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will not go." Comyns's Digest, Admiralty, |-injured by the motion of the vessel, by a F. 5; 1 Rolle, Abr. 533, pl. 18.

What the early law seems most to have looked to as fixing the liability of the ship was the motion of the vessel, which was treated as giving it the character of a responsible cause. Bracton recognizes this as an extravagance, but admits the the fact, fact, for the common law. 122a, 1366. 1 Select Pleas of the Crown, 1 Seld. Soc. Pub. 84. The same was true in admiralty. Rowghton, ubi sup. art. 50; 2 Rotulæ Parlimentariæ, 345, 346, 372a, b; 3 Rotulæ Parlimentariæ 94a, 1206, 121a; 4 Rotulæ Parlimentariæ 12a, b, 4926, 493. The responsibility of the moving cause took the form of deodand when it occasioned death, like the steam engine in Queen v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 10 Mees. & W. 59, and innumerable early instances, but it was not confined to such cases. 2 Black Book (Twiss) 379. But compare 1 Select Pleas in Adm., 6 Seld. Soc. Publ. lxxi., lxxii. The principle has remained until the present day. United States v. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 234, 11 L. ed. 239, 249; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. ed.

67.

The foregoing references seem to us enough to show that to maintain jurisdiction in this case is no innovation even upon the old English law. But a very little history is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the Constitution does not prohibit what convenience and reason demand.

continuous act, beginning and consummated
upon navigable water, and giving character
to the effects upon a point which is only
technically land, through a connection at the
bottom of the sea. In such a case jurisdic-
tion may be taken without transcending the
limits of the Constitution or encountering
The Plymouth or any other authority bind-
ing on this court. As to the present English
law, see The Uhla, L. R. 2 Adm. & Eccl. 29,
note; The Swift [1901] P. 168.
Decree reversed.

Mr. Justice Brown, concurring:

I do not dissent from the conclusion of the court, although for forty years the broad language of Mr. Justice Nelson in the case of The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, sub nom. Hough v. Western Transp. Co. 18 L. ed. 125, has been accepted by the profession and the admiralty courts as establishing the principle that the jurisdiction of the admiralty does not extend to injuries received by any structure affixed to the land, though such injuries were caused by a ship or other floating body. It received the approval of this court in the case of Fc parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610, 30 L. ed. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, and in that of Johnson V. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 447, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254, and has been followed by the courts of at least a dozen different districts, and applied to bridges, piers, derricks, and every other class of structure permanently affixed to the soil.

I do not think this case can be distinguished from the prior ones, as, in my opin

whether a beacon be affixed to piles driven into the bottom of the river or to a stone projecting from the bottom, or whether it be surrounded by 12 feet or 1 foot of water, or whether the injury be done to a wharf projecting into a navigable water, or to a beacon standing there, or whether the damage be caused by a negligent fire or by bad steering.

In the case of The Plymouth there was nothing maritime in the nature of the tort for which the vessel was attached. The fact that the fire originated on a vessel gave no character to the result, and that circum-ion, it makes no difference in principle stance is mentioned in the judgment of the court, and is contrasted with collision, although the consideration is not adhered to as the sole ground for the decree. It has been given weight in other cases. Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co. 62 C. C. A. 274, 125 Fed. 696; Queen v. London Court Judge [1892] 1 Q. B. 273, 294; Benedict, Admiralty, 3d ed. § 308. Moreover, the damage was done wholly upon the mainland. It never has been decided that every fixture in the midst of the sea was governed by the same rule. The contrary has been supposed in some American cases (The Arkansas, 5 McCrary, 364, 17 Fed. 383, 387; The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. 511, 515), and is indicated by the English books cited above. It is unnecessary to determine the relative weight of the different elements of distinction between The Plymouth and the case at bar. It is enough to say that we now are dealing with an injury to a government aid to navigation from ancient times subject to the admiralty, a beacon emerging from the water,

I accept this case as practically overruling the former ones, and as recognizing the principle adopted by the English admiralty court jurisdiction act of 1861 (§ 7), extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to "any claim for damages by any ship." This has been held in many cases to include damage done to a structure affixed to the land. The distinction between damage done to fixed and to floating structures is a somewhat artificial one, and, in my view, founded upon no sound principle; and the fact that Congress, under the Constitution, cannot extend our admiralty jurisdiction, affords an argument for a broad interpretation com

mensurate with the needs of modern com- Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinmerce. To attempt to draw the line of ju-ion of the court: risdiction between different kinds of fixed This is a writ of error to the supreme structures, as, for instance, between beacons court of Missouri on the ground that the and wharves, would lead to great confusion plaintiff in error is denied the rights with and much further litigation. regard to charging interest conferred upon it by the national banking act. Rev. Stat. §§ 5197, 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493. The suit was brought by the plaintiff

(195 U. S. 369)

CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK OF KAN-in error upon a promissory note for $20,000, SAS CITY, MISSOURI, Plff. in Err.,

v.

M. S. C. DONNELL.

Usury by national banks.

1. By compounding interest oftener than is permitted by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 3711, a national bank charges interest at a higher rate than that allowed by the laws of the state, within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, fixing the rate which national banks may charge, although the compounded interest is less

that the state laws permit to be charged di

rectly, without 'compounding. 2. A national bank which has made a 12 per cent charge on overdrafts, where 8 per cent is the highest rate of interest permitted by the state laws, cannot escape the forfeiture prescribed by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S.

with interest at 8 per cent, made on April
29, 1892. The facts, shortly stated, are as
follows: On October 29, 1892, the plaintiff
bought the defendant's note for $15,000, with
interest at 7 per cent. On July 12, 1895,
the defendant being behindhand with
his payments of interest and also hav-
ing overdrawn a bank account which
he kept in the plaintiff's bank,
bank, he
gave the plaintiff a new note for $17,-
500, and interest at 7 per cent, in satis-
faction of both liabilities. The amount of
this note included three semiannual interest

charges of $525 each, with a few days'

further interest, on the former note, with interest on this interest from the time it was due, and charges of 1 per cent or more a month on the amount overdrawn each month. It left the defendant with a credit on his bank account of $230.50. On April 29, 1896, the note in suit and another note for $2,000were given in satisfaction of the last note for $17,500, and of another note for $2,500, of October 1, 1895, with interest accrued on both, and of an overdraft of $919.90, and a balance of $2.42. The overdraft item included, as before, charges of about 1 per cent a month on the amounts actually overdrawn. The supreme court of Missouri held that the plaintiff must forfeit all interest from. the beginning of the above transactions, and could recover only the original $15,000, the actual overdraft on July 12, 1895, $474.24, Argued November 1, 1904. Decided Novem- the bank credit of $230, given the same day,

Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, where a greater rate of interest is charged than the state laws allow, because of the trifling amount, or on the theory that the charge is a penalty because of the failure to pay a debt when due. 3. A national bank whose action on a promissory note is met by the plea of usury may not avoid the forfeiture of the entire interest, imposed by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, in absolute terms, by then declaring an election to remit the excessive interest.

[No. 36.]

ber 28, 1904.

the note of October 1, 1895, for $2,500, the overdraft on April 29, 1896, of $878.81, and the bank credit of $2.42-in all, $19,081.97, less $5,500 collected on account since the action was begun. 172 Mo. 384, 72 S. W. 925.

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the INtate of to a les 95,500 State of Missouri to review a judgment reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, in that State, in favor of plaintiff in a suit on a promissory note for the full amount claimed, and directing the trial court to enter up judgment for plaintiff without interest, which it decided was forfeited under the national banking act because usurious. Affirmed.

See same case below, 172 Mo. 384, 72 S. W. 925.

on

By the U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, a bank may charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state,

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where the bank. is located, and no more." By § 5198 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493), taking, receiv ing, or charging "a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note,.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Oliver H. Dean, William D. Mc-bill, or other evidence of debt carries with Leod, and Hale Holden for plaintiff in

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it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon." The Revised Statutes of Missouri fix 6 per cent as the rate of interest in the absence of agreement (§ 3705), but allow

parties to agree in writing for not over 8 per cent (§ 3706). They also allow parties to contract in writing for the payment of interest upon interest, "but the interest shall not be compounded oftener than once in a year" (§ 3711). It will be seen that the charge on the overdrafts went beyond § 3706, and the compounding of the semiannual interest on the notes encountered § 3711.

The plaintiff in error denies that the prohibition of compounding oftener than once a year affects the "rate of interest" within the meaning of those words in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, and contends that so long as the total sums received would not amount to more

than 8 per cent on the debt, it has a right to charge them under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, coupled with Mo. Rev. Stat. § 3706. It disposes of the 12 per cent charge on overdrafts by the suggestion that the amount is trifling, and de minimis non curat lex, and that this charge was a penalty because of a failure to pay a debt when due, and therefore not usurious. We are of a different opinion. The rate of interest which a man receives is greater when he is allowed to compound than when he is not, the other elements in the case being the same. Even if the compounded interest is less than might be charged directly without compounding, a statute may forbid enlarging the rate in that way, whatever may be the rules of the common law. The supreme court of Missouri holds that that is what the Missouri statute has done. On that point, and on the question whether what was done amounted to compounding within the meaning of the Missouri statute, we follow the state court. Union Nat. Bank v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 163 U. S. 325, 331, 41 L. ed. 177, 179, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039. Therefore, since the interest charged and received by the plaintiff was compounded more than once a year, it was at a rate greater than was allowed by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5197, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, and it was forfeited. The suggestions as to the 12 per cent charge on overdrafts do not seem to us to need answer.

We perceive no warrant in the statute or the cases for the contention that the bank, when it brings the action and is met by the plea of usury, may avoid the forfeiture imposed by Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, in absolute terms, by then declaring an election to remit the excessive interest. Judgment affirmed.

(195 U. S. 375) BALTIMORE SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK COMPANY OF BALTIMORE CITY, Plff. in Err.,

v.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTI

MORE et al.

Taxes-state taxation as prohibited by Federal interest-taxation of Federal agency. 1. A state tax, though in form levied upon land conveyed by the United States to a corporation for dry-dock purposes, with a reserved right in the grantor to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision for forfelture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for use, or the use of the land for other purposes, will be held to create a lien upon the company's interest alone, where the highest state court so regards the effect of the tax, although it neglects to modify its judgment sustaining the tax to conform to its views.

2. The United States has no such interest in land conveyed by it to a corporation for drydock purposes, with a reserved right to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision for forfeiture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for use, or the use of the land for other purposes, as will prevent the state from taxing the corporation's interest in such land.

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vember 28, 1904.

IN ERROR to the Court of Appeals of

There is no doubt, of course, that the Argued November 8, 3, 1904. Decided Nocourt could go behind the face of the present note, and analyze the sum which it represents into its original elements. Brown v. Marion Nat. Bank, 169 U. S. 416, 42 L. ed. 801, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep 390; Haseltine v. Central Nat. Bank, 183 U. S. 132, 135, 136, 46 L. ed. 118120, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. These cases sufficiently show, also, if more is wanted than the words of Rev. Stat. § 5198, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493, that the court below did not err in forfeiting all the interest from the beginning.

the State of Maryland to review a judgment which affirmed an order of the Baltimore City Court, confirming the action of the Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City in assessing for taxation certain property held under a conveyance from the United States for dry-dock purposes, with a reserved right in the grantor to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision for forfeiture

in case of the continued unfitness of the dry | cerned in the appeal in this case," that is dock for use, or the use of the land for supposed to mean the same thing. other purposes. Affirmed. We will deal with the argument drawn

See same case below, 97 Md. 97, 54 Atl. from the last consideration first. It is true 623.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. E. P. Keech, Jr., Leon E. Greenbaum, and Archibald H. Taylor for plaintiff in error.

that commonly taxes on land create a lien paramount to all interest, and that a tax sale often has been said to extinguish all titles, and to start a new one. Hefner v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 123 U. S.

Messrs. Edgar Allan Poe and W. Ca- 747, 751, 31 L. ed. 309, 311, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. bell Bruce for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion

of the court:

This is a writ of error to the court of appeals of the state of Maryland, brought to reverse a judgment sustaining a tax upon certain land. The plaintiff in error filed a petition and appeal from an assessment by the appeal tax court of Baltimore in the Baltimore city court, alleging that its land was not subject to taxation, and, if subject, was taxed too high. The city court reduced the tax, but held the land liable, and its judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. 97 Md. 97, 54 Atl. 623. The land in question formerly belonged to the United States, being part of the property known as Fort McHenry, and is admitted not to have been taxable at that time. Under an act of Congress of June 19, 1878 (20 Stat. at L. 167, chap. 310), it was conveyed to the plaintiff in error on March 26, 1879. By the terms of the deed, following the requirements of the act, the consideration of the conveyance and the condition upon which it was made was that the dock company should construct a dry dock upon the land as specified, which it did, and that it should "accord to the United States the right to the use forever of the said dry dock at any time for the prompt examination and repair of vessels belonging to the United States, free from charge for docking, and if at any time said property hereby conveyed shall be diverted to any other use than that herein named, or if the said dry dock shall be at any time unfit for use for a period of six months or more, the property hereby conveyed, with all its privileges and appurtenances, shall revert to, and become the absolute property of, the United States." This condition is relied upon as still keeping the land outside the taxing power of the

337; Textor v. Shipley, 86 Md. 424, 438, 38 Atl. 932; Emery v. Boston Terminal Co. 178 Mass. 172, 184, 86 Am. St. Rep. 473, 59 N. E. 763. Perhaps it was assumed that this always was the effect of tax sales, in Northern P. R. Co. v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600, 29 L. ed. 477, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201. But it needs no argument to show that a state may do less. It may tax a life estate to one and a remainder to another, and sell only the interest of the party making default. With regard to what the state of Maryland has done and what are the purport and attempted effect of the tax in this case, we treated the tax and the lien as going only to follow the court of appeals. That court the dock company's interest in the land, although, probably by an oversight, it neglected to modify the judgment according to its own suggestion so as to show the fact. That only the company's interest was taxed is shown by the reduction of the assessment on account of the condition. Of course it does not matter what form of words the judgment employs when its meaning is thus declared by the court having the matter under its control.

In the next place, as to the interest of the United States in the land. This is a mere condition subsequent. There is no easement The obligation to or present right in rem. keep up the dock and to allow the United States to use it carries active duties, and is purely personal. The property is subject to forfeiture, it is true, if the obligation is not fulfilled. But it is only by forfeiture that the rights of the United States can be enforced against the res. It would be a very harsh doctrine that would deny the right of the states to tax lands because of a mere possibility that they might lapse to the United States. The contrary is the law. The condition cannot be extinguished by the state, but the fee is in the dock company, and that can be taxed and, if necessary, sold, subject to the condition. See Northern P. It is argued that the United States has R. Co. v. Myers, 172 U. S. 589, 598, 43 L. ed. such an interest in the land as to prevent the 564, 567, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; Maish v. Artax, and also that the land is an agency of izona, 164 U. S. 599, 607-609, 41 L. ed. 567, the government by the terms of the grant. 570, 571, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193; Central P. It is noted that this tax originally was lev- R. Co. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 525, 40 L. ied upon the land, not upon the dock com- ed. 1057, 1061, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885. The pany's interest, and although the language title of the dock company was not inalienof the final judgment was "the property con-able, as that of the railroad was held to be

state.

in Northern P. R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 47 L. ed. 1044, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671.

6.

7.

British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States," because of the exemption of coastwise steam vessels of the United States from pilotage, resulting from U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4444, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3037, or of any lawful exemption of coastwise vessels, created by the state laws.

No inherent rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution are infringed by state regulations providing for the appointment of pilots, and restricting the right to pilot to those duly appointed.

Finally, we are of opinion that the land is not exempt as an agency of the United States. The dock company disclaimed that position for itself as a corporation, but asserts it for the land. The position is answered technically, perhaps, by what we have said already. The United States has no, present right to the land, but merely a personal claim against the corporation, reinforced by a condition. But, furthermore, it seems to us extravagant to say that an independent private corporation for gain, created by a state, is exempt from state taxation, either in its corporate person or its property, because it is employed by the United States, even if the work for which it is employed is important and takes much Argued November 3, 1904. Decided Novemof its time. Thomson v. Union P. R. Co. 9 Wall. 579, 19 L. ed. 792; Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787. Judgment affirmed.

(195 U. S. 332)

OTTO OLSEN, Piff. in Err.,

v.

A. D. SMITH, L. Huth, L. Best, et al.

Commerce-validity of state pilotage lawserror to state court-Federal question.

State legislation concerning pilotage is not necessarily repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 2. Whether clauses of a state pilotage law granting discriminatory exemptions, in violation of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4237, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903, can be eliminated without destroying the remaining provisions, is a question for the state court to decide, and cannot be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court, on writ of error to the state court. 3. Only the discriminatory features of state pilotage laws are abrogated by the provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4237, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903, forbidding such discrimination. and annulling and abrogating "all existing regulations or provisions making any such

discrimination."

The exemption of coastwise steam vessels of the United States from the operation of state pilotage laws, created by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4444, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3037, interferes with such laws only so far as they relate to these vessels, as the section expressly declares that "nothing in this title shall be considered to annul or affect any regulation established by the laws of any state, requiring vessels entering or leaving a port in any such state, other than coastwise steam vessels, to take a pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of such state." 5. State pilotage laws, as applied to a British vessel coming from a foreign port, do not

conflict with a treaty provision that "no higher or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any ports of the United States on

No monopoly or combination forbidden by the Federal anti-trust laws is created by state regulations providing for the appointment of pilots, and restricting the right to pilot to those duly appointed.

[No. 42.]

vember 28, 1904.

IN ERROR to the Court of Civil Appeals

for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas to review a judgment which affirmed in part a judgment of the District Court of Galveston County, in that State, in favor of plaintiffs in an action in which the alleged repugnancy of the pilotage laws of that state to the Federal Constitution and laws was set up as a defense. Affirmed.

See same case below (Tex. Civ. App.) 68
S. W. 320.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Walter Gresham for plaintiff in

error.

Messrs. James B. Stubbs and Charles J. Stubbs for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendants in error, who were plaintiffs in the court of original jurisdiction, as the duly licensed state pilots of the port of Galveston, Texas, sued in a Texas district court to recover the damages averred to have been caused them by the alleged illegal action of the defendant in offering, when he was not authorized by law to do so, his services "to pilot sail vessels or registered steamers, bound to or from foreign ports, in or out of the port of Galveston." An injunction was prayed restraining the defendant from acting "in any manner as branch or deputy pilot, or pilot under the laws of the state of Texas, and of said port, or under the laws of the United States, with respect to the kind of vessels specified." The defendant filed a general demurrer, and, reserving the demurrer, answered, raising special defenses based on averments that the pilotage laws of Texas were in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The court overruled the demurrer

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