pay the last mentioned obligations and the receiver agreed to turn over the pledged securities to him, he undertaking in case it should be adjudged that he was a general partner to hold the equities in the same as trustee for the estate-all conditioned upon the Court making an order approving the contract. The order was made on January 6, 1915. On January 25, 1915, the composition was declared to be for the best interests of his estate and the creditors thereof, it and the arrangement with Thompson were confirmed, and it was decreed that on his complying with its terms he should be "relieved of any further liability to the said receiver or the estate by reason of the order heretofore' entered by this Court dated January 6, 1915 or otherwise." It was further decreed that the petitions to have Thompson declared liable as a general partner be dismiss ed. The defendants had been notified of the bankruptcy and the appointment of receivers, had paid one claim made against them for the estate and had disputed another which is now the subject *of a suit in New York, but they did not appear in the bankruptcy proceedings, assent to the composition, or attempt to prove à claim. *576 We believe that we have stated the essential facts relied upon to support the bill. They seem to us not sufficient for that purpose. It is said that in pursuance of a contract sanctioned by the Court there was a settlement with Thompson discharging him from all liability to the firm and anyone claiming under it. We do not perceive that the decree just recited even purports to deal with the defendants' claim, and reading it in connection with the proposal as to Thompson in the offer of composition we find it at least difficult to understand it to have been directed against other creditors than those who as Ct. 263, 63 L. Ed. 587; Manson v. Williams, 213 U. S. 453, 29 Sup. Ct. 519, 53 L. Ed. 869. The claim of the present defendants in their action in South Carolina is based as we have said upon allegations of fraud, and it is further alleged in their complaint that they believed the representations said to be *577 fraudulent *until long after the decree set up here as a bar. If those allegations are the claim, and of course they were not passed proved the composition would not discharge upon in the bankruptcy court. A decree that, as we have tried to show, cannot be taken to deal with the defendants' rights does not give ancillary jurisdiction to the District Court to enforce it against them. The concession by the demurrer that Thompson was a special partner does not affect the scope of the decree, and the jurisdiction depends upon that alone. It is true that if he was only liable as a special partner the South Carolina suit cannot be maintained, but the allegations of fraud open the whole matter and moreover the question here is not whether that suit can be maintained but whether an injunction against it should be issued by the District Court. The appeal is dismissed and upon the writ of certiorari the decree dismissing the bill is affirmed. Appeal dismissed. (250 U. S. 596) NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. v. BIANC. 10, 1919.) sented to the latter. It is argued, to be sure, (Argued Oct. 22 and 23, 1919. Decided Nov. that the petitioners seeking to charge Thompson as a general partner were dismissed out Nos. 374, 375 and 376.-October Term, 1919. and out and that that portion of the decree MASTER at least must be taken to operate in rem and 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301 AND SERVANT 347-PERMITTING AWARD Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of New York, amended and re-enacted by Laws 1914, c. 41 (Consol. Laws, c. 67), and section 15, amended by Laws 1916, c. 622, § 3, to anthorize the Industrial Commission in its discretion, in case of an injury resulting in serious facial or head disfigurement, to make such award as it may deem proper and equitable, not to exceed $3,500, held not to deprive employers ordered to pay such an award of their property without due process of law, in contravention of Const. U. S. Amend. 14; the provision not being unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to fundamental right, while the allowance prescribed does not exceed the constitutional limitations on state power. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (40 Sup.Ct.) 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~301 MASTER not to exceed three thousand five hundred dol- Whether an award to an injured employé for permanent facial or head disfigurement should be made in combination with, or independent of, the compensation allowed for mere inability to work, is a matter of detail for determination by the state, as is also the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum or in installments; decision one way or the other not rendering the portion of a state Workmen's Compensation Act unconstitutional as a taking without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting. In Error to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, of the State of New York. In the matter of the claims of George Sweeting and others, employés, for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, against the American Knife Company and others, the employers, and the Ætna Life Insurance Company the insurance carrier. From orders of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (186 App. Div. 925, 172 N. Y. Supp. 880; 186 App. Div. 926, 172 N. Y. Supp. 921; 186 App. Div. 925, 172 N. Y. Supp. 924), affirming awards of the State Industrial Commission, the employers and insurance carrier appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, which affirmed (226 N. Y. 199, 123 N. E. 82; 123 N. E. 856, 893), and the employers and insurance carrier bring error. Judgments affirmed. The present writs of error bring up for review three judgments of the Court of Appeals of that state, affirming orders of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, in which awards based upon this amendment were sustained. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, applicable to all of the cases, is reported under the title of Matter of Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N. Y. 199, 123 N. E. 82. In each case the commission found accidental injuries sustained by an employé in a hazardous occupation, arising out of and in the course of the employment, and, as a result of the injury, some serious facial or head In each case an disfigurement, or both. award was made on account of such disfigurement irrespective of the allowance of com pensation according to the schedule based upon the average wage of the injured employé and the character and duration of the disability. [1] The sole contention here is that the amendment of 1916, as thus carried into ef *601 fect, deprives the respective plaintiffs *in error of property without due process of law, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument is that an award for disfigurement, made wholly independent of claimant's inability to work, is not based upon impairment of earning power; that only such impairment can justify imposing upon an employer without fault compulsory pay In No. 374: Mr. Robert E. Whalen, of Al- ment by way of compensation to an injured bany, N. Y., for plaintiff in error. In Nos. 375, 376: Mr. William H. Foster, of Syracuse, N. Y., for plaintiffs in error. Mr. E. C. Aiken, of Albany, N. Y., for Industrial Commission of New York. *600 workman; and hence that the "disfigurement clause" is not a reasonable exercise of the police power, but is arbitrary and oppressive. In view of our recent decisions sustaining state laws imposing upon employers in the hazardous industries responsibility in one *Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion form or another for the consequences of inof the Court. juries received by employés in the course of The Workmen's Compensation Law of the the employment in the absence of fault on state of New York (chapter 816, Laws 1913, the employer's part (New York Central R. R. as amended and re-enacted by chapter 41, Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, Laws 1914 [Consol. Laws, c. 67]), which was 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. sustained by this court against attacks bas- 1917D, 629; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washed upon the Fourteenth Amendment in Newington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Arizona Em188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. ployers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, was amended | Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058), little need now by Laws 1916, c. 622, among other things by be said. inserting in the fifteenth section, which con- Even were impairment of earning power tains the schedule of compensation for cases the sole justification for imposing compulof disability, a clause reading as follows: sory payment of workmen's compensation "In case of an injury resulting in serious fa- upon the employer in such cases, it would cial or head disfigurement the commission may be sufficient answer to the present contenin its discretion, make such award or compention to say that a serious disfigurement of sation as it may deem proper and equitable, in the face or head reasonably may be regarded view of the nature of the disfigurement, but as having a direct relation to the injured For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes person's earning power, irrespective of its provision debar a state from adopting other effect upon his mere capacity for work. Under ordinary conditions of life, a serious and unnatural disfigurement of the face or head very probably may have a harmful effect upon the ability of the injured person to obtain or retain employment. Laying aside exceptional cases, which we must assume will be fairly dealt with in the proper and equitable administration of the act, such a disfigurement may render one repulsive or offensive to the sight, displeasing, or at least less pleasing, to employer, to fellow em602 ployés, and to patrons or customers. See Ball v. Wm. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., [1912] App. Cas. 496. methods, or a composite of different methods, provided the result be not inconsistent with fundamental rights. As was stated in the Arizona case, 250 U. S. 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 559, 63 L. Ed. 1058: "If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair result, is for the state itself to determine." And we see no constitutional reason why *603 But we cannot concede that impairment of earning power is the sole ground upon which a state may not, *in ascertaining the amount compulsory compensation to injured work- of such compensation in particular cases, men legitimately may be based. Unques- take into consideration any substantial phystionably it is a rational basis, and it is adopt-ical impairment attributable to the injury, ed for the generality of cases by the New whether it immediately affects earning caYork law. But the Court of Appeals has pacity or not. construed the 1916 amendment as permitting For the reasons thus outlined, it was not an allowance for facial or head disfigure- unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to funment although it does not impair the claim-damental right to embody in the New York ant's earning capacity. Matter. of Erickson Workmen's Compensation Law a provision v. Preuss, 223 N. Y. 365, 368, 119 N. E. 555; and see opinion of Judge Cardozo in the present case, 226 N. Y. 199, 200, 123 N. E. 82. In view of this, and there being no specific finding of such impairment in these cases, it is proper to say that in our opinion the "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states to base compulsory compensation solely upon loss of earning power. The New York law as at first enacted, the Washington, and the Arizona laws presented for our consideration three different methods adopted for the purpose of imposing upon the industry the burden of making some compensation for the human wastage attributable to the hazards of the work. We were unable to find that any of these ran counter to the "due process" clause. Nor does that for a special allowance of compensation for a serious disfigurement of the face or head. Nor is there any ground for declaring that the allowance prescribed by the 1916 amendment exceeds the constitutional limitations upon state power. [2] Whether an award for such disfigurement should be made in combination with or independent of the compensation allowed for the mere inability to work is a matter of detail for the state to determine. The same is true of the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum, or in installments. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058. Judgments affirmed. Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS dissents. (251 U. S. 1) (40 Sup.Ct.) District Court found that the charge was UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. true and entered a decree of cancellation, et al. and this was reversed by the Circuit Court Southern (Argued March 5 and 6, 1919. Decided Nov. of Appeals, one judge dissenting. Pac. Co. v. United States, 249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19. 17, 1919.) No. 179. [1] "All mineral lands" other than those 1. PUBLIC LANDS 78 RAILROAD GRANT Containing coal or iron were excluded from EXCLUDING LANDS. "MINERAL LANDS" BARS OIL The exclusion from a railroad land grant of "all mineral lands," other than those containing coal or iron, embraces oil lands. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Mineral Land.] 2. PUBLIC LANDS 120-CANCELLATION OF RAILROAD GRANT OF LANDS KNOWN AS OIL LANDS. Evidence in suit by the government to cancel for fraud a patent to a railroad company for indemnity lands held to entitle it to the relief, as showing that, when the patent was sought and obtained on affidavit that the lands were nonmineral, they were known by the company's officers to be valuable for oil; that is, that the then known conditions were such as to reasonably engender the belief that the lands contained oil of such quality and in such quantity as would render its extraction profitable and justify expenditures to that end. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Suit by the United States against the Southern Pacific Company and others. the grant, and this exclusion embraced oil lands. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 676-679, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527. As will be seen presently, there can be no doubt that the patent was procured by representing that the lands were not mineral. Whether this representation was false turns upon the character of the lands as known when the patent was sought and obtained. If they then were known to be valuable for oil, as the government asserts they were, they were mineral in the sense of the granting act. To compensate for losses to the grant within its primary limits the railroad company was entitled to select other lands of like area within the indemnity limits, approval by the Secretary of the Interior being essential to passing the selections to patent. The established mode of making the selections was by presenting at the local land office selection lists designating the lands lost and those selected, with supporting affidavits showing, among other things, that the lands selected were of the character contemplated, that is to say, were not minerDe-al but agricultural. These lists and affida cree of District Court for the United States was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19), and the United States appeals. Decree of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and decree of District Court affirmed. #2 vits would then be examined in that office and in the General Land Office, and ultimately the selections would be passed to the Secretary of the Interior for his action. That course was followed here. The original list was presented November 14, 1903, but it encountered obstacles which *Messrs. J. Crawford Biggs, of Raleigh, N. led to the presentation of a substituted list C., and Assistant Attorney General Kearful, for the United States. Messrs. Charles R. Lewers, and William F. Herrin, both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. *6 *Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit by the United States to cancel a patent issued December 12, 1904, to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for eight full and two partial sections of land within the indemnity limits of the grant made to that company by an act of Congress (Act July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat. 292), it being charged in the bill that the railroad *7 *8 covering the same lands on September 6, 1904. Both lists were presented by the company's land agent, Mr. Eberlein, and were accompanied by affidavits made by him stating that the lands selected "are not interdicted mineral," but "are of the character contemplated by the grant," and that "he has caused" them "to be carefully examined by the agents and employés of said company as to their mineral or agricultural character, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief none of the lands returned in said list are mineral lands." In acting on the substituted list the officers of the company *fraudulently obtained the patent In truth Mr. Eberlein had not examined the lands or caused them to be examined by others. Nor had any examination of them person's earning power, irrespective of its provision debar a state from adopting other effect upon his mere capacity for work. Under ordinary conditions of life, a serious and unnatural disfigurement of the face or head very probably may have a harmful effect upon the ability of the injured person to obtain or retain employment. Laying aside exceptional cases, which we must assume will be fairly dealt with in the proper and equitable administration of the act, such a disfigurement may render one repulsive or offensive to the sight, displeasing, or at least less pleasing, to employer, to fellow em*602 ployés, and to patrons or custom*ers. See Ball v. Wm. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., [1912] App. Cas. 496. methods, or a composite of different methods, provided the result be not inconsistent with fundamental rights. As was stated in the Arizona case, 250 U. S. 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 559, 63 L. Ed. 1058: "If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair result, is for the state itself to determine." And we see no constitutional reason why *603 But we cannot concede that impairment of earning power is the sole ground upon which a state may not, *in ascertaining the amount compulsory compensation to injured work- of such compensation in particular cases, men legitimately may be based. Unques- take into consideration any substantial phystionably it is a rational basis, and it is adopt-ical impairment attributable to the injury, ed for the generality of cases by the New whether it immediately affects earning caYork law. But the Court of Appeals has pacity or not. construed the 1916 amendment as permitting an allowance for facial or head disfigurement although it does not impair the claimant's earning capacity. Matter. of Erickson v. Preuss, 223 N. Y. 365, 368, 119 N. E. 555; and see opinion of Judge Cardozo in the present case, 226 N. Y. 199, 200, 123 N. E. 82. In view of this, and there being no specific finding of such impairment in these cases, it is proper to say that in our opinion the "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states to base compulsory compensation solely upon loss of earning power. The New York law as at first enacted, the Washington, and the Arizona laws presented for our consideration three different methods adopted for the purpose of imposing upon the industry the burden of making some compensation for the human wastage attributable to the hazards of the work. We were unable to find that any of these ran counter to the "due process" clause. Nor does that For the reasons thus outlined, it was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to fundamental right to embody in the New York Workmen's Compensation Law a provision for a special allowance of compensation for a serious disfigurement of the face or head. Nor is there any ground for declaring that the allowance prescribed by the 1916 amendment exceeds the constitutional limitations upon state power. [2] Whether an award for such disfigurement should be made in combination with or independent of the compensation allowed for the mere inability to work is a matter of detail for the state to determine. The same is true of the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum, or in installments. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058. Judgments affirmed. Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS dissents. |
