(251 U. S. 556) (40 Sup.Ct.) No. 623. Wade C. KILMER, trustee, etc., petitioner, v. The FIRST SAVINGS & BANKING COMPANY. Jan. 12, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 497. Messrs. Conrad H. Syme and F. H. Stephens, both of Washington, D. C., and Stuart W. Walker, of Martinsburg, W. Va., for petitioner. Messrs. Clarence E. Martin, and C. M. Seibert, both of Martinsburg, W. Va., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 557) No. 629. VIRGINIA-WESTERN POWER COMPANY, petitioner, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA at the relation of the CITY OF CLIFTON FORGE; No. 630. VIRGINIA-WESTERN POWER COMPANY, petitioner, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA at the relation of the CITY OF BUENA VISTA; No. 631. VIRGINIA-WESTERN POWER COMPANY, petitioner, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA at the relation of the TOWN OF COVINGTON; and No. 632. VIRGINIA-WESTERN POWER COMPANY, petitioner, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA at the relation of the TOWN OF LEXINGTON. Jan. 12, 1920. For opinion below, see 99 S. E. 723. Messrs. F. W. King, of Clifton Forge, Va., and J. M. Perry, of Staunton, Va., for petitioner. Messrs. O. C. Jackson, and Frank Moore, both of Lexington, Va. (Mr. Wm. A. Anderson, of Lexington, Va., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia denied. (251 U. S. 557) No. 635. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. James B. CONNORS. Jan. 12. 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 303. Messrs. C. D. Hine and Paul J. Jones, both of Youngstown, Ohio, for petitioner. Mr. W. J. Kenealy, of Youngstown, Ohio, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 557) No. 637. EDWARD HINES LUMBER COMPANY, petitioner, v. AMERICAN CAR & FOUNDRY COMPANY. Jan. 12, 1920. For opinion below, see 262 Fed. 757. Messrs. Jacob Newman, Conrad H. Poppenhusen, Henry L. Stern, Edward R. Johnston and Charles T. Farson, all of Chicago, Ill., for petitioners. Messrs. Charles J. Hardy, of New York City. Kemper K. Knapp, Robert W. Campbell, and William D. McKenzie, all of Chicago, Ill., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 558) = No. 639. Emil HERMAN, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Jan. 12, 1920. For opinion below, see 257 Fed. 601. Messrs. Austin Lewis, of San Francisco, Cal., and C. E. S. Wood, of Portland, Or., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Assist. Atty. Gen., and Harry S. Ridgely, of Cheyenne, Wyo., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 558) Nos. 641 and 642. CONSOLIDATED WINDOW GLASS COMPANY, petitioner, v. WINDOW GLASS MACHINE COMPANY et al.; Nos. 643 and 644. PENNSYLVANIA WINDOW GLASS COMPANY, petitioner, v. WINDOW GLASS MACHINE COMPANY et al.; and Nos. 645 and 646. KANE GLASS COMPANY, petitioner, v. WINDOW GLASS MACHINE COMPANY et al. Jan. 12, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 362. Messrs. Marshall A. Christy, of Pittsburgh, Pa., Charles Neave, of Boston, Mass., and Albert W. Bright, of Washington, D. C., for petitioners. Messrs. George H. Parmelce, and Clarence P. Byrnes, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., and Livingston Gifford, of New York City, for respondents. Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 558) No. 648. ARCTIC IRON COMPANY, petitioner, v. CLEVELAND-CLIFFS IRON COMPANY et al. Jan. 12, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 15. Mr. Otto C. Sommerich, of New York City (Messrs. Alexis C. Angell, of Detroit, Mich., Edwin M. Borchard, of New Haven, Conn., and Otto C. Sommerich, of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner. Messrs. A. C. Dustin, Horace Andrews and W. P. Belden, all of Cleveland, Ohio, for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. No. 220. The UNITED STATES, appellant, v. George F. ARCHER et al. Jan. 13, 1920. See, also, Archer v. Archer, 53 Ct. Cl. 405. The Attorney General, for the United States. T. M. Miller, of New Orleans, La., for respond ent. Death of George F. Archer suggested, and appearance of Kate C. Archer, as administratrix of the estate of George F. Archer, deceased, as a party, filed and entered, on motion of Mr. T. M. Miller for Archer. No.-, original. The STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, complainant, v. A. Mitchell PALMER, Attorney General of the United States et al. Jan. 19, 1920. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint herein granted. (251 U. S. 543) No., original. Ex parte in the matter of James F. BISHOP, administrator, etc., petitioner. Jan. 19, 1920. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus herein denied. (251 U. S. 542) No. 136. E. GOUGE et al., appellants, v. John M. HART, collector of internal revenue et al. Jan. 19, 1920. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia. For opinion below, see 250 Fed. 802. Mr. C. J. St. John, of Bristol, Tenn., | for a writ of certiorari to the United States Cirfor appellants. cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 91, 25 Sup. Ct. 208. 49 L Ed. 398; Farrugia v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 233 U. S. 352, 353, 34 Sup. Ct. 591, 58 L. Ed. 996; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 U. S. 369, 371372, 34 Sup. Ct. 810, 58 L. Ed. 1356; Male v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Ry. Co., 240 U. S. 97, 99, 36 Sup. Ct. 351,.60 L. Ed. 544. No. 660. The AMERICAN GUARANTY COMPANY, petitioner, v. AMERICAN FIDELITY COMPANY. Jan. 19, 1920. For opinion below, see 260 Fed. 897. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 559) (251 U. S. 559) No. 664. JEONG QUEY HOW, petitioner, v. Edward WHITE, as Commissioner of Immigration at the port of San Francisco. Jan. 19, 1920. For opinion below, see 258 Fed. 618, 170 C. C. A. 72. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. (251 U. S. 543) No. -. Harmon P. MCKNIGHT v. The UNITED STATES. Jan. 20, 1920. Application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for the purposes of a petition for certiorari to and an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. PER CURIAM. The prayer to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose of an application for certiorari to review the judgment below, as well as for the purpose of an appeal asked to review a refusal to release on habeas corpus, made to the Chief Justice and by him submitted to the court for its action is hereby denied. (251 U. S. 566) No. 174. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. Mrs. Lessie HORTON, administratrix, etc. Jan. 21, 1920. On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina. For opinion below, see 175 N. C. 472, 95 S. E. 883. See, also, 248 U. S. 553, 39 Sup. Ct. 8, 63 L. Ed. 418; 39 Sup. Ct. 21, 64 L. Ed. -. Mr. Thaddeus A. Adams, of Charlotte, N. C., for petitioner. Mr. Robert W. Winston, of Raleigh, N. C., for respondent. Dismissed with costs, on mo No. 663. MORRIS & CUMINGS DREDG- (251 U. S. 382) (40 Sup.Ct.) REX v. UNITED STATES et al. (Argued Jan. 13, 1920. Decided Jan. 26, 1920.) No. 126. COURTS456 STATUTE REINSTATES ONLY The amendment of Act March 3, 1891, § 1, giving jurisdiction to Court of Claims over claims for property of "citizens" taken by Indians of a "band, tribe or nation" in amity with the United States, by Act Jan. 11, 1915, so that, in claims for property of "citizens or inhabitants" taken by Indians belonging to any "tribe" in amity with the United States, the alienage of the claimant shall not be a de fense, and reinstating claims that had been dismissed for want of proof of citizenship, or for alienage, of claimant, does not, as is necessary to prevent the claim being barred by limitations, reinstate a claim dismissed because the Blackhawk "band" of Utes, taking the property, was not in amity with the United States. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Suit by Mary E. Rex, administratrix of James A. Ivie, deceased, against the United States and the Ute Indians. Petition dis missed (53 Ct. Cl. 320), and claimant appeals. so that in all claims for property of citizens or inhabitants of the United States taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any tribe in amity with and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, &c., the alienage of the claimant shall not be a defence to said claims, with provisos to be mentioned. The present petition, filed September 21, 1917, alleges that the tribe of Utes was in amity with the United States. The claimant contends that the amendment had two purposes-not merely to give inhabitants the same rights as citizens, but also to admit claims for damage done by hostile bands from a tribe that maintained its amity, subject to a proviso that suit had been *384 brought upon them theretofore in the Court of Claims. It is said that claims of that nature that still were pending in the Court have been awarded judgment under the new jurisdiction. Another proviso in the Act is that claims that have been dismissed by the Court for want of proof of citizenship or alienage shall be reinstated, and the petition prays that the former claim be consolidated with this suit, and that judgment be awarded upon the evidence filed in the former case. It is pointed out as an anomaly that the case of a neighbor of the intestate who suffered damage from the same band on the same day was reinstated and passed to judgment, his claim having been dismissed at an earlier date because he was not a citizen at the time. But we are of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Claims was plainly right. The emphasis and primary intent, at least, of the Act of 1915 was to remove the defence of alienage. When it goes on by an express proviso to reinstate claims dismissed upon that ground and says nothing as to the other class it is impossible to extend the words. According to the claimant's necessary argument Congress had claims for damage by hostile bands before its eyes. On the face of the act it had before them also the matter of reinstatement. Yet it did not purport to reinstate claims of the present class. According to the claimant's account there was something for the act to operate on in the way of damage by hostile bands and the words cannot be carried further than they go. The Court of Claims rightly held that the old claim was not reinstated and that considered as a new claim the present suit was barred by the three years' limitation in the original act. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the appellant's petition upon demurrer. The claim is for depredations committed on June 10, 1866, by a band of the Ute tribe of Indians, known as Blackhawk's band. The Act of March 3, 1891, с. 538, § 1, 26 Stat. 851, gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims over all claims for property of citizens taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United States. See Rev. Stat. § 2156 (Comp. St. § 4159). Act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, § 17, 4 Stat. 729, 731. The appellant's intestate filed his claim but on June 13, 1898, the Court of Claims held that the Blackhawk band of Utes was not in amity with the United States and dismissed the petition. The present petition relies upon the Act of January 11, 1915, c. 7, 38 Stat. 791, amending the first section of the Act of 1891 Judgment affirmed. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (251 U. S. 385) tioned, they both were arrested at their SILVERTHORNE LUMBER CO., Inc., et al. homes early in the morning of February 25, v. UNITED STATES. (Argued Dec. 12, 1919. Decided Jan. 26, 1920.) No. 358. 7-KNOWLEDGE 1. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES BE USED. Knowledge gained by government's wrongful search and seizure may not, on return by order of the court, of the original articles, be used to call on the owners by subpœnas to produce them; so that they may not be punished for disobeying an order to comply with the subpœnas. and were detained in custody a number of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the Department of Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there. All the employés were taken or directed to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also the books, &c., were taken at once. An application was made as soon as might be to the District Court for a return of what thus had been taken unlawfully. It was opposed by the District Attorney so far as he had found evidence against the plaintiffs in error, and it was stated that the evidence so obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given by the District Attorney to the approach of those concerned in the act The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Pitney, by an invalid subpœna for certain documents dissenting. 2. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES TION TO BE PROTECTED. 7-CORPORA The rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected, even if the same result might be achieved by the government in a lawful way. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of New York. Judgment for contempt was rendered against the Silverthorne Lumber Company, Incorporated, and another for disobedience of an order to comply with subpœnas to produce papers in a prosecution by the United States, and they bring error. Reversed. Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney and Myer Cohen, both of Washington, D. C., and William D. Guthrie, of New York City, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Stewart, for the United States. *390 *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment of the District Court fining the Silverthorne Lumber Company two hundred and fifty dollars for contempt of court and ordering Frederick W. Silverthorne to be imprisoned until he should purge himself of a similar contempt. The contempt in question was a refusal to obey subpœnas and an order of Court to produce books and documents of the company before the grand jury to be used in regard to alleged violation of the statutes of the United States by the said Silverthorne and his father. One ground of the refusal was that the order of the Court infringed the rights of the parties under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. *391 relating to the charge in the indictment then on file. Thus the case is not that of knowledge acquired through the wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be assumed that the Government planned or at all events ratified the whole performance. Photographs and copies of material papers were made and a new indictment was framed based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpœnas to produce the originals then were served and on the refusal of the plaintiffs in error to produce them the Court made an order that the subpœnas should be complied with, although it had found that all the papers had been seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this order is the contempt alleged. The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not have had. [1, 2] The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177, to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly The facts are simple. An indictment upon a single specific charge having been brought against the two Silverthornes men- before the grand jury was unwarranted, but 392 For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (40 Sup.Ct.) it is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. 232 U. S. 393, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177. The es sence of a provision forbidding the acquisi tion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. The numerous decisions, like Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575, holding that a collateral inquiry into the mode in which evidence has been got will not be allowed when the question is raised for the first time at the trial, are no authority in the present proceeding, as is explained in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 394, 395, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177. Whether some of those decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is unnecessary to inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is stated satisfactorily in Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A. 367. In Linn v. United States, 251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 С. С. A. 470, it was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. Judginent reversed. The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice PITNEY dissent. (251 U. S. 396) BROOKS-SCANLON CO. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Suit by the Brooks-Scanlon Company against the Railroad Commission of Louisiana. Judgments adverse to defendant were reversed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana (144 La. 1086, 81 South. 727), and plaintiff brings certiorari. Reversed. Messrs. J. Blanc Monroe, of New Orleans, La., Robert R. Reid, of Hammond, La., and Monte M. Lemann, of New Orleans, La., for petitioner. Mr. Wylie M. Barrow, of Baton Rouge, La., for respondent. •397 *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit by the Brooks-Scanlon Company, a Minnesota corporation organized to manufacture and deal in lumber and to carry on other incidental business, against the Railroad Commission of Louisiana. It seeks (Argued Jan. 6, 1920. Decided Feb. 2, 1920.) to set aside an order (Number 2228) of the No. 386. Commission requiring the plaintiff either directly or through arrangements made with 1. RAILROADS 57 OPERATION AT LOSS the Kentwood and Eastern Railway ComCANNOT BE REQUIRED. A company cannot be compelled to operate its railroad where it cannot do so without loss therefrom, though its other business of lumbering be sufficiently remunerative to absorb the loss and make returns on its entire business. pany, to operate its narrow gauge railroad between Kentwood and Hackley in Louisiana upon schedules and days to be approved by the Commission. The plaintiff alleges that the order cannot be complied with except at a loss of more than $1,500 a month, and that 2. RAILROADS 57-MAY DISCONTINUE OP- to compel compliance would deprive the plain ERATION AT LOSS. If a company operating a lumber business and a railroad be taken to have granted to the tiff of its property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, with For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMEER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |
