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United States v. Goodwin. 7 C.

MARSHALL, C. J. What prevents you from producing the witnesses here, or taking their depositions de novo?

Hare suggested a doubt, whether cases for violation of the embargo, are cases of admiralty, or of prize jurisdiction.

However, on a subsequent day, he moved for and obtained a commission to take the depositions of witnesses at New Orleans, to be used on the trial in this court, at the next term.

A like commission was granted in the case of Williams and Armroyd, at this term.

THE UNITED STATES V. JOHN GOODWIN.

7 C. 108.

No writ of error lies to the supreme court of the United States, to reverse the judgment of a circuit court in a civil action, which has been carried up to the circuit court from the district court, by writ of error.'

THIS was an action of debt brought originally in the district court, for the district of Pennsylvania, by the United States, against John Goodwin, for $15,000, as a penalty for not entering goods agreeably to the prime cost, at the place of exportation, with intent to defraud the revenue. The judgment of the district court, which was in favor of the United States, was, upon a writ of error, reversed in the circuit court; and thereupon the United States sued out the present writ of error to this court.

A doubt having been suggested, whether this court could take jurisdiction by writ of error, in a civil action, which had been carried up by writ of error, from the district court to the circuit court, that question was submitted to this court without argument.

[ * 109 ]

WASHINGTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, as

follows:

This case stands upon a writ of error to the circuit court, for the district of Pennsylvania. By the record, it appears that an action of debt was brought, in the name of the United States, against the defendant in error, in the district court of Pennsylvania; in which judgment was rendered for the United States. On a writ of error to the circuit court for that district, that judgment was reversed; and

1By the act of July 4, 1840, s. 3, (5 Stats. at Large, 393,) jurisdiction was given to the supreme court.

United States v. Goodwin. 7 C.

upon like process, the cause has been brought into this court, for reëxamination. A rule has been obtained by the defendant in error, upon the United States, to show cause why the writ of error should not be dismissed; and the ground of the rule is, that, as the cause was not removed from the district into the circuit court, by appeal, but by writ of error, there is no provision in any of the laws of the United States, giving jurisdiction to this court, to reëxamine the judgment of the circuit court, upon a writ of error or otherwise. This question can only be decided by an attentive consideration of the different acts of Congress on this subject.

The 21st section of the judicial law' of 1789, declares, that from final decrees in a district court in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $300, an appeal shall be allowed to the circuit court. The 22d section provides, that final decrees and judgments in civil actions, in a district court, where the matter in dispute exceeds the value of $50, exclusive of costs, may be reëxamined and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court, upon a writ of error. This section then proceeds to declare, that, upon a like process, (that is to say upon a writ of error,) may final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity, in a circuit court, brought there by original process, or removed there from the state courts, or by appeal from a district court, where the value exceeds $2,000, exclusive of costs, be reëxamined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court.

The 2d section of the act of the 3d of March, 1803,2 so [*110 ] far changes the above sections of the act of 1789, that whereas the latter allows an appeal from the district to the circuit court, only in admiralty and maritime cases, where the value in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $300, the former provides an appeal from all final judgments or decrees in a district court, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $50, and also an appeal to the supreme court, from all final decrees and judgments in a circuit court, in cases of equity, of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, where the value, exclusive of costs, exceeds $2,000. But this law makes no provision for the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in any other cases than those above mentioned. Consequently, we must refer to the sections of the act of 1789, before noticed, (which are still in force, except so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the act of 1803,) to see in what cases, other than those provided for by the act of 1803, the supreme court can review the decisions of the circuit courts. It has been

11 Stats. at Large, 83.

2 2 Stats. at Large, 244.

United States v. Goodwin. 7 C.

shown, that all final judgments or decrees in civil actions and suits in equity, in a circuit court, brought there by original process, or removed from the state courts, or by appeal, from a district court, may be reëxamined in the supreme court, upon a writ of error. But no case can, under this act, be removed from a district court by appeal, except it be of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and, consequently, under the literal construction of this law, no other cases could be carried from the circuit court to the supreme court. The question, then is, whether the word appeal, in the 22d section, is to be understood fechnically, or merely as descriptive of the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court, without regard to the particular mode by which a cause is transmitted to that jurisdiction? This question appears to have been considered by the supreme court so early as as the year 1796, in the case of Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dallas, 321. Chief Justice Ellsworth, in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, expresses himself as follows: "The act of 1789,' speaks of appeal and writ of error, but does not confound them. They are to be understood ac cording to their ordinary acceptation. An appeal is a civil law pro

cess, and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the law and A writ of error is a common

[*111] fact, to a review and * retrial.

law process, and removes for reëxamination nothing but the law. This statute observes this distinction. In admiralty and maritime causes, an appeal is allowed from the district to the circuit court, if the matter in dispute exceeds $300, and yet decrees and judgments in civil actions may be removed by writ of error, from the district to the circuit court, though the value barely exceeds $50." In another part of this opinion, the judge adds, "that as to the appel late jurisdiction of the supreme court, the 22d section says, and upon a like process, that is, upon a writ of error, shall final judgments and decrees in civil actions, namely, cases not criminal, and suits in equi ty, &c. Among the causes which may be brought to the supreme court, by writ of error, are cases which had been removed to the cir cuit court, by appeal from a district court, which can only be cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."

The objection made to this interpretation of the word appeal, that judgments in civil actions at common law, commenced in a district court, could be reëxamined only in a circuit court, if well founded in itself, could not, with any propriety, be addressed to courts, after the legislative meaning of the term is ascertained. The technical dis tinction between a writ of error, and an appeal, and between the dif ferent cases to which they were applicable, was clearly marked in the act of the 13th of February, 1801,2 which was afterwards repealed

11 Stats. at Large, 73.

22 Stats. at Large, 89.

Whelan v. The United States. 7 C.

by the act of the 8th of March, 1802. The former act, after providing for the removal of all final judgments or decrees, above the value of $50, from a district to a circuit court, by appeal, and by a like proceeding for a removal to the supreme court, of those cases only, which were of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, proceeded to provide for civil actions at common law, originating in a district court, by declaring that final judgments, in such cases, if of a certain value, might be removed at once, from the district to the supreme court, by writ of error. So that, as the law stood at that time, a party, in cases at common law, had an election to carry his case, where it exceeded $2,000, by writ of error, from the district to the circuit court, under the 22d section of the act of 1789, but without the privilege of proceeding *far- [* 112 ] ther, or to proceed with his cause at once, to the supreme court, passing by the circuit court. But it appears not to have been the policy of the legislature at that time, to subject the decisions of the district court, in civil cases at common law, to more than one reëxamination in an appellate court.

7 C. 287; 5 P. 190; 6 P. 470; 12 P. 143; 14 P. 614.

WHELAN V. THE UNITED STATES.

7 C. 112.

Cases of seizure upon waters navigable from the sea, by vessels of more than ten tons burden, for breach of the laws of the United States, are civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and are to be tried without a jury.

THIS cause standing so late on the docket, that it was not likely to be called for trial at this term, Dallas, for the United States, suggested the propriety of assigning a particular day for the hearing, as it was a case of importance, and involved a question of jurisdiction, namely: whether a seizure of a vessel, on waters navigable from the sea for vessels of ten and more tons burden, for breach of a law of the United States, was to be tried by a jury. This question was

said to be important, because the judge of the district of Pennsylvania had refused to try any cases of that kind, until the question was finally settled by this court.

1 2 Stats. at Large, 132.

United States v. The Brig Eliza. 7 C.

The court accordingly assigned a day for hearing that question, but intimated an opinion that it was already decided in the cases of The Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Betsey and Charlotte, 4 Cranch, 433; and Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281.

E. Tilghman, for the appellant, after looking into those cases, abandoned the question as to jurisdiction, considering the cases cited as conclusive against him.

THE COURT said that the question had been certainly settled in this court, upon full argument.

[ * 113 ]

5 H. 441.

* THE UNITED STATES v. The Brig ELIZA.

7 C. 113.

Under the Embargo Act of January 9, 1808, (2 Stats. at Large, 453, s. 3,) the offence was not complete until the arrival of the vessel at a foreign port. But on her return the vessel was liable to seizure.

APPEAL from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Delaware, dismissing a libel filed by the United States against The Eliza, for having proceeded to a foreign port or place, contrary to section 3, of the act of January 9, 1808, (2 Stats. at Large, 453.)

Dallas, for the United States.

J. R. Ingersoll, for the claimant.

[* 115 ] * MARSHALL, C. J., stated that it was the opinion of the court that the vessel was liable to seizure; but that a majority of the court was of opinion that the offence was not complete until the arrival of the vessel in a foreign port; but the facts of the case do not appear, so as to enable the court to decide that point; the cause is therefore continued for further proof.

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