act of 1898 was never adopted providing for the pay of officers. Their regular compensation and their compensation by reason of longevity services are both spoken of in that act as "pay."
for the Third Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas, to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Travis County, in that state, in favor of the state in an action to recover lands for which patents were issued to Greer county, Texas, under the mistaken supposition that this county was Texas territory, and as such entitled to share in the grant of lands to each county in the state, for school purposes. Affirmed.
See same case below, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 223, 72 S. W. 104.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. George Clark, H. N. Atkinson, and D. C. Bolinger for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. C. K. Bell, C. A. Culberson, R. V. Davidson, and T. S. Reese for defendant
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a suit brought by the state of Texas to recover certain lands in Hockley and Cochran counties, Texas, for which pat
We have no doubt that the pay of the officer under the statutes of 1900 and 1901, in connection with the Revised Statutes re-ents were issued to Greer county, Texas, on ferred to, consists of the amount granted for longevity service as well as of the amount provided in § 1261, and that the total is "pay proper," upon which total the percentage is to be computed provided for in the acts of 1900 and 1901. Our attention
July 18, 1887, under color of the general laws of the state granting four leagues of land to each county of the state for school purposes. Texas Gen. Laws, 1883, chap. 55. Greer county, Texas, was created by an act of February 8, 1860, and was organized as a
*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 41, Cent. Dig. Public Lands, §§ 384, 386.