Hence a- XVII. For fince it is of fuch a Nature as must rofe the be annihilated either alltogether, or not at all, they for its felf that attempted to annihilate it only by Parts, existence. faw that it was impoffible to be done, the Nature Prejudice of the Thing remonftrated against a partial Annihilation, and if one Part be fuppofed, all others might be demonftrated to exift by neceffary Connection. But if any one fhould fuppofe all extended things to be removed together and at once he would find nothing impoffible in that Suppofition: For one may imagine nothing to exist in Nature befide his own Soul, and the Cause on which it depends; which, as a thinking Being, includes nothing of Extenfion in it: Every thing that is extended may therefore be separated from Existence. But they that attempted this by Parts, when they found it impoffible, did not scruple to refolve the Caufe into the Self-existence of Space, tho' in reality it did not arife from thence, but from this, that they attempted to separate things naturally infeparable, namely, the Parts of Space one from another. XVIII. But NOTES. an imaginary Extenfion. And this is the more eafy because the Idea we have of a real Substratum or Subftance the Support of real Qualities is dark and confufed, an Idea of somewhat, and that's all. Now it is but joyning the Idea of somewhat • with the Idea of one Quality only, namely Extenfion, and we have an imaginary Substratum prefently formed, that is, an Idea of Space, or an Ideal extended fomething. Whether this be not the very Cafe, I must leave to any Man to judge ⚫ by reflecting on his own Ideas. Ágain: To this Question, Why may not Space be rather de fined Extenfion in the Abstract, or imaginary Extenfion rather than the imaginary Subftratum of imaginary Extenfion? He answers, Extenfion in the general or in the abftract, is an Idea of pure Intellect, i. e. is to be understood, but cannot be imagin'd any more than Whiteness in the general; or a thousand other the like abftract Ideas. But as foon as Imagination comes to deal with this general abftract Idea (or Ideas) it fupplies it with an imaginary Subftratum, and fo makes the general the Dif XVIII. But whether there be any fuch Thing We are as Space, or no; whether its Extenfion be diftin- certain of a first guished from the Extenfion of Body, or not: Be Cause in it nothing at all: Be it mere privation of Contact, what manas fome are pleased to term it; be it mere Poffibi- ner foever lity or Capacity of exifting, as others; be it, laftly, pute about either fomething created, or of itself, and neceffar-Space be ily exifting, yet ftill, as far as we know any thing of determinthe Nature of it, 'tis an indolent thing, it neither ed. acts, nor is in the least acted upon; it cannot therefore, as mere Extenfion, under which Notion only it appears to us, be the Caufe of Matter, or imprefs Motion on it. There muft then neceffarily te 6 NOTES. ⚫ general, which was invifible, be conceived as a particular, for the help of the Understanding. So if the Imagination comes to conceive any certain Degree of Whiteness, it fupplies the "Mind with fome imaginary white Surface, and brings down the general Idea to a particular Object. In like manner, 'when it comes to conceive a Length, a Breadth, a Thickness, it fupplies the Mind with a Subftratum, pro hac vice, fuch as may ferve the Purpose, otherwife the Mind must rest in pure intellect only, as in numbers; and there is nothing more tedious or uneafy to the Mind generally than to be wholly • abftracted; which is the Reason, by the way, that Arithmetical Demonftrations, tho' as clear and certain as any, are lefs delightful than Geometrical, and nothing more irkfome than ⚫ abstract Numbers. Now Space being the Object of the Imagination, and not of pure Intellect, as are all general, abstract Ideas, it is properly the imaginary Subftratum ofan imaginary Extenfion, or the general Idea of Extenfion particulariz'd in an imaginary Subject; and hence it is that Space is faid to be extended, which would be Nonfenfe to fay of Extenfion itfelf: And Bodies are faid to be in Space, which would like⚫ wife be Nonfenfe to fay of Extenfion. And fo it is conceived as immoveable, indivifible, infinite. Immovable, &c. all Properties of Subftances; which makes it plain that it is conceiv ⚫ed after the manner of Subftance, and therefore is, because it can be nothing elfe, an imaginary Subftratum, which the 'Mind takes to particularize, and thereby render conceivable its general Idea of Extenfion; which could not otherwise fall within the Imagination, nor be eftimated any way but 6 ' by be another Caufe of Matter and Motion, that NOTES. by abstract numbers, fo many Yards, or fo many Miles, 10, 20, 30; without attending to any thing but the numbers, and the meaning of the Words, Yards, Miles, &c. as it is 'when we reckon Ounces, Pounds, &c. of Weight. Thus then you fee how we come by the notion of S pace, and what it is. ' See alfo Note 3. fonings a bout the SECT. III. Of the First Cause. Our Rea-I. WHAT this active Principle is we cannot apprehend otherwife than by Reafirft Caufe Jon, for it occurs not to the Senfes, unless by its Efare like fests, nor is it perceived by them any more than thofe of a Light is by the Ears: Our Reasonings therefore blind Man about this Principle will be like thofe of a blind about Man about Light. A blind Man may be affured fince it is that there is a certain thing called Light, which the not an ob- Eye can perceive, as the Nofe can Smells; he may ject of Light, Senfe. be taught alfo by them who fee, to understand many Advantages of Light, namely that it can direct the Steps, that it can warm, that it derives its Origin from a large remote Body, i. e. the Sun; that by the help of it very diftant Bodies may be perceived, with their Forms and other Qualities unknown to him; and that Fire which affords only beat to him, can give Light alfo to them who fee: Laftly, that it arifes from fome Motion in the minutest Particles of a Fluid. II. From II. From these external Properties he might dif- Yet we courfe of Light, and in fome Measure understand know a the reasonings of other Men upon it; he would eat ma things believe it to be distinct from Heat; he would ea- concerngerly defire, and willingly undergo many Hard- ing it. fhips, to enjoy the Benefit of it; yet would he never have any fuch Sense of it as those who fee. After the fame manner we may know many things about this active Principle, which we are compelled, by the force of Reasons, to believe certainly to exift, tho' we are no lefs ignorant of what it is in itself, than the blind Man is of the Senfation which Light produces in those who fee*. For Inftance; In the first Place we are certain that all other things come from this active Principle: For nothing else as we have fhewn before, contains in itself Neceffary Existence or active Power, entirely independent of any other, as therefore itself is from none, so all others are from it. For from hence we conclude, that this Principle does exift; because after confidering the reft of the things which exist, we perceive that they could neither be nor act, if that had not existed, and excited Motion in them. IV. Secondly, we are certain that this Principle is One, Similar and uniform: For Matter is, as to its Effence, every where One and alike; the fame must be faid of Space, if we grant it to be any any thing distinct from Matter: much more must the Caufe, which fills Space with Matter be One, fimple and uniform. (10.) V. Thirdly, NOTES. (10.) This Argument (as well as fome others hereafter mention'd) were the foundation of it true, can but be call'd a prefumptive This Comparison is farther illuftrated by the Author of the That it is one. Infinite in V. Thirdly, that it is Infinite both in Nature and Power: For fince it exifts of itself, there is nothing Nature and Peter NOTES. that fumptive one at beft: nay, in truth the contrary will rather follow from the multiplicity and diverfity of created Substances. We fhall therefore endeavour to give a diftinct proof of the Being and Attributes of God, fo far at leaft as the knowedge of them may affect our prefent Subject. * Now these feem capable of a clear deduction from this one felf-evident Principle I Exit. I myself exift: therefore fomething exits. If fomething exists now then fomething has existed always. Otherwife that fomething which now exifts, must once either have been made by nothing, i. e. been caused by no Caufe, which is abfurd; or else have made itself, i. e. have acted before it exifted, or been at once both Effect and Cau/e; which is alfo abfurd; or, laftly, (which is the only fuppofition left) it must have been produced by fomething, which had its Exiftence from fomething else, which alfo depended on fome other Caufe, and fo on in an infinite Series of Caus'd or Succeffive Beings, without any eternal or firft Caufe; which is also abfurd. For either fome one Part of this infinite Series has not been fucceffive to any other, or else all the feveral Parts of it have been fucceffive: if fame one part of it has not, then there was a first, which deftroys the Suppofition; if all the feveral Parts of it have been fucceffive to each other, then they have all once been future, and if they have been all once future, then there was a time when none of them exifted; and if there was a time when none of them existed, than either all the Parts of this infinite Series, and confequently the whole, must have arisen from nothing; which is abfurd; or elfe there must be something in the whole befide what is contained in all the parts; which is alfo abfurd. Or thus: Since all the Parts of this infinite Series are fucceffive or future to one another, they must once either have been all future, i, e. non-existent, (and then the fecond abfurdity will follow, i. e. that this zobole Series arofe from nothing) or elfe all but fome one, (and then the first will follow, i. e, that it had a Beginning) which one added to the reft either makes them infinite, which is abfurd; or they are infinite without that one, and then that one added to them, either makes one more than infinite, or adds nothing at all; both which are Abfurdities. See Remark a. at the end of Chap I If |
