Held (reversing the judgment of the court below) that the letter did not amount to an equitable assignment of the 40,000l., and the respondent had no claim on the appellants for the price of the parcels for which certificates had been refused, as the terms of the contract, which could not be varied by parol, had not been complied with.

Semble: That if a trust had been created the fact that the French Government did not appear would not have prevented the Court of Chancery from dealing with the fund.

THIS was an appeal from a judgment of Lord Hatherley, L.C. (reported L. Rep. 7 Ch. 550; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 859) affirming a judgment of Malins, V.C. (reported 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 339) in a suit in which the respondent was plaintiff, and the appellants defendants. The facts are fully set out in the reports in the courts below, and appear also in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor."

J. Pearson, Q.C., Fry, Q.C., and Joson Smith, for the appellants, argued that there was nothing in the letter to create a trust or an equitable assignment in favour of the respondent, no money having been ear-marked and set apart. In any case it is impossible to make a decree claiming unliquidated damages against a foreign Government which has not appeared. The judgment of the court below proceeds on an entirely erroneous view of the case. They referred to

Wylie v. Wylie, 29 L. J. Ch. 341;

Stevenson v. Anderson, 2 V. & B. 407;

Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 6 Beav. 1. Glasse, Q.C., H. Davey, and Hilbery for the respondent, contended that the whole question depended on the contract, as to which the evidence of the respondent was uncontradicted. The letter was an equitable assignment, and the "special credit" amounted to an appropriation of the sum. The respondent's only object was to have a material guarantee of which the appellants now seek to deprive him. They cited

Burn v. Carvalho, 4 M. & C. 690.

Feb. 11.-Their Lordships gave judgment. The LORD CHANCELLOR (Cairns.)-My Lords, the question at issue in this case arises on a letter, dated the 1st Dec. 1870, from the appellants to the respondent; and the decree of the Court of Chancery, which is brought before your Lordships' House by the appellants, proceeds upon the footing that that letter constituted either an equitable assignment of, or impressed the character of a trust upon a particular sum of money in the hands of the appellants. The decree in question proceeds to give directions for the administration of that sum as a trust fund. If the view of the Court of Chancery were well founded, there would have been no necessity for considering the position of the French Government, who were interested parties, but did not appear in the court below, though they had an opportunity of doing so. In that case the court might have administered a trust fund which was before it, even though an interested foreign government did not appear. But, my Lords, was that view correct? The facts, my Lords, are these: During the late war between France and Germany a contract was made between the Provisional Government of France and the respondent for the supply of ball cartridges. It was dated the 30th Nov. 1870, and provides that the contractors should supply 20,000,000 ball cartridges for rifles according to the model of 1866 at the rate of 150 francs per 1000; to be delivered in London. Out of the

[H. or L.

The

20,000,000, 7,000,000 were to be delivered before the 5th Dec., and the remainder before the 10th Jan. 1871; time to be of the essence of the contract. They were to be tried by a delegate of the Provisional Government, who was to give certificates stating that they were efficient for service. The lots, after being accepted by him, were to be paid for through the French Ambassador, who was to issue cheques for the amount. That contract was approved by the French Government then at Tours, and was signed on behalf of the Minister of War by a M. Joulin, who was acting as his delegate in this country. That was the contract between the French Government and the respondent. appellants are bankers in London, and at this time were engaged in raising a loan for the French Government, and had large financial dealings on their behalf. For obvious reasons the respondent wished to have some one to look to who would be answerable for the payments as they became due under the contract; and in answer to that wish the letter of the 1st Dec. 1870 was written. The question is merely one of the construction of that letter; for I think your Lordships will be of opinion that no evidence of any subsequent conversations between M. Joulin and the respondent can be admissible to alter its true construction. The letter is as follows: "We are instructed by M. Joulin to advise you that a special credit for the sum of 40,000l. has been opened with us in your favour, and that it will be paid to you rateably as the goods are delivered upon receipt of certificates of reception issued by the French Ambassador, or by M. Joulin." My Lords, I pause to remark that the word "rateably appears to be intended to mean that the documents to be presented to the appellants were to be the documents of the reception of the cartridges, not of the price to be paid; and it meant that the quantities delivered would be paid for with reference to the contract as to the price. My Lords, what is there in this letter to make it an equitable assignment, or to impress the character of a trust fund upon the sum mentioned in it? Nothing; it is a mere statement by bankers that they have opened a credit, under instructions they have received, in favour of a particular person. Your Lordships are well aware of what is meant in ordinary commercial transactions by an intimation that a firm will give credit to another to a certain amount. It means that they will allow drafts to that amount to be drawn upon them; and your Lordships are familiar with the manner in which such a credit opened with one house for another may be operated upon by bills, or cheques, or any other demand for the amount of the sum for which the credit is opened. But, my Lords, I read this letter merely as being a statement by a banker to a tradesman, who has supplied goods to a customer of the bankers, that he will act as paymaster to the tradesman up to a certain amount; but in order that he may do so the tradesman must a bring certificates that the goods have been delivered to the customer. There is nothing of an equitable assignment, nothing of a trust in this. The banker would be much surprised to learn that the funds of his customer had been equitably assigned to, or had become impressed with a trust making them the property of the tradesman who supplied the goods. My Lords, that is the whole of the case. In the Court of Chancery questions were raised as to the position of the French Government in the matter, and as

H. OF L.]

to whether the stipulation as to time had been waived or not, but those questions do not arise unless there is some fund for the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to act upon. If this is merely a personal undertaking of the banker there is no room for the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. It is a personal claim against the appellant, and these proceedings are merely an attempt to change the jurisdiction, and to bring that which might be the foundation of a claim at law into Chancery, and, by treating it as question of the administration of a trust fund, to get rid of the stringency of the provision making time of the essence of the contract. It appears to me that the jurisdiction fails, and that the Bill should be dismissed with costs. My Lords, I should add that Lord O'Hagan, who was present during the argument of this case, but who is prevented by indisposition from being here to day, concurs in the judgment which I have submitted to your Lordships.

Lord CHELMSFORD.-My Lords, the question of the appellants' liability in this case depends entirely on the letter of the 1st Dec. 1870. It has been argued that the letter is an equitable assignment, or special appropriation of the sum of 40,0001. mentioned in it, or that it constituted the appellants trustees to that extent; but the opening of a credit at a banker's cannot do so; it is merely an authority to the person in whose favour it is opened to draw to the specified amount. Nor can a letter

[H. OF L.

because Joulin, the agent of the French Minister in London, suggested alterations which necessitated an alteration in the machinery, and prevented a delivery at the appointed time, and that he applied to Joulin for an extension of the time, which he verbally agreed to, and further parcels of cartridges were accepted on and after the 10th Jan. 1871. The time is said to have been enlarged by the agent of the French Government, but the agent had no authority to alter what was to be of the essence of the contract, and the appellants cannot be liable for cartridges supplied after the contract time. At any rate they were to pay for them not on receipt, or on approval by the French authorities, but on the production of the certificates; and the respondent cannot allege that they were improperly withheld, as he was wholly unable to fulfil his contract in the time, and he cannot claim any further sum than he has received, not being able to produce the required evidence of delivery. I concur in the opinion of the noble and learned lord on the woolsack that the bill should be dismissed with costs.

Decree complained of reversed. Appealed allowed. Bill dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellants, G. M. Clements. Solicitors for the respondent, Innes and Son.

Feb. 15 and 16.

in

in his favour, when no special sum is set apart, constitute the bankers trustees of a special fund. If it could do so would a court of equity enforce a purely voluntary assignment? The money question belonged to the French Government, who might have withdrawn it. Could the appellants then have been compelled to pay for the cartridges? If a trust had been impressed upon an appropriated sum they would have been bound to do so. Supposing the fund had been withdrawn, and the French Ambassador had given cheques on the appellants, would a court of equity say that parting with the money was a breach of trust, and that therefore they must pay for the cartridges, and look for an indemnity to the French Government? By the contract the cheques were to be drawn by the French Ambassador-by the letter, either by the Ambassador, or by Joulin. Suppose the certificates had been withheld, would the court order a payment by the appellants such as was not sanctioned in the manner prescribed by the authority, and suggest that if the certificate improperly refused they had a remedy by action P I doubt if there was any consideration, even if the letter was a promise to pay; but I think that the letter created no trust, and that the decree of the court below cannot be supported. This disposes of the case; but I wish to add a few words as to the alleged waiver of the stipulation as to time. It was important to the French Government that the contract should be executed with dispatch, therefore time was made of the essence of the contract; but the respondent did not adhere to the contract in any instance. He made default in the time of the first delivery, and in the quantity he then delivered, but that was waived by the acceptance of the parcel, which was paid for; but that did not set him free from the contract as to the delivery of the remainder. He alleges that the stipulation as to time was waived as to the residue,

was

CHELMSFORD and HATHERLEY.)

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN ENGLAND.
YATES v. UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.
Will-Construction-Bequest to found a Professor-
ship according to certain rules-Condition—
Practice.

A testator gave personal estate to a college, for the purpose (inter alia) of founding a professorship, for the regulation of which he purposed preparing a code of rules, and he directed his executors, as soon as possible after his death, to communicate to the college the fact of the bequest, together with a copy of the rules; and declared that if the college did not within twelve months signify in writing their acceptance of the rules, all the bequests should be void, and the property should sink into his residuary estate. The testator lived for some years after the date of the will, but died without having prepared any rules for the professorship:

Held (affirming the judgment of the court below): that the reference to the proposed rules did not impose a condition on the bequest, but merely amounted to a statement of the future intentions of the testator; and that the whole chain of subsequent provisions, not being of the essence of the original bequest, might be absolutely struck out. An application on the part of a respondent, who does not challenge any part of a decree, to vary it as to the administration of the estate, should be made to the Court of Chancery, not to the House of Lords. THE question for decision in this appeal was whether certain legacies given by the will of James Yates to the respondent, University College, London, failed by reason only of the testator not having prepared and anthenticated a code of rules for the regulation of a new professorship of archæology in the college, for the founding of which professorship one of the legacies was given.

By the decree made by Bacon, V.C., on the 2nd

H. OF L.]

Dec. 1872, in the said suit, it was declared that in the events which had happened the bequest in favour of the respondent, University College, London, was wholly null and void, and that the appellant, upon the decease of the testator, became absolutely entitled to the same as residuary legatee. (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 538).

The respondent, University College, London, presented a petition of rehearing, by way of appeal from the said decree of the 2nd Dec. 1872.

The appeal came on to be heard before the Lord Chancellor (Selborne) and Mellish, L.J. And by an order made on the 17th March 1873, on the hearing of the said appeal, it was ordered that the said decree be varied, as follows: "This court doth declare that the bequests of stocks, shares, and debentures in the London and North Western Railway Company and the North London Railway Company respectively, and every other legacy and bequest contained in the said will of the said testator, James Yates, in favour of the said University College, London, are valid: " (L. Rep. 8 Ch. 454; 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 461).

Kay, Q.C. and Forbes Hallett, for the appellant, urged the same arguments, and relied on the same authorities as in the court below; and in addition cited,

Davis v. Angel, 31 L. J. 613, Ch.; 6 L. T. Rep. N. S. 880; 10 W. R. 722;

Wheeler v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 367;

Re Dickson's Trust, 1 Sim. N. S. 37.

Fry, Q.C. and Cozens Hardy, who appeared for the respondent, were not called upon.

The LORD CHANCELLOR (Cairns).-My Lords, the question which has been raised by this appeal appears to me to admit of no doubt whatever; and I think it cannot have failed to have struck your Lordships that in arguing the case the learned counsel for the appellants were driven to rest their arguments rather upon the effect of the gift over than upon the consideration of the meaning of the original bequest. Now I quite agree that if it could be found that in the original bequest there was something which required to be supplemented, so that you could not predicate of it that it was a complete bequest without that supplement, and if that supplement had never been supplied or added, the bequest would have remained incomplete, and no legatee could have claimed under it. But, on the other hand, if the original bequest is in itself complete, then the only question which your Lordships have to inquire into is this, is there anything is the subsequent part of the will which takes away that which was originally given? Now, my Lords, the original bequest is this: After leaving the property in question to his wife for life, the testator proceeds thus, "And from and immediately after her decease, then I give and bequeath the same stock and shares, and the dividends, interest, and annual income thereof, unto the said University College, London, for the purpose of founding in it a new professorship of archæology." My Lords, stopping there, it appears to me beyond all doubt that that is a complete bequest. It is a bequest to the college upon trust, and that trust is sufficiently defined to be the foundation of a professorship which, in the college, was to be a new one, and it was to be a professorship of archæology. No doubt "Archæology" is a very large word; and it may be, as was well stated by the learned counsel who last addressed your Lordships, that it refers in particular cases to the antiquities of particular

[H. OF L.

66

nations only, or to those antiquities which range over a limited portion of time; but not being limited in any such way it stands in all the expanse which it will of itself cover. The word is a term of art perfectly well known, and not being limited in any way this professorship is to be a professorship of archæology in the largest sense of the term. Now, my Lords, is there anything in the words that immediately follow which make that original bequest, which appears from the words I have read to be complete, really incomplete? I can find nothing. The additional words are, for the regulation of which professorship I purpose preparing a code of rules and regulations, which I intend to authenticate under my hand." I read this not as imposing any incompleteness upon the bequest, but merely as a statement of the mind of the testator, that at some future period he proposed preparing a code of rules for the regulation of the professorship, which if he did prepare them, were to regulate the details which were necessary to be regulated with regard to the professorship; but if he did not prepare them, then the framing of the rules would naturally fall to the college in which the professorship was to be erected. I can find nothing here in any way approaching to the nature of a condition; and I think the argument which referred to cases founded upon conditional bequests has no application whatever to the bequest in its original construction. But no doubt although you have a complete bequest in the first instance there may afterwards be a condition, clear in its terms, which, by reason of the events which have happened, must have effect given to it. But what is said to be the condition which comes subsequently, which, if it exists at all must be a divesting condition. "And I hereby expressly declare my mind and will to be that as soon as conveniently may be after my decease, my executors shall communicate to the said University College the fact of my said last mentioned bequest to the said college, and a copy of the said rules and regulations." What rules and regulations? Those which at the time he made his will he was minded at some subsequent period to prepare. But if he did not prepare any such rules, how could his executors communicate them to the college ? And if they were not communicated to the college, how could the fact of non-communication of non-existent rules in any way interfere with the bequest? But he proceeds"And the said college shall, within twelve calendar months next after the fact of the said bequest shall have been so communicated by my said executors as aforesaid, signify by writing under the hand of their president, treasurer, or secretary, their acceptance of the said rules for the future regulation of the said professorship; and I further declare that if the said college shall decline or refuse to accept the said rules, or shall not within the space of twelve calendar months signify to my executors in manner aforesaid their acceptance of the same, then I declare that the said bequest of the said stocks, shares, and debentures, and every other legacy herein or in any codicil hereto contained in favour of the said college shall be wholly null and void," And then the property is to sink into the residue. Now, my Lords, it appears to me that the whole of the directions depend upon the meaning which your Lordships give to the two words "said rules." If they mean, as I think they clearly must mean, "rules to be prepared by me," and if those rules are not prepared by the testator, then there can be no

refusal, no declining, no failure to accept that | which has no existence. And then, going back to the original bequest, if the making of these rules is not of the essence of the original bequest, the whole of this chain of subsequent provisions may be absolutely struck out of the will. It was this view which was taken by the Lord Chancellor (Selborne) and Mellish, L.J. in the court below. I think that view is entirely correct; and I submit to your Lordships that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Lord CHELMSFORD.-My Lords, I entirely agree. Lord HATHERLEY.-My Lords, I entirely concur; and for the same reasons. The question wholly depends upon the construction of the will, and authorities are of no value in this case. There is a clear original gift, and the testator then indicates an intention which he has not performed. He does not express any condition, or anything which amounts to a condition. If the intention had been carried out, no doubt there might have been some ground, which there is not now, for contending that, in the event of the rules not being accepted, the property was to go over. I may just call attention to one thing. We find that a share in the college is to go to his heir-at-law, and is always to be held by his "heir-at-law for the time being so that he may have means of knowing whether my various bequests in favour of the college, and the two aforesaid professorships are applied and maintained as I have endeavoured to prescribe and appoint." So that he clearly points to the things as done in the will; he wishes the bequests to be applied for the professorships, and he wishes them to be maintained "as I have endeavoured to prescribe and appoint." I think it would be a very strange reading of the previous passage as to his then intention to frame rules to say that you are to include in what he has "endeavoured to prescribe and appoint," the necessity of accepting certain rules which he has not made. It is quite clear that he thinks he has founded and endowed the professorships as he had determined; he has given some books and other articles to the professor of mineralogy and geology, and some other articles to the professor of archæology; he has prescribed and appointed certain things with reference to those professorships, and he speaks of his bequests as a clear gift at all events; and he says, "hereafter I have some notion of making other rules, and if I do make them, and they are not accepted, then there is to be a gift over.'

Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed with costs.

Hinde Palmer, Q.C., who appeared for the executor, submitted to their Lordships that as the gift to the college prevailed the estate would not be sufficient to pay the testator's debts and administration expenses, and suggested that their Lordships should order an account to be taken in the usual way to ascertain what the deficiency was, and to make it good rateably out of the specific legacies.

The LORD CHANCELLOR.-My Lords, I submit that it is not your Lordships' habit to hear suggestions with regard to an alteration in the decree made on the part of a respondent who does not challenge any part of the decree. It is quite irregular to make any alteration in the decree as to the administration of the estate. If any change should be necessary in consequence of what your

[CHAN

Lordships have now done, it is to the Court of Chancery that the application must be made. Solicitors for the appellant, and for the executor, Hyde and Tandy.

Solicitors for the respondents, Cookson, Wainewright and Pennington.

Equity Courts.

COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Reported by E. STEWART ROCHE and H. PEAT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Feb. 1 and 9.

(Before the LORDS JUSTICES.)
HEUGH v. GARRETT.

Practice-Production of documents-Discovery-
Sealing up.

The defendant was agent to the plaintiffs for the sale of patent ruffles according to the terms of a certain agreement. The plaintiffs believed that the defendant had violated the terms of the agreement, and accordingly filed a bill against him for an account. The defendant, by his answer, submitted that the inquiries made by the interrogatories as to the names of the persons to whom he had sold the goods, and as to the quantities and particulars of such sales were wholly immaterial to the questions at issue. The plaintiffs took out a summons for the production of documents, and the defendant, by his affidavit, admitted the possession and revelancy of the documents, and agreed to produce the documents mentioned in the first part of the first schedule to his affidavit as relating exclusively to these transactions with the plaintiffs, but declined to produce certain other documents mentioned in the second part of the said first schedule, on the ground that in them were contained the whole of his business transactions, except those_contained in the documents he had agreed to produce. The plaintiffs accordingly took out a further summons to produce the documents contained in the second part of the said first schedule, upon which the chief clerk made an order to produce the documents required. On this summons being adjourned into court, it was held by ViceChancellor Bacon that the defendant was bound to produce all the documents in question: Held (varying the order of the Vice-Chancellor), that the defendant must be allowed to seal up the names and addresses of his customers, and was only bound to produce the entries showing the quantities of goods sold, and the prices.

A discovery which is useless to the plaintiff for any purposes of the hearing, but which may be very injurious to the defendant in case the plaintiff fails at the hearing, is not a discovery that ought to be made.

THIS was an appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Bacon. The facts and arguments are fully reported (31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 669). The suit was instituted by Messrs. Haugh, Balfour and Co., merchants and manufacturers, against their agent, disputing the mode in which commission was charged. On the 17th Dec. last Vice-Chancellor Bacon made an order for the inspection of the defendant's books and documents generally. The defendant appealed on the ground that he was

agent for other persons, and that the disclosure of the names and addresses of his customers would be injurious to him.

Kay, Q.C. and Freeling for the appellant.
Jackson, Q.C. and Lawson for the plaintiffs.
The following cases were cited :-

Weir v. Tucker, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 719; L. Rep. 14
Eq. 25;

Great Western Colliery Company v. Tucker, 30 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 731; L. Rep. 9 Ch. 376;
Moore v. Craven, L. Rep. 9 Ch. 94 (note);
Gresley v. Mousley, 2 K. & J. 292;

Saull v. Browne, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 697; L. Rep. 9
Ch. App 364;

Carver v. Pinto Leite, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 722; L. Rep.
7 Ch. App. 90.

Lord Justice JAMES.-I am of opinion that this case is really not distinguishable in principle from either the case we had before us, or the case of Moore v. Craven, which decided that a discovery which is, in fact, useless to the plaintiffs for any purposes of the hearing, but which may be very injurious to the defendant in case the plaintiff fails at the hearing, is not a discovery which is to be made. In this case the amount of goods for which the defendant is responsible cannot be in dispute at all, because the goods were supplied to him, or according to his order, by the plaintiffs, and they knew themselves what the goods were. It is not disputed that he is only entitled to 2 per cent. commission upon those goods, which were supplied according to their list, and by their authority and sanction, not del credere. Then, the balance he has to account for. The question is whether he is entitled to 4 per cent. on the whole of that balance or not. The plaintiffs say, "You are not entitled to 4 per cent. on the whole of that balance, because you are only to have that 4 per cent. on the terms of selling to wholesale shippers and wholesale dealers, and upon that account if you have sold to anybody else you have sold in violation of your duty, or if you have sold at a higher price than our prices you have sold equally in violation of your duty." That is a question to be decided at the hearing. As the defendant admits that he sold great quantities of goods other than those which he sold to what are called shippers, the question is whether he rightfully might or might not do so; and what would be the consequences to the plaintiffs if the court says at the hearing that he was wrong in that. It is very material to the plaintiffs to know the quantities of goods sold, and the prices at which they were sold; and there is no reason why the defendant should not give an exact account showing what the quantities were, and what were the prices at which those quantities were sold for. But it is impossible that the names and addresses of the persons can be of the slightest value whatever in determining that question. Whether it is Brown or Smith he has sold to the result must be exactly the same to the plaintiffs if that Brown or Smith is not a shipper; and the question whether he is a shipper or not is a mere matter which would have to be taken into account, if an account is ever decreed in the form in which the plaintiffs ask that it may be. It is said that this is the first time in which the court has ever protected a defendant, who admits himself an agent, from discovery. Whether he is an agent or not does not signify. The question is whether he is to make a discovery which may be injurious to him (whether he is an agent or not), and which will

[CHAN.

not be of material assistance at the hearing of the cause. The principle must be the same whatever the alleged character in which the defendant is brought before the court. We being of opinion that the names and addresses are not to be disclosed at this time, the order of the ViceChancellor will be varied by allowing the defendant to seal up the names and addresses of the persons to whom he has sold. But, of course, he is to produce the sales. He is not to seal up the entries showing the amounts sold, or the prices at which they were sold.

Lord Justice MELLISH.-I am of the same opinion. I think the mere fact of the defendant being an agent, when we consider what description of agent he is, does not at all make out that it may not be a very serious inconvenience to him to produce his books showing the names and addresses of his customers. He appears to be a Manchester warehouseman, whose business it is to sell, not merely for the plaintiffs, but for a great number of persons, and who sells under a del credere commission, not disclosing to the persons for whom he sells the names and addresses of his customers; in short, if he did disclose their names and addresses he might possibly enable the plaintiffs to deal directly with those persons whose names he might disclose. Therefore, I think it plainly appears, from the nature of the business, even independently of the affidavit which has been produced before us, but which was not before the Vice-Chancellor, that it might be a serious injury to him to produce the names and addresses of his customers. That being made out I think it follows from what has been laid down in the previous cases, that he ought not to make a discovery unless it is necessary for the ing. I am of opinion that the names and addresses purpose of proving the plaintiffs' case at the hearof the customers cannot in any degree tend to throw any light on the question which is really in dispute between the parties.

Solicitor for the plaintiffs, J. H. Johnson. Solicitors for the defendant, Dean and Taylor.

Wednesday, Feb. 10.

(Before the LORDS JUSTICES.)

GISBORNE v. GISBORNE.

Lunacy of wife-Provision by marriage settlement Provision by husband's will-Primary fund for maintenance of lunatic-Discretion.

The husband of a lunatic, entitled under her marriage settlement to considerable property, by his will devised real and personal estate to trustees, the whole, or such part as the trustees should think fit, of the annual income to be for the clothing, board, lodging, maintenance, ease, and support, or otherwise for the personal and peculiar benefit and comfort of the wife during her life, "and in such proportions and manner in all respects as the trustees should think most conducive to her confort."

Held (reversing the decision of Vice-Chancellor Hall) that by the terms of the will the trustees had an absolute discretion.

THIS was an appeal by the defendants from a decree of Vice-Chancellor Hall. The facts are fully reported (31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 472.).

Greene, Q.C. and Gardiner for the appellants, contended that the trustees had exercised a bonâ