Supreme Court Reporter

holders, after being sworn according to the fout his having an opportunity to take an apIt takes into account some of the statutory peal. We think the contention is not tenable. provisions and rejects others equally important. It is true there is no express provision for notice at the inception or during the early stages of the proceedings; and for present purposes it may be assumed that such a requirement is not even implied, although a different view might be admissible. See Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 13 Sup. Ct. 750, 37 L. Ed. 637. But the provisions relating to the later stage the decision by the supervisors-are not silent in respect of notice, but speak in terms easily understood. Clauses 5 and 22 taken together provide that the owner, if dissatisfied with the decision, shall have the right to appeal as in other This presupposes that he will have some knowledge of the decision, and yet neither clause states how the knowledge is to be obtained, or when or how the right of appeal is to be exercised. All this is explained, however, when 'section 838 is examined. It deals with these questions in a comprehensive way and evidently is intended to be of general application. Of course, newly created rights of appeal of the same class fall within its operation unless the Legislature provides otherwise. Here the Legislature has not provided otherwise, and so has indicated that it is content to have the general

cases.

*60

provisions of section three of this act,2 *shall accordingly ascertain such compensation and report the same to the board of supervisors. Said board may allow the full amount so agreed upon, or reported by said freeholders, or so much thereof as upon investigation they may deem reasonable, subject to such owner or tenant's right of appeal to the circuit court as in other cases."

The same statute, in clause 5, deals with the compensation to be paid for lands taken for roadways, and in that connection provides that the proprietor or tenant, if dissatisfied with the amount allowed by the supervisors, "may of right appeal to the circuit court of said county, and the said court shall hear the matter de novo" and determine and certify the amount to be paid. And a general statute (section 838), which regulates the time and mode of taking appeals from decisions of the supervisors disallowing claims in whole or in part, provides that the claimant, if present when the decision is made, may appeal to the circuit court within thirty days thereafter, and, if not present, shall be notified in writing by the clerk and may appeal within thirty days after service of the notice.

Under the statute the proceedings looking to an assessment may be initiated by the owner as well as by the road officers. Either may apply to a justice for the appointment of viewers. Thus the owner is free to act promptly and upon his own motion, if he

chooses.

But it is contended that where the road officers take the initiative as they do in many instances the proceedings may be carried from inception to conclusion without any notice to the owner, and therefore withThat they will faithfully and impar

214

tially discharge their duty as viewers."

*62

statute applied. As before stated, that *statute provides that the claimant, if not present when the supervisors' decision is made, shall be notified thereof in writing and shall have thirty days after such notice within which to appeal. If he be present when the decision is made, he is regarded as receiving notice at that time, and the thirty days for takIt is ing an appeal begins to run at once. apparent therefore that special care is taken to afford him ample opportunity to appeal and thereby to obtain a full hearing in the circuit court.

[5] The claim is made that this opportunity comes after the taking, and therefore is too late. But it is settled by the decisions of this court that where adequate provision is made for the certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable delay the taking does not contravene due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of what compensation is just. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 402, 407, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 440, 47 L. Ed. 559; Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771. And see Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 Pac. 527, 24 L. R. A. 355. As before indicated, it is not questioned that such adequate provision for payment is made

in this instance.

We conclude that the objections urged against the validity of the statute are not

well taken.

Judgment affirmed.

(251 U. S. 121)

(40 Sup.Ct.)

PETERS et al. v. VEASEY.

A compensation policy in favor of Peters, issued by the Etna Life Insurance Company,

(Argued Nov. 14, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) was in force when the accident occurred.

No. 77.

1. ADMIRALTY 20-STATE COMPENSATION LAWS INAPPLICABLE TO MARITIME tort.

The work in which a longshoreman on board a vessel lying at New Orleans was engaged having been maritime in its nature, his employment was a maritime contract, his injuries were maritime, and the rights and liabilities of himself and his employers were within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, so that the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana had no application.

2. ADMIRALTY 20-STATUTE SAVING REMEDIES UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS WITHOUT BETROACTIVE EFFECT.

Act Cong. Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, amending Judicial Code, § 24, cl. 3, and section 256, cl. 3 (Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991, 1233), so as to save to claimants for injuries otherwise within the federal admiralty jurisdiction their rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state, should not be given a retroactive effect; there being nothing to indicate

such a purpose.

Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Clarke

dissenting.

Suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Louisiana by Thomas Veasey against Henry Peters, Eugene Peters, and the Etna Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which affirmed (142 La. 1012, 77 South. 948), and, plaintiff having died, and the administratrix of his succession having been substituted, defendants bring error. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Messrs. George Janvier and William C. Dufour, both of New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Walter S. Penfield, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.

•122

employed by Henry *and Eugene Peters as a longshoreman on board the Seria, then lying at New Orleans. The steamer was being unloaded. While upon her and engaged in that work, Veasey accidentally fell through a hatchway. Veasey v. Peters, 142 La. 1012, 77 South. 948.

[2] Clause third, section 24, of the judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1091) confers upon the District Courts of the United States jurisdiction "of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a commonlaw remedy where the common law is competent to give it." Clause third, section 256, provides that the jurisdiction of the courts

of the United States shall be exclusive in "all

of Louisiana.

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." By an act approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 395, c. 97 [Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991, 1233]), Congress directed that both of these clauses be amended by inserting after "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," the words "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state." The court below erroneously concluded that this act should be given retroactive effect and applied in the

*123

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana (No. 20, Acts La. 1914), the Supreme Court of that state affirmed a judgment against plaintiffs in error and in favor of Veasey, who claimed to have suffered injuries, August 6, 1915, while

[1] The work in which defendant in error was engaged is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiraty jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state had no application when the accident occurred. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59, 60, 61, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 217, 218, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900.

*present controversy. There is nothing in the language employed, nor is there any circumstance known to us, which indicates a

purpose to make the act applicable when the cause of action arose before its passage; and we think it must not be so construed.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice CLARKE dissent.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
40 SUP.CT.-5

holders, after being sworn according to the fout his having an opportunity to take an appeal. We think the contention is not tenable. It takes into account some of the statutory provisions and rejects others equally important. It is true there is no express provision for notice at the inception or during the early stages of the proceedings; and for present purposes it may be assumed that such a requirement is not even implied, although a different view might be admissible. See Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 13 Sup. Ct. 750, 37 L. Ed. 637. But the provisions relating to the later stage the decision by the supervisors-are not silent in respect of notice, but speak in terms easily understood. Clauses 5 and 22 taken together provide that the owner, if dissatisfied with the decision, shall have the right to appeal as in other This presupposes that he will have cases. some knowledge of the decision, and yet neither clause states how the knowledge is to be obtained, or when or how the right of appeal is to be exercised. All this is explained, however, when 'section 838 is examined. It deals with these questions in a comprehensive way and evidently is intended to be of general application. Of course, newly created rights of appeal of the same class fall within its operation unless the Legislature provides otherwise. Here the Legislature has not provided otherwise, and so has indicated that it is content to have the general

$60

Apart from what is implied by the decision under review, no construction of these statutory provisions by the state court of last resort has been brought to our attention; so for the purposes of this case we must construe them. The task is not difficult. The words employed are direct and free from ambiguity, and the several provisions are in entire harmony. They show that, in the absence of an agreement, the compensation is to be assessed primarily by viewers, that their award is to be examined by the supervisors and approved or changed as to the latter may appear reasonable, and that from the decision of the supervisors an appeal lies as of right to the circuit court where the matter may be heard de novo. Thus, by exercising the right to appeal the owner may obtain a full hearing in a court of justiceone concededly possessing and exercising a general jurisdiction. An opportunity to have such a *hearing, before the compensation is finally determined, and when the right there-made for the certain payment of the compento can be effectively asserted and protected, sation without unreasonable delay the taking satisfies the demand of due process. does not contravene due process of law in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of what compensation is just. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 402, 407, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 568, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853; Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 440, 47 L. Ed. 559; Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290, 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771. And see Branson v. Gee, 25 Or. 462, 36 Pac. 527, 24 L. R. A. 355. As before indicated, it is not questioned that such adequate provision for payment is made

[5] The claim is made that this opportunity comes after the taking, and therefore is too late. But it is settled by the decisions of this court that where adequate provision is

*61

in this instance.

chooses.

But it is contended that where the road officers take the initiative as they do in many instances-the proceedings may be carried from inception to conclusion without any notice to the owner, and therefore withThat they will faithfully and impartially discharge their duty as viewers."

244

*62

We conclude that the objections urged against the validity of the statute are not

well taken.

Judgment affirmed.

(40 Sup.Ct.)

(251 U. S. 121)

LAWS INAPPLICABLE TO MARITIME TOrt.

2. ADMIRALTY

PETERS et al. v. VEASEY.

A compensation policy in favor of Peters, issued by the Etna Life Insurance Company,

(Argued Nov. 14, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) was in force when the accident occurred.

No. 77.

[1] The work in which defendant in error was engaged is maritime in its nature; his 1. ADMIRALTY 20-STATE COMPENSATION employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiraty jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the Workmen's Compensation Law of the state had no application when the accident occurred. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59, 60, 61, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 217, 218, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900.

20-STATUTE SAVING REMEDIES UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS WITHOUT RETROACTIVE EFFECT.

such a purpose.

dissenting.

of the United States shall be exclusive in "all In Error to the Supreme Court of the State diction, saving to suitors, in all cases, the civil causes of admiralty and maritime juris

of Louisiana.

right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." By an act approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 395, c. 97 [Comp. St. 1918, §§ 991, 1233]), Congress directed that both of these clauses be amended by inserting after "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," the words "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state." The court below erroneously concluded that this act should be given retroactive effect and applied in the *present controversy. There is nothing in the language employed, nor is there any circumstance known to us, which indicates a purpose to make the act applicable when the cause of action arose before its passage; and we think it must not be so construed.

*123

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Messrs. George Janvier and William C. Dufour, both of New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Walter S. Penfield, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.

•122

employed by Henry and Eugene Peters as a longshoreman on board the Seria, then lying at New Orleans. The steamer was being unloaded. While upon her and engaged in that work, Veasey accidentally fell through a hatchway. Veasey v. Peters, 142 La. 1012, 77 South. 948.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice CLARKE dissent.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
40 SUP.CT.-5

(251 U. S. 48)
LIVERPOOL, BRAZIL & RIVER PLATE
STEAM NAV. CO. v. BROOKLYN EAST-
ERN DISTRICT TERMINAL.
(Argued Nov. 14, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.)
No. 81.

COLLISION

The car float was the vessel that came into contact with the Vauban, but as it was a passive instrument in the hands of the Intrepid that fact does not affect the question of responsibility. The James Gray v. The John Fraser, 21 How. 184, 16 L. Ed. 106; The J. P. Donaldson, 167, U. S. 599, 603, 604, 25-LIMIT OF RESPONSIBILITY 17 Sup. Ct. 951, 42 L. Ed. 292; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 474, 475, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600; Union Steamship Co. v. Owners of the Aracan, L. R. 6 P. C. 127. The rule is not changed by the ownership of the vessels. The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 123, 18 Sup. Ct. 544, 42 L. Ed. 969; The

G. Mason, 142 Fed. 913, 917, 74 C. C. A. 83; The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 475, 29 Sup. Ct. 339, 53 L. Ed. 600; L. R. 6 P. C. 127, 133. These cases show that for the purposes of liability the passive instrument of the harm does not become one with the actively responsible vessel by being attached to

OF OWNER OF TUG.

Under Rev. St. §§ 4283-4285 (Comp. St. §§ 8023-8025), providing that liability of owner of any vessel for any injury by collision shall in no case exceed the value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, responsibility of owner of tug, the moving cause of collision with a vessel, is not increased by the fact that a load-W. ed car float and a disabled boat, both belonging to the tug's owner, were lashed to its sides, and that one of them was the object that came in contact with the injured vessel.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit.

it. If this were a proceeding in rem it may be assumed that the car float and disabled tug would escape, and none the less that they were lashed to the Intrepid and so were more helplessly under its control than in the ordinary case of a tow.

*52

abled tug, both belonging to the *respondent. By a stipulation dated August 3, 1917, it was agreed that the damage sustained was $28,036.98 with $5,539.84 interest. The value of the tug Intrepid was found to be $5,750, and the liability of the respondent was limited by the District Court to that sum with interest. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree without an opinion. 250 Fed. 1021, 162 C. C. A. 664. The case is brought here on the question whether the value of the whole flotilla should not have been in. cluded in the decree.

It is said, however, that when you come to limiting liability the foregoing authorities are not controlling-that the object of the statute is "to limit the liability of vessel owners to their interest in the adventure,” The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 131, 14

Sup. Ct. 486, 488 (38 L. Ed. 381), and that the same reason that requires the surrender of boats and apparel requires the surrender of the other instrumentalities by means of which the tug was rendering the services for

*51

*Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

*53

This is a libel in admiralty brought by the which it was paid. It can make no differpetitioner against the respondent for a col-ence, it is argued, whether the cargo is carlision with the petitioner's steamship Vau- ried in the hold of the tug or is towed in ban while it was moored at a pier in Brook- another vessel. But that is the question, and lyn. The respondent does not deny liability it is not answered by putting it. The rebut claims the right to limit it under Rev. spondent answers the argument with the sugStats. 88 4283, 4284 and 4285 (Comp. St. §§ gestion that if sound it applies a different 8023-8025), to the value of the vessel that rule in actions in personam from that which caused the damage. The moving cause was as we have said, governs suits in rem. Withthe respondent's steam tug Intrepid which out dwelling upon that, we are of opinion was proceeding up the East River, with a car that the statute does not warrant the distincflat loaded with railroad cars lashed to its tion for which the appellant contends. port side and on its starboard side a dis

The statute follows the lead of European countries, as stated in The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 126, 127, 14 Sup. Ct. 486, 38 L. Ed. 381. Whatever may be the doubts as to the original grounds for limiting liability to the ship or with regard to the historic starting point for holding the ship responsible as a moving cause, The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, 366, 367, 25 Sup. Ct. 46, 49 L. Ed. 236, it seems a permissible conjecture that both principles, if not rooted in the same conscious thought, at least were influenced by the same semi-conscious attitude of mind. When the continental law came to be followed by Congress, no doubt, alongside of the de For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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