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arrangement, and that it must be a mere cover and sham? Clearly not, it seems to me. If issue is taken upon the answer of the garnishee, and evidence showing the fact of insolvency, and any and all other circumstances showing the real situation of the parties is introduced, then, upon such issue, the court will adjudge the matter according to the fair preponderance of the entire evidence, but upon a motion for judgment upon the answer alone the facts stated in the answer must be accepted as true, and the conclusion they require must be the one placed upon the answer. The result of a judgment in favor of plaintiff would be to compel the garnishee to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $500, while it is not made to appear from the answer that if Rice had sued, in his own behalf, the piano company, he would be entitled to any judgment against the company.
If this was an action by Rice against the company, and the only evidence offered was the testimony of Macy, president of the defendant, containing just the facts and statements set forth in the answer of the garnishee, it is clear that he could not recover thereon against the company, and that for the reason that it did not appear that the company was bound to him for the work he had done, but, on the contrary, that the company was not bound to pay him for his services. Under these circumstances, I do not think the liability of the garnishee is made to appear so clearly as to justify a judgment against it.
If, however, it should be held, according to the contention of plaintiff, that I. N. Rice is in fact engaged as a foreman or superintendent in the factory at Chicago, and that the company, for such services, has engaged to pay the price or wages of $25 per week, the mode of payment testified to being merely a sham, then the question arises whether such salary or wages is not exempt from execution. Rice is a married man, and head of a family, and under the statutes of Illinois, as well as under the statutes of Iowa, his wages are exempt from execution, unless allowed to accumulate beyond $50 in amount in Illinois or beyond 90 days in Iowa. On behalf of plaintiff it is contended that as Rice is now a non-resident of the state of Iowa, his wages are not exempt from execution. In a general sense it is held that matters of exemption pertain to the remedy, and are governed by the law of the state wherein suit is brought, but the reason for such holding is that the property sought to be reached is situated where the remedy is sought, and in truth it is the situs of the property that determines what statute shall govern in the matter of exemption. Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S. 542-546, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522. As to all property situated in Iowa, it is the law of Iowa which determines what portion of it, if any, may be held exempt froni execution. Therefore it is held that the provisions of the statute of Illinois, for illustration, cannot be invoked to protect property in Iowa from seizure upon execution, even though the cause of action may have arisen in Illinois, and between citizens of that state. Newell v. Hayden, 8 Iowa, 140.
The question, then, arises whether the property or debt sought to be reached by the process of garnishment in this case is situated in Iowa or in Illinois. From the answer of the garnishee it appears that the fac
tory of the piano company is situated in Illinois; the work done by I. N. Rice was so done and performed in Illinois; the weekly payments were made to him in Illinois, and he is a resident of that state. As the weekly wages were earned and came due, the debt thus created was the property of I. N. Rice, and, as a chose in action, “follows the person of the owner and has its situs at his domicile." Tappan v. Bank, 19 Wall. 490. It is equally true that personal property may be held to have a situs other than that of the owner's domicile. Based upon this fact the supreme court of Iowa, in Mooney v. Railroad Co., 60 Iowa, 346, 14 N. W. Rep. 343, held that, under the attachment laws of Iowa, a debt due from the railway company to a resident of Nebraska, for wages earned in Nebraska, was a debt due in the state of Iowa, in such sense that a garnishment in attachment would give jurisdiction to the court, and further, that, the debt having a locality in Iowa, the question of exemption was to be determined by the law of Iowa, and, as the provisions of that law did not apply to non-residents, the attachment creditor could hold the debt, although by the statute of Nebraska it would have been exempt. It seems to me that the attention of the court could not have been fully given to the latter proposition; but it is assumed to necessarily follow froin the ruling that the presence of the debtor in Iowa gave the debt a location in Iowa sufficient to sustain jurisdiction by attachment in the Iowa court. The situs of property for the purpose of jurisdiction is one thing, and its situs for the purpose of determining the rights of parties thereto is another, and the two are not necessarily the same.
I do not think the reasoning of the court in the Mooney Case, upon the point that a debt due from a person living in Iowa may be reached by garnishment upon attachment, under the provisions of the Iowa statute, and thereby jurisdiction may be acquired over the debt considered as property, can be successfully questioned; but even if there might be another side to the argument, yet that decision settles the law to be that a debt due from a person in Iowa to a non-resident may be deemed to be property in Iowa, within the meaning of the attachment laws of the state, so that by garnishing the debtor in Iowa jurisdiction can be secured in the attachment proceedings. The jurisdiction thus secured enables the court from which the writ issued to hear and determine all claims made touching the property, and to subject it to further process of the court. Does it follow that because the debt has a situs in Iowa, by reason of the presence of the debtor in Iowa, sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the court in attachment, that it may not be shown to have another situs with regard to other questions and rights?
To property thus seized by attachment a dozen claims may be asserted, and the court can hear and determine the issues thus presented. A lien for taxes may be asserted against the property, and the court will determine the situs of the property for purposes of taxation in determining the question of the priority of the lien for taxes. The garnishee may present various questions touching the extent of his liability, and these the court will determine with regard to the law of the place of con
tract or performance as the case may require. It cannot be true that simply because the court originally obtained jurisdiction by garnishment upon attachment, the court is precluded from ascertaining the proper situs of the property with regard to other rights and questions that may be asserted to the property. The jurisdiction of the court having attached, then all other questions are to be decided upon their own merits, and just the same as though the jurisdiction had attached by means other than by attachment.
In the case at bar the jurisdiction was obtained by personal service upon I. N. Rice in Iowa, and the garnishment was had upon execution, and not upon attachment. Certainly it cannot be true that the question whether the debt due Rice for wages earned in Illinois is or is not exempt from 'seizure in Iowa is to be determined or influenced by the fact that the garnishment was upon attachment rather than upon execution. The real question is whether Rice can claim the benefit of the Illinois exemption, and this depends upon the ruling as to the situs of the property with reference to the exemption laws, and not upon any difference between the process of attachment or of execution under the statutes of Iowa. The jurisdiction of the court in a given case having attached, whether based upon personal service or upon service of a writ of attachment by garnishment, then the court can determine whether the attached property should be sold upon execution or be released because exempt from seizure for debt, and this question should be determined the same in a case wherein jurisdiction rests upon a garnishment as in a case wherein personal service was had upon the defendant within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The query is, what is to be deemed to be the situs, with regard to the exemption law of Illinois, of a debt due for wages earned in Illinois by a resident of that state? Why not, to such a case, apply the general rule that a chose in action has its situs at the domicile of the owner thereof? True, it may be said that this is a fiction of the law which will, in many instances, be disregarded. Is it, however, any more of a fiction than to hold that the situs of the debt is wherever the debtor may be found? Fiction or not, it is the primary or general rule, and will govern unless good reason exists for adopting some other guide. What principle is there, or statutory provision, which requires the holding that the exemption afforded by the Illinois statute to wages due should be lost to a resident of that state simply because the debtor happened to come, for a single day, into Iowa, and was here garnished upon execution? If a resident of Illinois buys realty in Iowa, or sends personal property, like cattle or horses, into Iowa to bere remain, he, by his own act, subjects the property to the laws of Iowa, and is conclusively bound thereby. If A., a resident of Illinois, engages in the service of B., likewise a resident of Illinois, his wages, if he is a head of a family, are exempt to the amount of $50. B. comes to Iowa for a temporary purpose, and is garnished on an execution against A. issuing from a court in Iowa. Did B., by coming to Iowa, without the knowledge, perhaps, of A., change the situs of A.'s property, to-wit, the sum due bim for wages, so that the benefit of the exemption secured to
him by the Illinois law is thus lost to him? Is the situs of A.'s property, to-wit, the debt due him for wages earned in Illinois, changed back and forth every time B. chooses to cross the Iowa state line? Why not hold that the situs of the property, in view of the exemption laws, remains unchanged at the domicile of the owner of the chose in action?
But it may be said that it is only on the principle of comity that Iowa will recognize and give force to the laws of another state.
This may be true, but if the basis of recognition be comity only, it is, nevertheless, the fact that recognition should be given to the laws of a sister state, when justice and fair dealing require it, unless the right claimed is contrary to public policy or some statutory or other established rule of law in Iowa. The statutes of Iowa, in this regard, are in entire accord with those of Illinois. It is the settled 'policy of Iowa to exempt the wages earned by the head of a family. No ground, therefore, exists for refusing to recognize the law of Illinois on the theory that such recognition would contravene the rule prevailing in Iowa on that subject. The supreme court of Iowa, in Teager v. Landsley, 69 Iowa, 725, 27 N. W. Rep. 739, held that the courts of Iowa would, by injunction, restrain a citizen of Iowa from prosecuting a suit by attachment in Minnesota against another citizen of Iowa, and by garnishment reaching a debt due for wages earned in Iowa. It was held that the jurisdiction to issue the injunction is founded on the clear authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction, "to restrain them from doing acts which will work injury and wrong to others, and are contrary to equity and good conscience,” it being further said that “the settled policy of this state is to exempt certain property from the payment of debts. Contracts are made and credit extended with full knowledge of the law in this respect, and the state, we think, has the power to compel its citizens to respect the laws beyond its territorial limits.” If it is the settled policy of this state that wages earned in this state, and exempt from execution under the laws thereof, will be protected from seizure in Illinois whenever the courts of Iowa can afford such protection, by enjoining the creditor from prosecuting his suit in Illinois, and this for the reason that it is contrary to equity and good conscience to permit the creditor, by suing in Illinois, to evade the settled policy of Iowa in exempting wages from seizure for debt, why should the courts of Iowa encourage citizens of Illinois to come into this state for the purpose of evading the settled policy of the laws of Illinois by subjecting, through the process of Iowa courts, wages earned in Illinois, and exempt by the laws of that state, to the payment of their claims? Is it consistent for the courts of Iowa to forbid, by injunction, its own citizens from suing in Illinois for the purpose of evading the exemption laws of Iowa, and at the same time entertaining suits by citizens of Illinois brought here for the purpose of evading the exemption laws of Illinois? If this becomes the settled doctrine in Iowa, and is accepted as the correct rule of law, it must be expected that the adjoining states will adopt the same principle in dealing with the citizens of Iowa, and what will be the necessary consequences? Thousands of men are in the employ of the for
eign railway and other corporations in this state. Under the law of Iowa, wages are exempt to heads of families. If the rule announced in Mooney v. Railroad Co., supra, is carried out, without modification, the protection intended to be secured to the families of the wage-earners, by the exemption law of the state, is practically destroyed. A creditor can go to Illinois or Wisconsin, bring suit by attachment, garnish the railway company, and defeat the Iowa exemption on the fiction that the debt due from the corporation has a situs in the state wherein suit is brought. It may be answered that the Iowa courts will enjoin the creditor from so doing under the rule followed in the Teager Case.
The creditor may not reside in Iowa, or, if a resident, he may absent himself from the state, so that personal service cannot be had until the attachment suit is disposed of, or by the easy device of selling the claim to a non-resident the effect of an injunction may be avoided. At best, the cost of an injunction suit renders that form of protection valueless to the wage-earner. Practically, therefore, the doctrine laid down in the Mooney Case strips the families of workmen in lowa of the protection the statute intended to give them. By holding, as that case seems to do, that the situs of a debt due for wages earned in Iowa, in regard to this matter of exemption, is to be deemed to be wherever the debtor may be found for purpose of garnishment, it follows that the creditor of the workmen may evade the Iowa statute by the simple device of bringing, or causing to be brought, an attachment suit in an adjoining state. The injustice and inequity of such a result, it seems to me, may be avoided by holding that when, by garnishment upon execution or attachment, it is sought to reach a debt due for wages, the court has the right to determine whether the debt is or is not exempt from seizure upon judicial process, and that in the determination of this question the situs of the debt will be deemed to be at the domicile of the wage-earner by whose labor the property, i. e., the debt due him, was created.
In the case of corporationis carrying on business in several states wages earned will be governed by the law of the place where the workman has his domicile, according to the primary rule regarding the location of choses in action.
If a workman, living in Iowa, earns wages in Iowa for work done for a foreign corporation, the question of the exemption or non-exemption of such wages should be governed by the law of Iowa, no matter where the tribunal may be located that is required to hear and determine the question. Is there any reason, either in matter of form or of substance, that prevents courts from adjudging, in such cases, the rights of parties, according to the law of Iowa, or the law of Illinois, as the case may be? I can see no difficulty in so doing. For illustration: Suppose suit is brought in Iowa by attachment against a non-resident, and service is had by garnishing a supposed debtor living in Iowa. The garnishee answers that he is indebted to the defendant for goods sold him on credit in one amount and for wages for work done in Illinois by the defendant, a resident of Illinois, in another amount. A third party appears, and, being allowed to intervene, sets up that the debt due from the garnishee for goods sold had been assigned to him for value before service of the