(40 Sup.Ct.) it adds to the value of the road and the | terstate commerce and a taking of property *70 without due process of law. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498, 48 L. Ed. 761; Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 282, 39 Sup. Ct. 276, 63 L. Ed. 602. rights exercised in the State. Hence the *possession of bonds secured by mortgage of lands in other States, or of a land-grant in another State or of other property that adds to the riches of the corporation but does not affect the North Dakota part of the road is no-sufficient ground for the increase of the The Attorney General of the State in his very candid argument suggested that if the mode adopted by the tax commissioner were strued to give him an election as to the methopen to objections the statute might be conod of distribution, and that he should take gross earnings, or, if more easily ascertain tax-whatever it may be whether a tax on property, or, as here, an excise upon doing business in the State. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 364, 35 Sup. Ct. 99, 59 L. Ed. 265. In this case, able, the property or mileage basis of distriit is alleged, the tax commissioner's valua-bution. As we are dealing only with a pretion included items of the kind described to liminary injunction we confine our consideravery large amounts. The foregoing consid- tion to a general view of the mode actually erations justify the preliminary injunction followed, and upon that we are of opinion that was granted against what would appear that the decree should be affirmed. to be an unwarranted interference with in- Decree affirmed. (253 U. S. 149) In Error to the Supreme Court of the State KNICKERBOCKER ICE CO. v. STEWART. of New York, Appellate Division, Third De(Argued Dec. 16, 1919. Decided May 17, 1920.) partment. No. 543. MATTERS. Proceeding by Lillian E. Stewart for com1. ADMIRALTY 1-CONGRESS HAS EXCLU-pensation under the Workmen's CompensaSIVE POWER OF LEGISLATION IN MARITIME tion Law for the death of her husband, William M. Stewart, opposed by the KnickerUnder Const. art. 3, § 2, providing that the bocker Ice Company, employer. Compensajudicial power shall extend to all cases of ad- tion was awarded, and the award affirmed miralty and maritime jurisdiction, and article by the Appellate Division (187 App. Div. 915, 1, § 8, authorizing Congress to make necessary 173 N. Y. Supp. 924), and by the Court of Apand proper laws for carrying out granted pow-peals (226 N. Y. 302, 123 N. E. 382), and the ers, the Constitution adopted and established as part of the laws of the United States approved rules of the general maritime law and empowered Congress to legislate in respect to them and other matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and took from the states all power by legislation or judicial decision to contravene the essential purposes or work material injury to characteristic features of such law. Reversed and re 2. STATES 4-RESERVATION OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION TO STATE COURTS DOES NOT AUTHORIZE CREATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS. As, under Const. art. 6, cl. 2, declaring the Constitution and the laws adopted in pursuance thereof the supreme law of the land, the state courts may, and unless inhibited must, apply federal laws, a mere reservation of partially concurrent jurisdiction to such courts by an act of Congress conferring an otherwise exclusive jurisdiction on national courts cannot create substantive rights or obligations or indicate assent to their creation by the states. 3. STATUTES CLAUSE IS NOT TO CREATE. 228-OBJECT OF SAVING The usual function of a saving clause in a statute is not to create anything, but to preserve something from immediate interference. 4. STATUTES 216-ERRONEOUS LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT ALTER LAW. An expression by the Legislature of an erroneous opinion concerning the law does not alter it. 5. ADMIRALTY MARITIME INJURIES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Act Oct. 6, 1917, amending Judicial Code, §§ 24, 256 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 991[3], 1233), relative to the jurisdiction of federal courts, so as to save to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy, etc., "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state," seeks to authorize and sanction action by the states in prescribing and enforcing rights, obligations, liabilities, and remedies designed to provide compensation for injuries to employés engaged in maritime work, and, as so construed, is beyond the power of Congress, as its power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement cannot be delegated to the states, especially as it would destroy the uniformity contemplated by the Constitution. employer brings error. $150 *Mr. Frank R. Savidge, of New York City, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Justice Pitney, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting. *152 *Mr. E. Clarence Aiken, of Albany, N. Y., for defendant in error. children; and both Ap*pellate Division and the Court of Appeals approved it. Stewart v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 226 N. Y. 302, 123 N. E. 382. The latter concluded that the reasons which constrained us to hold the Compensation Law inapplicable to an employé engaged in maritime work-Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. 1-SAVING REMEDIES UNDER STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS FOR | Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900-had been extinguished by "An act to amend sections twenty-four and two hundred and fifty-six of the Judicial Code, relating to the jurisdiction of the District Courts, so as to save to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state," approved October 6, 1917. 40 Stat. 395, c. 97 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 991 [3], 1233). *155 *Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. While employed by Knickerbocker Ice Company as bargeman and doing work of a maritime nature, William M. Stewart fell into the Hudson river and drowned-August 3, 1918. His widow, defendant in error, claimed under the Workmen's Compensation Law of New York (Consol. Laws N. Y. c. 67); the Industrial Commission granted an award against the company for her and the minor #156 The provision of section 9, Judiciary Act 1789 (1 Stat. 76, c. 20), granting to United States District Courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, * * saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a commonlaw remedy, where the common law is competent to give it," was carried into the Revised Statutes (sections 563 and 711 [Comp. St. § For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (40 Sup.Ct.) 1233]) and thence into the Judicial Code, sary and proper laws for carrying out grant(clause 3, sections 24 and 256 [Comp. St. Sed powers), “in the absence of some control991(3), 1233]). The saving clause remained ling statute the general maritime law as unchanged until the statute of October 6, accepted by the federal courts constitutes 1917, added "and to claimants the rights and *158 remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state."1 *157 part of our national law applicable to the matters within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"; also that "Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country." And we held that, when applied to maritime injuries, the New York Workmen's Compensation Law conflicts with the rules adopted by the Constitution and to that extent is invalid. "The necessary conse *In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (May, 1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, we declared that under section 2, article 3, of the Constitution ("The judicial power shall extend to * all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"), and section 8, article 1 (Congress may make neces-quence would be destruction of the very uni "The District Courts shall have jurisdiction as follows: "Eighth. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it; and of all seizures on land and on waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. And such jurisdiction shall be exclusive, except in the particular cases where jurisdiction of such causes and seizures is given to the circuit courts. And shall have original and exclusive cognizance of all prizes brought into the United States, except as provided in paragraph six of section six hundred and twenty-nine." Rev. Stats. § 711: "The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states: "Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." The Judicial Code formity in respect of maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to establish, and freedom of navigation between the states and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and impeded." We also pointed out that the saving clause taken from the original Judiciary Act had no application, since, at most, it only specified common-law remedies, whereas the remedy prescribed by the compensation law was unknown to the common law and incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court. Moreover, if applied to nraritime affairs, the statute would obstruct the policy of Congress to encourage investments in ships. In Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co. (June, 1918) 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171, an action at law seeking full indemnity for injuries received by a sailor while on shipboard, we said: Pacific Co. v. Jensen, no state has power to "Under the doctrine approved in Southern abolish the well recognized maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law. Such a substitution would distinctly and *159 definitely *change or add to the settled maritime law; and it would be destructive of the 'uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial Section 24: "The District Courts shall have orig- character affecting the intercourse of the states inal jurisdiction as follows: "Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it. "Section 256: " "The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States in the cases and proceedings here inafter mentioned, shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states: • "Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy; where the common law is competent to give it." Act Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, 40 Stat. 395: "That clause three of section twenty-four of the Judicial Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state; of all seizures on land or waters not within admiralty and maritime with each other or with foreign states.'" And concerning the clause, “saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," this: "In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen we definitely ruled that it gave no authority to the several states to enact legislation which would work material prejudice to the characteristic features jurisdiction; of all prizes brought into the United States; and of all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize.' "Sec. 2. That clause three of section two hundred and fifty-six of the Judicial Code is hereby amended to read as follows: ""Third. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state.'"' the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.' "Under the saving clause a right sanctioned by the maritime law may be enforced 999 of the general maritime law or interfere with Since the beginning federal courts have recognized and applied the rules and principles of maritime law as something distinct from laws of the several states-not derived from or dependent on their will. The foundation of the right to do this, the purpose for which it was granted, and the nature of the system so administered, were distinctly pointed out long ago: through any appropriate remedy recognized at common law; but we find nothing therein which reveals an intention to give the complaining party an election to determine whether the defendant's liability shall be measured by commonlaw standards rather than those of the maritime law." Thus we distinctly approved the view that the original saving clause conferred no substantive rights and did not authorize the states so to do. It referred only to remedies and to the extent specified permitted continued enforcement by the state courts of rights and obligations founded on maritime law. The field was not left unoccupied; the In Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 308, 39 Sup. Ct. 112, 63 L. Ed. 261, an admiralty cause, a master sought to recover damages for breach of an oral contract, with the owner of a vessel for services to be performed principally upon the sea. The latter claimed invalidity of the contract under a statute of California, where made, because not in writ- | Constitution itself adopted the rules concerning and not to be performed within a year. ing rights and liabilities applicable therein; We ruled: and certainly these are not less paramount than they would have been if enacted by Congress. Unless this be true it is quite impossible to account for a multitude of adjudications by the admiralty courts. See Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, 557, et seq., 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 45 L. Ed. 314. "The Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held that this contract was maritime in its nature and an action in admiralty thereon for its breach could not be defeated by the statute of #160 *California relied upon by the petitioner." "In entering into this contract the parties contemplated no services in California. They were making an engagement for the services of the master of the vessel, the duties to be performed in the waters of Alaska, mainly upon the sea. The maritime law controlled in this respect, and was not subject to limitation because the particular engagement happened to be made in California. The parties must be presumed to have had in contemplation the system of maritime law under which it was made." "That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot #161 See, also, The Black Heath, 195 U. S. 361, 365, 25 Sup. Ct. 46, 47, 49 L. Ed. 236. *be doubted. * * One thing, however, is ferred to a system of law coextensive with, and unquestionable; the Constitution must have reoperating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign states." The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 574, 575 (22 L. Ed. 654). [2] The distinction between the indicated situation created by the Constitution relative to maritime affairs and the one resulting from the mere grant of power to regulate commerce without more, should not be forgotten; also, it should be noted that federal laws are constantly applied in state courtsunless inhibited their duty so requires. Constitution, art. 6, clause 2; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44. Consequently mere reservation of partially concurrent cognizance to such courts by an act of Congress conferring an otherwise ex [1] As the plain result of these recent opinions and the earlier cases upon which they are based, we accept the following doc-clusive jurisdiction upon national courts, trine: The Constitution itself adopted and could not create substantive rights or obligaestablished, as part of the laws of the United tions or indicate assent to their creation by States, approved rules of the general mari- the states. time law and empowered Congress to legislate in respect of them and other matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, it took from the states all power, by legislation or judicial decision, to contravene the essential purposes of, or to work material injury to, characteristic features of such law or to interfere with its tainties. In the first, the District Court in proper harmony and uniformity in its inter- New York dismissed a libel, holding that national and interstate relations. To pre- rights and remedies prescribed by the comserve adequate harmony and appropriate uni-pensation law of that state are exclusive and form rules relating to maritime matters and pro tanto supersede the maritime law. In bring them within control of the federal gov- the second, the District Court of Oregon rulernment was the fundamental purpose; and ed that when an employé seeks redress for a to such definite end Congress was empowered maritime tort by an admiralty court, rights, to legislate within that sphere. obligations and liabilities of the respective *162 When considered with former decisions of this court, a satisfactory interpretation of the Act of October 6, 1917, is difficult, perhaps impossible. The Howell (D. C.) 257 Fed. 578, and Rohde v. Grant Smith Porter Co. (D. C.) 259 Fed. 304, illustrate some of the uncer (40 Sup.Ct.) parties must be measured by the maritime | general legislative purpose. And, with this law and these cannot be barred, enlarged or and accompanying circumstances, the words taken away by state legislation.. Other dif- must be read. ficulties hang upon the unexplained words [5] Having regard to all these things, we "workmen's compensation law of any state." conclude that Congress undertook to permit [3, 4] Moreover, the act only undertook to application of workmen's compensation laws add certain specified rights and remedies to of the several states to injuries within the a saving clause within a Code section con- admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and ferring jurisdiction. We have held that be- to save such statutes from the objections fore the amendment and irrespective of that pointed out by Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. section, such rights and remedies did not ap-It sought to authorize and sanction action by ply to maritime torts because they were in- the states in prescribing and enforcing, as to consistent with paramount federal law- all parties concerned, rights, obligations, liawithin that field they had no existence. Were the added words therefore wholly in- bilities *and remedies designed to provide effective? The usual function of a saving compensation for injuries suffered by emclause is to preserve something from immedi-ployés engaged in maritime work. #164 And, so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities dies for their enforcement, arises from the within the maritime jurisdiction, and remeConstitution, as above indicated. The definite object of the grant was to commit direct control to the federal government, to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary bur ate interference-not to create; and the rule is that expression by the Legislature of an erroneous opinion concerning the law does not alter it. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 372. Neither branch of Congress devoted much debate to the act under consideration-altogether, less than two pages of the Record (65th Cong. pp. 7605, 7843). The Judiciary dens and disadvantages incident to discordCommittee of the House made no report; but ant legislation, and to establish, so far as a brief one by the Senate Judiciary Commit-practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union. *163 tee, copied below,2 *probably indicates the Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite end for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that in their characteristic features and essential international and interstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended, or changed, except by legislation which embodies both the will and deliberate judgment of Congress. The subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to its discretionnot for delegation to others. To say that, because Congress could have enacted a compensation act applicable to maritime injuries, it could authorize the states to do so, as they might desire, is false reasoning. Moreover, such an authorization would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only contemplated, but actually established-it would defeat the See Sudden & very purpose of the grant. Christenson v. Industrial Accident Commission (Cal.) 188 Pac. 803. 265th Congress, 1st Session. Senate Report No. 139. Amending the Judicial Code. October 2, 1917. -Ordered to be printed. Mr. Ashurst, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following Report [to accompany S. 2916]: The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (S. 2916) to amend sections 24 and 256 of the Judicial Code, relating to the jurisdiction of the district courts, so as to save to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state, having considered the same, recommend its passage without amend ment. The Judicial Code, by sections 24 and 256, confers exclusive jurisdiction on the district courts of the United States of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." It was declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen that "the remedy which the compensation statute attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction." The bill (S. 2916) proposes only to amend the Judicial Code by so enlarging the saving clause as to include the rights and remedies under the compensation law of any state. Inasmuch as not only the remedy but sometimes the right under the compensation plan is unknown to the common law, both rights and remedies are included in the bill. The bill, if enacted, will not disrupt the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. The most that can be said of it will be that it is a recognition S. 470, 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525; by Congress that a concurrent jurisdiction, state Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 119, and federal, should exist over certain matters. 126, 25 Sup. Ct. 211, 49 L. Ed. 409; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Goodrich, Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 214, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729. In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Actions that were formerly triable in admiralty courts will still be triable there. Where the cases were formerly triable only in such courts, it will now be possible for the state, through its compensation plan, to determine the rights of the parties concerned. In other words, there being concurrent Co., 242 U. *S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. jurisdiction, the injured party, or his dependents, *165 may bring an action in admiralty or submit a 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, claim under the compensation plan. 845, notwithstanding the contention that it Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the states-by nature this is nondelegable. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. |
