scribed and is to the principal, vice-principal or agent. Under the reasoning of this court in Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498, and Wabash Railway Co. v. Industrial Com. 286 id. 194, the knowledge of the forelady must be held to be notice to plaintiff in error. Moreover, the record shows that a written notice was served on plaintiff in error not later than July 28, 1917. Under the evidence in the record we think the Industrial Board was justified in holding that this notice was within thirty days. of the accident. The facts in this case on this point plainly distinguish it from the case of Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 262, relied on by counsel for plaintiff in error.

Counsel also argue that Franckina was not engaged in an extra-hazardous employment, especially in that part of plaintiff in error's business in which he was working. The evidence shows, without contradiction, by the testimony of the manager of plaintiff in error, that the deceased was a handy-man, working in all parts of the business, and that the factory used electric power-driven machinery. This court has held that it is frequently a question of fact whether a business is extra-hazardous. (Hahnemann Hospital v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 316; Cinofsky & Co. v. Industrial Com. 290 Ill. 521.) We cannot agree with the argument of counsel for plaintiff in error that the employment of the deceased was not a part of plaintiff in error's business or occupation in manufacturing peroxide. The manufacturing business of plaintiff in error, as shown by the evidence, brought it clearly within the classification of section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation act as to extrahazardous employment.

The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12783.-Reversed and remanded.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Edson Cash et al. Defendants in Error, VS. FRANK C. WELLS et al. Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed February 18, 1920-Rehearing denied April 7, 1920.

I. QUO WARRANTO-quo warranto questions only jurisdiction in organizing drainage district. In a proceeding by information in the nature of quo warranto attacking the organization of a drainage district, the only question for the circuit court is whether the county court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of organizing the district, and if it had such jurisdiction the judgment entered cannot be reviewed, reversed or set aside except by appeal or on writ of error.

2. DRAINAGE—land owners who file objections to petition and participate in hearing waive objections to notice. In a proceeding for the organization of a levee drainage district, land owners who enter their special appearance and object to the jurisdiction on the ground of insufficiency of notice and also file objections to the petition and participate in a hearing on the merits, thereby submit to the jurisdiction of the court and waive the objections to the notice.

3. SAME-record of organization of district must show requirements of statute. The jurisdiction to organize a levee drainage district is conferred upon county courts by statute, and when the jurisdiction is questioned compliance with the requirements of the statute must appear from the record.

4. SAME-petition need not contain every matter of detail in description of proposed district. The purpose of the Levee act in requiring the petition to describe the proposed drainage district is that the land owners and those interested may ascertain from the petition the general nature of the work proposed to be done, so that they can form a judgment as to the necessity or propriety of the work; and the statute does not contemplate that every matter of detail shall be minutely set forth.

5. SAME when description of lateral drains is sufficient. In a petition for the organization of a levee drainage district a general description of the lateral drains as tile drains so located that one of such drains shall commence at each property line nearest the head or source of each swale or valley requiring drainage and at the point of intersection of such property line with the lowest spot in such swale or valley, and thence across intervening lands along the valley to such one of the four particularly described main ditches as will naturally receive and carry off the water, is sufficient.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of McHenry county; the Hon. CLAIRE C. EDWARDS, Judge, presiding.

D. T. SMILEY, for plaintiffs in error.

B. F. MANLEY, PAUL J. DONOVAN, and E. H. WAITE, for defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

On the petition of the State's attorney to the circuit court of McHenry county leave was given to file an information in the nature of quo warranto requiring the plaintiffs in error, Frank C. Wells, Elmer Walter and William Desmond, to make answer to the people by what warrant they claimed to hold, use and enjoy the corporate powers, privileges, liberties and franchises of a supposed drainage district known as the Chemung Drainage District of McHenry county, in the State of Illinois, which they were alleged to have usurped. The defendants filed a plea setting forth at length the proceedings in the county court of McHenry county for the organization of the district, consisting of a petition to the court, the posting and publishing of notices for a hearing on the petition, a hearing by the court and a finding of all the necessary jurisdictional facts, and a judgment on March 20, 1916, declaring the district duly established as provided by law. The relators demurred to the plea and also filed a replication to a part of it, which was afterward withdrawn. The demurrer was sustained by the circuit court, and the defendants having elected to stand by their plea, the court entered judgment finding that the alleged drainage district had no legal existence and the defendants were guilty as charged in the information and ousting them from exercising the powers, privileges, liberties and franchises of a drainage district. A writ of error was sued out of this court to review the judgment.

In the proceeding by information in the nature of quo warranto the only question that could be considered by the circuit court was whether the county court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of organizing the drainage district. If it had such jurisdiction the judgment entered could not be reviewed, reversed or set aside except by appeal or on writ of error. People v. Waite, 213 Ill. 421; People v. Munroe, 227 id. 604; People v. Niebruegge, 244 id. 82.

One ground of the demurrer was that the notices published and posted for a hearing on the petition were insufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the relators because the notices varied from the petition two days in the date of the act under which the district was proposed to be organized. The relators entered their special appearance and objected to the jurisdiction, but they also filed objections to the petition and participated in a hearing of their objections on the merits. An appearance for any other purpose than to question the jurisdiction of the court is a general appearance, and the purpose of notice being to inform the property owners and persons interested of the contemplated hearing, the relators having appeared to the merits, it is immaterial whether any notice was ever published or posted or what it was. By their objections they asked for an exercise of jurisdiction by the court and could not at the same time say that they refused to submit to the jurisdiction. Nicholes v. People, 165 Ill. 502; McChesney v. People, 178 id. 542; Dickey & Baker v. People, 213 id. 51; People v. Smythe, 232 id. 242; People v. Chicago Title and Trust Co. 261 id. 392; People v. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n, 266 id. 32.

The jurisdiction to organize a drainage district is conferred upon county courts by statute, and when the jurisdiction is questioned the requirements of the statute must appear from the record. (Aldridge v. Clear Creek DrainDrummer Creek Drainage Dis

age District, 253 Ill. 251;

trict v. Roth, 244 id. 68; People v. Darst, 265 id. 354.) It was the view of the circuit court that the petition, a copy of which was set forth in the plea, did not contain all the requirements of the statute and was not sufficient to give the county court jurisdiction. The requirement of the Levee act, under which the petition was filed, is, that it shall set forth the proposed name of the drainage district, the necessity of the same, the description of the proposed starting points, routes and termini of the work and a general description of the lands proposed to be affected. The petition in question set forth a proposed district containing 8640 acres of land therein described. It also described with particularity the location of a main ditch, with a starting point, route and terminus, and described three branch ditches, the West branch ditch, the Big Foot branch ditch and the Lawrence branch ditch,-with the starting point, route and terminus of each. There were specifications of the bottom width, top width, side slope and bottom slope from the starting point of each one of the ditches to the outlet. No objection could be or is made to the description of these ditches, but the objection is to the description of the lateral ditches draining the several tracts of land. Following the minute and particular description of the main and branch ditches, the lateral drains for local drainage along such ditches were described as follows: "In addition to the above open ditches it is proposed to construct lateral tile drains, constructed in such manner that one of such drains shall commence at each property line nearest the head or source of each swale or valley requiring drainage throughout said entire district which lies within the watershed of said open ditches, and which property line intersects said swale or valley at the intersection of such property line with the lowest spot in such swale or valley; thence across intervening lands along such swale or valley to and terminating in whichever of the open ditches herein specified would naturally receive and carry off the water