And section 3436 declares:

respect for the views of my Brethren, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court because convinced that there is error in holding without qualification that since the decision of the Forrester Case 8 per cent. is the rate of interest allowed and limited for state banks of issue by the laws of the state of Georgia. It seems to me erroneous to regard that decision as merely defining usury and thus settling what lawfully may be done by state banks in respect of taking interest in advance, and to ignore its effect, in combination with the quoted sections of the Code, as constituting the law of the State which fixes the maximum rate of interest for such banks and therefore, under section 5197, Rev. Stat. U. S., establishes the limit for national banks located in that state. Plainly, I think, the purpose of Con

*118

Banking Co. v. Forrester, 143 *Ga. 302, 84 S. E. 961, L. R. A. 1915D, 1195. See Mackenzie v. Flannery, 90 Ga. 590, 599, 16 S. E. 710; Union Savings Bank v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 614, 34 S. E. 217; McCall v. Herring, 116 Ga. 235, 243, 42 S. E. 468.

The Forrester Case was decided April 13, 1915. The claim involved in the present suit includes a series of transactions, the first of which was on November 2, 1914, the last on October 18, 1915. A majority of these were prior to the decision in the Forrester Case, and as to them I agree that there was no violation of the federal statute.

With respect to the others, I have reached a different conclusion. The case was decided on a demurrer to plaintiff's petition, in which it was alleged that defendant (now respondent) knowingly received and charged interest in excess of the highest contractual rate allowed under the laws of the state, specifying the particular dates and amounts. This necessarily imports a knowledge at the time of each transaction as to what then constituted the law of the state, supposing such knowledge need be averred.

precise equality in this respect with banks of issue organized under state laws, and that where the local law places a higher or a lower limit upon such banks of issue than upon other lenders of money the same limit should be imposed upon the national banks.

The section has regard to substance, not merely to form; and in determining what is in substance the local rate of interest it is fallacious, I submit, to regard the multiplier only (say, 8 per cent.), and ignore the multiplicand, since both factors have equal influence in producing the result. As in other cases of testing state laws by a federal standard, the question is: What is the effect and operation of those laws, as construed and applied by the state court of last resort?

The difference between, the effect of computing discount taken in advance according to the custom of bankers, by applying the allowed percentage to the face of the note, termed “bank discount,” and the effect of deducting an amount equivalent to exact interest on the sum actually loaned, termed "true discount," is very substantial, and is recognized in the standard interest and discount tables, which contain computations on both bases. To illustrate by a comparison: If interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum be reserved in advance and computed upon the face of a three months note, it amounts to 2.0408 per cent. for the period, or at the rate of 8.1632 per centum per annum upon the money loaned; upon a six months note it amounts to 4.1667 per cent. for the period, or at the rate of 8.3333 per centum per annum; upon a nine months note, to 6.383 per cent. for the period, or at the rate of 8.511 per centum per annum; upon a one year note it amounts to 8.695 per cent.

The legal problem is precisely analogous to that involved in comparing respective burdens of taxation imposed upon different prop

*119

*60

provisions of section three of this act,2 *shall accordingly ascertain such compensation and report the same to the board of supervisors. Said board may allow the full amount so agreed upon, or reported by said freeholders, or so much thereof as upon investigation they may deem reasonable, subject to such owner or tenant's right of appeal to the circuit court as in other cases."

The same statute, in clause 5, deals with the compensation to be paid for lands taken for roadways, and in that connection provides that the proprietor or tenant, if dissatisfied with the amount allowed by the supervisors, "may of right appeal to the circuit court of said county, and the said court shall hear the matter de novo" and determine and certify the amount to be paid. And a general statute (section 838), which regulates the time and mode of taking appeals from decisions of the supervisors disallowing claims in whole or in part, provides that the claimant, if present when the decision is made, may appeal to the circuit court within thirty days thereafter, and, if not present, shall be notified in writing by the clerk and may appeal within thirty days after service of the notice.

Apart from what is implied by the decision under review, no construction of these statutory provisions by the state court of last resort has been brought to our attention; so for the purposes of this case we must construe them. The task is not difficult. The words employed are direct and free from ambiguity, and the several provisions are in entire harmony. They show that, in the absence of an agreement, the compensation is to be assessed primarily by viewers, that their award is to be examined by the supervisors and approved or changed as to the latter may appear reasonable, and that from the decision of the supervisors an appeal lies as of right to the circuit court where the matter may be heard de novo. Thus, by exercising the right to appeal the owner may obtain a full hearing in a court of justiceone concededly possessing and exercising a general jurisdiction. An opportunity to have such a *hearing, before the compensation is finally determined, and when the right thereto can be effectively asserted and protected, satisfies the demand of due process.

*61

Under the statute the proceedings looking to an assessment may be initiated by the owner as well as by the road officers. Either may apply to a justice for the appointment of viewers. Thus the owner is free to act promptly and upon his own motion, if he

chooses.

But it is contended that where the road officers take the initiative as they do in many instances-the proceedings may be carried from inception to conclusion without any notice to the owner, and therefore with

peal. We think the contention is not tenable. It takes into account some of the statutory provisions and rejects others equally important. It is true there is no express provision for notice at the inception or during the early stages of the proceedings; and for present purposes it may be assumed that such a requirement is not even implied, although a different view might be admissible. See Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 13 Sup. Ct. 750, 37 L. Ed. 637. But the provisions relating to the later stage the decision by the supervisors-are not silent in respect of notice, but speak in terms easily understood. Clauses 5 and 22 taken together provide that the owner, if dissatisfied with the decision, shall have the right to appeal as in other This presupposes that he will have some knowledge of the decision, and yet neither clause states how the knowledge is to be obtained, or when or how the right of appeal is to be exercised. All this is explained, however, when section 838 is examined. It deals with these questions in a comprehensive way and evidently is intended to be of general application. Of course, newly created rights of appeal of the same class fall within its operation unless the Legislature provides otherwise. Here the Legislature has not provided otherwise, and so has indicated that it is content to have the general

cases.

*62

statute applied. As before stated, that *statute provides that the claimant, if not present when the supervisors' decision is made, shall be notified thereof in writing and shall have thirty days after such notice within which to appeal. If he be present when the decision is made, he is regarded as receiving notice at that time, and the thirty days for taking an appeal begins to run at once. apparent therefore that special care is taken to afford him ample opportunity to appeal and thereby to obtain a full hearing in the circuit court.

It is

[5] The claim is made that this opportunity comes after the taking, and therefore is too late. But it is settled by the decisions of this court that where adequate provision is made for the certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable delay the taking does not contravene due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of what compensation is just. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 402, 407, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 440, 47 L. Ed. 559; Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771. And see Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 Pac. 527, 24 L. R. A, 355. As before indicated, it is not questioned thɛt such adequate provision for payment is made in this instance.

We conclude that the objections urged against the validity of the statute are not well taken.

Judgment affirmed.

(251 U. S. 121)

PETERS et al. v. VEASEY.

⚫122

No. 77.

1. ADMIRALTY 20-STATE COMPENSATION LAWS INAPPLICABLE TO MARITIME TORT. The work in which a longshoreman on board a vessel lying at New Orleans was engaged having been maritime in its nature, his employment was a maritime contract, his injuries were maritime, and the rights and liabilities of himself and his employers were within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, so that the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana had no application.

2. ADMIRALTY 20-STATUTE SAVING REMEDIES UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS WITHOUT RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

Act Cong. Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, amending Judicial Code, § 24, cl. 3, and section 256, cl. 3 (Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991, 1233), so as to save to claimants for injuries otherwise within the federal admiralty jurisdiction their rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state, should not be given a retroactive effect; there being nothing to indicate

such a purpose.

Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke

dissenting.

Suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Louisiana by Thomas Veasey against Henry Peters, Eugene Peters, and the Etna Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which affirmed (142 La. 1012, 77 South. 948), and, plaintiff having died, and the administratrix of his succession having been substituted, defendants bring error. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Messrs. George Janvier and William C. Dufour, both of New Orleans, La., for plain

tiffs in error.

Mr. Walter S. Penfield, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

[1] The work in which defendant in error was engaged is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiraty jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state had no application when the accident occurred. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59, 60, 61, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 217, 218, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900.

[2] Clause third, section 24, of the judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1091) confers upon the District Courts of the United States jurisdiction "of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a commonlaw remedy where the common law is competent to give it." Clause third, section 256,

provides that the jurisdiction of the courts

of the United States shall be exclusive in "all

civil causes of admiralty and maritime juris

diction, saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." By an act approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 395, c. 97 [Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991, 1233]), Congress directed that both of these clauses be amended by inserting after "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," the words "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state." The court below erroneously concluded that this act should be given retroactive effect and applied in the *123

present controversy. There is nothing in the language employed, nor is there any circumstance known to us, which indicates a purpose to make the act applicable when the cause of action arose before its passage; and we think it must not be so construed.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.