When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or... Elementary Arithmetic - Σελίδα 235των William W. Speer - 1897 - 314 σελίδεςΠλήρης προβολή - Σχετικά με αυτό το βιβλίο
| Thomas Reid, William Hamilton, Harry M. Bracken, Thomas Reid, Sir William Hamilton - 1094 σελίδες
...with simple ideas of sensation and reflection, has the power to repeat, to compare, and to combine them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas : but that is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged * That Locke did not (as even Mr Stewart... | |
| Diogenes Allen, Eric O. Springsted - 1992 - 324 σελίδες
...suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz., sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple...pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or... | |
| Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka - 1994 - 328 σελίδες
...suggested and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. Sensation and Reflection. When the Understanding is once stored with these simple...Variety, and so can make at Pleasure new complex Ideas. (II, ii, 2) Combined with the assertion that the mind is passive in the acquisition of simple ideas,... | |
| Stephen L. Darwall - 1995 - 376 σελίδες
...between simple and complex ideas. When furnished with simple ideas, Locke says, the understanding can "repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost...Variety, and so can make at Pleasure new complex ideas" (Essay. 119). 13 Simple ideas are precisely those that we cannot 11. See also the introduction to Illustrations... | |
| Leon Chai - 1998 - 181 σελίδες
...philosophical enterprise. In particular, it defines his view of both the nature and limits of thought itself: When the Understanding is once stored with these simple...Pleasure new complex Ideas. But it is not in the Power of the most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or variety of Thought, to invent... | |
| John W. N. Watkins - 1999 - 374 σελίδες
...was there before. Here is Locke's statement of classical empiricism's no-invention-ofideas thesis: When the understanding is once stored with these simple...pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit . . ., by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple... | |
| Michael Ayers - 1999 - 68 σελίδες
...uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas. 2. ... When the understanding is once stored with these simple...variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas, (ll.ii.1-2) For Locke, an object appears to possess a variety of distinct sensible qualities, not because... | |
| Robert J. Maciunas - 2002 - 392 σελίδες
...ideas. John Locke described the mechanism of the formulation of ideas: . . . which the senses provided when the understanding is once stored with these simple...power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not the power of the most... | |
| Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez, Francesca Greensides - 2003 - 496 σελίδες
...suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple...pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent... | |
| Asa Mahan - 2003 - 494 σελίδες
...mind has over simple ideas, or the elements of all our knowledges, our author thus correctly expounds: 'When the understanding is once stored with these...pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or... | |
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