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control, and the right to all the revenues de- [ These considerations not only show the misrived from the operation of the business take of the interpretation, but also point were in the United States as the result of the out the confusion and conflict which must resolution, the proclamation, and the con- necessarily arise from giving effect to the tracts, yet as to intrastate earnings, the state mistaken presumption of the continuance of power remained to “incumber" the authority state power to which we have previously reof the United States, because that situation ferred. necessarily resulted from the terms of the congressional resolution.
This superficially was based on an interpretation of the resolution, but in substance was caused by the application to the clause of the resolution interpreted, of the erroneous presumption as to the continuance of state power dealt with in the North Dakota case. Let us see if this is not necessarily so. The provision dealt with was the proviso of the resolution which in the first place saved "the lawful police regulations of the several states" and therefore subjected the control of the United States to the operation of such power, and in the second place prohibited the states during the United States control from exerting authority as to the issue of stocks and bonds.
 *Inherently the power of a state to fix rates to be charged for intrastate carriage or transmission is in its nature but derivative, since it arises from and depends upon the duty of those engaged in intrastate commerce to charge only reasonable rates for the services by them rendered, and the authority possessed by the state to exact a compliance with that duty. Conceding that it was within the power of Congress, subject to constitutional limitations, to transplant the state power as to intrastate rates into a sphere where it, Congress, had complete control over telephone lines because it had taken possession of them and was operating them as a governmental agency, it must follow that in such sphere there would be nothing upon which the state power could be exerted except upon the power of the United States; that is, its authority to fix rates for the services which it was rendering through its governmental agencies. The anomaly resulting from such conditions adds cogency to the reasons by which in the North Dakota case the error in presuming the continuance of
It was conceded that the words "police power" were susceptible of two significations, a comprehensive one embracing in substance the whole field of state authority and the other a narrower one including only state power to deal with the health, safety and morals of the people. Although it was admitted that the reservation, considered in-state power in such a situation was pointed trinsically, was not susceptible of being interpreted in the broader of the two lignts, it was held that it was necessary to so interpret it because of the clause of the proviso prohibiting the states from legislating concerning the issue of stocks and bonds by the companies during the United States control. The reasoning was this: It was inconceivable, it was said, that the subject, stocks and bonds, should have been withdrawn from
out and makes it certain that such a result could be brought about only by clear expression or at least from the most convincing implication.
This disposes of the case, but before leaving it we observe that we have not overlooked in its consideration the references made to proceedings in Congress concerning the resolution at the time of its passage, and further, that we have also considered all the
suggestions made in the many and volumi
nous briefs filed on behalf of various state authorities and individuals having interests in suits pending elsewhere, concerning the construction of the resolution. In saying this, however, we must except suggestions as to want of wisdom or necessity for conferring uncalled for exertion of the power as conthe power given, or as to the precipitate or ferred, from all of which we have turned aside because the right to consider them was wholly beyond the sphere of judicial authority.
state control by an express prohibition unless that subject would have been under state control in the absence of the prohibition, a result which could only exist by giving the saving clause as to police power its widest significance. But the fact that the rule of construction applied had the result of incorporating in the act of Congress unlimited state authority merely as the result of a prohibition by Congress against the exertion of state power in a specific instance, in and of itself admonishes of the incorrectness of the rule. But its want of foundation is established by two further considerations: (1) In view of our conclusion we shall in this Because it causes the provision as to stocks and bonds, which was plainly enacted to case, as we did in the previous one and for preserve the financial control of the United the reasons therein stated, content ourselves States over the corporations, to limit if not with reversing the judgment below upon the destroy such control; (2) because by convert-merits with directions for such further proing the prohibition against state power into ceedings as may be not inconsistent with this an affirmative and comprehensive grant of opinion. that power, it so interprets the act as to limit the grant of authority which the act beyond doubt gave to the United States.
And it is so ordered.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissents.
(250 U. S. 191)
(250 U. S. 195) BURLESON, Postmaster General, v. DEMP- MACLEOD et al. v. NEW ENGLAND TELECY et al. PHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
(Argued May 5 and 6, 1919. Decided June 2, (Argued May 5 and 6, 1919. Decided June 2,
Messrs. Solicitor General King, of Atlanta, Ga., and Henry S. Robbins, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Mr. Raymond S. Pruitt, of Chicago, Ill., for appellees.
*Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a suit commenced by the Postmaster General, the members of the Public Utilities Commission of Illinois and the Attorney General of that state filed a cross-bill to enjoin the Postmaster General from enforcing telegraph rates which he had directed to be charged for services rendered over lines which were in the possession, under the control, and being operated by the United States under authority of the resolution of Congress and the proclamation of the President, considered in the Dakota Central Telephone Case, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507, 63 L. Ed. - this day announced.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts.
Petition by Frederick J. Macleod and Everett E. Stone, constituting the Public Service Commission of Massachusetts, against the New England Telephone & Telegraph Company. On the petition and answers, the case was reserved for the consideration of the Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed the petition (122 N. E. 567), and petitioners bring certiorari. Affirmed.
Mr. William Harold Hitchcock, of Boston, Mass., for petitioners.
Mr. Solicitor General King, of Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners, composing the Public Utilities Commission of the state of Massachusetts, filed their bill against the respondent to compel it to enforce certain telephone rates for intrastate business established in conformity to the state law and to forbid the putting into effect of conflicting rates fixed by the Postmaster General in a schedule by him established and the enforcement of which he had ordered.
On the petition and answers the case was reserved for the consideration of the Supreme Judicial Court where it was finally decided. The The theory of the cross-bill was that the Unit- Chief Justice Rugg, having after full consideracourt in a lucid opinion, speaking through Mr. ed States in operating the lines was governed as tion reached the conclusion that the Postmaster to intrastate rates by state authority and could General was empowered by the law of the not lawfully exact for such services rendered United States to fix the schedule of rates comany charges but those which the state sanction-plained of and that the telephone company was ed. The court below upheld this view and there-authorized by such law to put in effect and enfore permanently enjoined the Postmaster General from charging any other than the state rates for the intrastate business. The case is before us on appeal from the decree to that ef
As there is no difference in legal principle as to the question of power between the Dakota Central Case and this, it follows that the decision in that case is conclusive here and makes certain the error committed below. In this case, therefore, as in that, as a decree of reversal will dispose of every issue in the case, it follows that the decree below must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
And it is so ordered.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissents.
force such rates even though in doing so the
of jurisdiction. But the form of the decree thus
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissents
(250 U. S. 188)
wherein the President, through the Postmaster Post-General, assumed control, possession, and supervision of each and every marine cable system, etc., the cable lines of the complainant compa
(Argued May 5 and 6, 1919. Decided June 2, nies were turned over to and accepted by them,
No. 31, Original.
In Equity. Original bill by the State of Kansas against Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster General, and the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. Bill dismissed.
Mr. Fred S. Jackson, of Topeka, Kan., for complainant.
the cases became moot, and appeals from decrees of dismissal must be dismissed, notwithstanding contentions by the companies that an adjudication of their rights was necessary to prevent future encroachments.
2. APPEAL AND ERROR 801(1)-REVIEW— MOOT CASE.
Where bills by the complainant cable companies to enjoin the Postmaster General or his Mr. Solicitor General King, of Atlanta, Ga., representatives from interfering with their propfor respondents.
Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The state of Kansas, invoking the original jurisdiction of this court, filed its bill to enjoin the Postmaster General from enforcing and the defendant corporation from giving effect to a schedule of telephone rates which the Postmaster General had established and which he had directed should be applied for telephone services rendered on lines which were in the control and possession of the United States and were being operated as governmental agencies in virtue of the resolution of Congress and the proclamation of the President referred to and considered in the Dakota Central Telephone Case (just announced) 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507, 63 L. Ed. -.
The defendants, insisting that the suit was not in substance against an officer to restrain the doing of unauthorized acts, but was really one to prevent an official of the United States from discharging his duty under a law of the United States, both disputed the merits and challenged the jurisdiction. The case was heard coincidentally with the Dakota Central Case this day decided. As the ruling in that case estabIlishes the want of foundation for the contention made in this, as to the illegality of the acts of the officer complained of, it follows also that what was stated in that case as to the form of our decree is likewise here controlling and for the reasons there stated in this as in that case our decree must be and is one of dismissal of
And it is so ordered.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS dissents.
(250 U. S. 360)
COMMERCIAL CABLE CO. v. BURLESON,
COMMERCIAL PAC. CABLE CO. v. SAME.
Nos. 815 and 816.
1. APPEAL AND ERROR 781(2)-REVIEWMOOT CASE.
Where, after bills by cable companies to enjoin the Postmaster General or his representatives from interfering with their property under presidential proclamation of November 2, 1918,
erty pursuant to presidential proclamation, whereby the President assumed control, possession, and supervision of marine cable systems, etc., were dismissed, and pending appeal from the decrees of dismissal the property was returned to the companies, thus making the cases moot and necessitating dismissal of the appeals, the original decrees dismissing the bills ought not to be allowed to stand, but should be reversed, and the causes remanded, with directions to set aside the decrees and substitute decrees dismissing the bills without prejudice.
Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Bills by the Commercial Cable Company and by the Commercial Pacific Cable Company against Albert S. Burleson and Newcomb Carlton. On motion of defendants, the bills were dismissed (255 Fed. 99), and complainants appeal. Decrees reversed, and causes remanded, with directions to set aside the decrees and substitute decrees dismissing the bills without prejudice.
Mr. Charles E. Hughes, of New York City, for appellants.
Mr. Solicitor General King, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellees.
*Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
By virtue of the Joint Resolution of July 16, 1918 (40 Stat. 904, c. 154 [Comp. St. 1918, § 3115x, appendix]), considered in the Dakota Central Telephone Case, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507, 63 L. Ed. -, decided June 2, 1919, the President, by proclamation dated November 2, 1918 (Sess. Laws 65th Cong., 2d
Sess., part 2, "Proclamations, 1918,” p. 228), assumed control, possession, and supervision "of each and every marine cable system and every part thereof owned or controlled and operated by any company or companies organized and existing under the laws of the United States, or any state thereof."
As in the case of the telephone lines, the proclamation conferred authority upon the Postmaster General to carry out its provisions. In the name of the President, the Postmaster General then took possession and assumed control of the cable lines owned or
For other cases see same topic and Y-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
under the control of the two companies which giving effect, however, to that conclusion, are appellants on these records. The com- we are of opinion that the decree below, panies thereupon filed their bills in the court which in substance rejected the rights asbelow to enjoin the Postmaster General or serted by the complainants, ought not to be his representatives from interfering with allowed to stand, but on the contrary, foltheir property because (1) under the cir- |lowing the well established precedents cumstances alleged the President had no (United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische power to take possession and control of the | Co., 239 U. S. 466, 36 Sup. Ct. 212, 60 L. Ed. cable lines; (2) if he had such power, he 387; United States V. American-Asiatic was not justified in exerting it under the Steamship Co., 242 U. S. 537, 37 Sup. Ct. 233, conditions stated; and (3) as the result of 61 L. Ed. 479), the decrees below should be the failure to provide adequate compensa- reversed and the cases remanded to the tion, the taking of the cable lines was void lower court, with directions to set aside the for repugnancy to the Constitution. These decrees and to substitute decrees dismissing propositions were based upon elaborate aver- the bills without prejudice and without costs, ments concerning the subject-matter. On because the controversy which they involve motion of the defendant the bills were dis- has become moot and is no longer therefore a missed for want of equity. The court held subject appropriate for judicial action. that as under the facts admitted the first And it is so ordered. two propositions raised no question of power, but only charged a wrongful exercise of a discretion vested, they stated no ground for relief as the subject was not justiciable, and that as to the third proposition there was no equity in the bill because the provision made for compensation met the constitutional requirement.
(250 U. S. 363)
LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. (two cases). (Argued Jan. 22 and 23. 1919. Decided June 9, 1919.)
Nos. 176, 248.
So far as bill in federal court by railroad company against telegraph company to have state judgments of condemnation decreed void alleges a failure to comply with state laws, decree against plaintiff in identical suit in state court between the parties is conclusive.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281 EMINENT DOMAIN 167(2)—DUE PROCESS-HEARING
 By appeals, the cases were brought here and were argued and submitted in March last. While they were under advisement the United States directed attention to the fact that by authority of the President all the cable lines with which the two corporations were concerned, and to which the bills related, had been turned over to and had been accepted by the corporations, and the Government hence had no longer any interest in the controversy. As the result of submitting an inquiry to counsel as to wheth-2. er the cases had become moot, that result is admitted by the United States, but in a measure is disputed by the appellants for the following reasons: First, it is said that as the taking over of the lines by the President was wholly unwarranted and without any public necessity whatever, there is ground to fear that they may again be wrongfully taken unless these cases now proceed to a decree condemning the original wrong; and, second, that although it is true that during the operation of the property while under the control of the Government all the revenues derived from it were separately kept and have been returned to the owners of the property-a result which financially is sat-4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281-DUE PROisfactory to them-nevertheless, unless there is a decree in this case, the owners can feel no certitude that the revenues may not be claimed from them by the United States in the future.
 But we are of opinion that these anticipations of possible danger afford no basis
One whose property is sought to be condemned cannot complain of not being given a hearing on the right to condemn, because referred for that hearing, under state law, to a different suit from that in which the value of the property is fixed.
3. COURTS 366(11) FEDERAL COURTS
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS POSTPONING DISCUSSION.
No constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment is infringed when the state court in suit to have a judgment of condemnation for telegraph line along a railroad held void, on the ground that the state law allows condemnation only for a new line and that the company wantfor the suggestion that the cases now presented the right for an old line, postpones discusany possible subject for judicial action, and sion till attempt is made to use it for the old hence it results that they are wholly moot line; the judgment of condemnation being and must be dismissed for that reason. In right on its face.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 39 SUP.CT.-33
Description in judgment of condemnation for telegraph line along railroad right of way, satisfying the state law under state decisions, though not fixing exact location of line, the judgment allowing only one line, and requiring it to be where it will not interfere with use of railroad, and to be subject to agreement in petition to change its location if required by change in tracks, is not bad under the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281-DUE PRO-jant in error. Western Union Tel. Co. v. CESS- - JUDGMENT - DESCRIPTION OF RIGHT Louisville & N. R. Co., 107 Miss. 626, 65 CONDEMNED. South. 650. Then in the District Court the telegraph company pleaded the State decree as a conclusive adjudication and moved that the bill and a supplemental bill be dismissed. Against the supplemental bill it also set up an injunction in its favor granted by another Court of the United States, reported in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (D. C.) 201 Fed. 946, and 207 Fed. 1, 124 C. C. A. 573. The bills were dismissed upon both grounds. 233 Fed. 82, 147 C. C. A. 152. The constitutional questions raised are presented equally in the State case and as we shall deal with them under that, 107 Miss. 626, 65 South. 650, it may be assumed, subject to those questions, that the other decision was right, as we see no reason to doubt.
6. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES 11 ALONG INTERSTATE RAILROADS-STATUTORY PERMISSION.
Assent to acquisition, by condemnation under state laws, of right for telegraph line along right of way of interstate railroad, as against objection of interference with interstate com
merce, is given by Act July 24, 1866 (Comp. St. § 10072).
[1-4] The Mississippi proceedings in eminent domain are limited in their effect to de
7. COURTS 522-PRIORITY OF JURISDIC-termining the amount of damages to be paid.
While it stands, injunction to maintain
status quo, issued by district court of one circuit against railroad company interfering with telegraph wires, precludes contrary action in district court of another circuit.
Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.
If the right to condemn is disputed that is left to be decided by a suit in equity. Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. v. Oak Grove & Georgetown R. R. Co., 89 Miss. 84, 105-107, 110, 113, 43 South. 292. The railroad company resorted to such a bill in this case. So far as it alleged a failure to comply with the State laws the State decision is conclusive against it, and of course it cannot complain of not being given a hearing simply because it is referred for that hearing to a different suit from that in which the value of the property is fixed. The separation is familiar. United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 519, 3 Sup. Ct. 346, 27 L. Ed. 1015. Passing these matters by, the first contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment alleged is that under the Mississippi laws the right could be taken only for a new line, whereas the bill avers that the telegraph company wanted the right not for a new line but for the purpose of maintaining an existing line that it had maintained theretofore under a contract with the railroad now brought to an end. Το this the Supreme Court replied that, the judgments being *right upon their face, if the telegraph company attempted to use them to maintain an existing line instead of a new one its rights could be determined when the Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin attempt was made. The Fourteenth Amendion of the Court.
Two suits by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company against the Western Union Telegraph Company, one in state court, and the other in federal District Court. In the first case, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, there was a decree for defendant (107 Miss. 626, 65 South. 650), and plaintiff brings error. In the second case, decree dismissing bill was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (233 Fed. 82, 147 C. C. A. 152), and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
*Messrs. Gregory L. Smith, of Mobile, Ala., and Henry L. Stone and Edward S. Jouett, both of Louisville, Ky., for appellant and plaintiff in error.
Mr. Rush Taggart, of Louisville, Ky., for appellee and defendant in error.
These suits, the earlier begun in the District Court of the United States, the later in a court of the State of Mississippi, are bills in equity containing the same allegations and seeking the same relief. They both seek a decree that State judgments of condemnation by emient domain, giving to the telegraph company the right to erect its poles along the railroad's right of way across the *State of Mississippi, are void. The State case was decided first and was in favor of the defend
ment knows no difference between the two purposes, and the extent to which the telegraph company is confined to one of them under the State laws is for the State court to decide. No constitutional right is infringed when the State court postpones discussion until the attempt is made. The decree as well as the opinion saves the railroad's right in that event.
 It is argued that the judgments are void because they do not fix the exact location of the telegraph poles within the speci
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes