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for publication upon nonresident defendants was deprived of its jurisdiction. The lands in suits begun in the circuit court of the were still held by the attachment to answer United States to enforce any legal or equita- such judgment as might be rendered against ble lien upon a claim to real or personal the defendant. property within the district where suit is The defendant had a right to remove to brought.
the Federal court, but it is neither reasonaIt must be taken at the outset as settled ble nor consonant with the Federal statute that no valid judgment in personam can be preserving the lien of the attachment, that rendered against a defendant without per- the effect of such removal shall simply be sonal service upon him in a court of compe- to dismiss the action wherein the state court tent jurisdiction, or waiver of summons, and had acquired jurisdiction by the lawful seivoluntary appearance therein. Pennoyer v. zure of the defendant's property within the Neff, 95 U. S. 715, 24 L, ed. 565; Caledonian state. Coal Co. v. Baker (New Mexico ex rel. Cale- When the jurisdiction of the state court donian Coal Co. v. Baker) 196 U. S. 432, 444, was terminated by the removal, that court 49 L. ed. 540, 545, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, and had seized upon the attached property, with cases cited.
the right to hold it to answer such judgment Nor did the petition for removal in the as might be rendered. In the absence of perform used in this case have the effect to sonal service the state statute provided for submit the nerson of the defendant to the publication of notice of the pendency of the jurisdiction of the state court, or, upon re- suit. If the defendant failed to appear the moval to the Federal court, deprive him of court might proceed to render a judgment, the right to object to the manner of service which would permit the attached property upon bim (Goldey v. Morning News, 156 to be sold for its satisfaction. To render U.S.518, 39 L. ed. 517, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559), such a judgment in the absence of an apand the exercise of the right of removal did pearance and defense the state court had not have the effect of entering the general only to require the statutory notice to the appearance of the defendant, but a special defendant, when its proceedings were inappearance only for the purposes of removal | terrupted by the removal to the Federal (Wabash Western R. Co. v. Brow, 164 U. S. court on the application of the defendant. 271–279, 41 L. ed. 431–434, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. The Federal court thus acquired jurisdic126).
tion of a cause of which the defendant had But we cannot agree with the contention notice, as appears by his petition for reof counsel for plaintiff in error, that, as a moval and the action of the state court inpersonal judgment can only be rendered voked by him. The defendant, it is true, upon personal service, and service by publi- had not been personally served with process cation under the state statutes cannot be or submitted his person to the jurisdiction made in the Federal court, and that the of either the state or Federal court. But he United States statute (act of March, 1875, did not attack the validity of the attach18 Stat. at L. 472, chap. 137, U. S. Comp. ment proceedings, which appear to be reguStat. 1901, p. 513) is inapplicable to the case, lar and in conformity to the law of the the effect of the removal is to render nuga- state. There was no necessity of publicatory the attachment proceedings in the state tion of notice in the Federal court in order court.
to warn the defendant of the proceeding; The purpose not to interfere with the he knew of it, and to a qualified extent had lien of the attachment in the state court is appeared in it. recognized and declared in the statute ($ 4 Without further notice to him, the court of the removal act, 18 Stat. at L. 471, chap. had jurisdiction to enter a judgment en. 137, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 511) provid- forcible against the attached property. The ing that, when any suit is removed from a judgment purported to be rendered as upon state court to the circuit court of the United personal service and after a finding by the States, an attachment of the goods or estate court “that the so-called special appearance of the defendant, had in the suit in the state for the removal hereinbefore recited was an court, shall hold the goods or estate attached absolute and unqualified submission to the to answer the final judgment or decree in jurisdiction of this [the Federal] court." the same manner as by law it would have There are expressions in the opinion of the been held to answer the final judgment or learned judge of the circuit court to the efdecree had it been rendered by the court in fect that the judgment rendered was inwhich the suit was commenced, and pre-tended to be effectua) only to subject the serving the validity of all bonds or security attached property (130 Fed. 462), and it given in the state court.
seems to be in the form used in some jurisThe transfer of the cause to the United dictions, which recognize that the property States court gave the latter court control attached is all that is reached by the judge of the case as it was when the state court 'ment rendered. But the judgment is abso
lute upon its face, and entered after a find- | Argued November 7 and 8, 1906. Decided ing of full jurisdiction over the person of
November 19, 1906. the defendant. It is in such form as can be sued upon elsewhere and be pleaded as a N ERROR to the Supreme Court of Apfinal adjudication of the cause of action set peals of the State of Virginia to review forth in the petition, and be executed a decree affirming, with a slight modificaagainst other property of the defendant, tion, a decree of the Chancery Court of whereas the court had only jurisdiction to Richmond, in that state, enforcing the rights render a judgment valid against the prop- of a local benevolent society under its erty seized in attachment.
charter. Affirmed. We hold that, to the extent that it ren- See same case below, 104 Va. 197, 51 S. E. dered a personal judgment absolute in 166. terms, the court exceeded its jurisdiction in The facts are stated in the opinion. the case, not having, by service or waiver, Messrs. C. V. Meredith, Ellis G. Kinkead, personal jurisdiction of the defendant. and Smith W. Bennett for plaintiffs in
The judgment to that extent is therefore error. modified and made collectible only from the Messrs. Frank W. Christian and Samuel attached property. So modified, the judg. A. Anderson for defendant in error. ment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a writ of error to reverse a deNATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE JUNIOR cree in favor of the defendant in error, ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN ME
the original plaintiff, and hereinafter CHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA et al., Piffs. in Err., called the plaintiff. 104 Va. 197, 51 S. E.
166. The plaintiffs in error will be called STATE COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA, JUNIOR the defendants. The plaintiff is a Virginia
ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN ME-corporation. The principal defendant is a CHANICS OF THE STATE OF VIR- Pennsylvania corporation. The other defendGINIA.
ants are alleged to bc officers of a voluntary
association, calling itself by the plaintiff's Contracts-impairing obligation. 1. No contract obligations of a foreign the Pennsylvania corporation. The latter
name, and are acting under a charter from benevolent society are impaired by a state statute incorporating a local society with was incorporated in 1893, the articles of the same name as that of a previously ex- association reciting that the asse viates isting voluntary state association whose comprise the national council, the supreme charter from the foreign corporation had head of the order in the United States been withdrawn, and conferring upon it the (where it previously had existed as a volunexclusive right of granting subcharters in tary association). Its objects were to prothe state.
mote the interests of Americans and shield Constitutional law—due process of law-ex-them from foreign competition, to assist cluding foreign corporation.
them in obtaining employment, to encourage 2. No existing property rights are taken without due process of law by a state stat-them in business, to establish a sick and ute, passed in the exercise of its power funeral fund, and to maintain the public over foreign corporations, incorporating a school system, prevent sectarian interference local benevolent society with the same with the same, and uphold the reading of the name as that of a voluntary state associa- Holy Bible in the schools. As the result of tion whose charter had been withdrawn by internal dissensions the Virginia corporation the foreign corporation that issued it, and was chartered in 1900, with closely similar conferring upon such society the exclusive right of granting subcharters in the state. objects, omitting those relating to the public
schools. It seems to have consisted of the Constitutional law-equal protection of the dominant portion of a former voluntary laws-excluding foreign corporation.
3. The equal protection of the laws is state council of the same name, from which not denied by a state statute, passed in the a charter issued by the Pennsylvania corexercise of its power over foreign corpora - poration had been withdrawn. The act of tions, incorporating a local benevolent so- incorporation declared that the new body ciety with the same name as that of a vol. “shall be the supreme head of the Junior untary state association whose charter had Order of the United American Mechanics in been withdrawn by the foreign corporation the state of Virginia,” and provides that it that issued it, and conferring upon such society the exclusive right of granting sub-“shall have full and exclusive authority to charters in the state.
grant charters to subordinate councils,
Junior Order United American Mechanics, [No. 89.]
in the state of Virginia, with power to re
voke the same for cause.” The plaintiff and at the date of the charter be read as a conthe voluntary organization of the defendants struction of the charter, it does not affect both have granted and intend to grant char- the scope or validity of the act. And if so ters to subordinate councils in Virginia, and read, still it cannot be taken to empty the are obtaining members and fees which each specific prohibitions in the decree of all defi. would obtain but for the other, and are nite meaning and to leave only an indeterholding themselves out as the only true and minate injunction to obey the law at the de. lawful state council of the Virginia Junior fendants' peril. That injunction remains Order of United American Mechanics. and imports what the words of the charte::
The plaintiff sued for an injunction, and import, that the plaintiff has been granted the defendants, in their answer, asked cross certain defined exclusive rights which the relief. The plaintiff obtained a decree encourt will enforce. joining the defendant corporation and the The decree, however, goes beyond the other defendants (declared to be shown by rights which we have mentioned as given by their answers to be its agents and represent the charter. In that respect the discussion atives) as officers of the Virginia voluntary here must be limited again. Whether the association, from continuing within the state plaintiff is using paraphernalia, or a ritual, the use of the plaintiff's name or any other or a seal, which it should not be allowed to name likely to be taken for it; from using use, is not before us here. The charter says the plaintiff's seal; from carrying out under nothing about them, and its validity is not such name the objects for which the plaintiff affected by any abuse of rights of property and the Virginia voluntary association were or of confidence which the plaintiff or its organized; from granting charters to sub- members may have practised. This court, ordinate councils in the state as the head of we repeat, cannot go beyond a decision upon the order in the state; from interfering in the constitutionality of the charter granted, any way with the pursuit of its objects by and we address ourselves to that. the plaintiff within the state; and from The contract of which the obligation is designating their officers within the state by alleged to have been violated is a contract applications set forth as used by the plain- between the plaintiff and the principal de tiff. On appeal the decree was affirmed, with fendant.
fendant. What that contract is supposed a modification, merely by way of caution, to have been is not stated, but manifestly providing that nothing therein contained there was none. It would have had to be a should, in anywise, interfere with any per contract not to come into existence, at least sonal or property rights that might have ac- with the plaintiff's present functions and crued before the date of the Virginia charter. name. There have been cases where adminThe defendants had set up in their answer istration was taken out on a prematurely and insisted that the charter impaired the born child and a suit brought for causing it obligation of the contract existing between to be born, per quod it died, but they have the plaintiff and the principal defendant, failed. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. contrary to article 1, $ 10, of the Constitu- 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242. See Walker v. Great tion, and also violated § 1 of the 14th Northern R. Co. Ir. L. R. 28 Eq. 69. An Amendment, and they took a writ of error antenatal contract presents greater difficulfrom this court.
ties still. Even if we should substitute an · The bill and answer state the two sides allegation of a contract with the members of the difference which led to the split, at of the plaintiff, the contention vould fail. length. But those details have no bearing The contract, if any there was, was not that that needs to be considered here. The only they would not become incorporated, but question before us is the constitutionality must be supposed to be that they would reof the act of the Virginia legislature grant- tain their subordination to the national ing the charter. The elements of that ques-council, or something of that sort. It is tion are the appropriation of the name of going very far to say that they contracted the previously existing voluntary society and not to secede, but whether they did so or the exclusive right of granting subcharters not, it was a matter outside the purview of in Virginia conferred by the words that we the charter. There was nothing in that to have quoted. Whether the persons who were hinder their returning to their allegiance. using that name when they got themselves Whether any, and if any, what, contract was incorporated were using it rightly or wrong- made (National Council, J. O. of U. A. M. v. ly does not matter if the legislature had the State Council J. O. of U. A. M. 64 N. J. Eq. right to grant the name to them in either 470, 473,53 Atl. 1082, 66 N. J. Eq. 429, 57 Ati. case. On the other hand, we do not consider 1132), and whether, if made, it must not be the question stated to be disposed of by taken to have been made subject to the the limitation put upon the decree by the powers of the state, with which we are supreme court of appeals. Unless the savo about to deal, are questions which we may ing of personal and property rights existing pass. See Pennsylvania College Cases (Jef
ferson College v. Washington & J. College), 239, 260, 43 L. ed. 432, 440, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13 Wall. 190, 218, 20 L. ed. 550, 554; Bed-165. But when the so-called property conford v. Eastern Bldg. & L. Asso. 181 U. S. sists merely in the value that there might 227, 45 L. ed. 834, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597. be in extending its business or membership
The most serious aspect of the defense is into a state, that property, it hardly needs presented by the matter of the plaintiff's to be said, depends upon the consent of the name. If the legislation of a state under- state to let the corporation come into the took to appropriate to the use of its own state. The state of Virginia had the uncreature a trade name of known commercial doubted right to exclude the Pennsylvania value, of course the argument would be very corporation and to forbid its constituting strong that an act of incorporation could branches within the Virginia boundaries. As not interfere with existing property rights. it had that right before the corporation got And, no doubt, within proper limits, the ar- in, so it had the right to turn it out after it gument would be as good for a foreign cor- got in. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, poration as for a foreign person. But that 202 U. S. 246, 50 L. ed. 1013, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. is not what has been done in this case. 619. It follows that the state could impose
The name in question is not the name of the more limited restriction that simply forthe principal defendant, but distinguished bade the granting of charters to "subordifrom that name as state and national coun- nate councils, Junior Order United American cils no doubt generally are distinguished by Mechanics, in the state of Virginia.” members of similar institutions. It is the It is argued that the power of the state name of a voluntary association of which in this case was less than it otherwise might the officers are defendants. But it is not have been, because it did not turn the Pennused even by that association in its own sylvania corporation out.
The supreme right, but only under a charter from, and court of appeals says that the plaintiff's in the right of, the Pennsylvania corpora- charter leaves the whole order of things as tion. Furthermore, the name is not asso- it existed unaffected except by the exclusive ciated with a product of any kind. Its only right of the plaintiff to issue subordinate value to the defendants, in a property charters. It is said that the general sense, is as tending to invite membership in statutes recognized the defendant and aua club which professes to derive its existence thorized such associations to continue within and its powers from the Pennsylvania com- the state. A subordinate council of the orpany. It does not seem likely that anyone der had been granted a special charter, would join the plaintiff, and certainly no which is not revoked. The conclusion is member could be retained, in ignorance of drawn that the restrictions upon the deits alienation from the national council. As fendant which flow from the charter to the the national council has its branches else- plaintiff amount to a denial of the equal where, and as the plaintiff is, on its face, protection of the laws of Virginia to a pera state organization, competition outside the son within its jurisdiction. But the power state appears improbable. So that the claim of the state as to foreign corporations does of the defendants comes down to a claim of not depend upon their being outside of its right to compete within the state, and a jurisdiction. Those within the jurisdiction, right, as we have said, of or in behalf of the in such sense as they ever can be said to Pennsylvania corporation, which controls the be within it, do not acquire a right not to existence of its subordinate Virginia coun- be turned out except by general laws. A cils. Thus the question as to the grant of single foreign corporation, especially one the name passes over into the question as to unique in character, like the national counthe exclusive right of the plaintiff to issuecil, might be expelled by a special act. It charters, which was the other legislative equally could be restricted in the more limgrant.
The supreme court of appeals was right, There were many difficult questions pretherefore, in treating the constitutional sented to the state court which cannot be question as depending on the power of the reviewed here. As to the constitutionality state with regard to foreign corporations. of the plaintiff's charter, we are of opinion That must decide the case. Now it is true, that the court was right. of course, that an unconstitutional law no Decree affirmed. more binds foreign corporations than it binds others. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co.
JAMES GOUDY, Piff. in Err., 199 U. S. 401, 409, 50 L. ed. 246, 249, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66. And no doubt a law specially directed against a foreign corporation might EDWARD MEATH, Assessor of Pierce be unconstitutional, for instance, as depriv
County, Washington. ing it of its property without due process Taxes-exemption-Indian allotments. of law. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. Land allotted under an Indian treaty
which exempts such land from levy, sale, or, the consent of Congress.” Under this treaty, forfeiture until the state legislature shall, on January 30, 1886, a patent to the plainwith the consent of Congress, remove the re- tiff was issued. One of the facts agreed striction, can no longer escape taxation after the Indian patentee has become a citizen upon is the following: under the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat.
“That since the issuance of said patent, at L. 388, chap. 119), which, in addition to and by an act of Congress passed and apthe grant of citizenship, provides that “In-proved on the 8th day of February, 1887, dians to whom allotments have been made plaintiff became and now is a citizen of the shall have the benefit of, and be subject to, United States, and entitled to all the rights, the laws, both civil and criminal, of the privileges, and immunities of such citizens. state or territory in which they may re-Said act is found in the United States Statside,” and the ten years during which con-utes at Large, vol. 24, chapter 119, at page gress, by the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat.
388." at L. 612, 633, chap. 209), postponed the operation of the provision of Wash. Laws
In 1889, Washington was admitted as a 1889, 1890, p. 499, granting the power of state. Its first legislature enacted: alienation "in like manner and with like
“Section 1. That the said Indians who effect as any other person may do under now hold. or who may hereafter hold, any the laws of the United States and of this of the lands of any reservation, in severalty, state," and removing all restrictions in ref- located in this state, by virtue of treaties erence thereto, have expired.
made between them and the United States,
shall have power to lease, encumber, grant, [No. 53.]
and alien the same in like manner and with Submitted October 23, 1906. Decided No
like effect as any other person may do un
der the laws of the United States and of vember 19, 1906.
this state, and all restrictions in reference I N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the thereto are hereby removed.” Laws 1889, State of Washington to review a judg.
1890, p. 499. ment which affirmed a judgment of the Su
In 1893, Congress passed an act (27 Stat. perior Court of Pierce County, in that state, at L. 612, 633, chap. 209) authorizing the denying the claim of an Indian allottee to superintend the sale of the allotted lands, exemption from taxation. Affirmed. See same case below, 38 Wash. 126, 80
with this proviso: Pac. 295.
“That the Indian allottees shall not have
power of alienation of the allotted lands Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:
not selected for sale by said commission for This case is before us on error to the su
a period of ten years from the date of the preme court of Washington. 38 Wash. 126. passage of this act.” 80 Pac. 295. It was submitted to the state
Construing these several acts, the Secrecourts on an agreed statement of facts, and tary of the Interior, on February 14, 1903, involves the question of the liability of the wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Afland of the plaintiff, now plaintiff in error,
fairs, summing up his conclusions in these
words: to taxation for the year 1904. He is a Puyallup Indian, and claims exemption under
"I am of the opinion that the requireand by virtue of the treaty of December 26. ments of the treaties with respect to these 1854. 10 Stat. at L. 1132. That treaty pro- visions of the act of the legislature of the
lands have been fully met, and that the provided for an allotment of land in severalty to such members of the tribe as were will state of Washington of March 22, 1890, and ing to avail themselves of the privilege, on
the Indian appropriation act of March 3, the same terms, and subject to the same 1893, referred to above, together operate to regulations, as were named in the treaty
remove all restrictions upon the alienation
I have with the Omahas. The latter treaty, March or sale thereof by the allottees. 16, 1854 (10 Stat. at L. 1043), authorized therefore to direct that the Puyallup comthe President to issue a patent for any al- missioner be instructed to continue the selotted land, "conditioned that the tract shall lection and appraisement of such portions not be aliened or leased for a longer term than of the Puyallup allotted lands, but only two years; and shall be exempt from levy, with the consent of the Indians, as provided sale, or forfeiture, which conditions shall in the act of March 3, 1893, until the excontinue in force until a state constitution, piration of the ten-year period mentioned, embracing such lands within its boundaries, to wit, March 3, 1903, after which date, in shall have been formed, and the legislature my judgment, the Puyallup Indian allottees of the state shall remove the restrictions. will ‘have power to lease, encumber, grant,
• No state legislature shall remove and alien the same in like manner and like the restrictions herein provided for without effect as any other person may do under
27 S. C.-4.