time of the levy, and, if exemptions could be claimed under such circumstances, they could much better be claimed out of property situated as was that in the case at bar. The partnership which had owned this property was no longer doing business; and such conditions had been produced by the action of the partners as to work a dissolution of the partnership. All of the partnership debts had been paid, and the property was in the possession of the individual partner who claimed the exemptions. Under these circumstances, the reasoning of the courts which have held against such exemptions has no force. It is true the partnership affairs had not been adjusted, and for that reason the interest of each of the partners was to a certain extent uncertain; but there is no reason why the partner in whose possession the goods were found should not have been allowed to claim them as exempt, for the reason that some other person might have an interest therein, certain or uncertain. If such partner had an interest in the property which could be levied upon under an execution against him alone, he had such an interest as should entitle him to his exemptions out of it. The officer found him in possession of the property. He levied upon it because of the interest which he had or was supposed to have therein. Having done so, he could not rightfully refuse to set aside exemptions therefrom because of the fact that some other person had or might have an interest in the property. The great weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that exemptions may be allowed out of property held with another as tenant in common, and the same course of reasoning which establishes this proposition will sustain the allowance of exemptions out of partnership property when levied upon under an execution against an individual partner. But it is not necessary in this case to resort to such a course of reasoning, since the facts show that the relation of the appellant to the property was substantially that of a tenant in common. The cases which have held that partnership property could not be levied upon have founded their reasoning largely upon the inconvenience and uncertainty which would arise if such exemptions were allowed. Such courts say that the interest in the property is uncertain; that the partner who seeks his exemptions therefrom does not own it; and that, for that reason, it cannot be set aside as his property. A sufficient answer to this course of reasoning, when the execution is against one of the partners, is found in the fact that, so far as exemptions are concerned, it is of no concern to the officer whether or not the entire title to the property levied upon is vested in the judgment debtor. For the purpose of determining the amount which is exempt, it must be assumed that he owns the property; but the facts of such assumption and of the setting aside of the property to him will have no effect upon the title there

to. Exemption statutes should receive a liberal construction, and the aim of courts should be to see that those entitled to the benefits thereof receive the same. To hold that one against whom an officer has an execution is entitled to have a certain amount of property, of which he has the entire title, exempted therefrom, and at the same time to hold that he could have no exemptions out of such property if he was not the sole owner, is to do violence to the evident intention of the statute. The different text writers upon the subject, though most of them have fallen into the error of grouping cases of judgments against a partnership with those against the individual members thereof, have come to the conclusion that, upon principle, exemptions should be allowed to the individual partner when the levy is under a judgment against him; and those of such writers who have carefully discriminated between cases of this kind and those in which the judgments were against the partnership have arrived at the conclusion that such doctrine is sustained by authority. The others seem to concede that the weight of authority is the other way, but we are not satisfied that such concession was the necessary result of the cases when critically examined. Mr. Thompson, in his work on Homesteads and Exemptions, discusses this subject with ability, and, after citing the cases upon each side of the question, sums up his conclusions, in section 216, by the statement that the courts which have held that exemptions could not be had out of partnership property when levied upon under an execution against the individual partner have done so in the face of the statutes, for the reason that the rule announced by them is more convenient of execution than would be one which allowed such exemptions. The respondents cite the case of Charleson v. McGraw, 3 Wash. T. 344, 17 Pac. 883, to sustain their contention; but an examination of that case will show that it is not in point, urder the facts in this. In the opinion in that case the learned judge who wrote it supposes a case similar to the one at bar, and says that in such a case exemptions could be allowed. Hence, so far as it is in point, it supports the rule for which appellant contends, and which, under the circumstances of this case, we are compelled to sustain. The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

SCOTT, DUNBAR, ANDERS, and GORDON, JJ., concur.

(11 Wash. 360)

HAYS et al. v. DENNIS et al. (Supreme Court of Washington. March 7,

1895.)

NOTICE OF APPEAL-COMPLAINT-EXHIBITS. 1. A notice of appeal given after the announcement by the court of the terms of the judgment, but before it was signed or entered, is sufficient.

2. Where references in the body of a complaint to exhibits attached thereto contain information as to their general nature sufficient to put defendant on inquiry as to the same, the exhibits become a part of the complaint.

Appeal from superior court, King county; J. W. Langley, Judge.

Action by W. F. Hays and another against J. H. Dennis and others to foreclose a chattel mortgage. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiffs appeal. Re

versed.

William E. Humphrey, for appellants. Steele & Gephart, for respondent Wales. Frank P. Lewis, for respondent Peterson.

HOYT, C. J. Respondents move to dismiss this appeal, for the reason that it was taken before the judgment had been made, signed, and entered. That it was taken after the announcement by the court of the terms of the judgment is conceded, and, such being the fact, we think the motion must be denied. The statutes governing appeals should be liberally construed, to the end that parties may have a review by this court of the rulings of the superior courts when they so desire. The appeal statute thus construed will require us to give force to a notice of appeal given after the court had announced its de cision, although it was before the signing and entering of the formal judgment. For some purposes the judgment may not be complete until thus signed and entered, but, after such announcement, it was so far complete as to sustain a notice of appeal.

The only question presented upon the merits is as to the sufficiency of the complaint of appellants. We have been able to gather from the brief of respondents but two grounds upon which they found their contention that such complaint did not state a cause of action. One is that the interest of the mortgagor in the property to foreclose a mortgage upon which the suit was brought was not such that he could make a valid mortgage ⚫thereon. The other is that the mortgage and another paper upon which plaintiffs founded rights were not set out, either at length or in substance, in the complaint; that they were only referred to therein, and annexed thereto as exhibits. That there is a line of cases which hold that a complaint cannot be aided by an exhibit referred to therein and attached thereto is beyond question. But, under the liberal rule as to the construction of pleadings under our statute, the doctrine therein announced is of doubtful authority in any case; and, when there is such a statement of the nature of the paper attached as an exhibit as to put an interested party upon inquiry as to its contents, can be given no force. The reference in the complaint under consideration to the attached exhibits was sufficient to thus put the defendants upon inquiry, and, in our opinion, made them a substantial part

of the complaint. Information as to their general nature was given in the body of the complaint, and the means given to obtain the fullest knowledge by easy reference. Hence the complaint fully advised the defendants of the facts relied upon by plaintiffs; and, this being its effect, it was good, when attacked by general demurrer.

As to the interest of the mortgagor in the property, it is only necessary to say that, upon substantially the same facts in regard thereto as were shown by the complaint in this action, his interest therein was determined by this court in the case of Dennis v. Kass & Co. (just decided) 39 Pac. 656. It will therefore not be necessary for us to enter into a discussion of that question. From what was therein said, it will be seen that, in the opinion of this court, the interest of the mortgagor was substantially that of a tenant in common. Hence, under well-settled rules, it was within his power to give a mortgage which would cover his interest in the property. In addition to the facts which appeared in the case just referred to, an additional fact is set out in this complaint, to the effect that the affairs of the partnership had been fully adjudicated in a suit between the partners. and a lien on the property in question declared in favor of the mortgagor for something over $500. The reasons for holding that he had such an interest in the property as would authorize him to make a mortgage thereon are greatly aided by this adjudication; and, if the conclusion to which we arrived in the case cited was correct, it is beyond question that, under the facts stated in this complaint, the mortgagor had an interest in the property, which he could incumber by mortgage.

In our opinion, the complaint stated a cause of action, and the superior court committed error when it sustained a general demurrer thereto. Judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer.

SCOTT and DUNBAR, JJ., concur.

GORDON, J. I concur in the result, but am not prepared to extend what is said in the opinion concerning the failure of plaintiff to set out at "length or in substance" the instrument upon which his right to a recovery is founded, to all cases, nor to adopt it as a rule of pleading. By far the better and safer rule is that a complaint should state a cause of action by its averments without reference to exhibits. Here, however, the exhibit is a chattel mortgage,-something which has a fixed and definable meaning in law and in English, and hence I think the reference to it in the pleading is permissible and sufficient.

ANDERS, J., concurs in the above.

1. On an issue as to whether plaintiff executed a certain release, several witnesses testiSed that it bore plaintiff's signature, and he admitted that the signature looked like his, and that, if it were not signed to an instrument which he did not intend to consent to, he would say that it was his. The release was acknowledged before a notary, under his seal, and the notary swore that plaintiff executed it. Plaintiff admitted having signed some release, but thought it was not so general as that in question, but his attorney swore that he executed the release in question. There was no indication that any change or erasure had been made in the release. Held, that a finding that plaintiff executed the release was justified.

2. There being some testimony that a settlement arranged by the attorneys for the respective parties to a suit was agreed to by their clients, an instruction that, when parties employ attorneys to manage their affairs in a pending suit in court, the attorneys may do anything proper in the management of their business, and that if negotiations are commenced for the compromise of a lawsuit, and clients authorize the attorneys to make it, and the attorneys do so, and have the suit dismissed and settled, the dismissal is a bar to any other suit for the same matter, until the proper action has been brought to set aside the dismissal, was proper.

Appeal from superior court, King county; R. Osborn, Judge.

Action by Samuel Livesley against George

W. Pier. Judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Fishback & Ferry and Henry F. McClure, for appellant. Will H. Thompson, E. P. Edsen, and John E. Humphries, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J. The appellant is a dealer in hops, residing at Seattle, Wash. Respondent is also a dealer in hops, residing in the city of New York, and doing business under the firm name of Pier Bros. During the year 1890 appellant was engaged in buying hops for respondent on commission, and in securing consignments to respondent. The appellant claims he bought a lot of hops, and consigned them to the respondent, for which he never received his pay; while the claim of the respondent is that the hops were purchased by appellant for the respondent, but that after the purchase, and before the respondent learned of the purchase of the same, the price of hops advanced, and that appellant sold the hops so purchased to other parties, and kept the profit made from the sale of respondent's hops. At all events there was a dispute between them concerning their hop account, and in December, 1890, appellant went to New York City to have a settlement of his account with respondent. While he was there respondent brought two suits against him,-one for $10,000 against appellant alone; and the other for $5,000 against appellant and his two sons, who compose the firm of George F. Livesley & Co., dealers in

hops in the state of Washington, the respondent claiming that appellant was a member of the firm of George F. Livesley & Co. After his return from New York City the appellant brought this action against the respondent, alleging that the amount of $ was due

him upon their hop transactions. The respondent appeared in this action, and filed his answer and counterclaim to the complaint, pleading in bar a settlement and payment of $1,000 and dismissal of the actions in New York above mentioned. He also pleaded the release executed by appellant, and, as a counterclaim, the difference between respondent and appellant, setting up the claims of respondent against appellant for the appropriation of the money belonging to respondent by appellant in the purchase and sale of hops, and the profit made thereon, above referred to. The issues were tried before a court and jury. The jury found that the respondent did not owe appellant anything. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent for costs, and the case is appealed here.

One ground of appeal is that the evidence does not sustain the verdict in this case. It seems to us, from a perusal of the whole record, that the verdict is amply sustained by the testimony. The defendant offered an agreement, upon which the settlement of the cases in New York was based, and a release from Livesley, the appellant, to Pier, the respondent, of all claims of any kind up to date. This release, in so many words, discharged "George W. Pier, doing business under the firm name of Pier Bros., his heirs, executors, and administrators, of and from all and all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, premises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments, extents, executions, claims, and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which against them, or elther of them, I ever had, or which I, my heirs, executors, or administrators hereafter can, shall, or may have, for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents. Dated January 9th, 1891,"-and was filed as defendant's Exhibit B, and signed by the appellant, Samuel Livesley. Defendant's Exhibit A is a document stating that "whereas, Samuel Livesley and George W. Pier have come to an agreement, satisfaction, and compromise of all their differences, including all claims and demands of every kind and nature held by either of said parties against the other up to this date, including the claims mentioned in the annexed schedules, marked 'A,' 'B,' and 'C' [which schedules contain the matters and claims which are the subject of this suit]: Now, said parties agree as follows: Said Livesley accepts from said George W. Pier one thousand dollars in cash, and an assignment of his said claim for $1,120.68 against

chose to get together and make a settlement, they had a right to do so, whether specially authorized so to do or not, merely by reason of the relation of attorney and client, and whether the client had any knowledge of the terms of the settlement before the same was made or not, or whether or not the client assented thereto, or, in fact, knew anything about it." As we understand the instruc. tions of the court, no such idea was intended to be enunciated, and we do not think the jury would get such an idea from the instructions themselves. The court had previously laid down the question of authority to the jury in the following language: "If a client intrusts a paper to his attorney, the attorney's possession is the client's possession; that is, the paper still continues to be in the possession of the client. So far as third parties are concerned, if these papers are delivered by the attorney, it must be by reason of the fact that the client authorized him so to do. If the matter to be settled thereby is settled out of court, the attorney has no other or greater authority than such as is expressly given to him by his client, and it is the duty of the person with whom he deals to ascertain the extent of the authority conferred upon the attorney. An attorney at law has no right to release a cause of action without the consent of his client." This instruction was as favorable to the appellant as it should have been. The appellant complains that, while this is true, there are some portions of the charge, in relation to the effect of the action of the attorney, which are so often repeated by the court that the jury were likely to forget, by reason of such repetition, that such instructions were to be qualified by other portions of the charge. But we do not think that mere tautology in the language of the court would warrant the conclusion that the jury was misled. The other proposition laid down by the court, that the appellant could not sue the respondent upon any matters that were settled and compromised, without setting aside the settlement and placing the respondent in statu quo, is elementary. Without reviewing minutely all the different portions of the charge, we think the case was plainly and fairly presented on both sides to the jury, and that they were not misled in any particular by the instructions of the court.

The appellant also raises strenuous objections to the action of the court in commenting on the testimony, in the following colloquy between the attorneys and the court: "Question by Mr. Fishback: When you came back here from New York City, what statement, if any, were you to make, Mr. Livesley, as to whether or not the assigned account was correct or not, and as to whether they would pay it? Mr. Humphreys: The contract introduced in evidence shows that it was to be done without recourse. The Court: If Livesley signed that contract, that ends the case. If that was the contract he

made, if he made that contract which has been introduced in evidence,-that ends this case. Mr. Humphreys: He made that contract unless he shows this paper has been changed since he signed it. The Court: That is what the court holds. He admits that the papers contain his signature." While it might not have been necessary for the court to say this, it was so evidently the undisputed truth, both as to law and fact, that no error could be based upon it, because no prejudice to plaintiff's rights could have been created thereby; for, if Livesley made and signed the contract, that did end the case, and that was the whole question at issue, the appellant contending he did not make and sign this contract, and respondent that he did; and the court simply held that if he made that contract, unless it had been changed since he signed it, he would be bound by it, and would have no cause of action. We do not think this was stating to the jury the conclusion of the court with regard to the testimony of the appellant, but that he simply stated the legal effect of making and signing this contract, provided it was conceded that the appellant did make and sign it. No substantial errors appearing, the judgment will be affirmed.

HOYT, C. J., and SCOTT, ANDERS, and GORDON, JJ., concur.

(11 Wash. 260)

MILLER v. BORST et al. (Supreme Court of Washington. Feb. 20, 1895.)

PLEADING-ALLEGATIONS AS TO EXECUTORS' POWERS-ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT AID OF COURT -AUTHORITY TO GIVE MORTGAGE.

1. In a complaint seeking the foreclosure of a mortgage given by an executor upon his testator's property, an allegation that "the will authorized and directed said executor to administer upon said estate without the intervention, order, or advice of any court, and to fully execute all its terms and provisions," sufficiently shows that the terms of the will dispensed with letters of administration.

2. A complaint which states that a person named as executor and trustee executed a certain note and mortgage, and that he had "executed and performed all the terms and conditions of the will," it also appearing that the testator wished his estate administered without the aid of any court, sufficiently alleges that the will conferred authority to give such note and mortgage.

3. Allegations that an estate has been fully administered according to the provisions of a will, and that certain acts have been done in the course of such administration, must be construed to mean that such acts were within the power conferred by the will.

Appeal from superior court, King county; J. W. Langley, Judge.

Action by Mary H. Miller against Kate M. Borst and others. Defendants' demurrer to the complaint was overruled. They stood upon the demurrer, and, from a judgment against them for want of an answer, bring this appeal. Affirmed.