Adams, whom I equally respect for his pure patriotism, high character and integrity, and lofty views, and who I well know was not a pro-slavery man. I did not say nor imply that the reasons stated by Mr. Clay were imaginary, and, much less, that he had advanced them knowing them to be unfounded; what I said was that I thought that besides the reasons expressed in Mr. Clay's letter there might have been others, and I acknowledge that my surmise may be incorrect.

As considerations which supported my assertion, which, as I have just said, was only a surmise, I had the fact that Mr. Clay was a Southern man, and that President Adams' administration was the result of a compromise in which he could not well support a policy which might in some way affect the slavery question in the United States, then the leading question in this country. Senator Money states that "the reason mentioned as given by Mr. Clay was not the only one which he avowed." The only official paper I have seen on that subject, and the one on which I based my statement, was a letter addressed by Mr. Clay, as Secretary of State, to Mr. Everett, United States Minister to Madrid, dated April 13, 1826, enclosing a copy of his letter to the Colombian and Mexican Ministers in Washington, of December 20, 1825, in which he recommended the suspension of the combined expedition, and which was published in March of the present year by the Monitor, a newspaper of the City of Mexico, a translation of which I insert below.* If Mr. Clay avowed any other reasons, I am not aware of them. I expressed the opinion that Mr. Clay had other reasons besides those which he stated, and I am glad to be in accord with Senator Money on this point, possibly our only difference of opinion being which were those other reasons not avowed.

*The letter referred to is the following, which, as it has been retranslated from Spanish into English, cannot have the same wording as the original: "WASHINGTON, April 13, 1826.

"I addressed on the 20th of last December a note to the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico, copy whereof I enclose, for the purpose of inducing their respective governments to suspend any expedition which they might be preparing, either individually or collectively, against the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico.

"Great Britain is firmly convinced that the United States will never consent that those islands should belong to England, no matter what might be the consequences of such policy. France is also aware that we would not be indifferent to her obtaining the possession of said islands.

"The situation of the great maritime powers (the United States, Great Britain, and France) is nearly equivalent to an absolute guarantee of the possession of those islands in favor of Spain, but it is impossible to enter into any agreement by treaty guaranteeing such possession, and the President wishes you should let the Sparish Government know that we cannot bind ourselves to any obligation whatever looking to such guarantee. You must continue to decline any proposition for that pur pose, if any such is presented."

Studying further this subject, I have found that the United States could not have acted in any other manner than they did in this case, for the simple reason that they had committed themselves to follow that course. This fact appears very clearly stated in the following extract from a note by Mr. Richard Henry Dana, to paragraph 68, page 106, Chapter II. of Part II., of Wheaton's Elements of International Law, Boston edition of 1866, which shows at the same time that the people of Cuba, far from being entirely satisfied with the Spanish rule, desired their emancipation from the mother country, when the other American colonies of Spain had either already accomplished their independence or were fighting for the same:

"The people of Cuba, already divided between the parties of the king and the Cortes, and terrified by symptoms of slave insurrections, had among them large numbers who, dissatisfied with Spanish rule, looked to other powers for protection-some to Great Britain, but far the larger part to the United States. About September, 1822, the latter party sent a secret agent to confer with President Monroe. They declared that if the United States government would promise them protection, and ultimate admission into the Union, a revolution would be made to throw off the Spanish authority, of the success of which they had no doubt. While this proposition was before Mr. Monroe's cabinet, he received an unofficial and circuitous communication from the French Minister, asserting that his government had positive information of the design of Great Britain to take possession of Cuba. The American government replied to the Cuban deputation that the friendly relations of the United States with Spain did not permit us to promise countenance or protection to insurrectional movements, and advised the people of Cuba to adhere to their Spanish allegiance; at the same time informing them that an attempt upon Cuba by either Great Britain or France would place the relations of Cuba with the United States in a very different position. Mr. Rush was instructed to inform Mr. Canning that the United States could not see with indifference the possession of Cuba by any European power other than Spain, and to inform him of the rumors that had reached the cabinet. Mr. Canning disavowed emphatically all intention on the part of Great Britain to take possession of Cuba, but avowed her determination not to see with indifference its occupation by either France or the United States, and proposed an understanding between the British, French, and American governments, without any formal con vention, that Cuba should be left in the quiet possession of Spain. This was assented to by Mr. Monroe; but he had no communication with France on the subject, leaving that to the management of Great Britain."

The fact that the slavery question had something to do in this case appears also stated in the following extract from a note of Mr. Dana's on the Monroe Doctrine to Wheaton's Elements of International Law, above quoted, paragraph 68, page 111, Chapter II., Part II.:

"The slaveholding interest was clearly looking to Cuba, not only as an addition to its political power in the Union, but to prevent abolition of slavery there by some other power; and it is known that Mr. Adams had a noticeable leaning in favor of its importance to us in a military and commercial view."

The Cubans had been conspiring to proclaim their independence since similar movements began on the mainland. The example of the Spanish colonies in America which had revolted against the mother country and accomplished their independence could not but influence the Cubans to attempt to attain the same object. Mr. Ballou, of Massachusetts, who in 1854 visited Cuba, and who remained there for a long time, returned to this country and wrote a book on that subject, in which he says:

"When the Cubans saw that their brothers in the Spanish-American colonies had revolted against the mother country, and that most of them had secured their independence, they thought of following in their footsteps, and in 1823 the disaffected party conspired against Spain, relying on the promise of Simon Bolivar of throwing an invading force into the island. The conspiracy was discovered and suppressed prematurely. In 1826 some Cuban agitators residing in Caracas attempted a new expedition which failed and caused the execution of Don Francisco de Puero y Velazco and Don Bernabe Sanchez."

Senator Money seriously misunderstands me when he says that Mr. Clay's caution is regarded by me as unfriendly. I did not express any such opinion, as my object was merely to mention a fact without commenting on it.

How Mr. Clay's action on this question could be of the most vital service to Mexico is more than I can comprehend. Spain did not feel the necessity of terminating the war with the colonies already gone from her in order to secure Cuba and Porto Rico, as she was bent on recovering Mexico, and in 1829 she sent an armed military expeditiou for that purpose under General Barradas, which landed at Tampico. It was not until 1836, when all hopes of recovering her dominion in Mexico were lost, that Spain recognized our independence.

The assertion that Mexico did not emancipate her few slaves until several years after the events considered in the paper that I am examining is incorrect. The leader of the independent movement, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, proclaimed independence on September 16, 1810, and on December 6 of the same year he issued a decree abolishing slavery, and the slaves were emancipated in such places as were under the patriots' control.

The first Mexican Congress, which met at Chilpancingo in 1813, and issued a constitution on October 22, 1814, promulgated also a decree abolishing slavery; and as soon as independence was accomplished the abolition of slavery was ratified by another decree issued on July 13, 1824, soon after the City of Mexico had been occupied, and it was then carried into effect in the whole country. The fact that our present constitution of 1857 repeats the prohibition against holding slaves in Mexico, a provision which also appears in all our former constitutions, has caused the common opinion prevailing in this country that we only abolished slavery in 1857.

I shall be entirely satisfied if I have succeeded in showing in this paper that there is nothing in the former one that can reasonably be taken as a complaint against the government of the United States, or any censure of its policy, as my only purpose was to state facts which are matter of history, and which are, I think, highly creditable to this government.

M. ROMERO.

THIRTY YEARS OF AMERICAN TRADE.

BY MICHAEL G. MULHALL, F. S. 8.

THE foreign trade of the United States is relatively small. With a territory as large as Europe and a population double that of Great Britain; with domestic industries which nearly equal the aggregate of those of Great Britain, France, and Germany,* the American people carry on less trade with foreign nations than any of the three aforesaid countries, the ratio of such trade being only $25 per inhabitant of the United States, against $36 in France or Germany and $92 in Great Britain. There has been, nevertheless, a prodigious development of American trade in the last quarter of a century, viz.:

Comparing the fourth period with the first, we find that in 25 years there was an increase of 82 per cent. in imports, 162 per cent. in exports. It may be asked, why have not both branches of commerce advanced equally? The reason would appear to be that in the period 1867-71 the Union, and especially the Southern States, had not recovered from the disastrous effects of civil

war.

Subsequently the productive powers of the republic came into play, with force augmented every year, until the value of exports in 1892-96 rose to an annual average of $13 per inhabitant, against $9 in 1867-71.

There can be no doubt that trade received a great impulse

* In 1894 the domestic industries of the United States reached 14,330 million dollars; the aggregate of those of Great Britain, France, and Germany 18,100 millions.