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should change, and shouted it through a Limitations of actions—threefold damages speaking trumpet, he would owe no duty to

under antitrust act. obey, but would be as free as before to do

2. The limitation of five years prewhat he thought best. Then, as to the scribed by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1047, U. S. selection of members, there is no indication Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 727, for any “suit or of any in the Code, the rules of the board, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the

prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, or the constitution and by-laws of the as- laws of the United States," does not apply sociation. Nothing is said about member to the action for threefold damages for inship, and the implication is plain that a jury to "business or property,” authorized condition of the association being permitted by the antitrust act of July 2, 1890, § 7, by the board to exist is that every pilot be in cases of violations of that act. longs to it. Probably, while it exists, a Limitation of actions—threefold damages pilot scarcely would find it possible to com

under antitrust act. pete from the outside. It is still plainer

3. The ten years limitation prescribed that the only provision for expulsion is that by Tenn. Code, § 2776, for "all other cases which would follow upon a pilot's being

not expressly provided for,” rather than the deprived of his license. The association has for "statute penalties," or the three years

one year limitation prescribed by § 2772 no power over that. All that there is upon which to base a to personal or real property, governs an ac

limitation prescribed by $ 2773 for injuries joint liability is that the pilots, instead of tion for threefold damages for injury to taking their fees as they earn them, accom- "business or property” brought under the plish substantially the same result by min. antitrust act of July 2, 1890, § 7, in which gling them in the first place, and then, after the right of recovery is based on the expaying expenses, distributing them to those cessive price for iron water pipe which a on the active list according to the number municipality was led to pay by reason of of days they respectively have been there. bers of a trust or combination formed in

an illegal arrangement between the memApart from the possible slight difference violation of that act. between the proportion of days on the active list and days of active service, the case is

[No. 94.] the same as if each pilot kept his fees, merely contributing to keep up a common | Argued November 9 and 12, 1906. Decided office from which his bills might be sent out

December 3, 1906. and where a few details of common interest

N ERROR to the United States Circuit could be attended to.

IN

In the latter case this suit hardly would have been brought. review a judgment which affirmed a judg

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to The distinction between it and the one at review a judgment which affirmed a judg. bar is not great enough to justify a dif- ment of the Circuit Court for the Eastern ferent result. See The City of Dundee, 47 District of Tennessee, in favor of plaintiff

,

in an action to recover threefold damages C. C. A. 581, 108 Fed. 679, 684, 103 Fed. 696. The second and third questions certi- for injury to business or property, sustained

by reason of a violation of the antitrust fied are answered "No."

act. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Frank Spurlock and Foster V.

Brown for plaintiffs in error. CHATTANOOGA FOUNDRY PIPE Messrs. George Westmoreland, Churchill

WORKS and South Pittsburg Pipe Com- P. Goree, Linton A. Dean, and J. L. Foust pany, Plffs. in Err.,

for defendant in error.
V.
CITY OF ATLANTA.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion

of the court: Monopolies-antitrust act-action for three

This is an action by the city of Atlanta fold damages.

1. The action for threefold damages for (Georgia) against two Tennessee corporainjury to "business or property” authorized tions, members of the trust or combination by the antitrust act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. held unlawful in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. at L. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 136, p. 3202), § 7, in cases of violations of that | 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36. The object of the suit act. may be maintained by a Georgia munic- is to recover threefold damages for alleged ipal corporation against the foreign corpo injury to the city in its business or property, rate members of a combination forbidden by under § 7 of the act of July 2, 1890, chap. that act, where the municipality was led, by 647 (26 Stat. at L. 209, U. S. Comp. Stat. reason of the illegal combination, to pur. 1901, p. 3202). The alleged injury is that chase from an Alabama corporation at an excessive price the iron pipe needed for its the city, being engaged in conducting waterworks system.

system of waterworks, and wishing to 27 S. C.-5.

&

iron water pipe, was led, by reason of the money of the plaintiff, which is owned withillegal arrangements between the members in some particular state. In other words, of the trust, to purchase the pipe from the if Congress had power to make the acts Anniston Pipe & Foundry Company, an Ala- which led to the damage illegal, it could bama corporation, at a price much above authorize a recovery for the damage, alwhat was reasonable or the pipe was worth. though the latter was suffered wholly with: The purchase was made after a simulated in the boundaries of one state. Finally, the competition, at a price fixed by the trust, fact that the sale was not so connected in its and embracing a bonus to be divided among terms with the unlawful combination as to the members. The plaintiffs in error de- be unlawful (Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe murred to the declaration, and pleaded not Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. guilty, and that the action accrued more Rep. 431) in no way contradicts the proposithan one year and more than three years tion that the motives and inducements to before the suit was brought, relying upon make it were so affected by the combination 88 2772 and 2773 of the Code of Tennessee, as to constitute a wrong. In most cases the eastern district of Tennessee being the where the result complained of as springing district in which the suit was brought. from a tort is a contract, the contract is The demurrer to the declaration was over- lawful, and the tort goes only to the motives ruled and the plaintiff had a verdict and which led to its being made, as when it is judgment in the circuit court. The verdict induced by duress or fraud. was for the difference between the price paid The limitation of five years in Rev. Stat. and the market or fair price that the city $1047, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 727, to any would have had to pay under natural con- "suit or prosecution for any penalty or ditions had the combination been out of the forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing way, together with an attorney's fee. The under the laws of the United States," does judgment trebled the damages. It was af- not apply. The construction of the phrase firmed by the circuit court of appeals, the “suit for a penalty," and the reasons for plaintiffs in error having saved their rights that construction, have been stated so fully at every stage. The discussions of the law took place before the jury trial was reached. by this court that it is not necessary to reThey will be found in 64 L.R.A. 721, 61 c. peat them. Indeed, the proposition hardly C. A. 387, 127 Fed. 23, and 101 Fed. 900. is disputed here. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 For our purposes it seems unnecessary to

U. S. 657, 668, 36 L. ed. 1123, 1128, 13 Sup. state the case at greater length.

Ct. Rep. 224; Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, The facts gave rise to a cause of action 155, 156, 44 L. ed. 109, 112, 113, 20 Sup. Ct. under the act of Congress. The city was a Rep. 62. person within the meaning of $ 7 by the Thus we come to the main question of the express provision of g 8. It was injured in case, namely, which limitation under the its property, at least, if not in its business laws of Tennessee is applicable, the matter of furnishing water, by being led to pay being left to the local law by the silence of more than the worth of the pipe. A person the statutes of the United States. Rev. whose property is diminished by a payment Stat. § 721, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.

581; of money wrongfully induced is injured in Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 39 L. his property. The transaction which did the ed. 280, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217. The material wrong was a transaction between parties in provisions of the Tennessee Code are as fol. different states, if that be material. The lows: By article 2769 (Shannon, 4466) all fact that the defendants and others had civil actions are to be commenced within the combined with the seller led to the excessive periods prescribed, with immaterial excepcharge, which the seller made in the inter

tions. By article 2772 (Shannon, 4469) est of the trust by arrangement with its actions, among others, for "statute penalmembers, and which the buyer was induced ties, within one year after cause of action to pay by the semblance of competition, accrued.” By 2773 (Shannon, 4470) “actions also arranged by the members of the trust. for injuries to personal or real property; One object of the combination was to pre-actions for the detention or conversion of vent other producers than the Anniston Pipe & Foundry Company, the seller, from como personal property, within three years from

the accruing of the cause of action." By peting in sales to the plaintiff. There can be no doubt that Congress had power to 2776 (Shannon, 4473) certain actions enumergive an action for damages to an individual ated, "and all other cases not expressly prowho suffers by breach of the law. W. W. vided for, within ten years after the cause Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48 of action accrued.” The circuit court of apL. ed. 608, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307. The dam- peals held that the case did not fall within age complained of must almost or quite al- 2772 or 2773, but only within 2776, and ways be damage in property, that is, in the therefore was not barred. Although the

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decision is appealed from, as this question pressly provided for." On the whole case involves the construction of local law, we we agree with the court below. cannot but attribute weight to the opinion Judgment affirmed. of the judge who rendered the judgment, in view of his experience upon the supreme

The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice Peck. court of Tennessee. And although doubts ham dissent. were raised by the argument, we have come to agree with his interpretation in the main.

As to the article touching actions for statute penalties, notwithstanding some

CITY OF MONTEREY, Plff, in Err., grounds for distinguishing it from Rev.

DAVID JACKS. Stat. § 1047, which were pointed out, so far as this liability under the laws of the Private land claims-state control

control over United States is concerned we must adhere

pueblo lands. to the construction of it which we already 1. The California legislature could enhave adopted. The chief argument relied act the act of April 2, 1866, ratifying conupon is that this suit is for injury to person- veyances made by the corporate authori. al property, and so within article 2773. It ties of the city of Monterey of pueblo lands was pressed upon us that formerly the limi-confirmed to that city by the United States tations addressed themselves to forms of and afterwards patented to it, its succes

sors and assigns. action; that actions upon the case, such as this would have been, were barred in three Error to state court-Federal question. years, following Stat. 21 Jac. I. chap. 21, §

2. The question whether the California 3, and that when a change was necessitated legislature could enact the act of April by the doing away with the old forms of 2, 1866, ratifying conveyances made by the action, it is not to be supposed that the corporate authorities of the city of Monte

rey of pueblo lands confirmed to that city change was intended to affect the substance, by the United States, and afterwards pator more than the mode of stating the time ented to it, its successors and assigns, is allowed. Of course, it was argued also that not so far unsubstantial as to justify disthis was an injury to property, within the missal of a writ of error to a state court. plain meaning of the words. But we are satisfied, on the whole, and in view of its

[No. 27.] juxtaposition with detention and conversion, that the phrase has a narrower intent. It Argued and submitted October 10, 1906.

Decided December 3, 1906. may be that it has a somewhat broader scope than was intimated below, and that

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the some wrongs are within it besides physical I

State of California to review a judg. damage to tangible property. But there is a sufficiently clear distinction between in- ment which affirmed a judgment of the Su. juries to property and “injured in his busi- perior Court of the County of Monterey, in ness or property,” the latter being the lan that state, in favor of defendant in an'acguage of the act of Congress. A man is in- tion to quiet title to pueblo lands. Affirmed.

See same case below, 139 Cal. 542, 73 Pac. jured in his property when his property is

436. diminished. He would not be said to have

The facts are stated in the opinion. suffered an injury to his property unless the

Mr. Hamilton Gay Howard for plaintiff harm fell upon some object more definite

in error. and less ideal than his total wealth. А trademark, or a trade name, or a title, is Frederic D. McKinney for defendant in er

Messrs. W. I. Brobeck, John Garber, and property, and is regarded as an object capable of injury in various ways. But when a man is made poorer by an extrava

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opin. gant bill we do not regard his wealth as a unity, or the tort, if there is one, as directed ion of the court: against that unity as an object. We do not tiff in error (and, being plaintiff in the court

Action to quiet title, brought by plaingo behind the person of the sufferer. We

below, we will so designate it) in the susay that he has been defrauded or subjected perior court of the county of Monterey to to duress, or whatever it may be, and stop 1,635.03 acres of land, situate in Monterey there. It was urged that the opening article county, state of California. Plaintiff alto which we have referred expressed an in- leged title in fee simple, and contends that tention to bar all civil actions, but that such title has come to it as successor of hardly helps the construction of any par- the pueblo of Monterey of Upper California. ticular article following, since the dragnet There is no dispute that the land was part at the end, 2776, catches all cases not "ex. l of the pueblo of Monterey, and that, after

ror,

.

proper proccedings had in pursuance of acts | fendant, David Jacks, and in the conveyof Congress, the title of the city of Monte- ance the proceedings taken by the trustees rey was confirmed by a decree of the in the matter of such sale were recited. board of land commissioners, and a patent. This conveyance was recorded in the county issued to the city November 19, 1891. recorder's office of the county of Monterey

The defendant gets his title through one on June 11, 1859. On April 2, 1866, the act D. R. Ashley, who was the attorney for to incorporate the city of Monterey was the city, to present and prosecute its claim amended to read as follows: 'Sec. 2. All to the land before the board of land com- sales and conveyances made by the corpomissioners. To pay the indebtedness in- rate authorities of said city since the 8th curred for his services the land was sold day of February, 1859, and which conveyunder the authority of certain acts of the ances purport to have been recorded in the legislature of the state, and purchased by county recorder's office of Monterey county, him. The validity of the title so derived, purporting to convey public lands, or lands as against the title of the city as successor confirmed to said city of Monterey, in purof the pueblo of Monterey, free from the suance of the act of Congress of March 3, control of the legislature, makes the ques- 1851 (9 Stat. at L. 631, chap. 41), and ention in the case. Judgment passed for the titled "An Act to Ascertain and Settle the defendant in the trial court and was af- Private Land Claims in the State of Califirmed by the supreme court. 139 Cal. 542, fornia," are hereby ratified and confirmed.' 73 Pac. 136. This writ of error was then

On September 4, 1869, Ashley conallowed.

veyed all his interest in the land in conThe city of Monterey was incorporated by troversy to the defendant.” an act of the legislature of the state of The contentions of the parties are in part California, March 30, 1850, and became there made to turn upon the kind of right the by successor of the former pueblo to its pueblo city of Monterey derived as the successor lands. In 1857 the charter of the city was of the pueblo of Monterey, whether proprieamended, and by § 7 thereof the trustees tary or in trust, and, because in trust, subwere empowered to pay off the expenses of ject to the disposition of the legislature of prosecuting the title of the city before the the state. This distinction was expressed United States land commissioners and before by the supreme court and the case deterthe United States courts, and for that pur- mined by it, and the court supported its pose sell and transfer any property, right, action by a citation of prior decisions. It or franchise upon uch terms and for such was said: “There is a marked difference, price as might by them be deemed reason- however, between lands which are held by a able. It was found by the lower courts (and municipality in trust for public, municipal we quote from the opinion of the supreme purposes, such as pueblo lands, and lands court) that,

acquired by a municipality through pur“On January 24, 1859, said Ashley pre- chase or special grant, and held in propriesented to the trustees of the city of Monte- tary right.” Of the latter class it was said: rey a claim amounting to $991.50 for services “That it is beyond the power of the stateas its attorney in presenting such pueblo, to control its disposition without the conclaim to the commissioners. The claim was sent of the municipality.” In the other approved and allowed, and there being no case, “the lands, being simply ancillary to funds in the treasury to pay it, the board the execution of the public trust,-lands in of trustees passed a resolution directing that which the pueblo never had an indefeasible a sale of all the pueblo lands of the city, or proprietary interest, and which were subso much of them as might be necessary to ject to the supreme political dominion of pay the claim of said Ashley, be made at the former Mexican government,-became public auction on the 9th day of February, equally subject to the sovereignty of the 1859. Due notice of the time for holding state of California through its legislature said sale was given, and the same was held upon the change of government.” at the time and in accordance with the no- Plaintiff attacks this conclusion, and contice, at which sale the entire pueblo tract tends that the title to the lands vested, was bid in by the said D. R. Ashley and not in the state of California as succeeding the defendant, David Jacks, for the sum of sovereign, but in the United States, and the $1,002.50, heing the amount of the indebted - United States, having the title, passed it by ness and the necessary expenses of sale; the patent of November 19, 1891, to the no one offering to purchase less than the plaintiff. And this contention, plaintiff aswbole, or bid a higher amount. Thereafter serts, presents the Federal question to be said trustees made, executed, and delivered decided. At one time this might have been & conveyance of said lands, dated February regarded as a serious question, but it is 9, 1859, but acknowledged February 12, 1859, no longer so. Whatever of legal power the in favor of said D. R. Ashley and the de- 'state of California may exercise over itsmunicipalities has received decisive defini- as shall be, by the lessors, actually real. tion in many decisions. The cases are quot- ized.” * ed by the supreme court in the case at bar. Whatever power the United States may

[No. 31.] exercise, or, by refraining from exercising, Argued October 17, 1906. Decided Decemyield to the state of California to exercise,

ber 3, 1906. has long been decisively settled. We need not review the cases . An exposition of them I Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

N ERROR to the United States Circuit can be found in United States v. Santa Fe, 165 U. S. 675, 41 L. ed. 874, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. to review a judgment which affirmed, on a 472.

second writ of error, a judgment of the If the United States was, as contended, Circuit Court for the District of Massachua paramount sovereign, and, as such, pos- setts in favor of defendant in an action for sessed the power to direct the trust to which rent. Affirmed. pueblo lands were subject, it did not do so, See same case below, 139 Fed. 5, 71 C. C. but conveyed land to the “city of Monterey, A. 417. its successors and assigns." In other words, The facts are stated in the opinion. the conveyance was made to a municipality Messrs. Robert M. Morse and William M. of the state of California,-a creature of Richardson for plaintiff in error. the laws of the state and subject to the Messrs. G. Philip Wardner and Edward E. state. Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220; Blodgett for defendant in error. San Francisco V. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541. See also Atty. Gen. ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, ion of the court:

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opin199 U. S. 233, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.

This is an action on contract brought in 27. And we may observe that the United States, by an acť passed June 15, 1906, has the district of Massachusetts, for rent al

the circuit court of the United States for designated the city of Monterey as trustee of the original grant, and confirmed the land leged to be due under the terms of a lease to the city as patented. 34 Stat, at L. 267. made by Henry Parkman and others to the We do not think, however, that the Fed Broadway National Bank.

The original lessors sold the land and eral question presented is so far unsubstantial as to justify a dismissal of the building leased to the International Trust writ of error, and the motion to dismiss is Company, plaintiff in error. Defendant in

error is agent of the shareholders of the denied.

Broadway National Bank. Judgment affirmed.

The premises leased were the first floor of the building and the basement under the same, "to be used as the business offices of

said corporation and for no other purpose." INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, The lease contained a provision for re-entry Plff. in Err.,

upon breach of any covenant. "And there

upon the lessors may, at their discretion, reJOHN W. WEEKS, Agent of the Share | let the premises, at the risk of the lessee, holders of the Broadway National Bank. who shall remain for the residue of said

term responsible for the rent herein reCourts-jurisdiction of circuit court-ac-served, and shall be credited with such tion to wind up affairs of national bank. amounts only as shall be by the lessors

1. An action for rent, brought against the agent for the shareholders of an in

actually realized." solvent national bank to whom the Comp

On December 16, 1899, the bank became troller of the Currency has released the es insolvent, and the Comptroller of the Cur. tate of the bank, is one to wind up the rency appointed a receiver. On February affairs of the bank, and, as such, is within 15, 1900, the Comptroller released the esthe jurisdiction of a Federal circuit court. tate of the bank to defendant in error as Landlord and tenant-rent after re-entry- the stockholders' agent. Between December effort to relet.

16, 1899, and January 5, 1900, the trust 2. Rent after re-entry cannot be re- company entered upon the premises and recovered by the lessors unless a reasonable possessed itself of the same as of its former effort has been made to relet the premises, estate. The receiver occupied the premises where the lease provides that after re-en for a while, but it was stipulated that such try for breach of any covenant the lessors occupation was not to affect the rights of

may, at their discretion, relet the prem. ises, at the risk of the lessee, who shall the parties. Defendant in error occupied remain, for the residue of said term, re- the premises until May 19, 1900. He consponsible for the rent herein reserved, and tended in defense of the action that upon shall be credited with such amounts only the termination of the lease it was the duty

*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 32, Cent. Dig. Landlord and Tenant, $ 763.

v.

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