4. Habeas corpus 92 (2)-Habeas corpus! Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin-
not available in extradition proceedings ex- ion of the Court.
cept for limited purposes, stated.

Mr. John E. Benton, of Washington, D. C., lomatic channel" that the appellant was duly for appellant.

and legally charged by the United States of Mr. Harold B. Elgar, of New York City, for Mexico with the crime, and on behalf of appellee. that government prayed the arrest. Of

(45 S.Ct.)

course whatever form of words was used, the their manifestations for a time without complaint necessarily was upon information, charging himself, withdraw the amount with but as appeared at the hearing it was filed which he should charge himself for them by order of the Attorney General, upon re- ard present an account that was correct upquest of the Secretary of State, enclosing a on its face. By repeating the process is was request for the extradition from the Mexican possible to disguise an embezzlement for a Government and a copy of proceedings in a considerable time. This is what from his Mexican Court finding that the crime was du- books he seems to have done. It is unnecesly proved against the appellant and ordering sary to go into greater detail. We are of his arrest, many pages of evidence being ap- opinion that probable cause to believe the pended. This was enough. Yordi v. Nolte, defendant guilty was shown by competent 215 U. S. 227, 231, 232, 30 S. Ct. 90, 54 L. evidence and that the judgment remanding Ed. 170; Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371, 375, the appellant must be affirmed. 376, 21 S. Ct. 406, 45 L. Ed. 577; Glucksman Judgment affirmed. v. Henkel, 221 U. S. 508, 514, 31 S. Ct. 704, 55 L. Ed. 830. The crime charged is embezzlement of peculation of the public funds between May, 1922, and February 1, 1923, while a public officer of the United States of Mexico, to wit, the Cashier of the Department of Special Taxes. The crime is within the trea- EDWARD HINES YELLOW PINE TRUSty and sufficiently alleged. The warrant is

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND was absent

and took no part in this decision.

(268 U. S. 458)

TEES v. MARTIN et al.

said to be bad because it names Mariana | (Argued May 1, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925.)
Viamonte, and not Mariana Viamonte Fern-
andez, the appellant. He is named both ways

in the proceedings and is identified by testi- 1. Courts
mony. There is nothing in this objection, if
a warrant is required.

[8] The final objection is that there is no evidence that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. This is rather a bold contention seeing that upon the evidence the appellant was Cashier in the Department of Special Taxes, had sole charge of the money, kept the books in his own handwriting, that those books disclose a considerable deficit in the cash, and that he fled the country. He is said to have gambled. On his books the appellant mingled two classes of accounts and by so doing made detection difficult if he

$314

was guilty. First there are the items of cash actually received and paid out entered respectively under the heads ingress and egress. But besides these were other transactions called virtual in which he did not receive the cash but was to enter a series of debits and credits. These concerned the petroleum tax, which was a stamp tax. The taxpayers handed to the national treasurer their tax returns, called manifestations, paid their tax and received from him a memorandum receipt. The manifestation and receipt then were handed to the appellant. He forwarded the receipt to the comptroller and entered the amount in his egress column. He should then send the manifestation to the stamp department, which put on the proper stamps and returned it to appellant, the amount being entered as ingress. In the interval between the egress and the ingress, he appeared as having paid out so much money and could use that amount until it was necessary to enter the cross item. As the taxpayers were not very prompt in calling for their papers it was possible for him to keep

No. 363.

367-Construction of state stat

utes and rules of property by state courts ordinarily followed by federal courts.

Meaning of state statutes and rules of unwritten law of state affecting property within state are peculiarly questions of local law, determination of which by state courts will ordinarily be followed by federal courts. 2. Courts

of

368-Where construction state statute or local property rule not established by state decisions, federal court will exercise independent judgment.

When questions affected by interpretation of state statutes or local rules of property arise in federal court, that court has authority and duty to decide them as other questions, and, when state decisions are in conflict or do not clearly establish what local law is, federal court may exercise an independent judgment and determine law of case.

3. Courts 367-Federal courts follow state court decisions as to rule of real property.

Where a rule affecting title to real estate within a state has been repeatedly determined by decisions of courts of the state so that it courts will follow the decisions of the state is established as the law of the state, federal courts.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

record and which were not considered by courts which patents shall vest the fee simple in below.

On a writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit.

Four suits in equity by the Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees against Anna F. C. Martin, against F. C. Martin, against H. P. Lewis, and against George Lawrence, consolidated and tried together. To review a decree for defendants, affirmed on appeal by Circuit Court of Appeals (296 F. 442), complainants bring certiorari. Judgment of Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

said lands in this company." Within 60 days, the company filed a bond, executed by four individuals only, in the sum specified, and conditioned on the performance by the company of all duties imposed on it by the Act of April 8, 1871. The bond was approved by the Governor, and the patent of June 27, 1871, describing the lands referred to in that statute, including the lands involved in this litigation, was issued, signed by the Governor and countersigned by the Secretary of State.

The validity of petitioner's title depends upon the determination of the question

See, also, 265 U. S. 576, 44 S. Ct. 461, 68 whether the bond filed by the company was L. Ed. 1187.

*459

*Mr. T. J. Wills, of Hattiesburg, Miss., for petitioners.

Mr. Fleet C. Hathorn, of Hattiesburg, Miss., for respondents.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion

of the Court.

a compliance with the provisions of the statute so as to render operative the patent issued by the officials of the state to the company as a valid conveyance of the fee of the lands in question. Whether or not the bond was a compliance with the statute and the

legal effect of the patent, so far as other lands embraced within its description are concerned, are points which have been several times passed upon by the state courts of Mississippi and once before the present litigation, were considered by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir

cuit.

Petitioners, complainants below, filed four bills in equity in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against four different defendants to remove cloud on title of four plots of land separately described in the several bills. The suits thus brought were consolidated In Hardy v. Hartman (1888) 65 Miss. 504, and tried by the District Court, as one, up-4 So. 545, which was an action of ejectment, on an agreed statement of facts and docu- the court, although referring to the fact that mentary evidence, and a decree was rendered it did not appear from the record that any adjudging that the title to the lands in ques- patent signed by the Governor and countertion was in defendants and denying the pray- signed by the Secretary of State was ever er of the bill. On appeal to the Circuit Court issued to the company for the land in quesof Appeals, the decree was affirmed. 296 F. tion, nevertheless rested its decision on its 442.

*461

The lands in question were acquired by the *holding that the Act of April 8, 1871, requirstate of Mississippi from the United States ed, as a condition precedent to the validity under act of Congress approved September of any patent issued pursuant to it, that the 28, 1850 (9 Stat. 519). Petitioner's title de- company should file in the office of the Secpends upon the validity of a patent issued, retary of State its own bond in the amount June 27, 1871, by the state of Mississippi to specified; that by filing a bond executed by the Pearl River Improvement & Navigation individuals it had not complied with the conCompany, a corporation from which peti-dition and the patent was accordingly void. tioners derived their title by mesne conveyIn Southern Pine Co. v. Hall, 105 F. 84, ances. The title set up by the defendants 44 C. C. A. 363, decided in 1900, suit was was acquired by mesne conveyances under brought, as in the present case, to quiet the a second patent describing the same lands, title of a plaintiff claiming under the comissued by the state of Mississippi to Mitchell pany. In that case the Circuit Court of ApDecember 7, 1883. The Mississippi Legisla-peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the true ture, by act approved April 8, 1871 (Laws 1871, c. 169), incorporated the Pearl River Improvement & Navigation Company and pro

*460

vided that that company should "within sixty days after the passage of this act, file in the office of the Secretary of State a bond in the sum of $50,000, with two or more good securities," and that upon the approval and filing of the bond, "the said Secretary of State shall from time to time as demanded by said company make out a patent or patents which shall be signed by the Governor and countersigned by the Secretary of State,

meaning of the statute, confirmed by the contemporary construction of it on the part of the Governor and the Secretary of State by their action in issuing the patent, was that the company should file a bond in the specified amount insuring an indemnity to the state in that amount. Having complied with the requirements of the statute by filing the approved bond of four solvent individuals, residents of the state, the patent issued to the company by the state of Mississippi was held to be valid and to pass a fee to the patentee.

In Becker v. Columbia Bank, 112 Miss.

(45 S. Ct.)

819, 73 So. 798, decided in 1917, which was Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 S. Ct. 200, also a suit to quiet title of lands claimed un- 55 L. Ed. 82; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Inder the patent of 1871, the Supreme Court of dustrial Accident Commission, 255 U. S. 445, Mississippi reaffirmed the principle of its de- 41 S. Ct. 373, 65 L. Ed. 723; North Laramie cision in Hardy v. Hartman, supra, saying Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 45 S. Ct. that that "decision established a rule of 491, 69 L. Ed. 953, decided May 11, 1925. property which should not now be disturb- And follow rules of property declared by ed," and that the failure to comply with the state courts. Jackson ex dem. St. John v. requirements of the statute as interpreted in Hardy v. Hartman, supra, rendered the purported patent to the company void and that the patentee took no title under it.

In Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. State ex rel. Moore (1924) 134 Miss. 533, 98 So. 158, the Supreme Court of Mississippi again affirmed and adopted the view laid down in Hardy v. Hartman, supra, saying at page 534 (98 So. 158):

*462

"We are not here concerned with the correctness of the decision in Hardy v. Hartman, supra, and the rule there applied, whether correct or not, to titles derived through patents issued to the Pearl River Improvement & Navigation Company has become a rule of property and will not be now departed from."

The validity of titles derived under the same patent to the company appears to have been upheld in the case of Hines et al., Trustees, v. Martin by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, decided without opinion February 4, 1924, 99 So. 825.

*463

Chew, *12 Wheat. 153, 6 L. Ed. 583; Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427, 16 L. Ed. 742; Williams v. Kirtland, 13 Wall. 306, 20 L. Ed. 683; League v. Egery et al., 24 How. 264, 16 L. Ed. 655; Smith Purifier v. McGroarty, 136 U. S. 237, 10 S. Ct. 1017, 34 L. Ed. 346; Warburton v. Wright, 176 U. S. 484, 20 S. Ct. 404, 44 L. Ed. 555.

[2-4] When questions affected by the interpretation of a state statute or a local rule of property arise in a federal court, that court has the same authority and duty to decide them as it has to decide any other questions which arise in a cause, and where state decisions are in conflict or do not clearly establish what the local law is, the federal court may exercise an independent judg ment and determine the law of the case. See Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 598, 15 L. Ed. 915; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 S. Ct. 10, 27 L. Ed. 359; Barber v. Pittsburgh, etc., Railway, 166 U. S. 83, 99, 17 S. Ct. 488, 41 L. Ed. 925; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 140, 54 L. Ed. 228. This court has refused to follow a rule established only by single state decision rendered, after the rights involved in the case in the federal court accrued, Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., supra, or a single decision when not satisfied that it is conclusive evidence of the state law, Barber v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Railway Co., 166 U. S. 83, 99, 17 S. Ct. 488, 41 L. Ed. 925. In Burgess v. Seligman, supra, this court refused to follow decisions of the state court conflicting with a previous decision of the United States Circuit Court,

tion of a state statute, fixing the liability of stockholders of a corporation organized under the laws of the state as applied to a stockholder who was a nonresident of the

[1] In all these cases the question ruled upon was whether the bond filed by the company complied with the requirements of the statute and whether the filing of a bond satisfying those requirements was a condition precedent to the execution of the patent and the vesting of title in the patentee. An answer to these questions involved an interpretation of the state statute and the application of it, as interpreted, as a rule of property determinative of rights in titles to land within the state. Both the meaning of statutes of a state and the rules of the unwrit-in that case, with respect to the interpretaten law of a state affecting property within the state are peculiarly questions of local law to be ascertained and established by the state courts. For that reason federal courts ordinarily hold themselves bound by the in-state and who acquired his interest in the terpretation of state statutes by the state courts. Walker v. State Harbor Commissioners, 17 Wall. 648, 21 L. Ed. 744; Barrett v. Holmes, 102 U. S. 651, 26 L. Ed. 291; Geekie v. Kirby Carpenter Co., 106 U. S. 379, 385, 1 S. Ct. 315, 27 L. Ed. 157; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 5 S. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 1015; Schley v. Pullman Car Co., 120 U. S. 575, 580, 7 S. Ct. 730, 30 L. Ed. 789; Bucher v. Cheshire R. Co., 125 U. S. 555, 8 S. Ct. 974, 31 L. Ed. 795; Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U. S. 212, 224, 9 S. Ct. 72, 32 L. Ed. 401; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573, 11 S. Ct. 380, 34 L. Ed. 1063; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 13 S. Ct. 466, 37 L. Ed. 316; Balkam v. Woodstock Iron Co., 154 U. S. 177, 14 S. Ct. 1010, 38 L. Ed. 953; American 45 S.CT.-35

stock outside of the state. But where the rule is one affecting title to real estate within the state and has been repeatedly determined by decisions of state courts so that it is established as the law of the state, there has been no departure from the rule that the federal courts will follow the decisions of the state courts. Jackson ex dem. St. John v. Chew, supra;

Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291, 8

*464

L. Ed. 402; Suydam *v. Williamson, 24 How. 427, 16 L. Ed. 742; Walker v. State Harbor Commission, 17 Wall. 648, 21 L. Ed. 744; Barrett v. Holmes, 102 U. S. 651, 26 L. Ed. 291. And this is the rule even though the state rule is not approved. Walker v. State Harbor Commissioner, supra; Bucher v.

not consider questions not raised or disclosed by the record brought to it for a review and which were not considered by the courts below. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 283, 30 S. Ct. 501, 54 L. Ed. 762; Bass, etc., Ltd. v. Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 285, 45 S. Ct. 82, 69 L. Ed. 282. And see Davis v. Currie, 266 U. S. 182, 45 S. Ct. 88, 69 L. Ed. 234, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Woolridge, 268 U. S. 234, 45 S. Ct. 489, 69 L. Ed. 932, decided May 11, 1925.

Cheshire Railway Co., 125 U. S. 555, 8 S. Ct. | the payments stipulated for in the statute. 974, 31 L. Ed. 795; Balkam v. Woodstock This court is a court of review, and it will Iron Co., 154 U. S. 177, 14 S. Ct. 1010, 38 L. Ed. 953. To avoid the uncertainty and injustice which result from "the discordant elements of a substantial right which is protected in one set of courts and denied in the other, with no superior to decide which is right" (Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. Ed. 858), this court has not hesitated, when there has been a conflict of decision between it and the state courts affecting a rule of property within the state, to overrule its own decisions and to follow the state decisions once it has become evident that they have established a “rule of property" as the settled law of the state. Green v. Lessee of Neal, 6 Pet. 291, 8 L. Ed. 402; Suydam v. Williamson, supra; Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 100 U. S. 47, 25 L. Ed. 544; Robert v. Lewis, 153 U. S. 367, 376, 14 S. Ct. 945, 38 L. Ed. 747, and see Bauserman v. Blunt, supra, overruling a decision of the Circuit Court antedating a conflicting decision of the state court. We are therefore constrained in the present case to accept the view of the state courts as announced by them without inquiring, as an original proposition, into the justice and sufficiency of the rule which we follow.

In the argument before this court, petitioners relied upon the effect of chapter 114 of the Laws of Mississippi of 1873 (page 120), as validating his title. This was a private act of the Legislature of Mississippi which relieved the Pearl River Improvement & Navigation Company from some of its obligations under the Act of April 8, 1871, upon certain payments to be made by it to the state treasury, and provided that

"All acts, deeds and proceedings, whatever of the Pearl River Improvement and Navigation Company, be, and the same are hereby legalized, ratified and confirmed." Section 6.

*465

[5] *This appears to be the first occasion in the course of this litigation on which the existence of this statute, and the claim of right under it by the petitioner, have been brought to the attention of the court, although it appears to have been before the state court, but not commented on, in Becker v. Columbia Bank, supra, and Hines Yellow Pine Trustee v. Martin, supra. It is not referred to in the record here. By the agreed statement of facts the Act of April 8, 1871, and the patent issued to the company are the only suggested source of title in the petitioners. No reference is made to the Act of 1873 in the assignments of error. The record gives no information as to the existing situation at the time it was passed; as to what lands had been conveyed by the company or what lands retained. We are left uninformed as to whether the company made

In these circumstances, the petitioners cannot be heard to claim anything in these cases under the Act of 1873, and beyond this, we decide nothing in respect to it.

Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

(268 U. S. 435)

DUMBRA et al. v. UNITED STATES. (Argued and Submitted April 20, 21, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925.) No. 546.

249-Prohibition

I. Intoxicating liquors
agent has power and authority to serve search
warrant.

Under National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, § 2 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101382a), and Espionage Act, tit. 11, § 6 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 104961⁄4f), a prohibition agent regularly appointed by Commissioner of Internal Revenue has power and authority to serve search warrant.

2. Intoxicating liquors 101, 246-Permit for manufacture and possession of nonbeverage wine does not afford protection to one possessing liquors with intent to use in violation of Prohibition Act.

Permit under National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, § 3 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101382aa), authorizing manufacture and possession of wine for nonbeverage purposes, does not afford protection to one possessing such liquors with intent to use them in violation of Prohibition Act, and liquor so possessed is subject to search and seizure under section 25, tit. 2, of the act (section 101382m). 3. Intoxicating liquors

248-Affidavit held

to show probable cause for issuance of search warrant; "probable cause."

Affidavit on which search warrant was issued, wherein affiant alleged purchases of wine in grocery store adjoining winery operated under government permit, under circumstances indicating that wine purchased was obtained from winery, held sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of search warrant under National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, § 25 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101382m), Espionage Act, tit. 11, §§ 5 and 16 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 101964e, 104964p), and Const. U. S. Amend. 4; "probable cause" being reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes