DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS U.S. Vols. 1--206. L. ed. Books 1--51 APPENDING ALL STATE AND FEDERAL CITATIONS OF EACH DECIDED POINT TO THE STATE- TO EDITORIAL NOTES IN THE LAWYERS EDITION OF THESE RE- Courts-Martial-Internal Revenue. THE LAWYERS CO-OPERATIVE Ì LEISHING COMPANY ROCHESTER, N. Y 1908. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year nineteen hundred eight, by THE LAWYERS CO-OPERATIVE PUBLISHING CO., In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 95261 OMAZIZILA E. R. ANDREWS PRINTING COMPANY, Rochester, N. Y. DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF THAT COURT TO THE BEGINNING OF THE COURTS-MARTIAL. 1. In General, 1-13. C 2. The rules and articles of war respecting the number of officers to be convened for courts-martial and the approval of sentence II. Jurisdiction and Judgment; Pro- by commanding officers are not applicable cedure, 14-69. a. Jurisdiction, 14-24. to a court-martial convened under the militia b. Sentence or Judgment, 25-58. act of February 28, 1795, for the trial of c. Effect and Conclusiveness of d. Procedure, 62-7. delinquents, since that statute makes the rules and articles of war applicable only to militia actually employed in the service of the United States. Martin v. Mott, 12 6: 537 e. What Precludes Further Pro- Wheat. 19, Cited in Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 172, 29 3. The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to establish "regulations of the Navy," with the approval of the President, which regulations are the law of a naval courtmartial. Re Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 25: 538 Cited in Smith v. Whitney. 116 U. S. 181, 29 L. ed. 605, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570-United States v. Symonds. 120 U. S. 50, 30 L. ed. 558, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411-Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 536, 41 L. ed. 816, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444Glavey v. United States. 182 U. S. 606, 45 L. ed. 1252, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891-Symonds v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 151-Re Smith, 23 Ct. Cl. 459-Williams v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 316-Laurey v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 265-Brown v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 386-Re Huttman, 70 Fed. 702-Meads v. United States, 26 C. C. A. 239, 54 U. S. App. 150, 81 Fed. 694-Re Comingore, 96 Fed. 562-Wilkins v. United States, 37 C. C. A. 592, 96 Fed. 840-United States v. Hardison, 135 Fed. 422-Low v. Hanson, 72 Me. 105-Peters v. United States, 2 Okla. 123, 33 Pac. 1031. 2399 Editorial note. Naval courts-martial. Creation generally. See also infra, 57. though the volunteer troops organized under 12: 618 that act were mustered directly into the service of the United States without regard to state or territorial lines. McClaughty v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 786, 46: 1049 4. The power of the President to appoint a general court-martial is necessarily vested in him as Commander-in-Chief, and is not limited to the single case specified in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1342, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, P. 944, in which the commander of an officer charged with an offense is himself the accuser or prosecutor. Swaim v. United States, 165 U. S. 553, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, 41: 823 5. The prohibition against the convocation of a general court-martial by the commander of a fleet or squadron without the previous authorization of the President, which is made by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1624, art. 38, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1102, when such fleet or squadron is "in the waters of the United States," applies only to those waters which are within what was termed by the act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 1108, chap. 852, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1040), the continental limits of the United States. United States v. Smith, 197 U. S. 386, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489, 49: 801 6. The commander-in-chief of a squadron not operating or stationed in the waters of the United States has the power, without express authority from the President, to convene a general court-martial for the trial of an officer. Mullan v. United States, 140 U. S. 240, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788, 35: 489 Organization. 7. Whether the interests of the service permit the postponement of the trial of an officer of the Navy until a court-martial can be organized of which at least half of its members, exclusive of the President, will be his seniors in rank, or require a prompt trial by such officers as can then be assigned to that duty, is a matter committed to the discretion of the commander-in-chief of the squadron which, it will be presumed, in an action to recover pay for time succeeding dismissal from service by judgment of the court-martial, was properly exercised. Mullan v. United States, 140 U. S. 240, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788, 10. A court-martial entirely composed of officers in the Regular Army of the United States, who, by the 77th article of war, are "not competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of other forces," is without jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier of such other forces when convened for that sole purpose. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 786, Cited in Brown v. 46: 1049 United States, 206 U. S. 243, 51 L. ed. 1046, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620. 11. An officer of the Regular Army is within the provisions of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 77, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901. p. 959, that "officers of the Regular Army shall not be competent to sit on courts-martial to try officers or soldiers of other forces," although such officer has been granted an indefinite leave of absence from the Regular Army in order to enable him to accept a commission in the volunteer forces. United States v. Brown, 206 U. S. 240, 27 Sup. Ct. 51: 1046 Rep. 620, Control. 12. The authority that ordered a courtmartial may direct it to reconsider its proceedings and sentence, before the court shall have been dissolved. Re Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 25: 538 Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 6 Sup. Ct. court-martial called 13. A regularly under the act of February 28, 1795, providing for the calling out of the militia, does not expire with the end of a war then existing, nor is its jurisdiction to try offenses dewar or peace. pendent upon the fact of 6:537 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 35: 489 11. Jurisdiction and Judgment; Procedure. 8. Consent can confer no jurisdiction on a court-martial composed entirely of officers of the Regular Army of the United States in direct violation of the 77th Article of War, which declares that such officers shall not be competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of other forces. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 786, 46: 1049 9. The Volunteer Army of the United States raised under the act of Congress of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat. at L. 977, chap. 352), is "other forces" within the meaning of the 77th Article of War, declaring that "officers of the Regular Army shall not be competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of other forces," al a. Jurisdiction. Authority to Convict Army Officer for Mis- 14. A court-martial is a court of special The facts necesand limited jurisdiction. sary to show its jurisdiction and that its sentence is conformable to law must be stated positively. Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1141, 30: 1167 Criticized in Re Chapman, 166 U. S. 670, 41 L. ed. 1159, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 677. Cited in McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 62, |
