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the express language of the charter of the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, became, on adoption, the charter of the consolidated company, created a new corporation. It is spoken of as "the new company" in the resolutions of the board of directors, submitting the agreement to the stockholders for their approval, and directing the president to cause the same to be carried into effect, when approved, by calling in "the certificates of stock in this company outstanding," and exchanging them "for stock in the new company, according to the terms of the agreement." The two corporations agree to become one corporation, and a new name is given to the "new corporation." It is spoken of as such throughout the agreement of consolidation. The whole organization is changed and made new. The capital stock is made different from that of either, or the aggregate of both; each share of stock held in the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company being exchanged for sixty-hundredths of a share in the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. The act of consolidation is declared to be a conveyance of all the rights, privileges, and franchises of each of the constituent corporations, and of all other property, real, personal, and mixed, and all debts due, on whatever account, belonging to each corporation, to the new corporation, without further act or deed.

This new corporation did not come into existence until May 4, 1874. It came Into existence as a corporation of the state of Arkansas in pursuance of its constitution and laws, and subject in all respects to their restrictions and limitations. Among these was that one (article 5, § 48, of the constitution of 1868) which declared that "the property of corporations, now existing or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as property of individuals." This rendered it impossible in law for the consolidated corporation to receive by transfer from the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, or otherwise, the exemption sought to be enforced in this suit. The case is thus brought within the rule declared and applied in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; S. C. 3 SUP. CT. REP. 193. It is not an answer to this conclusion to say that the act of consolidation, having been made in pursuance of the tenth section of the charter of the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, was the exercise by that company of a right secured to it by contract which no subsequent constitution or law of the state of Arkansas could impair or defeat. For what was the contract? Construed in the most liberal spirit in favor of the company, it cannot be extended beyond a stipulation on the part of the state that the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company may at any time thereafter, by consolidation with any other railroad company, form and become a new corporation, with such powers and privileges as at the time when the offer is accepted and acted upon may be within the power of the state to confer, and lawful for the new corporation to accept. If acted upon before the law was changed, it might well be that all the powers and privileges originally conferred in the charter of the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, including the exemption in question, would have vested in the new company. But, as it was not accepted and acted upon until a change in the organic law of the state forbade the creation of corporations capable of holding property exempt from taxation, it must be presumed that when the original company entered into the consolidation, it did so in full view of the existing law, and with the intention of forming a new corporation, such as the constitution and laws of the state at that time permitted. That, at least, we must hold to be the legal effect of the transaction. In that view, the language used by this court at the present term in the case of Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609, S. C. ante, 299, is strictly applicable and is now reaffirmed.

The conclusion is unavoidable that the exemption from taxation declared in the eleventh section of the charter of the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company did not pass by the act of consolidation to the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company.

The judgment of the supreme court of Arkansas is therefore affirmed.

(113 U. S. 539)

RICHARDS v. MACKALL, Jr.

(October Term, 1884.)

1. PRACTICE-APPEAL-CITATION-JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT OF DISTRICT OF COLUM

BIA.

When there is an appeal from the supreme court of the District of Columbia, a justice of that court may sign the citation, under sections 999, 1012, and 705 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.

2. SAME ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL.

The supreme court of the District of Columbia, while sitting in special term, may allow an appeal to the United States supreme court from one of its final decrees rendered at a general term.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. On motion (1) to dismiss the appeal; or, if that is denied, (2) to vacate the supersedeas. W. Willoughby, for motion. W. B. Webb and Enoch Totten, in opposition. WAITE, J. The supreme court of the District of Columbia consists of one chief justice and five associate justices. Rev. St. D. C. § 750; 20 St. 320, c. 99, § 1. The law provides for both special and general terms of the court, and for an appeal from the special to the general term; but the judgments and decrees, when rendered, are, whether they be at general or special term, the judgments and decrees of the supreme court. Rev. St. D. C. §§ 753, 772. A general term is held by three justices, two, however, constituting a quorum, and a special term by one. Rev. St. D. C. §§ 754, 757; 20 St. 320, c. 99, § 2. By section 705 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended February 25, 1879, (20 St. 320, c. 99, § 4,) the final judgments and decrees of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, in cases where the value of the matter in dispute exceeds $2,500, may be brought to this court for review "upon writ of error or appeal, in the same manner and under the same regulations as are provided by law in cases of writs of error on judgments, or appeals from decrees rendered in a circuit court." This is an appeal from a decree of the supreme court of the district at a general term held by Chief Justice CARTTER and Associate Justices HAGNER and Cox, which began on the first Monday in April, 1884, and ended July 5, 1884. The transcript contains the following:

"[Filed July 8, 1884.]

"SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

"Brooke Mackall, Jr., v. Alfred Richards et al. (8,118, Eq.)

"And now comes the said defendant, Alfred Richards, and appeals to the supreme court of the United States from the decree of the general term passed July 5, 1884, in the above cause against him.

64

MCARTHUR, Justice."

Wм. B. WEBB, for defendant, Richards. "The above appeal is allowed this eighth day of July, 1884. "(By the court.) *Then follows a citation in proper form, signed by the chief justice of the court, bearing the same date as the order allowing the appeal. This citation was served October 7, 1884. Next in the transcript is the following: "IN THE SUPREME Court of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THE TENTH DAY OF JULY, 1884.

"Brooke Mackall, Jr., v. Alfred Richards et al.

Then follows a supersedeas bond in due form, "Approved July 11, 1884.

(No. 8,118, Eq. In Error.)" and at the foot these words: MCARTHUR, Justice."

The appeal was docketed in this court on the fifteenth of October, 1884. The grounds of the motion may be stated thus: (1) The citation was not signed by the justice who approved the bond; (2) the citation was not served

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in time; and (3) Mrs. Richards and Leonard Mackall, who were defendants below, have not joined in the appeal.

Sections 999, 1012, and 705 of the Revised Statutes, taken together, provide in effect that when there is an appeal from the supreme court of the District of Columbia to this court, the citation may be signed by any justice of that court. Such an appeal is to be taken under the same regulations as appeals from the circuit court. Section 705. On appeals from the circuit court a judge of that court may sign the citation. Section 999. Clearly, therefore, when the appeal is from the supreme court of the district, a justice of that court may do the same thing. The transcript in this case shows that the appeal was allowed by the court, undoubtedly sitting in special term. This, we think, may be done. An appeal in a proper case is a matter of right. The decree appealed from was the decree of the supreme court, and the court, while sitting in special term, was still the supreme court, and, as such, capable of allowing an appeal to this court from one of its final decrees, though rendered at general term. As the general term had closed, it was quite proper to apply to the court sitting in special term for the allowance of the appeal. The allowance by the court while in session at special term would not do away with the necessity of a citation, because the allowance would not have been made at the same term in which the decree was rendered. Yeaton v. Lenox, 7 Pet. 221; Railroad v. Blair, 100 U. S. 662. As the allowance was made by the court, it was quite regular for the chief justice to sign the citation. The transcript also shows that the bond was approved by the court. It seems to have been presented to the court on the tenth of July and approved the next day. What was done was, according to the transcript, "In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia." Even if the citation was not served in time, which we do not decide, the failure to serve will not work a dismissal of the appeal. Dayton v. Lash, 94 U. S. 112.

The last ground of the motion to dismiss was not relied upon in argument. The effect of what has been done was to allow a separate appeal by Alfred Richards. The motions are overruled.

(113 U. S. 339)

TOWN OF SANTA ANNA v. FRANK.

(January 26, 1885.)

1. PRACTICE--FINDING OF ISSUES -SUPREME COUrt.

The general finding of issues by the court below are not open to review by the United States supreme court.

2. SAME-COMMON COUNTS.

The determination by the supreme court of a question as to the authority of the town of Santa Anna to issue bonds in the aid of a railroad company, cannot affect the judgment when the common counts, under which the case was tried in the court below without a jury, are sufficient, under the laws of Illinois, to support the judgment, without reference to the question of authority to issue the bonds described in a special count.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois.

The first count in the declaration is upon certain bonds and coupons purporting to be the obligations of the town of Santa Anna, in the state of Illinois, and to have been issued in pursuance of an act of the legislature of Illinois, entitled "An act to amend the articles of association of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomington & Pekin Railroad Company, and to extend the powers of and confer a charter upon the same," approved February 28, 1867, and in accordance with the vote of the electors of said township, at the special election held July 21, 1866. The declaration also contains the common counts for money paid, money had and received, etc. A jury having been waived by

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a stipulation in writing, the case was tried by the court. The bill of exceptions, which embodies all the evidence, does not show any exception by either party to the admission of evidence, and concludes: "This was all the evidence offered by either party, and thereupon the court found the issues for the plaintiff." A judgment was entered for plaintiff, and a motion in writing for new trial was overruled, to which defendant excepted.

H. Spencer, for plaintiff in error. T. C. Mather, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court:

1. There is no special finding of facts, and the general finding of the issues for the plaintiff is not open to review by this court. Town of Martinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U. S. 670; S. C. ante, 321.

2. The questions discussed by counsel for the defendant as to the legal authority of the town to issue the bonds referred to, fairly arise upon the first count of the declaration. But their determination cannot affect the judgment, for the common counts are sufficient under the statutes of Illinois to support the judgment, without reference to any question of the legal authority to issue the bonds described in the first count. Rev. St. Ill. 1870, c. 110, 58; Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604; S. C. ante, 296. Judginent affirmed.

(113 U. S. 268)

COON and another v. WILSON.1

(January 26, 1885.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-REISSUE No. 8,169-VALIDITY.

Reissued letters patent No. 8, 169, granted to Washington Wilson, as inventor, April 9, 1878, on an application therefor filed March 11, 1878, for an "improvement in collars," (the original patent, No. 197,807, having been granted to him December 4, 1877,) are invalid as to claims 1 and 4.

2. SAME-INFRINGEMENT.

The original patent described and claimed only a collar with short or sectional bands; that is, a band along the lower edge of the collar, made in parts or sections, and having a graduated curve. The reissued patent, and claims 1 and 4 thereof, were so framed as to cover a continuous band, with a graduated curve, but not in sections. The defendants' collars were brought into the market after the original patent was issued, and before the reissue was applied for; and the reissue was obtained to cover those collars; and, although it was applied for only a little over three months after the date of the original patent, there was no inadvertence or mistake, so far as the short or sectional bands were concerned, and it was sought merely to enlarge the claim. Claim 2 of the reissue was substantially the same as the single claim of the original patent, and claim 3 had as an element short bands. As the defendants' collars had a continuous band, with a graduated curve, and not short or sectional bands, and did not infringe the claim of the original patent, or claims 2 and 3 of the reissue, and claims 1 and 4 thereof were invalid, the bill was dismissed.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

W. F. Cogswell, for appellants. Hamilton Wallis and Edmund Wetmore, for appellees.

BLATCHFORD, J. This is a suit in equity, brought in May, 1878, in the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New York, for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 8,169, granted to the plaintiff, Washington Wilson, as inventor, April 9, 1878, on an application therefor filed March 11, 1878, for an "improvement in collars," (the original patent, No. 197,807, having been granted to him December 4, 1877.) The specifica. tions and claims of the original and reissued patents are as follows, the orig.

1 S. C. 6 Fed. Rep. 611.

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inal being on the left hand, and the reissue on the right hand, and the parts of each which are not found in the other being in italic:

Original.

Be it known that I, Washington Wilson, of the city, county, and state of New York, have invented a new and improved collar, of which the following is a specification:

In the accompanying drawings, Fig. 1 represents a side elevation of my improved collar, and Fig. 2 a perspective view of the same. Similar letters of reference indicate corresponding parts.

This invention refers to an improved standing collar, that retains all the advantages of the old-style curved band, without the objection of springing the collar too far from the neck, so as to come in contact with the coat and soil the collar. The collar also hugs the neck-band in such a manner that the collar is prevented from overriding it, resulting in a more comfortable fit.

The invention consists of a standing collar, having sectional bands, starting from center of collar, or any other point between center and ends, and continuing with a graduated curve to and beyond the ends of the collar.

Referring to the drawing, A represents a standing collar of my improved construction, and B the short or sectional bands, which start from the center of collar, or any other point between the center and ends, and continue along the lower part of the same, with a graduated curve and increasing width, to and beyond the ends of the collar, in the same manner as in ordinary bands.

The bands, B, are made either to overlap the collar proper, or the collar is made to overlap the bands, or one part of the bands laps over the collar ends, while the remaining part is overlapped by the collar, so as to obtain smoothly covered joints at

Reissue.

Be it known that I. Washington Wilson, of the city, county, and state of New York, have invented a new and improved collar, of which the following is a specification:

In the accompanying drawings, Fig. 1 represents a side elevation of my improved collar, and Fig. 2 a perspective view of the same. Similar letters of reference indicate corresponding parts.

This invention refers to an improved standing collar, that retains all the advantages of the old-style curved band, without the objection of springing the collar too far from the neck, so as to come in contact with the coat and soil the collar. The collar also hugs the neck-band in such a manner that the collar is prevented from overriding it, resulting in a more comfortable fit.

The invention consists of a standing or other collar, having curved and graduated bands that extend along the lower edge of the collar, either from the center of the collar, or from any other point between center and ends, to and beyond the ends of the collar. The rear button-hole is thrown into the top or body of the collar above the band or binding of the same.

Referring to the drawings. A represents a standing or other collar of my improved construction, and B the curved and graduated bands, which extend from the center of the collar, or any other point between the center and ends and continue along the lower part of the top or body of the collar, with a graduated curve and increasing width, to and beyond the ends of the collar, the ends being curved in the same manner as in ordinary bands.

The bands, B, are made either to overlap the collar proper, or the collar is made to overlap the bands, or one part of the bands laps over the collar ends, while the remaining part is overlapped by the collar, so as to obtain smoothly covered joints at both

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