by the un

derftand

this in

Wax.

feparated to the Mind burning Wax, i. e. a thing that is hard, round, capable of being melted in the Fire, red, ing; an in- and when foftened by heat changeable into any Fiftance of gure, fufceptible alfo of various Colours ; and lastly, refolvable into Smoke. The Eye exhibits all burning thefe Properties in the burning Wax almost at one glance, but the Understanding feparates those things by Reflection, which the Sight had convey'd to the mind collectively. For it perceives that the Wax preferves its Effence and Denomination, though from round it be turn'd into square, from hard and red, into foft and black. From whence it appears that all these Properties are extrinsical to it, but that which continues under all thefe Changes is call'd its Nature and Substance.

The first

III. By Substance I here understand a thing diftincti- which the Mind can conceive by itself as distinct on of our and separate from all others: For that Thing, the conceptions into Conception of which does not depend upon another, Senfible nor include or fuppofe any other, is to us a SubQualities ftance; and accordingly we diftinguish it by that and Sub-Name; But that which implies dependence in the ftance. conception of it we call a Mode, or Accident. For inftance, we can conceive a certain portion of matter, fuch as Wax is, fetting afide all others, and alfo without any particular Figure: But we are not in like manner able to conceive any particular Figure without matter. Wax therefore is a Subftance, for our conception reprefents it as diftinet, divided from, and independent of, all other things Nor is it neceffary to the knowledge thereof, that we join the conceptions of other things when we think of it; for the conceptions of that and these contribute nothing to, nor ftand in need of, each other in order to their being underftood. But Colour, Figure, foftness and hardness are modes or accidents; fince they cannot be conceiv'd without fomething that is colour'd, figur'd, foft, or

bard;

bard; but they enter not into the Substance or nature of Wax, for that remains, whatever may be come of these.

there is

IV. But when this is refolv'd into fmoke, or How we flame, it has no longer the name of Wax given to know that it; we call the thing Wax, which is applicable to any fuch a certain peculiar ufe; but when it is once refolv- thing as ed into smoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that matter. ufe to which Wax is fubfervient; and therefore changes its Effence, and appellation. What then does it carry along with it under all mutations? It is always extended, and capable of motion or rest; and has always parts which are separable, and exclude one another out of the fame place; the Subftance therefore which is attended with these Qualities or Properties we call Matter. (1.)

(1.) Our Author's Notion of Subftance, as including all the conftituent Properties of any thing, feems to be more plain and agreeable to nature, and therefore of greater ufe in Philofophy than that which is commonly received. We find by Experience that a thing will always exhibit the fame appearances in fome refpects though it admit of Change in others; or in Mr. Locke's Language, that certain numbers of fimple Ideas go conftantly together, whereas fome others do not: The former of thefe we call the Substance, Thing or Being itself, the latter are term'd its Modes or Accidents. Thus the fubftance of Body, as far as we know of it, confifts in Solidity and Extenfion; which being neceffarily finite, it also becomes capable of Divifion Figure and Motion. Thefe are its original inseparable Qualities which conftitute the thing, and feem not to depend on any thing elfe as a Subject. But a particular Figure, Motion, &c. are only Accidents or Modes of its Existence, which do not neceffarily attend it, though they themselves cannot be fuppofed to exift without it. The fubftance of Spirit confifts in the Powers of Thinking and acting, which likewife admit of various Modifications. feems to be all that we can learn concerning the nature of things from Obfervation and Experience. To enquire into the Manner how thefe, which we call Properties, exift together,

This

or

What it is V. What is obfervable in Wax, may also be obferv'd in any other Substance, which we know

by

or to attempt to explain the Cause, Ground or Reason of their Union is in vain; to affign the word Subftance for a reprefentation of it is faying nothing; it is fetting a mere word for what we have neither any Idea of nor occafion for. Indeed if we confider thefe primary Qualities as needing fomething to inhere in, we are obliged to feek for fomething to fupport them; and by the fame way of reafoning we may feek for fomething elfe to fupport that other fomething, and fo on; and at laft fhall find no other fupport for the whole but the Caufe which produced it. Mr. Locke though he gave into this way of talking yet he has fufficiently thewn his diflike of it in B. 1. C. 4. § 18. B. 2. C. 13. ◊ 18, 19, 20. and C. 23. § 23. and elsewhere. Dr.Watts is of opinion, that it is introducing a needlefs Scholaftic Notion into the real nature of things and then fancying it to have a real Exiftence'. Logic p. 14. The Author of the Procedure, Extent &c. affirms, that as far as we directly know the effential Properties of any Substance, so far we have a direct knowledge of the Subftance itself; and if we had a direct Knowledge of all the effential Properties of any Substance, we fhould have an adequate knowledge of that Subftance; for furely, if there be any meaning in words, the knowing any of the effential Properties of a thing is knowing fo much of its very Substance or Effence.; * meaning the fame by these two laft words, though Mr. Locke ufes them in a very different Signification: The former being only that which makes any thing an Ens or Being; the latter that which makes it a Being of this or that Sort: Of which below.

In fhort, whatever is understood by this word fubftance; it cannot, as Mr. Locke obferves t be applied to God, Spirits and Body in the fame fenfe; and therefore the application of this and the like doubtful Terms to Subjects of a very different nature (especially that of Subftratum, which more apparently confines our thoughts to Body) must needs occafion Error and Confufion.

But though our Author's notion of Subftance be very defenfible, he has applied the word Matter to the Idea of Body, whereof

B. I. C. iii. p. 80, 81.

† B. II. C. xiii. §. 18.

by the Senfes. For all things that are perceived by the Senses admit of the like changes, and the above

NOTES.

*

whereof Matter is only a partial Conception containing nothing more than the Idea of a folid fubftance which is every where the fame. These two terms therefore cannot be put one for the other, as Mr. Locke obferves, though indeed they are often ufed promifcuoufly. Upon this occafion it may not be improper to observe that the various fignifications of these general Terms Matter, Subftance Effence, &c. will ferve to convince us in the first place, that these words don't denote the manner how things really exist, but only our manner of conceiving them, and fecondly, that there are no real Existences ftrictly conformable to this our manner of conceiving them, i. e. in Generals. For if either these general Terms flood for things really exifting under fuch a precifion, or this our way of conceiving things were fix'd by Nature, neither of them would be fo various and uncertain as we find they are. The End of making thefe General Conceptions is to range things into Sorts for the convenience of Language. The Manner of ac quiring them is as follows. We are at firft only acquainted with particular fubftances; but obferving that as these particu lar Subftances differ in fome refpects, fo they agree in others, (ie. though this particular excites in the mind fome fimple Idea or Ideas, which another does not, yet there are fome Ideas excited equally from both) we take no notice of those Ideas in which two or more particular fubftances differ, but felect those only in which they agree, and connect them into one complex Idea by giving them one Name. Which complex Idea becomes General, i. e. it may be affirm'd of, or belongs to, or is found in more than one particular fubftance; and the Leveral Subftances of which it is affirm'd, &c. are faid to be contain'd under that General Idea. General Ideas of Subftances therefore are not made by adding all or any of the particular Ideas found in each fubftance, or by that refin'd method, which the Author of the Procedure imagines, of adding and omitting them at the fame time; but only by leaving out all thofe Ideas in which two or more particular Subftances differ, and retaining thofe in which they agree. And from general Ideas thus made we proceed to more general ones in the fame way, viz. by always dropping the particulars wherein they differ. Thus obferving a certain agreement among Ind

B 3

* B. III. C. x. §. 15.

abovemention'd properties continue both underand after all these motions and mutations. Any sen

NOTES.

Individuals and omitting the reft we form an Idea of the feveral fpecies. In like manner leaving out the distinguishing marks of each Species, we get an Idea of the Genus, such as Man, Beat, or of a higher Genus, fuch as Animal: and again by dropping that by which Animals are diftinguish'd from all other things we acquire the ftill more general or partial, Idea of Being or Subftance. When any one of these general Ideas is found in a particular thing it is call'd the Ejence of that. thing: Effence therefore is only that general abftract Idea in the Mind by which we determine any thing to be of this or that fort, which fort we fignify by fuch a general name as Animal or Matter. So that the fame Quality may be effential or not effential to any thing according as that thing is ranked under a different fort *.

In the fame way that we make General Ideas of Substances we alfo confider fingle Properties, Modes and Relations, viz. by feparating them from all other Properties, &c. with which they are found in Nature, or from all particular Subjects in which they inhere, and leaving only fo much as remains in common, and includes, or may be affirm'd of every property, &. of that kind: Thus obferving that all Bodies agree in being extended, as well as folid, though they differ never fo much in magnitude and figure, we take the former of these Properties apart from the latter, as alfo from any particular Magnitude or Shape, and call it Extension in the abftract; which being thus made general it will comprehend all particular Extenfions, and may be enlarged every way and amplified in infinitum: We can conceive it as existing beyond the limits of Body, and by adding the confufed Idea of a Subftratum to it, it will become independent and ferve both as a common measure and a common Receptacle for all Bodies, which conftitutes our Idea of Space. See Notes 3 and 9. In the fame manner we form an Univerfal Mode, v. g. Obferving a train of Ideas fucceeding one another in our minds at certain distances, and being confcious that we our felves exift while we receive them, or that our own existence is commenfurate to this fucceffion, we get the Idea of continuing. Obferving alfo that feveral other things continue as well as ourselves, we find that the fame affection belongs to them; but it being an endless work to form as many distinct Ideas of this kind as there are things that thus continue, we abstract from particular Exiftences and make one general Idea of Continuance, which ferves for all, and this is Duration.

*See Locke B. III. C. vi. §. 4, 5, &c.

The